




MAPPING THE MIDDLE EAST

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MAPPING THE MIDDLE EAST



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CONTENTS

NOTE ON SPELLING, DATES AND SOURCES *7*

INTRODUCTION: ON THE 'MIDDLE EAST'
AND MAPPING *9*

ONE MAPPING THE 'REALM OF ISLAM' *17*

TWO MAPPING IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE *63*

THREE EUROPEAN COLONIAL MAPPING IN THE
LONG NINETEENTH CENTURY *111*

FOUR ENCLOSURE AND EXCLUSION IN NATIONAL MAPPING *175*

FIVE MAPPING ALTERNATIVE GEOGRAPHIES *235*

REFERENCES *265*

BIBLIOGRAPHY *303*


ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS *323*

PHOTO ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS *325*

INDEX *327*

NOTE ON SPELLING, DATES AND SOURCES

IN AN EFFORT to simplify transliteration from Arabic, Persian and Ottoman Turkish for ease of reading, I have dropped diacritical marks (other than the medial ‘*ayn*’ and *hamza*), as well as, in the cases of toponyms and well-known proper names, the definite article *al-*. Exceptions are terms in italics, titles of books and citations. Wherever possible, I have preferred brief, familiar and/or anglicized terms, toponyms and proper names to transliterated ones. This may at times risk anachronism or confusion, as in my use of ‘Syria’ for *al-Shām* or ‘Iraq’ for *al-‘Irāq*, but I take care to situate such toponyms in their historical context. I have adopted modern Turkish spellings for Ottoman rulers and widely accepted anglicizations of other well-known rulers (as in Gamal Abdel Nasser), but I have transliterated other names and terms from Arabic, Persian and Ottoman Turkish following the system in the *International Journal of Middle East Studies*. All dates are common era (CE), and death dates are preceded by ‘d.’ and in parentheses. The bibliography lists only published sources, with a focus on those that will be accessible to the general reader, but full citations for unpublished manuscripts, archival documents, rare books and related websites can be found in the references. Similarly, captions serve as brief descriptors of illustrations, but full discussions and information about sources are provided in the text and accompanying references.



INTRODUCTION: ON THE 'MIDDLE EAST' AND MAPPING

This book is a history of mapping in and of a world region commonly identified in English today as the 'Middle East' and associated with the history of Islam. This shifting region and its constituent parts have been conceived, named and mapped in many different ways over the past millennium. By focusing on mapping-from-within, I argue, first and foremost, that the people of the region have been making maps of their own worlds for centuries. This may seem obvious, but most histories of cartography are still strikingly Eurocentric, and those that do deal with other parts of the world tend to emphasize their encounters with Europe and European maps from the fifteenth or sixteenth centuries on. By contrast, this book spans a thousand years, from the eleventh to the twenty-first centuries, and only one of its chapters is devoted to maps made by Europeans in the context of colonial encounters. Nonetheless, my second argument is that those encounters and the subsequent rise of the nation-state have severely constrained cartographic and spatial thinking, both within the region and without, making it difficult to visualize other possibilities. In this light, engagement with the pre-colonial, pre-national period is intended not only as an assertion of the chronological depth of indigenous mapping traditions, but as nourishment for our geographical imaginations.

Thus, I use the term 'Middle East' here and in the book's title as a kind of shorthand, in lieu of toponyms that are no longer in use, that would sound unfamiliar to many readers, or that are themselves partial and problematic. I also use it with considerable reluctance, for I am all too aware of its baggage. However, it remains the term most likely to conjure a mental map that features the places discussed in

¹ World map from a 16th-century manuscript of the first version of Piri Reis's *Kitāb-i bahriye* (Book of the Sea).

this book. Unfortunately, it is also likely to conjure a host of negative images and generalizations that stem from the history of its use, which is inseparable from the history of European and North American imperialism. The term started circulating in Europe in the nineteenth century and was used in particular by the British to distinguish colonial projects in India and Central Asia (the ‘Middle East’) from foreign policy toward the Ottoman Empire (the ‘Near East’). At the very least, therefore, these terms were expressions of directional orientation particular to the people of northwestern Europe; the same lands, for instance, would be considered to some degree *west* of people living in China. But these terms were not merely expressions of directional orientation. Their emergence was inseparable from the imposition of European political and economic domination on the rest of the world, as well as accompanying discourses that distinguished a modern, civilized ‘West’ from a traditional, backward ‘East’, in need of proper management. In this context, the use of such terms reflected assumptions of ‘Western’ superiority and entitlement and helped legitimize European control over far-flung lands and peoples.

The term ‘Middle East’ would gain additional traction, and a higher degree of specificity, in the middle of the twentieth century, just as the United States launched its own bid for global dominance. In the period after the Second World War, American journalists, policy-makers and scholars increasingly used the term to refer to a strategically significant area, stretching in most formulations from Libya or Egypt to Iran or Afghanistan, in which the twin priorities of U.S. foreign policy were to build a bulwark against Communism and ensure access to cheap oil. To these ends, the U.S. government funded Middle East Studies programmes in institutions of higher education, which produced a new generation of intellectuals whose very training was predicated on the existence and coherence of such a region. This went hand-in-hand with growing media attention, which tended to trade in stereotypes – leering Arabs, extravagant wealth and fanatical Muslims, among others. In the past two decades, American obsession with the Middle East has only grown, though the post-9/11 ‘War on Terror’ has replaced the Cold War as the chief paradigm for foreign policy in the region. This has resulted in protracted U.S. military occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as bombing campaigns, drone strikes and proxy wars that have

caused mass destruction in Libya, Syria, Yemen and beyond. Against this backdrop, the term 'Middle East' has a particular currency in the Anglo-American world that makes it hard to ignore, even if its connotations are far from neutral.¹

Indeed, in order to problematize the idea of the Middle East, it is necessary to use the term in the first place, but here I intend it mainly as a way of ensuring that we are all on the same page – or map – before travelling into the deep past and retrieving its forgotten geographies. While there are other widely understood terms I could use (and will, elsewhere in this book) – most notably some combination of subcontinental designations, such as West Asia/North Africa – these too have limitations, only one of which is their comparative unwieldiness. The idea of the continents has its own history, along with its own baggage. Efforts to delimit the continent of Europe and to distinguish it from Asia, for instance, have been predicated on the same kinds of assumptions of European superiority as discourses contrasting 'West' and 'East'. Whatever term I use, the point is that people have imagined meaningful world regions on scales similar to that of the Middle East, and with considerable overlap, in many ways over the past thousand years. Parameters have shifted and the modes of mapping have varied, but regional or 'superregional' thinking is nothing new, nor is it the preserve of the West.² That said, this book is not intended to replace 'the Middle East' with a more accurate or authentic toponym, but to emphasize the contingency of all methods of dividing the world and endowing those divisions with meaning. They are never measurable in terms of their proximity or faithfulness to an outside reality – whether geographical, historical or political – but they are, rather, always already implicated in that reality. In taking this approach, I hope to contribute to ongoing conversations that push us to think critically about the ways people have described, named and visualized the world, both in the past and today.

One of the places those conversations have been the most lively is in the field of critical cartography. Since the 1980s work in this field has questioned assumptions about the objectivity of maps, as well as approaches that evaluate them primarily in terms of scientific progress and accuracy. Instead, scholars have started to understand maps as graphic representations of space, which can be deconstructed and interpreted using a range of methods adapted from art history,

linguistics and literary criticism.³ In so doing, they have expanded the definition of a map to encompass a wider range of artefacts than would be considered in a scientific approach, some of which may at first seem more like diagrams or paintings than maps. This is a particularly welcome development for this book, as many of the graphic representations I analyse as maps, particularly those from earlier periods, would be ignored in a more traditional cartographic history. Thus, at times I will use terms like map, image and illustration interchangeably, and I will combine methods of interpretation drawn from literary criticism, such as close reading, with insights from scholarship in art history.

Another important development in the field of critical cartography is increased attention to the relationship between maps and power, both the ways in which states use maps to conquer or control territory and the more subtle ways in which maps erase certain social or political formations and suppress alternative visions of space. At the most basic level, all maps must be understood as *selective* representations that are intended to facilitate a task and/or to make claims or arguments. This is true even for a simple road map, which tends to emphasize one means of transportation (usually by car) at the expense of another (walking, for example) and furnishes information relevant for that use (tolls or one-way streets) as opposed to other kinds of information (the location of pavements or crossing signals). A less seemingly neutral example might be maps that use coloured shading to depict U.S. presidential election results by state without factoring in population density. A candidate who wins states that are large in area, whether or not they have large populations, will appear on these maps to have had more support than a candidate who wins small states. Even if such choices are unintentional, they exert power by shaping people's perceptions of the places a map represents and the message it communicates.⁴

Maps are not only selective representations, they are also *embedded*, often literally within texts (as when they appear in books, manuscripts, newspapers or websites) and always within the historical and discursive contexts of their production and circulation. They cannot, therefore, be analysed on their own, even when they appear in stand-alone form, but must always be situated within their political and cultural milieu and in dialogue with related geographical

discourses. This is true not only in terms of the ability to interpret the writing and iconography on a map, but in terms of grasping the arguments it is making, the power dynamics it advances and its impact on an audience. Some scholars have taken this one step further and proposed 'mapping' as a practice or performance, with an emphasis on maps-in-circuit, their varied and often embodied modes of reception, and their perhaps unexpected 'afterlives'.⁵ While I embrace the term 'mapping', as it suggests a creative, open-ended process and avoids the scientific connotations of 'cartography', I focus less on how maps are made and what people do with them than on the ways in which maps build on, intersect with, and influence each other over time to produce changing understandings of space.

It is important to reiterate that this is not a history of cartographic science. I do not evaluate maps as exemplars of technical achievement or in terms of the accuracy of their representations, nor do I assert for what might be called 'Islamic' maps their rightful place in the onward march of scientific progress.⁶ Instead, I explore the ideas that maps convey, which are always historically and culturally contingent. This has also guided my choice of maps. The emphasis here is not on maps that can be presented as evidence of new discoveries or methods, but on maps that are revealing of major trends in spatial thought. I do treat some maps in light of the technical achievements they purport to display, as this is often a strategy for establishing authority and delegitimizing other approaches. In cases like these, I am engaging in 'denaturalization', the process by which a map that appears to be factual, self-evident or innocent – often because of the presumed objectivity of its scientific methods – is exposed as constructed, complex and inseparable from power relations. In other cases a map will appear so unfamiliar to today's readers that my task is rather to make sense of it, to render it a bit more self-evident, in order to resist tendencies to dismiss it as exotic or primitive.

A study that spans a thousand years and the vast area lying between the Atlantic Ocean and the Oxus and Indus river valleys would not be possible without drawing upon a rich body of prior scholarship. My contribution lies in sketching the contours of, and the relationships between, mapping traditions over a long chronological period, as well as providing exemplary close readings of maps, rather than uncovering new sources or delving deeply into one tradition or

period. The references, therefore, are essential resources for further reading, and I could not have put this book together without the scholarship cited there. However, one of the consequences of the academic specialization that makes groundbreaking work possible is that comparisons over time and space, especially those that bridge the so-called 'modern'/'pre-modern' divide, sometimes get lost. The goal of this book is to make those connections, to bring this material to a broader audience and, it is hoped, to inspire further research.

Each of the book's five chronologically organized chapters contextualizes and interprets a set of maps that are representative or compelling examples of regional and superregional thought in the period. Reproductions of most of these maps allow readers to compare the image with my written analysis and to get a sense of the visual culture from which it emerged. Chapter One explores the ways in which a superregion known as the 'realm of Islam' was mapped between the eleventh and fifteenth centuries, with an emphasis on diversity-in-unity. Its subdivisions were envisioned as distinctive but porous categories of belonging, connected to each other and to lands beyond by graphic displays of proximity and collective ritual practice. Chapter Two argues that Ottoman mapping traditions emerging in the sixteenth century were expressions of belonging in meaningful regions, rather than claims to territory or sovereignty. The resulting artefacts tended to be series of large-scale maps that stressed mobility and blurred what might be thought of as political or cultural borders. Chapter Three builds on the shift toward a continental division of the world that had begun, in the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Ottoman Empire, to interrupt and supersede earlier mapping traditions. It investigates the nineteenth-century tradition of European colonial mapping, which facilitated expansionist conquests and produced enclosures that fragmented and erased indigenous people. Chapter Four looks at the rise of national mapping in the twentieth century in conjunction with the emergence of a nation-state system based on the twin goals of securing bounded territories and producing homogeneous national populations. This occurred in some places against, and in others alongside, colonial projects, but always with devastating effects for those excluded or dispossessed by its regime of enclosure. Chapter Five opens with the return of superregional mapping in the context

of mid-twentieth-century pan-Arabist discourses and evaluates its possibilities as an alternative to national mapping. It concludes with a discussion of the persistence of a cartographic obsession with partition and the reification of religious and ethnic identities in the twenty-first-century Middle East.

The book's overarching twofold argument, then, is that a world region loosely corresponding to today's Middle East has been mapped from within for a thousand years, and that maps and related discourses from the eras of colonialism and nationalism have obscured this deeper past and constrained future possibilities. Generally speaking, in the earlier periods mapping was profoundly connective, highlighting constellations of cities, regions and segments of coastline, even those that extended over great distances. Maps tended to stress mobility, overlap or contiguity between the places they depicted and to serve as links to meaningful spaces or pasts. By contrast, mapping from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries on becomes more and more about atomizing territorial taxonomies and what could be called a 'godlike' gaze. Taken to its extreme in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, mapping has become an exercise in who belongs where, and the insidious logic of partition and social engineering seems to have taken over. This is where the book ends, with a plea for spatial thinking that complicates or subverts the enclosures with which we have become so familiar, particularly that of the religiously or ethno-linguistically majoritarian nation-state. While there is much talk about today's unprecedented levels of connectivity and mobility, this book shows a disturbing trend over the past millennium toward spatializing identity, with the consequence that mobility is for too many people the unwelcome effect of cartographic exclusion. Ultimately, the maps in this book are intended as both a challenge and an inspiration to seek new approaches to mapping that transcend or unsettle the taken-for-granted divisions of our world.



ONE

MAPPING THE 'REALM OF ISLAM'

This chapter analyses maps circulating in Arabic and Persian written works from the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries and argues that they emphasize both the meaningfulness of a superregional entity shaped by Islamic history and civilization – the 'Realm of Islam' (*mamlakat al-Islām*) – and the incredible diversity that it contained. That said, these maps do not rigidly delimit an Islamic zone, isolated from the outside world, but rather stress its connectivity with neighbouring areas, as well as its flexibility and potential expansiveness. Moreover, they do not always highlight a centre or Islamic core, such as Mecca or the Arabian Peninsula. When they do, it is not to privilege physical proximity to that centre but to communicate its accessibility to all, near and far, often collapsing time and space in the process. Thus, some of the maps that will be discussed in this chapter are not concerned with reproducing spatial relationships as they existed on the earth's surface, but purposefully propose virtual or metaphorical relationships that connect people and places across great distances.

But first, some background. Although the Prophet Muhammad spent his life in the west-central part of the Arabian Peninsula, his followers fanned outward after his death in 632 to conquer lands occupied by two rival powers of late antiquity, the Byzantine and the Sasanian Empires. One hundred years later, the first dynasty of Muslims, the Umayyads, from their base in Damascus, had consolidated control over an area that extended from the Atlantic Ocean in the west to the Oxus and Indus river valleys in the east, replacing the Sasanians entirely and forcing the Byzantines out of southwest Asia and northern Africa for good. In the second half

2 Map of the Arabian Peninsula from an 'Atlas of Islam' tradition manuscript of al-Istakhri's text, dated 1285.

of the eighth century, a new dynasty, the Abbasids, constructed a grand capital city, Baghdad, where intellectuals from across their vast domain converged to pursue scholarship in a variety of fields. Geography was among these fields, patronized by no less than the head of the dynasty – the ‘caliph’ – himself. This was partly a function of the logistical requirements of ruling and taxing such a large empire, but it also reflected a more general commitment to building on the scientific and administrative achievements of other civilizations. Indeed, Arabic translations and revisions of the second-century Greek works of Claudius Ptolemy were undertaken during this period, and the Abbasid caliph al-Ma’mun (d. 833) is said to have commissioned a world map based on geographical information being gathered by scholars working for him. Although the original of this map has never been found, maps dating from the eleventh century on indicate the persistence of this early Islamic interest in visualizing the world.

One of the complications of studying maps from this period is that most of them were embedded in handwritten manuscripts of scholarly works on astronomy, geography, cosmography or related subjects, very few of which survive from before about 1200.¹ In other words, for most works composed before this time, we must rely on copies dated sometimes hundreds of years later. Moreover, while some ‘stand-alone’ maps, such as the world map allegedly commissioned by Caliph al-Ma’mun, are reported to have been made in the same period, scarcely any of these have been found. There are few references in written sources to practical map use and only a handful of descriptions of what might be called luxury maps made for wealthy patrons. This is not to say that such maps did not exist, but that the uses to which they were put or their singularity mitigated against their survival. Maps embedded in written works, by contrast, had a greater chance of survival due to the importance in cities across the Islamic world of scribes, whose job included copying and sometimes translating scholarly manuscripts, and libraries in private homes, palaces and educational institutions where such copies were collected and preserved. However, it is often difficult to assess to what extent later manuscript copies resemble earlier versions that have not survived.

Given that such manuscripts constitute the vast majority of the sources in this chapter and the next, it is worth briefly outlining two general, non-mutually exclusive approaches to this problem. The first

is to situate a manuscript in the context in which it was copied – in other words, to stress the moment of and people involved with its production and circulation – rather than the context in which the work was originally composed. This approach has been favoured by scholars of visual and material culture, as well as art history.² The second approach, which has been predominant among those analysing written texts, is to ascertain the relationship of a manuscript copy to earlier versions of the same work through a number of techniques, including comparisons across manuscripts copied in different times and places.³ In general, while the copying of manuscripts was a more stable enterprise than might be assumed in light of today's mechanized, print-based culture, it is clear that scribes did make revisions, omissions and additions in response to changing circumstances or audiences, often without acknowledgement. Moreover, the fact that authors often drafted more than one version of a work – as well as the fact that authorship itself may be better seen, in some cases, as a collaborative or iterative project – might account for variations in manuscript copies as much as scribal intervention. For images, to be sure, the whole issue is more fraught, given the probability that different people were involved in designing maps or illustrating manuscripts than in composing or copying written texts. Thus, even when a written text remained reasonably stable over time, accompanying illustrations may have been omitted, added or changed.

Nonetheless, for the purposes of this book, I adopt the phrase 'mapping traditions' as a way of asserting a relationship between later manuscript copies and now-lost earlier ones, as well as between maps from different works that convey similar messages and use similar methods of visual communication. The looseness of the phrase is also intended as a recognition of the open-ended, creative and sometimes random process by which maps and the manuscripts in which they appear were copied, preserved and circulated over the centuries. For the most part, though, even when shifts in form or content can be discerned on a particular map, maps in other manuscripts of the same work or in other works from the same genre still bear enough of a resemblance to each other that it makes sense to speak of them as a tradition. Thus, when I provide a summary description of maps from a particular tradition, I am basing it on the patterns I have identified across manuscripts. When I produce particular examples

from a tradition, I have deemed them broadly representative of that tradition (or of a particular tendency within the tradition), but, where appropriate, I make explicit the elements on a map that are specific to its manuscript and cite scholarship to provide further information.

While a diverse array of maps were produced in the Islamic world before about 1500, this chapter focuses on those mapping traditions most revealing of modalities of regional and superregional thought.⁴ The three traditions that will be discussed in this chapter are the popular and enduring ‘Atlas of Islam’ tradition with roots in a set of tenth-century geographies of the ‘Realm of Islam’; the more universalist approach to world and regional mapping exemplified by the twelfth-century scholar al-Sharif al-Idrisi; and graphic representations of ritual and pilgrimage that appear in cosmographical literature and legal documents from the twelfth century on. All three of these traditions extend well beyond the fifteenth century in terms of both the continued copying of manuscripts and adaptations in new works and genres, and will be mentioned again in later chapters. One of the reasons, however, to discuss these traditions in the context of an origins period is to show the long history of imagining a superregional entity shaped by Islam. Indeed, it is significant not only that there was interest in mapping it as early as the tenth century, but that such interest persisted even as the demographic and political landscape underwent dramatic changes. Most of the maps analysed in this chapter were visually compelling ways of asserting belonging in a superregion that transcended political divisions and accommodated cultural differences, which helps explain their continued reproduction and circulation over the centuries.

THE ‘ATLAS OF ISLAM’ TRADITION


The earliest and most enduring tradition devoted to representing the ‘Realm of Islam’ in both word and image has come down to us in the form of an interrelated group of atlases each consisting of about twenty regional maps and commentaries. This tradition is said to have originated with an Arabic work that no longer survives by the early tenth-century scholar Abu Zayd al-Balkhi, which is why

it is sometimes referred to as the 'Balkhi school' of geography. The figures with which it is most often associated, however, are a trio of traveller-scholars, who also lived in the tenth century and wrote in Arabic: al-Istakhri, Ibn Hawqal and al-Muqaddasi. Very little is known about their lives, and the fifty-plus surviving manuscripts from the tradition, which date from the eleventh to the nineteenth centuries, carry a variety of titles and authorial attributions and appear as frequently in Persian translation as they do in Arabic. In other words, although the manuscripts each contain a recognizable version, translation or abridgement of a (usually) fixed sequence of maps and commentaries that can be grouped in terms of descent from one of the three aforementioned tenth-century authors, none of them actually dates from their lifetimes. Thus, although the relatively stable organization of the works and design of the maps make it possible to analyse them as a tradition, the manuscripts were certainly shaped, often subtly but occasionally dramatically, by the later context in which they were produced. Nevertheless, the collective moniker 'Atlas of Islam' was coined in the early twentieth century to highlight the structural similarities across this body of manuscripts, as well as their shared concern with describing and visualizing a set of regions bound together by Islamic history and civilization.⁵

Structurally, the works belonging to the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition all begin with a discussion of the physiognomy of the earth, illustrated in most cases by a world map, and a general account of the 'Realm of Islam' before proceeding to chapters on each of its terrestrial and maritime subdivisions (table 1).⁶ Thus, it is the constituent regions of the 'Realm of Islam' that constitute the bulk of the atlases. A regional map is usually placed at the beginning of a chapter, followed by a commentary that refers explicitly to the map, but also provides additional information about topography, subregions, cities and itineraries, as well as anecdotes about the history, architecture, dress, agricultural products, cuisine and religious and commercial practices of the inhabitants. The regions vary considerably in terms of size, with the lands lying between the river Euphrates and the Iranian plateau mapped in the smallest segments (illus. 3). One of the reasons for this might have been that one of the tenth-century authors, al-Istakhri, came from this area and thus could render it in the most detail. Another reason is that this had been the heartland of the pre-Islamic Sasanian

TABLE 1: SEQUENCE OF REGIONS IN AL-ISTAKHRI AND IBN HAWQAL
MANUSCRIPTS FROM THE 'ATLAS OF ISLAM' TRADITION

Arabic toponym	English translation	Location
1 Diyār al-‘Arab	‘Abode of the Arabs’/Arabia	Arabian Peninsula
2 Baḥr Fārs	‘Persian Sea’/Indian Ocean	Indian Ocean
3 al-Maghrib	‘the place where the sun sets’/the Maghrib	North Africa west of Egypt and the Iberian Peninsula (also known as al-Andalus), Sicily
4 Miṣr	Egypt	Egypt
5 al-Shām	Syria/Greater Syria	Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, into south-central Turkey
6 Baḥr al-Rūm	‘Sea of the Byzantines’/Mediterranean Sea	Mediterranean Sea
7 al-Jazīra	al-Jazira/Upper Mesopotamia	Upper Tigris and Euphrates river system in northern Iraq, northeastern Syria, southeastern Turkey
8 al-‘Irāq	Iraq	Iraq from Tikrit south
9 Khūzistān	Khuzistan	Southwestern Iran, west of the Zagros
10 Fārs	Fars	Southwestern Iran, on the Persian Gulf
11 Kirmān	Kirman	Southwestern Iran, on the Straits of Hormuz
12 al-Sind	al-Sind	Southeastern Iran, Pakistan, Gujarat (India)
13 Armīniyya, al-Rān, Adharbayjān	Armenia and Azerbaijan	Northwestern Iran, eastern Turkey, Azerbaijan, Armenia, into Georgia
14 al-Jibāl	al-Jibal	West-central Iran
15 al-Daylam/Ṭabaristān	Daylam/Tabaristan	Southern shores of the Caspian Sea, Elburz Mountains
16 Baḥr al-Khazar	‘Sea of the Khazars’/Caspian Sea	Caspian Sea
17 Mafāza Khurāsān	‘Desert of Khurasan’	Central Iranian plateau
18 Sijistān	Sijistan	Eastern Iran, Afghanistan
19 Khurāsān	Khurusan	Northeastern Iran, southern Turkmenistan, Afghanistan (including Sijistan)
20 Mā Warā’ al-Nahr	‘What lies beyond the river’ [Oxus]/Transoxiana	Northern Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, into Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan



3 Approximate locations of terrestrial regions in the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition.

Empire, and many descendants of Sasanian officials held posts in the Abbasid administration, where they passed on knowledge of its historical subdivisions. Moreover, in the mid-tenth century, when these atlases were first being composed, a family of Persian speakers from the southern shores of the Caspian Sea, the Buyids, seized control in Baghdad, leaving the Abbasid Caliph little more than a figurehead. While Arabic continued to be the language of religious scholarship, by the eleventh century literary, historical and scientific texts in areas east of the Euphrates were increasingly being written in or translated into Persian. Not surprisingly, more than half of the surviving manuscripts of al-Istakhri's work are copies of Persian translations made in the thirteenth century, and it may be that the relative emphasis on this area helps account for the tradition's prolonged popularity.

The overall effect of the works in the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition is to stress the existence of a superregional entity shaped by Islam, its situation in the context of the rest of the known world, and its great internal diversity. This is reflected not only by the written texts, but by the multiple and overlapping scales in the cartographic contents of the atlases: at the smallest scale are the introductory world maps

in which the subdivisions of the 'Realm of Islam' lie alongside those of the rest of the world; at a slightly larger scale are maps of maritime regions in which parts of the 'Realm of Islam' are pictured in proximity to their neighbours; and at the largest scale are maps of terrestrial regions that are both distinct from and connected to each other and that form meaningful categories of belonging within the 'Realm of Islam'. The maps themselves, therefore, are essential and striking components of the works, which is one of the reasons they should be referred to as atlases, even though there was no equivalent word in Arabic at the time.⁷ Several passages indicate that the authors considered maps an effective means to communicate with their audience, a kind of mnemonic device that complements the written text.⁸ Indeed, the maps give each region its own shape and emphasize its distinctive topographic features, while the written text enumerates its particular social, economic, religious and cultural characteristics. But it must be stressed that neither the 'Realm of Islam' nor its subdivisions were portrayed as rigid political or proto-national units. They were rather porous and connective, bound together by an overarching civilizational identity associated with Islam, but ruled from various centres and peopled by Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Overall, the works that belong to the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition are simultaneously a product of and an argument for the diversity of the 'Realm of Islam' as consolidated by Muslim rulers between the eighth and tenth centuries, as well as its internal and external connectivity.

The World Maps

The world maps that open most of the surviving manuscripts accomplish this by highlighting contiguity between regions without indicating where the superregion of the 'Realm of Islam' begins or ends (for examples, see illus. 4–6).⁹ The circular shape of these maps is meant to indicate a spherical globe, a fact widely acknowledged by Muslim geographers, as well as their ancient antecedents. The perimeter is always entirely ringed with water, referred to as the 'Encircling Ocean' (*al-baḥr al-mūḥīt*) and the space inside is filled with the Eurasian and African landmasses, separated by two major bodies of water, the smaller Mediterranean Sea (on the right) and the




4 World map from the oldest extant manuscript of the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition, attributed to Ibn Hawqal and dated 1086.



5 World map from a Persian translation of al-Istakhri's text, dated 1297.

6 World map from a 15th-century manuscript of al-Istakhri's text.



larger Indian Ocean (on the left).¹⁰ Other waterways, particularly the river Nile extending south and an elongated Dardanelles/Bosphorus extending north to meet with the 'Encircling Ocean', are usually portrayed conspicuously. This was, for the most part, the known world to medieval Muslims, and even after Columbus brought back news of the Americas, this 'old world' was still the one in which the 'Realm of Islam' could be seen as geographically central, which may help explain the popularity of maps along these lines, even from the sixteenth century on.

It has often been asserted that Muslim map-makers oriented their maps southward as a way of drawing attention to the location of the Arabian Peninsula and the city of Mecca, the holiest city in Islam. Although the majority of the world maps in the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition are oriented southward, there are certainly exceptions, and in any case no pattern for emphasizing a centre is discernible across the body of extant manuscripts.¹¹ Indeed, in illus. 5 the Arabian Peninsula is clearly off-centre, and in other examples it is extremely compressed. Rather, the dominant feature of these world maps is the plethora of regional toponyms, often enclosed in contiguous polygons, which appear with particular density in the land lying to the north of the Indian Ocean. No superregional entities, such as continents, which were known from Greek geography but little used, or even the 'Realm of Islam', are delineated or labelled on the world maps from this tradition. Thus, toponyms for regions that are discussed in the written texts as belonging within the 'Realm of Islam' lie adjacent to those that do not, such as India, Tibet and China in the east or 'country of the Byzantines' (*balad/bilād al-Rūm*) and France in the west, without any sense of a particular frontier between them.¹² The effect of this is to suggest a certain equivalence between the subdivisions of the 'Realm of Islam' and those of the rest of the world, as well as the potential for its relocation or expansion. This is probably one of the reasons that the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition was so popular and enduring: its world maps accommodated migration, conversion and the shifting claims of Muslim rulers over the centuries while staying within a time-honoured geographical tradition.¹³

The Regional Maps

While the introductory world maps give no indication of the location or even existence of any superregional entities, the remainder of the atlases are explicitly devoted to the regions that together constituted the 'Realm of Islam'. The chapters on the terrestrial regions in particular, generally referred to by the Arabic terms *iqlīm* or *bilād* (region, country), communicate both diversity and connectivity *within* the superregion. This is in slight contrast to the maps for the maritime regions, to which I will return in the next section, which, like the world maps, convey more seamlessness between the 'Realm of Islam' and its neighbours. The maps for terrestrial regions are, however, the core of the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition and what decisively sets it apart from other mapping traditions.¹⁴ No other works from the Islamic world between the tenth and fifteenth centuries so clearly propose the region as a category of belonging in both written and graphic terms.¹⁵ The combination of map and commentary for each regional unit communicates a sense of its individuality and at the same time, by virtue of its inclusion in the work, asserts its membership in the 'Realm of Islam'.

The first region in the sequence is the Arabian Peninsula, and its precedence is justified in the commentaries as a recognition of its importance as the birthplace of the Prophet Muhammad and home to the holiest cities in Islam. Special iconography or colour is sometimes used on the accompanying maps to draw attention to the city of Mecca, which is the principal pilgrimage destination for Muslims, though this is not common practice for sacred sites in other regions (see illus. 2).¹⁶ After this, manuscripts containing versions of Ibn Hawqal's or al-Istakhri's written text order the regional chapters, roughly, from west to east, whereas al-Muqaddasi divides his regions into 'Arab' and 'non-Arab' groups, which are then ordered within each group, roughly, from east to west.¹⁷ Other than the sequential precedence of the Arabian Peninsula in all the works, therefore, the organization does not seem to privilege any one region over the others. Still, as mentioned above, the lands associated with the pre-Islamic Sasanian Empire are mapped in smaller segments, and in the manuscripts attributable to al-Istakhri the commentary for Fars, his home region, is the longest. By contrast, in the manuscripts attributable to

قاره المغرب

البحر المتوسط



قاه ابرقة فافا امليه

al-Muqaddasi, whose home town was Jerusalem, the commentary for its region, *al-Shām* or Syria/Greater Syria, is among the most detailed. Moreover, in many manuscripts the maps for the easternmost regions, Khurasan and Transoxiana, are stretched over two facing pages. However, because other manuscripts devote two pages to different (or all, or none, of the) regions, it is impossible to argue a pattern based on map size that holds for the entire tradition. This reinforces the overall message that each of the terrestrial regions belongs equally in the 'Realm of Islam'.

The main features depicted on the regional maps are town names inscribed in or next to squares, circles or rosettes, and mountain ranges, rivers and seas rendered in a variety of shapes and colours. Lines often connect towns, suggesting roads or routes, though these are not usually labelled. Distinctive subregions or adjacent districts that are described in the commentaries are also sometimes designated on the maps. Although there is no consistency in the orientation of the regional maps as a whole, maps for a single region tend to be oriented in the same direction across manuscripts (maps of Iraq are oriented north, for instance, and maps of Syria are oriented south). Variations occur in the selection of toponymy and iconography, but once readers familiarize themselves with the shapes of the regions in one manuscript they would be able to recognize those same regions in most of the others without the aid of a title. Take, for example, two maps of northwest Africa and the Iberian Peninsula, known collectively in the tradition as al-Maghrib, from two different manuscripts of al-Istakhri's text, one of them copied in the twelfth and the other in the thirteenth century (illus. 7 and 8).¹⁸ It may at first appear that the two maps are very different. Certainly the second map comes from the only manuscript, to my knowledge, to use small ornate buildings as symbols for cities. However, at a structural level they share many similarities. They are both oriented west, with the Mediterranean flowing out into the Atlantic Ocean (labelled 'Encircling Ocean') on top. The physical proximity of the rounded Iberian Peninsula on the right and the elongated northwest African coast on the left – the sense that they make up a single region despite their separation by water – is conveyed equally by the two maps. The circular island of Sicily at the base, along with the Saharan oasis of Sijilmasa in the upper left (a purple semi-circle in illus. 7 and a golden one in illus. 8), are additional foci, which

7 Map of the Maghrib from a manuscript of al-Istakhri's text, dated 1193.

serve to highlight their belonging in the region and therefore in the 'Realm of Islam'. Moreover, at the approximate centre of the Iberian Peninsula on both maps is the city of Córdoba, pictured as a hub with lines radiating from it in all directions. Admitting variations in the shape of the Iberian Peninsula and the number of islands and cities pictured, this is the standard form for maps of the Maghrib across the manuscripts attributable to al-Istakhri and al-Muqaddasi.¹⁹ The prominence of Córdoba and Sicily reinforces the argument that later manuscript copies in the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition retain a close relationship with its tenth-century origins, since the eleventh century brought internal strife to Córdoba, which was subsequently eclipsed by other cities, and the Norman conquest of Sicily, ending more than two centuries of Muslim rule on the island.

As might be suggested by the geometric lines and minimalism in these examples, maps from the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition have sometimes been described as stylized, simplistic or even distorted. They do not show any evidence of the plotting of longitude or latitude or the use of a scale. Even though town locations are generally accurate relative to each other, the distances between them appear more regular or are more compressed than they are in reality. They certainly do not bear a strong resemblance to modern maps. Instead of pointing out their deficiencies, however, we might better understand them as analogous to today's public transportation diagrams. That is, they may have served as memory aids for travellers who did not need precise directions, or sought them from other sources, but for whom a basic sketch of the relative position of cities and topographical features would facilitate the visualization of the region through which they were moving.²⁰ This possibility reminds us that judging maps on the basis of mathematical accuracy alone obscures the many uses to which people put maps, both in the past and today. However, appearing as they do in bulky atlases, it is difficult to see these particular maps being used by travellers, though similar maps may well have circulated in loose-leaf form suited to practical purposes. Instead, the maps of the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition functioned as complementary graphic expressions of the regionalism that is proposed by the written texts. Much the way modern political maps teach viewers to recognize nation-states by shape, these maps enabled viewers to visualize the entirety of a region at a single glance and


8 Map of the Maghrib from a manuscript of al-Istakhri's text, dated 1285.

البحر المحيط.



لماذا يحلألفه "من الزور"


الحسين بن الروم



9 Map of Iraq from a 15th-century Persian translation of al-Istakhri's text.

to situate it in relation to its neighbours. They convey a sense of coherence for each region, as well as its distinction from, but connectivity with, the other regions of the 'Realm of Islam'.

Among the principal ways the maps communicate this message is through the repetition of shapes in a spatial sequencing reinforced by labelled borderlines. Almost all the maps identify the external boundaries of the region, and many of them label the boundaries using the Arabic term *ḥadd* (limit or border) and/or the name of the neighbouring region: an example is the phrase 'border of Egypt' inscribed below the southeast (bottom left) corner of the Maghrib map (see illus. 8). Indeed, the map for Egypt in the same manuscript, which comes next in the sequence, shows the label 'borders of the Maghrib' in the northwest (bottom right) corner, emphasizing contiguity and proximity between the two. Another example, with curved borders delineating the oval region of Iraq within a rectangular frame, comes from a fifteenth-century copy



10 Map of Khuzistan from a 15th-century Persian translation of al-Istakhri's text.

of a Persian translation of al-Istakhri's text (illus. 9).²¹ In the bottom portion of the map, the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates is pictured as a straight blue line with a blue crescent jutting out on its left, spilling into the blue expanse of the Persian Gulf. To its right, along the curve of the regional borderline, the phrase 'borders of Khuzistan' is inscribed. Flipping to the next map in the sequence for the region of Khuzistan (illus. 10), a significant chunk of Iraq appears across the top of the map, notably the blue line and crescent for the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates, which flows into the Persian Gulf in the upper-left corner. This also indicates a shift in orientation; the Iraq map is oriented north, while the Khuzistan map is oriented west. A borderline can be seen dropping at a diagonal from the river system at the top of the map with a reference to 'Iraq's fertile delta' above it and 'Khuzistan's fertile delta' below it. Just outside the left edge of the frame is the phrase 'borders of Fars', which points to the next regional map in the sequence. Thus, the reader is able to perceive

the connectivity between regions by virtue of the labelled borderlines, the depiction of overlapping areas and the sequencing of the maps. At the same time, the regions are clearly meant to be understood as separate, though not hermetically sealed, entities. The basic separation between regions is not only conveyed by the fact that they are each assigned a distinctively shaped, oriented and labelled map in the atlases, but by the fact that the written commentaries describe their topography and frontiers in detail and provide economic, social, religious and cultural information about their inhabitants.

The relative space devoted to regional maps and commentaries in the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition, as well as the emphasis on their individuality, may suggest a lack of unity in the Islamic world. Indeed, the tradition emerged at a time of profound political fragmentation, with rival dynasties challenging the pre-eminence of the Abbasid caliphs. This process started in the ninth century but reached a climax in the tenth century, when the atlases were composed. While this meant that the 'Realm of Islam' existed more as a civilizational or historical ideal than a political reality in this period, the fact that the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition addressed itself to that ideal indicated its ongoing significance as a superregional category of belonging. At the same time, most people identified with areas of smaller extent, and rulers sometimes sought to capitalize on these loyalties by defining themselves regionally. This is not to say that the regions of the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition reflected or anticipated the emergence of discrete political units, even less of proto-nation-states. Granted, the commentaries on a few of the regions associate them with particular dynasties, such as Khurasan with the Samanids or Egypt with the Fatimids, chief rivals to the Abbasids. However, the administrative jurisdiction of these dynasties did not correspond neatly to the maps, and any connection between a ruler and a region emerges, to the extent that it does, only in the written text. Moreover, while anecdotes about the regions and their inhabitants give a sense of local particularisms, neither the maps nor the commentaries set criteria for belonging (ethnolinguistic, religious or otherwise), and it is clear that mobility was a way of life for many throughout the 'Realm of Islam'. Nonetheless, geographical differentiation was clearly meaningful to the people among whom the atlases circulated, which is why their 'at-a-glance' regional maps made enough sense to copy over the centuries. At the

same time the organizing framework was a particular vision of what constituted the 'Realm of Islam', and though the introductory world maps allowed for the possibility of stressing different areas, no new regional maps were added to the tradition, leaving the impression that the bonds between a set of regions fixed in the tenth century were stronger and of deeper provenance than those between any other places where Muslims might live or rule. Thus, the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition celebrated diversity-in-unity for a particular segment of the world, a segment that, with the notable exception of the Iberian Peninsula, may be superimposed relatively neatly upon some of the more expansive modern interpretations of the Middle East.

MAPPING AN INTERCONNECTED WORLD

A different mapping tradition that was both more technical and more universal in design emerged two centuries later from the western end of the 'Realm of Islam'. Indeed, it could be argued that it did not emerge from within the 'Realm of Islam' at all. The island of Sicily was among the first Muslim-controlled lands to fall in the *Reconquista*, or the gradual process by which parts of the western Mediterranean that had been under Muslim control for centuries were 'reconquered' by Christian rulers. Sicily itself had come relatively late into the Muslim fold; the semi-independent Aghlabid dynasty, nominally subject to the Abbasid Caliph, extended its sphere of influence to Palermo from its base in what is now Tunisia in 831. By contrast most of the Iberian Peninsula south of the Duero river, known in Arabic as al-Andalus, had been consolidated as part of the Umayyad Caliphate over a century earlier. Nonetheless, in the second half of the eleventh century the balance of power in the western Mediterranean was shifting perceptibly, with Palermo surrendered to the Normans in 1072 and the strategically important principality of Toledo ceded to the Castilians in 1085. Nonetheless, constant interchange, both peaceful and adversarial, in the region, as well as sophisticated urban populations of Christians, Jews and Muslims for whom Arabic had long been the language of science and culture, meant that Islamic civilization retained a powerful influence in newly Christian lands. It is for this reason that the most famous of the Norman kings of Sicily,



11 World map from a
15th-century manuscript
of al-Idrisi's *Nuzhat
al-mushtāq*
(Book of Roger).

Roger II (*reg.* 1130–54), commissioned al-Sharif al-Idrisi, a Muslim scholar from a noble Andalusí family, to produce a landmark work of geography and cartography in Arabic. After studying as a youth in Córdoba, al-Idrisi embarked on extensive travels, finally settling down at Roger's court in Palermo. It was here that he composed the *Nuzhat al-mushtāq fī khtirāq al-āfāq* (A Pleasure for One Who Longs to Stroll Across Distant Lands) at the request of his princely patron, which earned it the nickname *Book of Roger*.

This work, which survives in ten manuscript copies dating from the thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries, divides the known world into seven latitudinal 'climes', a system adopted from the ancient Greeks.²² Although the Arabic word for clime, *iqlim*, is also used for the irregularly shaped regions of the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition, the word comes from the Greek *klimata*, referring to east–west parallel bands defined by their distance from the equator. Dividing the world into latitudinal climes was nothing new among Muslims, as the ninth-century geographers al-Khwarazmi and Suhrab used a seven-clime system to organize works listing longitude and latitude coordinates for major cities, mountains, rivers and seas throughout the known world. These lists may have been related to the world map commissioned by the Abbasid caliph al-Ma'mun in early ninth-century Baghdad.²³ Though this map has not survived, multiple maps from later centuries show the influence of the clime system. Some of these world maps are circular and bear a resemblance to the 'Atlas of Islam' world maps, with their southern orientation, emphasis on African and Eurasian landmasses within an 'Encircling Ocean', and inscription of regional toponyms throughout (illus. 11).²⁴ The differences are a more mimetic rendering of coastlines, the prominent portrayal of mountain ranges, and the addition of latitude lines (here in red ink) delineating climes. Since individual toponyms are not enclosed on most of these maps, the east–west parallel band becomes the basic division of the world. This makes them appear more scientific than the 'Atlas of Islam' world maps, although the extent to which they can be related to a mathematically plotted prototype is debatable. Examples of such maps can be found in some manuscripts of the *Book of Roger*, but these may not have been original to the work, as al-Idrisi never mentions including a world map. In fact, al-Idrisi's main interest lies in a further subdivision of the world based on latitude and longitude.

Al-Idrisi divides the seven climes longitudinally into ten 'sections', resulting in a total of seventy. Accordingly, the work is organized by clime and section, starting with the first clime closest to the equator and treating its ten sections from west to east in turn before moving northward to the second clime and so on. For each of a clime's ten sections, al-Idrisi provides a map, spread over two facing pages, and a written commentary. The sectional maps depict topographic features and toponyms, which are also detailed in the commentary along with distances between towns and information of political, economic or cultural significance about major cities. Because al-Idrisi's sections are all the same size and shape, they cut across the regional divisions of the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition. Rivers, seas, mountain ranges and even islands extend over multiple maps. For the most part the only way to tell what part of the world is being depicted is to read the toponyms inscribed on the map or to put the rectangular sectional maps together in sequence, though this would involve removing them from the manuscripts in which they are separated by large chunks of written text. Indeed, the sectional maps fit together extremely well, and if assembled they would form a large, rectangular world map measuring more than 20 feet (6 metres) long and 7 feet (2 metres) high.²⁵ It has been speculated that al-Idrisi may have been working from just such a map, even though nothing of this kind has survived. References in the preface to both a 'drawing board' and a 'silver sphere' upon which points of latitude and longitude were plotted point to the multi-stage planning process that went into producing the *Book of Roger*.²⁶

Al-Idrisi's sections bear little resemblance to the distinctively shaped regions of the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition. Within the standard rectangular frames of the sectional maps, cities and towns appear as circles or rosettes, and mountain ranges and rivers snake across the page, often breaking off at the edge. Sometimes toponyms are inscribed across swaths of terrain on one or more of the maps, suggesting the existence of regional entities that stretch beyond the bounds of a single section. The map showing the sixth section of the fourth clime, for instance, from the earliest surviving manuscript of the *Book of Roger*, is oriented southward with cities marked by yellow rosettes along the grey arteries of the Tigris and Euphrates river systems (illus. 12).²⁷ The Zagros mountain range is shaded in dark red and

brown and cuts diagonally across the map, with an offshoot of the purple-shaded Elburz range running east. A small portion of the Caspian Sea peeks out of the bottom left corner of the map. While toponyms for cities are penned in black ink, red ink is used to indicate regions. For instance, the toponym for Iraq appears in red in three places on the map: as part of the phrase 'Iraq's fertile delta' horizontally at the top; as part of the phrase 'continuation of Iraq' diagonally to the left of the crease; and finally on its own vertically at the approximate centre of the map. The map refers to four other regions using red ink: al-Jazira (Upper Mesopotamia) on the right side of the map, Armenia in the bottom centre, Azerbaijan in the lower left portion of the map, and al-Jibal (west-central Iran) in the upper left. In total, therefore, this map spans four terrestrial and one maritime region from the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition and uses toponyms directly associated with most of them. Though al-Idrisi's maps show no internal borders, the inscription of toponyms familiar from other geographical works suggests that meaningful regional entities cross-cut and overlap his standardized sectional divisions. In particular, for the areas associated with the 'Realm of Islam', toponyms from the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition would help viewers orient themselves when looking at the sectional maps and might even prompt the visualization of the distinctively shaped regions that spanned two or more maps in al-Idrisi's system.

Al-Idrisi applied his system to the entire inhabited world, as he knew it – or could find out about it – in the twelfth century, including lands outside the 'Realm of Islam', as well as those on its shifting western frontier with which he was most personally familiar. The fact that he gives equal treatment, at least in theory, to all seventy sections suggests that he was unusually interested in non-Muslims. This, combined with his technical approach to mapping, has attracted a lot of attention to al-Idrisi, who, as a Muslim living under Christian rule, is celebrated as an exemplar of civilizational exchange. While this judgement may be merited, it deflects attention from the way in which other mapping traditions, including the 'Atlas of Islam', portray the connectivity between lands ruled by Muslims and non-Muslims. In fact, al-Idrisi's sectional maps, especially as they occur individually scattered throughout the pages of the surviving manuscripts, are less immediately evocative of the interconnected world in which they were produced than other regional maps from the period.

overleaf

12 Sixth section of the fourth clime from the oldest extant manuscript of al-Idrisi's *Nuzhat al-mushtāq* (Book of Roger), copied c. 1300.

三



المشرف







13 (full image and detail)
Map of the Mediterranean
from the oldest extant
manuscript of the 'Atlas
of Islam' tradition, attributed
to Ibn Hawqal and dated 1086.

For instance, in the *Book of Roger*, the Mediterranean Sea is spread over fifteen sectional maps. While this division results in the island of Sicily appearing happily in its entirety in the second section of the fourth clime, the rest of the Mediterranean is apportioned without regard to the economic or political dynamics that bound it together. By contrast, maps of the Mediterranean Sea in the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition portray the maritime region as a coherent whole surrounded on three sides by nearly uninterrupted coastline. In fact, a unique map of the Mediterranean from the earliest surviving manuscript in that tradition, which is attributed to Ibn Hawqal and dated 1086, includes more information on the northern (right-hand) shores of the sea than on the southern (left-hand), as well as distinctive forms for not only the Iberian but the Italian peninsula and the Peloponnese (illus. 13). Even more detailed is the map that accompanies the chapter on the Maghrib in the same manuscript. Spread across three pages and titled 'Map of the Maghrib and the Country of the Byzantines', its mimetic rendition of the contours of the Mediterranean coastline would make it recognizable to most modern viewers. Maps like these provide graphic complements to the written text's discussion of the commercial, political and social activities that linked the 'Realm of Islam' to its European and sub-Saharan neighbours.²⁸

Most of the other Mediterranean maps from the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition are highly symmetrical, the northern and southern shores

almost mirror images of each other. A fifteenth-century manuscript containing al-Istakhri's text, most likely copied at the behest of the Ottoman Sultan Mehmet II, who after conquering Constantinople in 1453 styled himself heir to the Byzantine Empire, has the standard format for Mediterranean maps from this tradition (illus. 14).²⁹ It is oriented with the western end open on top to the 'Encircling Ocean' and the three islands of Sicily, Crete and Cyprus arrayed from west to east down the centre of the sea. The Nile can be seen extending southward on the left side and the Dardanelles/Bosphorus extending northward on the right side. What is distinctive about this manuscript, as well as the handful of others copied in the same circumstances, is the elongated shape of the sea and the conspicuousness of the phrase 'country of the Byzantines', which is inscribed three times along the northern and eastern shores, spanning two-thirds of its perimeter. This has the effect of highlighting the territorial legacy of the Byzantines, to which the Ottomans were actively laying claim, on a map that might otherwise be read, in the context of the rest of the work, as emphasizing the regions formally belonging to the 'Realm of Islam' – namely Syria, Egypt and the Maghrib. In general, the smaller scale of the 'Atlas of Islam' Mediterranean maps, like the world maps, made them flexible vehicles for expressing connectivity or aspirations to belonging, especially as new lands came under Muslim rule and others were lost, while still paying homage to a historical 'Realm of Islam'. Although these maps may be deemed, by today's standards, less accurate than al-Idrisi's sectional maps, they convey in much more immediate fashion the reality of an interconnected Mediterranean, the water appearing as a unifying factor, rather than a barrier or frontier.³⁰

This approach to mapping bodies of water is also a feature of a very different work from the period, *Kitāb gharā'ib al-funūn wa-mulāḥ al-'uyūn* (Book of Curiosities of the Sciences and Marvels for the Eyes), popularly translated as the *Book of Curiosities*. Most likely authored between 1020 and 1050 in Egypt, the political centre of the Fatimid Caliphate, it combines cosmographical and geographical information, much of which is based on Ptolemy, with maps of the heavens and the earth. The work's cartographic contents have recently come to light thanks to the discovery of a lavishly illustrated manuscript copy datable to about 1200.³¹ Of its two world maps, one

overleaf

15 Map of the Mediterranean from a manuscript of *Kitāb gharā'ib al-funūn* (Book of Curiosities), copied c. 1200.

is circular and resembles those appearing in many manuscripts of the *Book of Roger* (and thus may not be original to the work), and the other is rectangular and represents the earliest surviving map to feature a scale.³² The rest of the earthly maps, which portray coastal cities, islands, rivers and seas, share an emphasis on water as a medium of connectivity. The map of the Mediterranean Sea, for instance, takes the tendency toward symmetry in the ‘Atlas of Islam’ tradition a step further, depicting it as a closed oval completely and evenly ringed by red dots from which the names of 121 ports, harbours and other anchorages fan out to the edges of the page (illus. 15).³³ The green water inside the oval is crowded with 118 islands, all circular except two larger rectangles for the islands of Sicily and Cyprus, both of which receive their own maps later in the work. The sea itself does not dominate the map, but appears rather as the ‘glue’ holding the lands in and around the Mediterranean together, with a particular emphasis on Byzantine- and Fatimid-controlled areas in the east. Reinforcing this sense is the writing inscribed within the islands of Sicily and Cyprus, the former ruled, at the time of the work’s composition, by a vassal of the Fatimids and the latter by the Byzantines. Inside the rectangle for Sicily is a record of the distances between the island and the North African coast, on the one hand, and the Italian mainland, on the other, along with the observation that ‘it is continuously engaged in military raids’. Inside the rectangle of Cyprus is the statement: ‘one end is opposite Alexandria [in Egypt] and the other is opposite Latakia [in Syria]’. The writing embedded within the map, therefore, situates these islands explicitly in relation to surrounding coastlines, whether Muslim- or Christian-controlled, and suggests movement between them. Similarly, in another map in the same work, this one of al-Mahdiyya, a port on the east coast of Tunisia founded in 921 as the first capital of the Fatimid Caliphate, a list of distances between anchorages on the way to Palermo shares the space within the walls of the city with images of the Caliph’s palaces. These maps, which were designed before the fall of Sicily to the Normans, not only document the ties between the island and North Africa, but reflect an era of intensive interaction between Muslims and Christians in the eastern Mediterranean.³⁴

The river maps in the *Book of Curiosities* also stress mobility, both by depicting waterways as literal routes from one place to another

16 Map of the river Indus from a manuscript of *Kitāb gharā’ib al-funūn* (Book of Curiosities), copied c. 1200.

and by using their linear shapes as metaphors for connectivity. The river Indus map is particularly striking for highlighting the spatial relationship between one of the easternmost regions of the 'Realm of Islam', al-Sind, and neighbouring territories ruled by non-Muslims: India (*al-Hind*) and China (*al-Šīn*) (illus. 16).³⁵ It is also, of all the maps in the *Book of Curiosities*, the one that deploys its river most symbolically. Indeed, the waterway as depicted, which originates in the mountains of Tibet at the top left and winds its way down the map before emptying into the Arabian Sea at the bottom right, seems to combine stretches of the Brahmaputra, the Ganges and the Indus into a single composite river, a fiction that has the effect of unifying a topographically complex and vast area. Despite this, the toponyms for towns that appear next to red dots on the map sketch relatively accurate overland itineraries through northern India and then on to China. The major route starts in the lower left part of the map at 'al-Multan . . . the beginning of India', accompanied by some writing glossing its name and history; continues on a diagonal away from the river through towns identified with idol worship and/or described as 'Indian'; and arrives at 'Qanawj, capital of India', elaborated with additional writing in the centre right. Noting idol worship in a town or its 'Indian'-ness can be seen as a marker of difference, suggesting that a border has been crossed, even as the overall design of the map with the curving river at its centre blurs boundaries between regions. From 'Qanawj', the itinerary curves gently to the left through towns hugging the right bank of the river, here coinciding with a stretch of the Ganges, before winding up at 'the gates of China' in the top centre of the map. Parallel to the chains of red-dotted towns are phrases in elongated Arabic script, the form of the writing mirroring its content: 'route to Qanawj' and 'route to China'. Paralleling another set of red dots in the lower right corner of the map is the phrase 'coast of India'. Finally, stretched across empty space on the left side of the river is the toponym 'al-Sind'. In addition to bringing together three major regions depicted on many world maps of the period, the map uses a symbolic central river, chains of (mostly) identifiable towns, and the elongated lines of the Arabic script to emphasize the itineraries that bound the 'Realm of Islam' to its eastern neighbours. Although the maps of rivers, seas, islands and ports in this unique manuscript do not fit neatly into the other traditions discussed thus far, their message

is similar to that of the 'Atlas of Islam' maps – a reminder of the interconnectedness of the known world, both acknowledging and transcending regional and cultural differences.

MAPPING PILGRIMAGE AND PRAYER

Just as the sectional maps designed by al-Idrisi and the maritime and riverine maps from the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition and the *Book of Curiosities* stress connections between the 'Realm of Islam' and the lands beyond it, another mapping tradition originating in this period stresses connections between Muslims wherever they lived. This tradition uses the *qibla*, or prayer direction, as its organizing concept and portrays the cities and regions of the world arrayed around a sacred centre, the holy sanctuary of Mecca and the most prominent feature of its ritual landscape, the Ka'ba. The Ka'ba is a cuboid structure made of granite, traditionally draped with a black cloth and located in the courtyard of the 'Sacred Mosque' (*al-masjid al-ḥarām*) in Mecca. Believed to have been built by the Prophet Abraham and his son Ishmael, the structure predates the coming of Islam and represents continuity with Abrahamic monotheism. Although it had been used for polytheistic worship in the centuries before Muhammad's birth, the Prophet dedicated it to the one true God and led by example in establishing it as the direction toward which Muslims should pray and the primary destination for Muslim pilgrimage. Thus, one of the concerns faced by early Muslims as they moved out of the Arabian Peninsula into the far-flung lands of the Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphates was how to position themselves toward the Ka'ba in prayer and how to find the time, resources and dedication to make the hajj, or annual pilgrimage to Mecca, at least once in their lifetimes.

The question of aligning one's body toward Mecca in prayer contributed to the interest among Muslims in the fields of geography and astronomy. Wherever Muslims settled, mosques were built according to the *qibla* with a prayer niche, known as a *miḥrāb*, indicating the direction to Mecca. Scholarly treatises on determining direction according to mathematical and astronomical methods were composed as early as the ninth century to help the faithful fulfil their ritual requirements at home or on the road. Less technical schemes



روى عن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم ان الله قد وعد هذا البيت ان يحجها في كل سنة ستماه الف فان رقصوا
 كلهم بالملكية وان في الكعبة كالتروس المرفوعة وكل من حجها متعلق استارها يعرض عنها حتى يدخل الجنة فدخلوا
 معها وعن علي عليه السلام ان الله تعالى قال للملكة اني جاعلة في الارض خليفة قالوا اتجعل فيها من بعدنا نحن
 عليهم وابعد من عندهم فقالوا نعم يا ربنا فقال الله سبحانه كما يقول الناس ائت اليوم يستقر فيه يقولون ليكن الله ليكن ربنا
 معه ايكس سبعون ويوبل ليكن في عندهم فقال انزل في الارض منا طوف به عبادي من عصى عليه
 ارضي عنه كما رضى عنكم واما خصايل البيت وحجابه فان امره ان يصاح فصد وازاد مدهم فاهلك الله
 تعالى بطيئنا بل وقد كان انا من عمرى وابي له من سبيل زمانه الكعبة يحجها الله تعالى حرم صلبا حديما
 على اصفا ولاش على المروة لعينها الناس فلما طال كبرها وعبدل لاصنام عبيد معها الى ان كبرها رسول
 الله صلى الله عليه وسلم فذكر من الاصنام ومن عجائب البيت ان لا سقط عليه حمام الا اذا كان قليلا واذا حادى من
 الكعبة عزة من طير يرفق فرفيق ولم يعلها طيور منها واذا اصابها مطر احد حوائرها يكون اسحب في تلك السنة

for ordering the world according to the *qibla* are described in geographical works from the same period, and '*qibla* charts', which are usually circular in shape, with a number of sectors, anywhere from 4 to 72, arrayed around a central sketch of the Ka'ba or the Meccan sanctuary, appear in manuscripts from the twelfth century on. Within the sectors are lists of the cities and regions that share the same prayer direction toward a particular spot on the perimeter of the Ka'ba. Accordingly, the Ka'ba at the centre of the chart is sometimes labelled with the geographical orientation of its corners – 'the corner facing Iraq/east', 'the corner facing Syria/north', 'the corner facing west', and 'the corner facing Yemen/south' – and other structures in the sanctuary may be sketched or identified in relation to it. The idea was that Muslims would be able to look at the chart, find their city or region, and then identify the part of the Ka'ba they should face during prayer and thus, in a general sense, the cardinal direction in which they should position their bodies. Sometimes the charts also include more or less precise instructions as to how people located in each sector should determine the *qibla* by observing celestial bodies.³⁶

These charts can be thought of as maps because they graphically represent spatial relationships between sites on the earth's surface and appear most often within works of geography and cosmography.³⁷ Including as they do most of the regions inscribed on world maps from the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition, as well as toponyms known from a variety of other sources, they draw from and depend on diverse geographical discourses to be intelligible. However, by arraying these toponyms relative to the cardinal directions (and to each other) around a single, sacred pole, they communicate a particular vision of the world as an ordered and centred sphere. In this, they resonate with mapping traditions associated with medieval Christianity, such as T-O maps and *mappae mundi*, which are centred on Jerusalem and many of which appear in the context of works dedicated to astronomical calculations on ritual matters, such as the dating of Easter.³⁸ Even though the world order conveyed by *qibla* charts is distinctively Islamic, like the other maps in this chapter they typically do not distinguish between lands ruled by Muslims and those ruled by non-Muslims. Instead, they suggest that Muslims may live or go anywhere and remain in contact with, if only through ritual, the sacred centre. In fact, most surviving *qibla* charts do not include

17 *Qibla* chart from a manuscript of al-Qazwini's *Āthār al-bilād* (Monuments of the Countries), dated 1329.

astronomical instructions, and some of them even reverse the cardinal directions or display other lapses of geographical awareness. The basic message that Muslims may be anywhere in the world but united in prayer, however, remains the same. Even if most *qibla* charts were not being used explicitly to help Muslims complete their ritual requirements, the popularity of this mapping tradition lay in its ability to evoke in visual terms the concept of the *umma*, or world community of Muslims.

An eleven-sector *qibla* chart appears in an early fourteenth-century manuscript of a work by the well-known thirteenth-century scholar Zakariyya al-Qazwini called *Āthār al-bilād* (Monuments of the Countries) (illus. 17).³⁹ At the centre is a sketch of the Ka'ba, with the semicircular detached wall designating *al-ḥijr*, the additional area skirted in circumambulation, on top and the Black Stone, believed to have been a jewel dropped from heaven upon God's creation of the earth and often kissed by pilgrims, on the lower-right corner. The other three corners are labelled incorrectly relative to the locations of the Black Stone and *al-ḥijr* on the Ka'ba sketch, a mistake that reinforces the idea that accuracy was not the main goal, though the cardinal directions they indicate are consistent with the places listed in the surrounding sectors. Each sector is shaped in the curved form of a prayer niche as it would appear in a mosque, and the writing inside always begins with the phrase 'The prayer niche of . . .'. A sector on the bottom right reads: 'The prayer niche of Basra, Ahwaz, Fars and Isfahan, and what is beyond that'. All the toponyms listed in this sector come from the 'Realm of Islam' as conceived in the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition and refer to cities or regions located in southern Iraq and western Iran. Moving clockwise, the next sector reads: 'The prayer niche of India, and al-Sind, and what is beyond it [all the way] to Tibet and the country of China and the islands'. In this case, only one of the toponyms, al-Sind, refers to a region from the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition. However, during the 25 years before al-Qazwini's death in 1283, most of Iraq and Iran was ruled by a non-Muslim Mongol dynasty, and for the majority of his lifetime through to the copying of this manuscript in 1329 most of India was ruled by a Muslim dynasty in a polity known as the Delhi Sultanate. Thus, not only does this *qibla* chart juxtapose toponyms associated with the 'Realm of Islam' with those beyond it, but it emerged at a time

when the lands ruled by Muslims and those ruled by non-Muslims, as well as perhaps the entire concept of a 'Realm of Islam', were in serious flux.

This juxtaposition of diverse toponyms is reminiscent of the way they appear on world maps from the period without any sense of where the 'Realm of Islam' begins or ends. However, the difference is that here cities and regions are symbolically united by the presence of Muslims within them, and especially by the ritual activities of those Muslims who turn together in prayer every day toward Mecca. This is a particularly compelling idea at a time when non-Muslim minorities were ruling Muslim majorities, as in late thirteenth-century Iraq, and Muslim minorities were ruling non-Muslim majorities, as in fourteenth-century India. The *qibla* chart suggests that the 'Realm of Islam' may in fact be the whole world and that the concept of the *umma* is not restricted by political vicissitudes, cultural difference or physical distance from the Arabian Peninsula. Nevertheless, these maps define the *umma* in geographical terms, not metaphysical ones. While Muslims may be in any spot on the earth's surface and still belong to the *umma*, they still need to know where that spot is and how it relates to other spots on the earth's surface in order to activate that belonging through ritual. Thus *qibla* charts enable the visualization of the spatial relationship between a believer and the sacred centre. This act of visualization or imagination is crucial to the popularity of these maps, much more so than their practical usefulness for determining the *qibla*.

Just as *qibla* charts were a means of visualizing in geographical terms a sense of belonging in the *umma*, images of the sanctuaries of Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem, which remain popular to this day, allow believers to connect themselves to the sacred centre wherever they might live. The earliest surviving cluster of such images comes from a cache of about two hundred 'pilgrimage certificates', dating from the late eleventh century to the early fourteenth.⁴⁰ These legal documents, which had been stored in the Umayyad Mosque of Damascus until the fire of 1892, when they were moved to Istanbul for preservation, were originally in the form of relatively large paper scrolls (up to 20 inches wide and 85 inches long), but are now mainly in fragments due to age, paper quality and the conditions of storage.⁴¹ They attest to the completion-by-proxy of the hajj, the full pilgrimage



18 Pilgrimage certificate dated 1212 featuring images of Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem.

to Mecca performed at a prescribed time during the year and required of every Muslim with the means to do so at least once in a lifetime, and/or the less formal *'umra*, which requires fewer ritual activities and can take place at any time of the year. In other words, they testify to some form of pilgrimage to Mecca undertaken by an agent in the name of someone else. The names of beneficiary and proxy and a written description of the route taken and battery of rituals performed, interspersed with scriptural quotations, are usually followed by the date and witness signatures at the bottom. That such a legal possibility not only existed but is amply documented in this period suggests that the certificates were a means by which the sacred centre was brought to Muslims near and far; they were not just souvenirs from but substitutes for the trip itself.

A small group of these documents, primarily dating from the first half of the thirteenth century, features illustrations of holy sites in and around Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem, which were hand-painted or block-printed one on top of the other in a fixed sequence.⁴² The addition of a colourful programme of illustration reinforces the idea that the certificates were more than legal documents. Indeed, it is likely that, based on their size and construction, some of them were made to be publicly displayed.⁴³ In such cases, viewers might bear witness to the piety of the beneficiary of the pilgrimage, while also imagining themselves in the sites depicted, perhaps even experiencing a kind of unofficial pilgrimage by proxy. The topographical emphasis of the images and their spatial flow makes it possible to think of the scrolls as itinerary maps that stood in for the terrain traversed and the places visited. However, instead of picturing a central artery of transportation, like the river maps from the *Book of Curiosities*, distances between the holy sites are collapsed, and the written text of the document is squeezed into blank spaces between the images – right where the connective road or waterway might be on an itinerary map.

The only more or less intact example of an illustrated scroll from this cache is a certificate issued on behalf of a woman, Amina bint Muzaffar, for an *'umra* accomplished by an agent named 'Ubayd ibn Salama, in May 1212 (illus. 18).⁴⁴ The sequence begins at the top with Arafat, Mina and Muzdalifa on the outskirts of Mecca, which are sites specific to the hajj, followed at the centre of the scroll by

the Meccan sanctuary surrounding the Ka'ba, which is the site of the *'umra*. The final two images on the scroll are the Prophet's Mosque at Medina and the Dome of the Rock at Jerusalem, which are not part of either hajj or *'umra*, but are considered by most Muslims to be the second two most holy sites in Islam and were often combined with a trip to Mecca. The same set and sequence of images were used for all illustrated certificates in this collection, regardless of which rituals were performed and in what order.⁴⁵ The fact that the illustration programme was not customized to reflect the itinerary followed by a particular pilgrim suggests the intended transferability of the certificates themselves (and there is evidence that some of the certificates were mass produced with blank spaces for the inscription of names, dates and signatures).⁴⁶ It also reinforces the idea that these maps were more about bringing the ritual topography of the sacred centre to a Muslim audience for whom its visualization might affirm a sense of belonging in the *umma*, than about recreating the journey of a particular pilgrim.

The preponderance of members of the elite among the beneficiaries of the certificates, however, also suggests that they were a way of advertising the piety of the ruling class, in this case the Ayyubid dynasty that controlled Egypt and Syria in a loose confederation from the late twelfth century to the mid-thirteenth and the resurgent Abbasid Caliph in Baghdad, al-Nasir, who during his long rule (1180–1225) invested considerable money and prestige in his role as patron of the annual hajj.⁴⁷ The founder of the Ayyubid dynasty, Salah al-Din ibn Ayyub, popularly known as Saladin, had received a caliphal investiture as 'Sultan of Syria and Egypt' in recognition, at least in part, of his efforts against the Crusaders, from whom he triumphantly wrested Jerusalem in 1187. Not only did the first illustrated pilgrimage certificates emerge at this time (the earliest is dated 1193), but their inclusion of an image of the Dome of the Rock can be interpreted as an iconographic representation of the reunion between Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem made possible by Saladin's victory and the revival of caliphal power after more than two centuries of figureheads. Thus, whether or not the particular pilgrimage being certified included a visit to Jerusalem, the illustration programme of the certificates from this era affirmed Jerusalem's membership in a sacred urban triad. They can also be

seen as testaments to the righteousness of the Ayyubid house, for having reclaimed Jerusalem for Islam, and of the Abbasid house, whose distinctive black banners flying on either side of the summit of Arafat are inscribed, on at least some of the scrolls, with the name ‘al-Nasir, Commander of the Faithful’ (see illus. 18). These certificates visually link Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem, as well as the ruling elites of Baghdad and Damascus (the former where the early thirteenth-century illustrated scrolls were likely manufactured and the latter where they ended up), celebrating a moment of triumph and relative political centralization in the ‘Realm of Islam’. At the same time they suggest and even facilitate the accessibility of the sacred centre to all Muslims, collapsing the distances both between the sites themselves and between the sites and the audience, for whom the material presence of the certificate might prompt virtual pilgrimage.

The practice of illustrating pilgrimage certificates persisted, with particularly elaborate, if isolated, examples attested from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.⁴⁸ More generally, images of Mecca and Medina, and occasionally other Muslim pilgrimage destinations, proliferated in a variety of contexts in the coming centuries, as will be discussed in the next chapter. These also displayed a topographical emphasis and served similar purposes, evoking long-distance connectivity among Muslims and advertising the piety of their owners or the ruling class. Most importantly, these images, like the *qibla* charts and the ‘Atlas of Islam’ tradition, communicated an Islamic sense of place without insisting on rigid borders around the *umma*. In the case of the ‘Atlas of Islam’ tradition, regional belonging was clearly a cross-confessional and cross-cultural possibility, and though the super-regional concept of the ‘Realm of Islam’ is inseparable from some notion of Islamic history and civilization, its constituent regions were not mapped in ways that privileged particular religious or ethnolinguistic groups. This flexibility accounts for the longevity of these mapping traditions, some of which vie, even today, with more exclusive or atomized imaginings of the world.

MAPS CIRCULATING IN ARABIC and Persian written between the eleventh and fifteenth centuries stressed diversity-in-unity for the ‘Realm of Islam’ in the context of a more broadly interconnected

world. This meant that although the 'Realm of Islam' was indeed a meaningful category of belonging, it did not supersede other geographical affiliations, prevent mobility and exchange with neighbouring areas, or preclude the expansion or contraction of Muslim rule. Nonetheless, the numerical preponderance of extant manuscripts from the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition and the persistence of their copying and circulation over the centuries suggest that the set of regions that forms the core of the tradition should be seen as a particularly powerful manifestation of the 'Realm of Islam', if only as a nostalgic ideal. However, the reality is that the sixteenth century would see a burst of both conversion and immigration that created new and growing populations of Muslims in eastern Europe and southeast Asia and an unprecedented level of political centralization emanating from imperial seats in Europe (Constantinople/Istanbul), Iran (Tabriz, Qazvin, Isfahan) and India (Delhi). Of the three great empires that dominated central Eurasia in the sixteenth century – the Ottoman Empire, the Safavid Empire and the Mughal Empire – only one of them, the Safavid, was based in the regions mapped as part of the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition. While an analysis of mapping across all three of these empires is beyond the scope of this book, the next chapter illuminates one important context for the coexistence of change and continuity in mapping traditions in the early modern world – the Ottoman Empire between the sixteenth and early eighteenth centuries. The mapping traditions emerging in this period reflected the particular experiences and expertise of agents of the Ottoman Empire and were intended primarily for an audience of the ruling elite. At the same time, they promoted connectivity by emphasizing access to symbolic or desirable places, whether or not they were under Ottoman control, and trading in visual idioms that were comprehensible across a variegated political and cultural terrain.



TWO

MAPPING IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

The expansion of Ottoman power throughout the Mediterranean and western Asia in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries resulted in a centralized Islamic empire on a scale unseen since the ninth-century heyday of the Abbasid Caliphate. The ‘House of Osman’, a dynasty descended from a thirteenth-century Turkic warrior (from whose name comes the Anglicized ‘Ottoman’), consolidated control of a sizeable swath of western Anatolia and the Balkans by the turn of the fifteenth century. In 1453 Ottoman imperial ambitions attracted worldwide attention when Sultan Mehmet II conquered Constantinople from the Byzantines, and then again in 1517 when Mehmet’s grandson Sultan Selim I conquered Cairo from the Mamluks, a Muslim regime that had ruled Egypt, Syria and western Arabia for more than 250 years. Within a few decades, Ottoman sovereignty stretched from Algiers and Budapest in the west to Tabriz and Aden in the east, and Ottoman ships vied successfully against Venetian, Spanish and Portuguese rivals for dominance in the Mediterranean, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. The Ottoman capital city, Constantinople, was transformed from the provincial backwater it had been in the waning years of the Byzantine Empire to the centre of a vast terrestrial and maritime realm. In this context, sailors, soldiers, scholars and scribes experimented with various forms of mapping, continuing to invest not only in the ‘Atlas of Islam’ tradition, but with variations on other traditions that might appeal to the empire’s ruling elite. Despite this intended audience, such efforts were not primarily about representing Ottoman sovereignty or territorial claims, but rather about demonstrating authoritative knowledge and connections to meaningful geographies.

19 Map of the Dardanelles from a manuscript of the second version of Piri Reis’s *Kitāb-i bahriye* (Book of the Sea), dated 1574.

Like the last one, this chapter considers three major mapping traditions, but in this case they may all be described as innovative adaptations of pre-existing genres. The first is made up of dozens of manuscript copies of the beautiful and functional reinvention of a Mediterranean portolan atlas, originally authored in the 1520s by the Ottoman naval captain Piri Reis. This navigation guide joins word and image to depict the Mediterranean as a cohesive and attractive maritime region that had been mastered, if not conquered, by Ottoman agents of empire. The second mapping tradition consists of two new takes on the itinerary map, recreating the modes and nodes of long-distance travel and highlighting sites that evoked continuities between the Islamic past and the Ottoman present. This tradition is represented by a lavishly illustrated manuscript chronicling an Ottoman military campaign by soldier-scholar Matrakci Nasuh and by an outpouring of pilgrimage guides in the same period testifying to the Muslims from near and far who converged annually on west-central Arabia. Finally, the third mapping tradition may be understood as a creative grappling with the new genre of printed world atlases coming out of northwestern Europe. This tradition sprang from the efforts of two ambitious intellectuals in Istanbul in the seventeenth century, Katib Celebi and Abu Bakr al-Dimashqi, and was adapted and immortalized in the early eighteenth century by the printing house of Ibrahim Muteferrika.

The last of these traditions bridges the transition from manuscript to print in the Ottoman world. Thus, the majority of this chapter considers maps in the context of the handwritten and copied works of which they form integral parts, with all the caveats about dating and authorship that were raised in the last chapter. The difference here is that more of the manuscripts can be reliably dated to within a hundred years of the lifetime of the author credited with composing the work and designing its cartographic contents. In some cases we actually have manuscripts in the author's own handwriting. Nonetheless, variations across copies, especially of such a popular and enduring work as Piri Reis's *Book of the Sea*, must be taken into account when analysing them as part of the same mapping tradition. Similarly, even when the balance shifted to print, as it did in the Ottoman Empire by the late eighteenth century, it is important not to assume uniformity in production. Early printed books resembled

manuscripts in important ways, especially those that included maps, which were often coloured by hand after printing.

Necessity, however, requires a selective approach, both in the framing of mapping traditions and in the identification of patterns across each tradition. As in the previous chapter, instead of a survey of the varieties of map produced in the Ottoman Empire, I focus on mapping traditions that communicate modalities of regional or superregional thought. These tend to be series of comparatively large-scale maps appearing in the context of written works, rather than world maps or stand-alone artefacts. Overall, the works analysed below suggest that Ottomans perceived the world around them as highly differentiated and saturated with meaning, but fundamentally accessible, without rigid political or cultural barriers. Mapping regions of historical and religious significance or strategic and economic desirability was a way of claiming a share in a civilizational legacy emblemized geographically rather than territory per se. Since the maps in this chapter were made by and for Ottoman elites, they often emphasize the connective role of agents of empire, though in some cases it was the maps themselves that acted as agents connecting people across great distances. It is only at the end of this period, with the turn toward world atlases organized by continent, that mapping functions less to evoke access and connectivity than to privilege a posture of distance and objectivity, which was, despite Ottoman attempts to appropriate it, increasingly inseparable from discourses of European supremacy.

MAPPING THE MEDITERRANEAN

It would not be an exaggeration to say that the most famous cartographer of the Ottoman era was a mariner by the name of Piri Reis (meaning ‘Captain’ Piri). His fame was mostly posthumous, as he was executed on orders from the Ottoman Sultan in 1554 for allegedly mishandling a naval conflict, and he never enjoyed the recognition at the highest levels of the empire that he desired, at least not for his maps. However, in the decades after his death his signal achievement, an atlas of the coastlines and islands of the Mediterranean Sea, entitled *Kitāb-i bahriye* (Book of the Sea),

was copied many times and circulated into the eighteenth century. The *Book of the Sea* was not, however, his only cartographic work. Piri Reis has also achieved fame, in this case relatively recently, for a world map that he prepared in 1513.¹ This map, a fragment of which has survived to this day, was based on a number of sources available to sailors in the Mediterranean world in his lifetime, including one of Columbus's own maps. Thus, Piri Reis's 1513 fragment, which shows the eastern coast of Brazil and portions of the Caribbean, is among the earliest surviving maps to incorporate the geographical discoveries of the preceding two decades, and may be the earliest map to reproduce elements of Columbus's own cartographic vision. However, the *Book of the Sea* is arguably the most innovative of Piri Reis's works and certainly the work that most clearly conveys a sense of belonging in a greater Mediterranean region.²

The *Book of the Sea* may be described as a portolan atlas, a distinctive form of navigational guide that had circulated in the Mediterranean for more than two centuries by the lifetime of Piri Reis. Portolans might consist of written instructions and/or charts that were intended for practical use by sailors plying the seas for commercial or military reasons. A handful of Arabic portolan charts made in North Africa and dating from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries exhibit all the conventions associated with such cartographic texts by their time.³ These include compass roses from which rhumb lines corresponding to wind directions criss-cross the map and the inscription of toponyms for harbours, anchorages or port cities at right angles to the coastline (similar to the toponyms ringing the Mediterranean in illus. 15). The smaller-scale versions of these charts centre on the Mediterranean, but also include the Black Sea and the Atlantic coasts of Western Europe and the British Isles. Larger-scale versions might focus on the eastern or western half of the Mediterranean. By highlighting coastal points of orientation, portolan charts were useful for navigating bodies of water like the Mediterranean, in which a boat was never very far from land. Piri Reis's *Book of the Sea* may be classified as a portolan atlas in that it consists of written text and charts that together act as a navigational guide for sailors in the Mediterranean. However, its maps, rendered at a very large scale, and its lengthy commentaries in Ottoman Turkish, a Turkic language written in Arabic script that is the

ancestor of modern Turkish, endow it with aesthetic and literary qualities that exceed the practical requirements of a portolan.

Kinship may also be traced between the *Book of the Sea* and another genre known as the *isolarii* (books of islands) popularized in the fifteenth century by the Florentine Cristoforo Buondelmonti and the Venetian Bartolommeo dalli Sonetti.⁴ These works were generally devoted to the islands in a particular body of water with chapters consisting of a drawing of an island and an excursus, sometimes in verse, recounting its history or narrating anecdotes of the kind usually found in travel literature. The wealth of personal and, to a certain extent, historical and ethnographic information furnished by Piri Reis, as well as his attention to individual islands and segments of coastline, makes this an apt comparison, though *isolarii* were rarely as oriented toward navigation as the *Book of the Sea*. Instead, its detailed nautical instructions presented in both word and image; its first-hand information on coastal topography, settlements and towns; and its considerable aesthetic and literary appeal represent a hybrid of the practical uses of portolans and the belletristic tendencies of *isolarii*. Most of all, however, it represents a serious effort to map a Mediterranean region from the perspective of a mariner in the service of the Ottoman Sultan. The extant manuscripts of the *Book of the Sea*, about forty strong, thus constitute an important and unique mapping tradition, one that certainly attracted an appreciative audience, as the proliferation of copies suggests, but did not seem to inspire others to author works of similar scope and distinction.⁵

Piri Reis composed the *Book of the Sea* in two versions, the first in 1521 and the second in 1526, which survive today in manuscript copies dating from the 1550s to the turn of the eighteenth century.⁶ In the second version, the number of maps is increased from well over a hundred to just over two hundred, introductory and concluding sections in verse are appended, and the written text accompanying the charts is expanded or revised. In general, both versions move along the Mediterranean coast in a counterclockwise direction, starting near Gallipoli, which was the author's home town, and ending at the Sea of Marmara in the first version and the Gulf of Saros in the second.⁷ With the exception of a map of the city of Cairo, which will be discussed below, additions to the 1526 version do not cover any new areas, but rather portray the segments of coast and the islands

included in the first version at variant scales, from different perspectives, and with more detail and ornamentation. The generally more polished maps of the second version, along with clues in the written text, indicate that his decision to revise and expand the book was to increase its appeal for an elite audience, particularly the Ottoman Sultan to whom it is dedicated, rather than to improve its practical use for mariners, who may have been better served by the first version.⁸ Nonetheless, the maps in the dozen or so extant manuscripts of the second version, perhaps because they were intended for influential individuals who did not ply the seas, more clearly communicate a vision of a historically meaningful and economically desirable region in which Ottoman rule might continue to be consolidated and expanded, especially in contested frontier zones like North Africa. The overall effect, however, is to stress Ottoman belonging, rather than sovereignty, and the important role played by mariners in making the Mediterranean cohesive and accessible.

Basic patterns in the design of the maps across manuscripts of both versions contribute to this image of a cohesive and accessible greater Mediterranean region, even though it is treated in small segments rather than as a whole. What might be thought of as a fundamental distinction between land and sea is actually blurred on the maps, reinforcing the message of the written text that knowledge of both is essential to navigation. The use of clustered dots to indicate sandy shallows and reefs reminds the viewer of the ebb and flow of tides and the constantly shifting contours of the shore. Many stretches of coast are depicted over the course of more than one map, so that landmarks appear, come into focus, and recede from chapter to chapter. Islands tend to be mapped in their entirety, though often nearby mainland is visible, and larger islands may be treated over two maps at different scales, one zooming in on a major city and the other devoted to the island as a whole. The drawings of ships throughout many manuscripts are emblems of mobility, and the lines of the ubiquitous wind roses are suggestive of the many possible routes from one place to another. The written text, which refers frequently to the accompanying charts in giving specific instructions for navigating shallows or for finding sources of fresh water, buttresses the sense of connectivity by repeating the phrase 'let us continue' as a way of

transitioning from one feature of coastal topography or one map to the next.

The second version of the work, in particular, emphasizes cohesion and accessibility by portraying the same segment of coast two or three times, at different scales or from different perspectives. Two of the best examples of this phenomenon occur at straits. Straits may be seen as an interruption or division of an otherwise continuous coastline, but in Piri Reis's hands they become apertures and sites of connectivity. The first, the Dardanelles, is portrayed at least twice at the beginning of both versions (and sometimes again at the end), and the second, the Straits of Gibraltar, appears once or twice about three-quarters of the way through the work. In four of the earliest copies of the second version, which date to the second half of the sixteenth century, each set of straits is actually mapped three times (illus. 19 and 20).⁹ The maps of the Dardanelles are laid out from the perspective of someone headed out to sea, wondering which way to turn, an apt way to open the book. The first map points the viewer directly southward to the point at which the Dardanelles spill into the Aegean. The second map angles slightly toward the east, revealing the island of Bozcaada, and the third slightly toward the west, revealing the island of Imbros, before proceeding to the next map further west. The effect of placing three sequential maps, identical in most ways except the slight variation in orientation, at the beginning of the work is to stress possibility, an opening that allows for movement in multiple directions. In the case of Gibraltar, the emphasis is more on connectivity than opening, as the option of heading through the straits into the Atlantic is not suggested by the maps or the accompanying text. Instead, the northern and southern sides of the straits are mapped twice, spanning two pages each (and preceded by a smaller-scale map that includes the city of Granada). The effect of this repetition is to produce the opposite shores as near-mirror images, two sides of the same coin, rather than separate entities, a tendency that resonates with earlier mapping traditions that portrayed the Mediterranean with emphatic symmetry.


At the same time, toponyms on the maps, which are found on all four of the aforementioned early copies of the second version, suggest distinct regional identities on either side of the straits: Anatolia and Rumelia on the east and west shores of the Dardanelles,



respectively, and ‘province of Andalus, known as Rumelia’ and ‘province of Maghrib, known as Anatolia’ on the north and south shores of the Straits of Gibraltar, respectively. The phrasing of the toponymy in the case of Gibraltar constitutes an act of translation, the Arabic toponyms al-Andalus and al-Maghrib, familiar from earlier geographical works, put in Ottoman terms. In this rendition, Rumelia refers to the entire northern Mediterranean from the Dardanelles to the Atlantic, and Anatolia the entire southern and southeastern Mediterranean from the Atlantic to the Dardanelles, rather than their more limited referents of the Balkans and Asia Minor, which contributes to a sense of cohesion and symmetry. Maps from a range of manuscripts suggest other regional divisions, signalled by variations on the Ottoman Turkish toponyms for Catalonia, Spain, France, Calabria, Apulia and Morea in the north and Turkicized Arabic toponyms in the south, usually preceded by the terms *diyār* (lands), *vilāyet* (province) or *memleket* (realm). Thus, the *Book of the Sea* subdivides its Mediterranean region at three levels: small segments, which focus on port cities, coastal landforms or islands for the purposes of large-scale mapping; medium segments, which are identified by the repetition of regional toponyms over multiple maps; and two halves, loosely comprising the north/northwestern and south/southeastern shores, indicated frequently in the maps by the terms Rumelia and Anatolia and joined to each other at the Dardanelles and Gibraltar.

In general, there are more regional toponyms on maps from the second version, which suggests that Piri Reis’s decision to revise the *Book of the Sea* may have been at least partly intended to increase its usefulness as a general geographical reference work. Maps from some later manuscripts also tend to display markers of sovereignty more than earlier manuscripts do. Illustrating this tendency is a map of the Libyan city of Tripoli from one of the earliest surviving manuscripts of the second version, copied in 1555, which may be compared to a lavish, late seventeenth-century manuscript of the same version (illus. 21 and 22).¹⁰ Both maps include wind roses with arrows pointing north, and neither map differentiates between land and sea in terms of background colour. The city itself is rendered in simpler forms and more muted colours in the earlier manuscript, while the urban architecture in the later

20 Map of the Straits of Gibraltar from a manuscript of the second version of Piri Reis’s *Kitāb-i bahriye* (Book of the Sea), dated 1574.



21 Map of Tripoli (Libya) from a manuscript of the second version of Piri Reis's *Kitāb-i bahriye* (Book of the Sea), dated 1555.


22 Map of Tripoli (Libya) from a 17th-century manuscript of the second version of Piri Reis's *Kitāb-i bahriye* (Book of the Sea).

manuscript is more clearly differentiated. While the label 'city of Tripoli in the Maghrib' is inserted just inland from the city in the earlier map, the later map has a title in red ink inscribed vertically in the interior that explicitly identifies it with Ottoman sovereignty: 'realm of Tripoli West, which belongs to the Supreme Dynasty'.¹¹ A large, red flag can be seen on the same map billowing from a parapet on the seaward side of the city walls.¹² Crescent moons, a symbol of Ottoman imperial power, are not visible on this flag, but they can be discerned on the same map from another manuscript of a similar style.¹³

Although Piri Reis often notes which cities or islands are under the sway of which Mediterranean polity in the written text, this information does not regularly find its way to the maps; regional toponyms cannot automatically be understood in terms of political jurisdiction, and even flags, when they are depicted, are not always clear clues. In the case of this late seventeenth-century manuscript, however, not only do some of


the map titles make explicit political claims, but they actually reflect claims that post-date Piri Reis's completion of the work. In fact, the next map in the sequence repeats the assertion of Ottoman sovereignty at the top just inland from a smaller version of Tripoli. Strikingly, however, Piri Reis's written commentary on these maps describes Tripoli's fall to Spanish forces in 1510. The Ottoman Empire did not establish control over this portion of the North African coast until 1551, well after Piri Reis had completed the work. This may indicate that the copyists of later manuscripts sometimes updated the maps to reflect geopolitical realities while leaving the original written text intact.

Piri Reis actually suggests in this chapter that the Ottomans had missed an opportunity to conquer this part of the coast earlier in the



century, an opportunity made possible, it is implied, by his presence, along with that of his uncle and employer, Kemal Reis, who had gained the trust of the local people. He describes in detail the material benefits to be gained from the trans-Saharan trade in gold, slaves, wheat and horses by whoever holds sway over the port city of Tripoli and the entrepôts of its hinterland. Accordingly, the maps of Tripoli across manuscripts of the second version depict settlements well into the interior, such as the oases of the Fezzan, a desert zone of southwestern Libya, including sites as far as 300 miles (482 km) from the coast.¹⁴ Linked to this, the chapter on the Gulf of Sidra, stretching from Misrata in the west to Benghazi in the east, includes a discussion of a system of flag signals by which nomadic groups in the area alert each other about incoming ships in order to gather at the coast for purposes of defence or trade. Maps accompanying this chapter across manuscripts of the second version depict flags flying among extravagantly rendered tents (illus. 23).¹⁵ The drawings of tents rival the portrayal of the city of Tripoli in terms of size, centrality and detail on the maps, and though the hinterland of the Gulf of Sidra is described as desert, it is not, despite its nomadic population, mapped with any less attention to detail or aesthetic appeal. In both word and image, therefore, Piri Reis suggests that his knowledge of and access to places of relatively untapped potential could benefit the empire he served. The *Book of the Sea* evokes connectivity not only between the ports and anchorages of the coast, but between coast and interior in establishing a greater Mediterranean region of economic and strategic desirability.

Indeed, it has been argued that the maps in the second version of the *Book of the Sea* highlight North Africa in particular as a dynamic arena for the expansion and consolidation of Ottoman power.¹⁶ In general, the maps of the southern shores of the Mediterranean across manuscripts of the first version are less detailed than the maps of the northern shores, and among the changes to the second version is the increased number of maps of North Africa.¹⁷ In fact, the most notable addition to the cartographic contents of the second version may be the depiction of the course of the Nile in a series of consecutive charts that culminate in an elaborate image of the city of Cairo. The only other city to receive such prominent treatment in the earliest manuscripts of the second version is Venice, which,




23 Map of the Gulf of Sidra from a manuscript of the second version of Piri Reis's *Kitāb-i bahriye* (Book of the Sea), dated 1555.

as a century-old rival of the Ottomans for Mediterranean dominance and a popular subject for the established artistic genre of 'city views' in this period, would have increased the appeal of the work for an elite clientele.¹⁸ However, Venice, as a coastal city, also appears on charts from the first version, whereas inland Cairo represents a new area mapped specifically for the second version and is consistent with the generally increased cartographic emphasis on North Africa.¹⁹ The detailed image of a city located more than 100 miles (160 km) from the coast suggests that Piri Reis wanted to draw particular attention to this area. Piri Reis had participated in Sultan Selim I's conquest of Egypt in 1517 and then returned again in 1524 as part of an official delegation sent to strengthen Ottoman administration in the area. He mentions this latter trip in the introduction to the second version, and it presumably informed his

decision to add the maps of Cairo and the Nile, perhaps as a way of celebrating one of the empire's most recent acquisitions. At that point, Cairo had been part of the Ottoman Empire for less than a decade, and he may also have seen it as a frontier that needed further integration.²⁰

The maps of Cairo from the early manuscripts of the second version are oriented southward with the major urban areas lying to the east (left) of the central Nile and the pyramids of Giza in the northwestern (upper-right) corner (illus. 24).²¹ This example includes many of the same features found in other manuscripts of the second version, such as the identification of the earliest Muslim settlement in the area, here labelled 'Old Cairo', on the southeastern shore, the



24 Map of Cairo from a manuscript of the second version of Piri Reis's *Kitāb-i bahriye* (Book of the Sea), dated 1555.

port settlement of Bulaq on the centre-eastern shore, the island of Rhoda in the middle of the Nile, and the city of Cairo proper, founded in the tenth century as capital of the Fatimid Caliphate and more recently serving as seat of the Mamluk sultans, whose surrender to the Ottomans Piri Reis had witnessed, sprawling eastward to the edge of the map and linked to the Nile by an aqueduct. Other landmarks are more easily identifiable on maps in later manuscripts, but it is still possible here to discern the Nilometer on the southern tip of Rhoda Island, the shrine dedicated to the famed ninth-century religious scholar al-Shafi'i to the south of the city, and the palace complex where the aqueduct meets the walls of Cairo. Nonetheless, it is the Nile that draws the eye and forms the aquatic link with the rest of the work – both in the sense that the Nile charts can be fitted together vertically to depict the course of the river between the Mediterranean and Cairo and in the sense that it is a navigable body of water analogous to the Mediterranean itself. The sketches of river vessels alongside the Nile in many versions of this map, made all the more noticeable for being superimposed on land, function as a further reminder of the book's emphasis on nautical matters.

If Cairo represented a compelling frontier, what of the imperial centre? Conspicuous by its absence in a work that evokes Ottoman activity in a Mediterranean region is the city of Constantinople, also referred to as Istanbul, but most often called by its older name on maps up to the twentieth century. Although it is impossible to know for sure, it seems that Piri Reis never intended to include a map of the Ottoman capital in the *Book of the Sea*, nor, for that matter, any body of water north of the Sea of Marmara, such as the Bosphorus Straits and the Black Sea. At the very least, no chapter of the written text is devoted to these areas, whereas both versions include chapters on Venice and the second version includes a short chapter introducing the charts of Cairo and the Nile. However, many manuscript copies, dating from the second half of the sixteenth century on, boast a number of what have been called 'supplemental' maps, including a variety of images of the city of Istanbul, often appended to the end.²² A few manuscripts also include small-scale maps of the whole Mediterranean, the Black Sea, and/or subregions of the Mediterranean, such as the Aegean Sea, akin to portolan charts of the era, as well as world maps of different stripes (see illus. 1).²³ Whether or not Piri Reis intended

for all or some of these maps to accompany the *Book of the Sea*, they are certainly compatible with the work's vision of Ottoman belonging in a greater Mediterranean region. An image of Istanbul, in particular, serves to emphasize a connection between the imperial centre and the entire perimeter of the Mediterranean, painstakingly described and mapped in the rest of the work, segment by segment, island by island, and port by port, including its furthest peripheries, such as the Straits of Gibraltar or the oases of the Sahara. In this way, the surviving manuscripts of the *Book of the Sea* constitute a mapping tradition that celebrates a meaningful maritime region that had been mastered, if not (yet) fully conquered, by Ottoman agents of empire.

SACRED CENTRES, IMPERIAL PERIPHERIES

Matrakci Nasuh may be most famous for the magnificent image of Istanbul that opens his sixteenth-century campaign chronicle known as *Mecmū'a-i menāzil* (Compendium of Stages).²⁴ However, like his contemporary Piri Reis, his approach to mapping lavishes attention on what might be considered the periphery. Indeed, it could be argued that his several illustrated works convey the extent of Ottoman sovereignty through back-and-forth movement between the imperial centre and its various peripheries, with the tents on many of his images the terrestrial equivalent of Piri Reis's ships – signs of the mobility and reach of Ottoman agents of empire.²⁵ Nonetheless, in the *Compendium of Stages*, Matrakci Nasuh seems more interested in establishing Ottoman belonging in a meaningful region than in documenting imperial possessions. This region lay among the borderlands with the rival Safavid Empire in northwestern Iran and central Iraq, an area that was occupied by the Ottoman army in the campaign of 1534–5. In fact, the longer title of the work, *Beyān-ı menāzil-i sefer-i 'Irākeyn-i Sultān Süleymān Hān* (Exposition of the Stages of Sultan Süleyman's Expedition to the Two Iraqs) explicitly names this region using a Turkicized Arabic toponym: 'the Two Iraqs', referring to *'Irāq-i 'arab* (or Arab Iraq, which is simply known as Iraq in the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition) and *'Irāq-i 'acem* (or Persian Iraq, which is the equivalent of al-Jibal in the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition).²⁶

Despite the martial tone of the work, however, the climax is not the conquest of this region, but rather the visitation of its commemorative and sacred sites.

As a youth, Matrakci Nasuh was brought into imperial service through the *devşirme*, the process by which sons of Christian families in the Balkans were taken as levy from their homes, converted to Islam, trained in palace schools in Istanbul and then enlisted in whatever capacity for which their aptitudes made them suitable. The products of this process constituted an elite political-military class responsible for the administration, elaboration and defence of state resources. Matrakci Nasuh's training earned him a place among the Janissaries, the infantry corps of the Ottoman military, and he was a participant in the storied expansionist campaigns of the sixteenth century under Sultans Selim I and Süleyman I. He also developed an interest in intellectual pursuits and authored a number of books on topics from arithmetic to history to military strategy before his death in 1564. Among his historical works, the best known are his illustrated chronicles of Ottoman military campaigns, which he recounted based on, for the most part, first-hand observation. Unlike other examples of the genre, however, Matrakci Nasuh's illustrations do not depict people or warfare, but focus solely on topography and architecture. Thus, the illustration programme of his works brings them closer to atlases than to other imperial histories from the era, which portray battles, diplomatic exchanges, palace ceremonials and urban scenes with varying degrees of realism.²⁷

The *Compendium of Stages*, which chronicles Sultan Süleyman I's 1534–5 campaign against the Safavids, is Matrakci Nasuh's most famous work, with the most complete series of illustrations.²⁸ The topographical detail of the illustrations, their spatial sequencing, and their numerical predominance (130 out of a total of 218 pages are painted) bring up an immediate parallel with the *Book of the Sea*. Unlike the *Book of the Sea*, however, the *Compendium of Stages* survives in a single manuscript completed in 1537. Although it is likely that Matrakci Nasuh played a pivotal role in designing the images that accompany the written text, probably by means of sketches that he completed on the campaign, the finished product reflects a variety of artistic styles, which combine conventions associated with Persianate miniature painting, Mediterranean

portolan charts and the printed city views increasingly in vogue in Europe. The unique surviving manuscript and its sumptuous aesthetic contents suggest the *Compendium of Stages* was never intended for wide circulation, but rather conceived as a contribution to the palace library. Accordingly, it boasts none of the practical potential of the *Book of the Sea*, though it likewise reflects an expectation of what would appeal to the ruling elite.

The *Compendium of Stages* is structured as a progression of stops along a route stretching from Istanbul east across Anatolia to Tabriz, then dipping south to Baghdad, before heading back north and west through Aleppo to western Anatolia. Although its elaborate city views are the most well known, the majority of its illustrations depict minor sites, such as villages or fortresses, sequenced vertically from the top to the bottom of a page. These are then linked spatially to those on subsequent pages by streams and rivers that break off at one margin and resume at the next. The water courses, which are rarely labelled, are not the central features of Matrakci Nasuh's images, in contrast to the river maps in the *Book of Curiosities* (see illus. 16) and other itinerary maps from the Ottoman period, but they share the same symbolic function: water as a symbol of movement and connectivity.²⁹ Occasionally some of the written text of the itinerary is embedded in the images or breaks them up, but usually in ways that stress the vertical sequence and spatial progression. Thus, rather than a compendium of pleasing views of major cities, the kind of thing that reached a height of popularity in Europe with the publication of Georg Braun and Franz Hogenberg's *Civitates Orbis Terrarum* at the end of the sixteenth century, the *Compendium of Stages* is more comparable to a deconstructed itinerary map or portolan atlas, with the vast majority of its contents depicting not large cities, but the stretches in between.

A stretch of the campaign was undertaken in what is today northwestern Iran, about 150 miles (240 km) south-southeast of Tabriz, an area just beyond the point at which the Ottomans were able to maintain more than nominal control over land conquered in war (illus. 25).³⁰ Indeed, even the first Safavid capital of Tabriz, which had been conquered by Selim in 1514 and then several times by Süleyman and is mapped in two of Matrakci Nasuh's works, was too far away from Istanbul for consistent administration, though the

Safavid Shah Tahmasp I moved his capital further south and east to Qazvin in 1548, a recognition, among other things, of the reach of the Ottoman military. The spatial sequencing of sites, vertically and from right to left, is in evidence here, with the town of Miyana, southeast of Tabriz, labelled in the middle of the right-hand page and the town of Zanjan, south of Miyana, at the bottom of the left-hand page. The flow of the streams on this map is evoked by means of texture in the blue paint, suggesting movement from one page/stage to another. Although roads would have been available along most of the itinerary, they are rarely depicted in the *Compendium of Stages*. Bridges are often the only sign of the infrastructure necessary for overland travel, as in the three pictured on the lower right. At the top left is a campsite marking a halting place on the campaign, and below it are two named khans, which were fortified inns that might have doubled as military garrisons. The maintenance and security of such facilities were widely understood as a priority for any government, but in this area the responsible party is unclear. There is no indication of political jurisdiction on any of the maps in the *Compendium of Stages*, and even the recurrent appearance of tents symbolizes, at best, temporary imperial presence.³¹

The larger and more detailed city views, particularly those occupying two pages of the *Compendium of Stages*, which comprise Tabriz, Sultaniyya, Baghdad, Hilla, Karbala, Najaf and Aleppo, have been interpreted as a way of announcing the arrival at a frontier.³² These cities not only act as counterpoints to Istanbul, the imperial centre, which is rendered in the most detail at the beginning of the work, but, strung together, suggest an awareness of the furthest extent of the empire in the east and southeast. In Matrakci Nasuh's other major illustrated chronicle, a work documenting Süleyman's 1542–3 campaign against the Habsburgs in Hungary, the same pattern holds.³³ Two-page views of Budapest, Tata and Székesfehérvár mark the campaign's most far-flung military victories in the northwest. At the same time these were all historically resonant, religiously symbolic or otherwise desirable cities that would have made them compelling regardless of their political status, not unlike the images of Venice that grace most copies of the *Book of the Sea*. The absence of explicit markers of sovereignty on Matrakci Nasuh's illustrations suggest that the itineraries his works trace may have been less about documenting

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25 Map of route through northwestern Iran from the only extant manuscript of Matrakci Nasuh's *Mecmū'a-i menâzil* (*Compendium of Stages*), completed in 1537.



سرچ خان

خان کهنای

مقبره زکریا



the flows of imperial power than about inserting the Ottomans into a grand civilizational narrative emblemized geographically.³⁴

Tabriz and Baghdad, which each receive detailed, two-page treatment in the *Compendium of Stages*, were both former imperial capitals, for the Safavids and Abbasids respectively, that Süleyman was able to claim (or reclaim in case of Tabriz) as a result of the 1534–5 campaign. It has been observed that images of recently conquered cities sometimes included ‘Ottomanized’ elements, such as mosques with pencil-shaped minarets, clusters of rectangular residential housing and well-maintained perimeter walls.³⁵ Whether the portrayal of these elements was conventional, aspirational or documentary, they communicated a certain order, which may have been associated with Ottoman administration. By contrast, the image of Sultaniyya, a city that was not as populous as Baghdad or Tabriz and in which Ottoman rule was never established, even temporarily, communicates a sense of disorder (illus. 26).³⁶ The image is painted in lush colours, with ornate, oversized monumental architecture at its centre, including a particularly distinctive depiction of the tomb of Uljaytu, the Mongol ruler who had made Sultaniyya his capital in the early fourteenth century, but it also has an air of ruin about it, the perimeter wall in fragments and the spaces in between structures filled with vegetation. While flora and fauna are features of many of the illustrations, they are usually either located outside city walls or confined to clearly demarcated intramural orchards and gardens. Here vegetation is riotous and everywhere, and frolicking animals seem to descend on the city. In the context of the *Compendium of Stages*, this is the spatial other – a former imperial capital that will not be reinvigorated by sustained Ottoman presence, unlike Baghdad and Tabriz.³⁷ At the same time its difference can be read as a reminder of the transitory nature of worldly power, an edificatory theme that would have been very familiar to the Ottoman educated elite.³⁸

By way of comparison, Matrakci Nasuh’s image of Baghdad, despite its desert-like landscape, is more recognizably ordered than that of Sultaniyya (illus. 27).³⁹ The river Tigris divides the city in two halves, just as the Golden Horn does in the image of Istanbul that opens the work, evoking a visual parallel between the two cities. On the right side of the river is a rectangular fortified settlement that

boasts a variety of structures and three fenced gardens or orchards. On the left side of the river there are no ramparts, but the gardens are clearly enclosed and courtyards and arcades suggest protected spaces. Pathways enter and exit Baghdad, and even trace routes within the city walls, conveying both accessibility and order. In fact, the only images in the *Compendium of Stages* that consistently depict roads are those of central Iraq, implying connectivity with the surrounding region. Moreover, it is here, where the Ottoman army spent the winter of 1534–5, that Matrakci Nasuh lingers longest. Following Baghdad is a lengthy series (25 pages) of illustrations of individual shrines, mausoleums and mosques located in the city and its hinterland. These images are laid out vertically, but, instead of waterways connecting the sites, they are connected thematically by written passages inserted between them identifying the figure from Islamic history buried in or venerated by each structure. The series concludes with two-page views of three religiously significant towns located in an area roughly 100 miles (160 km) south of Baghdad – Najaf, Karbala and Hilla – before the narrative takes up the return trip to Istanbul and the illustrations resume their previous spatial rhythm.


This ‘Iraqi’ section places a meaningful region at the heart of the work and arguably constitutes its climax. Indeed, this region, while peripheral when viewed in terms of distance from Istanbul, is, in fact, textually central. It is evoked by a ritual topography within a geographical (and textual) space demarcated by the images of Baghdad in the north (the beginning) and the towns of Karbala, Najaf and Hilla in the south (the end). The emphatic Islamicization of this space accomplished on the intervening pages does not distinguish between Shi‘ism and Sunnism, despite the ideological aspect of the rivalry between the Sunni Ottomans and the Shi‘ite Safavids. One page names sites associated with the ninth, tenth and eleventh imams of the Twelver Shi‘ite tradition, which takes its name from the belief that the twelfth imam, a direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad in a line stretching back to his son-in-law Ali, was taken into occultation by God at the end of the ninth century and will return to herald the Final Judgment. The next page names sites associated with two of the most important scholars of Sunnism, the eighth-century Abu Hanifa, after whom the official Ottoman school of Islamic jurisprudence was named, and the ninth-century Ibn Hanbal.⁴⁰ The ritual topography

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26 Map of Sultaniyya from the only extant manuscript of Matrakci Nasuh’s *Mecmū’a-i menāzil* (Compendium of Stages), completed in 1537.







27 Map of Baghdad from the only extant manuscript of Matrakci Nasuh's *Mecmū'a-i menāzil* (Compendium of Stages), completed in 1537.

also commemorates Muslim mystics, or Sufis, both early controversial ones like the tenth-century al-Hallaj and later more mainstream ones who launched the religious orders that would become such an important part of Ottoman communal life, as well as a handful of female descendants of the Prophet through Ali. The two-page town views dominated by the mosque and mausoleum complexes honouring Ali at Najaf and his son, and third imam, Husayn at Karbala are richly coloured and detailed (illus. 28).⁴¹ Although their kinship with the Prophet and Ali's status as fourth Caliph of the Islamic community earned them Sunni reverence, they were certainly more closely associated with Shi'ism in this period, and especially with Shi'ite pilgrimage to and scholarly activities near their tombs. In fact, the tombs of Husayn and Ali are depicted twice, once among the paintings of isolated structures and again in the overall plans of Karbala and Najaf. This repetition not only suggests an effort to reproduce the architectural individuality of these structures in particular, especially compared to other more generic forms in the series, but magnifies the importance of the sites in the context of the work as a whole.

Indeed, the *Compendium of Stages* does not simply associate the region around Baghdad, former capital of the Abbasid Caliphate and home to some of the most notable scholars and mystics of Islam, with the power and righteousness of the Ottoman Sultan, but actively celebrates it as a destination for pilgrimage, reproducing the attention the Safavids had lavished on it – both literally, in the depiction of recent Safavid renovations to some of the sites, and symbolically, in the inclusion of Najaf, Karbala and Hilla, itself a centre of Shi'ite scholarly activities since the thirteenth century, among the cities assigned two-page treatment in the work as a whole.⁴² This suggests an appropriation of the Safavid message for Ottoman purposes. While there is no doubt about the geopolitical rivalry between the Ottomans and Safavids, their religious differences were invoked selectively and strategically. The Ottomans ruled sizeable populations of Shi'ites of various stripes, and the conflict with the Safavids was as much over their loyalty as it was over the lands they inhabited. But it must also be seen in terms of the piety of many members of the Ottoman ruling elite and the multivalence of sites associated with Islamic history. Descendants of the Prophet Muhammad were

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28 Map of Najaf from the only extant manuscript of Matrakci Nasuh's *Mecmū'a-i menāzil* (Compendium of Stages), completed in 1537.






revered by Sunnis and Shi'ites alike, and the Iraqi region at the heart of the *Compendium of Stages* would have been richly symbolic for Muslims everywhere, including Sultan Süleyman himself. Furthermore, the Ottomans were heirs to a long tradition of ensuring the accessibility of holy sites to pilgrims from various religions, as in the case of Jerusalem, which had rarely been closed to Christian and Jewish visitors in the nearly ten centuries of Muslim control. For Süleyman, who styled himself a second Alexander and took the titles of Emperor and Shah as a way of co-opting his rivals' universalist and absolutist claims, there would have been no contradiction in the implication that he would also be a protector of multi-confessional pilgrimage in Iraq.⁴³

In fact, some of the stylistic choices that distinguish Najaf and Karbala from the other cities in the *Compendium of Stages*, such as devoting so much space to the city's ritually significant mosque and mausoleum complex and combining plan and elevation views to show the layout of shrines therein, are reminiscent of the images of the sanctuaries of Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem that had been in circulation on pilgrimage certificates since the twelfth century. This similarity may have been intended as a visual signal that Najaf and Karbala should be counted among the premier pilgrimage destinations of the Islamic world. Indeed, a nearly contemporaneous explosion in the production of illustrated hajj guides begs comparison with the *Compendium of Stages*, despite the latter work's limited circulation.⁴⁴ These guides were structured as a cycle of topographical images, usually accompanying the text of the *Futūḥ-i ḥaramayn* (Introductions to the Two Holy Sanctuaries), a Persian poem extolling the virtues of Mecca and Medina, composed by one Muhyi al-Din Lari in 1506 and dedicated to the Muslim ruler of Gujarat, a polity in western India with seafaring ties to the Arabian Peninsula. The sequence and number of images vary from manuscript to manuscript, but most include connective elements and minor localities along the route followed by pilgrims, another parallel to the *Compendium of Stages*. While all the manuscripts depict the major holy sites in and around Mecca and Medina, a subset concludes with a depiction of the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem, which is not mentioned in the poem but formed part of a pilgrimage itinerary that the Ottoman administration encouraged.⁴⁵ The scribes who copied

and illustrated the poem and made the guidebooks available for sale to pilgrims came from different parts of the world, though many of them signed their work in Mecca, suggesting that they were engaged in *mujāwara*, prolonged or permanent residence in a holy city for pious reasons. This also contributed to the relative stability of the formats for the major illustrations in the cycle, especially those of Mecca and Medina.⁴⁶

One of the earliest dated manuscripts, produced in Mecca in 1544, gives a sense of the schematic approach employed in these guidebooks (illus. 29), as well as similarities to Matrakci Nasuh's images of Najaf and Karbala.⁴⁷ Like Najaf, here the Meccan sanctuary is rendered in a combination of elevation and plan view. The courtyard is a vertical rectangle oriented southwest, with the Ka'ba covered by the traditional black cloth, also a vertical rectangle, at its centre. The semicircular wall designating the area known as *al-ḥijr* is pictured on the right side, and the Black Stone is indicated by a faint gold crescent on the lower left corner. Other monuments in the sanctuary are identified by name, as are the gates around the perimeter. The courtyard arcades are flattened outward or inward, with hanging lamps in the archways, and the minarets are likewise flattened into the sanctuary. This approach is repeated for Medina, with the characteristic features of the sanctuary – the Prophet's tomb, the *minbar* (pulpit) and the palm tree(s) in the courtyard – enclosed in a consistently oriented compositional frame of flattened arcades. The layout of these two images is strikingly stable across surviving manuscripts of the work dating from the sixteenth century and the early seventeenth, although ornamentation and colour schemes vary considerably and the labels on the illustrations appear in different languages, a tendency that becomes more marked when the manuscripts were copied outside Mecca.⁴⁸

Whereas Matrakci Nasuh links the imperial centre, Istanbul, to an imperial periphery that is simultaneously a sacred (and past imperial) centre, these illustrated pilgrimage guides link a sacred centre to Muslims near and far. The images of Arafat, Mina and Muzdalifa, which are staples of the guides, represent this connectivity graphically with clusters of tents that evoke the multitudes of pilgrims from all over the world who converge on the sites for the annual hajj. One particularly topographically oriented mid-fifteenth-century



manuscript includes a two-page image of the port of Jidda, where many pilgrims coming by sea would first step foot on the Arabian Peninsula, with a variety of ships crowding its harbour.⁴⁹ Ships and tents were used by Piri Reis and Matrakci Nasuh to indicate imperial access to meaningful regions, even those located on or stretching beyond the frontiers of Ottoman sovereignty. Here they indicate Muslim access to the sacred centre. Moreover, the guidebooks themselves act as conveyances for bringing centre to periphery and in fact blurring the distinction altogether. By carrying the books home, or by commissioning them upon return, pilgrims re-enacted the experience for their communities. While the composition of the guidebooks was a product of Muslims travelling to Mecca, their widespread dispersal, as well as their variety of artistic styles and languages, is testimony to the diversity of the Islamic world, a world that extended well past the areas that enjoyed proximity to Arabia or Ottoman sovereignty.

This tradition of mapping the modes and nodes of sacred travel persisted for the rest of the Ottoman period. In particular, the basic formula for depicting the Meccan sanctuary – southwestern orientation, arcaded frame and central Ka'ba – was replicated in guidebooks, devotional materials and pilgrimage certificates, and even on painted tiles in mosques or private homes through the nineteenth century, though later iterations introduced three-dimensionality and perspective.⁵⁰ The reproduction of such widely legible images of Mecca transcended political and cultural boundaries, connecting people rather than separating them.⁵¹ This is not to say that political rulers did not benefit from this process; in fact, its very success meant that asserting sovereignty over Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem or investing conspicuously in the upkeep and beautification of their shrines had a ready-made vehicle for publicity.⁵² In the context of the contemporaneous popularization of these images of Mecca, however, the illustration programme of Matrakci Nasuh's *Compendium of Stages* makes even more sense as a reflection of the pious commitments of the Ottoman ruling elite. Moreover, the way these texts visualized holy sites suggests their accessibility to all (Sunnis and Shi'ites, subjects of rival empires) and facilitated their wide circulation. In other words, it was not only the movement of people, such as Ottoman armies or the pilgrims of Gujarat, that connected imperial

29 Plan of the Sacred Mosque (Mecca) from a manuscript of Muhyi al-Din Lari's *Futūḥ-i ḥaramayn* (Introductions to the Two Holy Sanctuaries), dated 1544.

and sacred centres, but the movement of texts and the visual idioms they reproduced across a variegated political and cultural terrain.

MAPPING THE CONTINENTS

By the end of the sixteenth century, therefore, Ottoman scholars had at least three major models for regional mapping. The first focused on coastlines, rivers and routes, and included portolan charts and graphic itineraries. The monumental sixteenth-century works of Piri Reis and Matrakci Nasuh and the illustrated hajj guides and pilgrimage certificates belong to this group and exemplify its tendency toward larger-scale maps and city views. For them, mapping a region properly involved evoking movement across space, whether by means of a well-ordered series of images, the depiction of a central artery of transportation, or inscriptions and iconography related to travel.⁵³ These maps required active participation from the viewer to connect the dots. This could be done by flipping between pages, rotating the maps to read inscriptions or decode iconography, engaging with the written text as a supplement to the accompanying images, or using the imagination or the memory to fill the spaces in between. This interactivity makes possible a kind of virtual travel on the part of the audience, and one of the purposes of hajj guides and pilgrimage certificates in particular may have been to re-enact the visitation of holy sites for those who were unable to make the physical trip themselves.⁵⁴

The second model for regional mapping was the still vibrant 'Atlas of Islam' tradition. World maps reflecting some or all of the conventions of this tradition, such as the circular shape, enclosed regional toponyms and centrally arrayed Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean, were inserted into a variety of works of geography or cosmography from the sixteenth century until well into the eighteenth (see illus. 1), and the 'Atlas of Islam' series continued to be copied, often in Persian translation and at least once in Ottoman Turkish, over the same period.⁵⁵ The persistence of this tradition, even in the face of the addition of the western hemisphere to world maps increasingly circulating in the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Ottoman Empire, reflected the continued interest in

portraying the part of the world dominated by the 'Realm of Islam'. Maps of its twenty or so subdivisions, unlike the world maps, show up less often outside the core works attributable to al-Istakhri, Ibn Hawqal and al-Muqaddasi, but the toponyms and regions they represented found their way into other models of mapping in this period.⁵⁶ Even the third model, which became increasingly popular among Ottoman elites in the seventeenth century, took the term for the subdivisions of the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition, *iqḷīm* (clime, region), and applied it to another kind of region or, in this case, superregion: the continent.⁵⁷


This model built on a tradition of printed world atlases coming out of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe, such as Abraham Ortelius's *Theatrum Orbis Terrarum* (1570), Gerard Mercator's *Atlas Minor* (1595), and Willem and Joan Blaeu's *Atlas Novus* (1635) and *Atlas Maior* (1662). In these atlases the world was divided into four continents – Europe, Asia, Africa and the Americas – and each was mapped individually. Subcontinental regions were also mapped and, although they were demarcated and identified in a variety of ways, they were grouped increasingly by continent. The fact that the atlases were printed made it possible for them to circulate in unprecedented numbers and to reach people whose personal, cultural or political frame of reference could be represented by, at most, a portion of the work as a whole. The small scale of the maps in these atlases conveyed a sense of distance, well beyond what might be imagined from a passing ship, a hillside or some other accessible vantage point, suggesting that the function of the work was more about impersonal classification and comprehensiveness than about evoking connectivity or belonging.

At the same time, the atlases reveal a bias toward their place of publication in terms of the structure of the book, including its language of publication; its titles and legends; and the number, variety and sequencing of the subcontinental units mapped.⁵⁸ Nonetheless, the aspiration to (or affectation of) totality in these atlases both responded to and produced an audience who wanted to acquire the world in its entirety for display – to gaze, rather than to move, across vast distances and, in so doing, to imagine profound differences.⁵⁹ The most basic difference served up by the atlases was that between continents, embodied on the frontispiece of Ortelius's *Theatrum Orbis Terrarum* by the figures of four women: a crowned Europa, sceptre and cross in

hand, reigning over Asia, Africa and America, whose averted eyes and body positions imply vulnerability and inferiority. As this frontispiece suggests, the approach to mapping exemplified by these atlases was often accompanied, if not underpinned, by a discourse of European civilizational supremacy.⁶⁰

Despite this, the vogue for such atlases inspired a creative effort at appropriation in the Ottoman Empire. The multi-stage and fruitful process by which a small group of individuals and workshops in Istanbul between the 1630s and 1730s translated, supplemented and transformed European world atlases for an Ottoman Turkish audience is still being unravelled. It was spear-headed by the well-known polymath Katib Celebi (d. 1657), continued by the Syrian geographer Abu Bakr al-Dimashqi (d. 1691), and adapted for the first imperially chartered Ottoman printing press owned by Ibrahim Muteferrika (d. 1747). Their cartographic projects preserved some aspects of earlier mapping traditions, particularly for the Mediterranean and the lands of the 'Realm of Islam'. Moreover, they did not reproduce the primacy of Europe as the atlases of Ortelius, Mercator or Blaeu had. However, by ultimately settling on a continental organization through which to pursue a totalizing representation of the world and its parts, they were consciously, if selectively, appropriating the European model. The outcome was thoroughly hybrid, though it marked the beginning of the end of earlier approaches to regional mapping.

Although the Istanbul-born Katib Celebi started his career in the Ottoman chancery and participated in numerous military campaigns, the backbone of his formal education was religious scholarship. He was also an autodidact and bibliophile, who read widely and acquired an impressive private library. When he died of a heart attack in his late forties, he had attained the status of one of the premier intellectuals of Istanbul. Among his major interests were geography and cartography, and one of his best-known scholarly endeavours was a massive, unfinished world atlas, combining maps with lengthy written commentaries in Ottoman Turkish, titled *Cihannüma* (Worldview). He began composing this work in 1648, relying primarily on earlier Arabic and Turkish sources, but then shifted gears to collaborate on a translation of Mercator's *Atlas Minor* in the Hondius edition before returning to the *Cihannüma*



30 Sketch world map in Katib Celebi's handwriting from a 16th-century manuscript of Sipahizade's *Awḍaḥ al-masālik ilā ma'rifat al-buldān wa-l-mamālik* (The Clearest Routes to Knowledge of the Countries and the Realms).

project in 1654. The resulting second, reconceptualized version reflected his engagement in the intervening years with European sources. From these two draft versions, both of which survive in manuscripts that he annotated or penned (known as 'autograph' manuscripts), as well as notes found in manuscripts of other works he owned, it is possible to piece together some aspects of his evolving approach to mapping. He was a freehand mapper who did not routinely employ projections or grids of latitude and longitude. He was, however, very interested in an encyclopedic approach to geography, which pushed him toward the world atlas as form and the most up-to-date taxonomies as contents.⁶¹

One clue as to his relatively modest beginnings, as well as the debt he owed to previous mapping traditions, has been recently discovered in another work that he likely used to develop his own ideas.⁶² A sketch world map inserted on a blank page in a sixteenth-century manuscript update of a fourteenth-century Arabic geography shows toponyms arrayed in an eastward-oriented cluster in handwriting that resembles Katib Celebi's (illus. 30). The boxes on the map each contain regional toponyms, from China in the east (on top) to the Maghrib and al-Andalus in the west (at the bottom). Empty spaces between the boxes are filled with names of seas or the Arabic word *mafāza* (desert). For the most part, these enclosed regional toponyms could have been lifted from one of the 'Atlas of Islam' world maps. However, the fact that a large circle has been sketched in which the cluster is not centrally positioned suggests that this information was going to be supplemented by other information, perhaps pertaining to the western hemisphere. Other sketch maps drawn in the margins of this same manuscript focus on rivers and mountain ranges with towns spaced out along them in the mode of itinerary maps, as in the Tigris and Euphrates map (illus. 31). Although some towns are labelled, such as Mosul at the approximate centre of the Tigris, which parallels the top of the page, and Baghdad to its right (south), unlabelled circles also appear along the rivers, signalling an intention to fill in the appropriate toponyms once adequate information had been gathered. Katib



31 Sketch of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers in Katib Celebi's handwriting from a 16th-century manuscript of Sipahizade's *Awḍaḥ al-masālik ilā ma'rifat al-buldān wa-l-mamālik* (The Clearest Routes to Knowledge of the Countries and the Realms).

Celebi used rivers as central features around which to build maps in his other works, a practice that had its corollary in his interest in recording distances between sites on itineraries that either followed or could be evoked graphically by waterways.

Many of the maps in the second version of Katib Celebi's *Cihannüma* also reflect the regionalism of the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition and an emphasis on towns ordered along the

contours of rivers, mountains and shorelines. One example is a map of west-central Iran that accompanies the chapter titled 'the region of *Cebal*, which means '*Irāk-i 'acem*' in the autograph manuscript.⁶³ The chapter title constitutes an act of translation between the Turkicized Arabic toponym for the area from the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition (*Cebal* or al-Jibal) and the term that was used more often in the Ottoman Empire for the same area ('*Irāk-i 'acem*, or Persian Iraq). Katib Celebi's map for this chapter labels cities, rivers and mountains and inscribes at the bottom 'borders of Fars' (the region immediately to the south, mapped earlier in the work) and at the left edge of the map '*Irāk-i 'arab* (Arab Iraq), communicating both separation from and connectivity with neighbouring regions, a message that resonates clearly with earlier mapping traditions. While this manuscript contains a number of maps that Katib Celebi left unfinished (as well as blank half-pages where maps were intended to go), many of them can be found filled out by other hands in later manuscript copies. For example, the map of Khuzistan in the autograph manuscript is nothing more than a set of lines indicating coasts and waterways, identifiable only by the toponym in the chapter heading immediately preceding it. An early eighteenth-century copy of the work, however, shows the same area with cities labelled and a title in red ink in the centre that reads 'realm of Khuzistan' (illus. 32).⁶⁴ The northern part of the Persian Gulf is visible on the upper left, with the city of Basra labelled next to a tiny cluster of buildings at the point where the rivers flow into the sea. This map covers much of the same area with approximately the same orientation as the 'Atlas of Islam' map discussed in Chapter One (see illus. 10), and the central prominence of the toponym Khuzistan on both maps reflects the

continued relevance of this regional division and/or the persistent influence of the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition.

Nonetheless, in stark contrast with previous approaches to composing atlases in the Islamic world, the second version of the *Cihannüma* begins, after an illustrated introduction on mathematical geography and astronomy, with a world map showing both hemispheres and then four individual continental maps (Europe, Africa, Asia and the Americas), followed by the polar regions, before moving from east to west in Asian subcontinental maps, starting with Japan and ending with Lake Van in eastern Anatolia. This was as far west as Katib Celebi reached before his death, leaving a work that barely touched upon the lands actually controlled by the empire he served. By contrast, the Mercator–Hondius *Atlas Minor*, from which he took inspiration in conceptualizing the second version of the *Cihannüma*, starts with Europe, the home of the authors. Katib Celebi's interpretation of a systematic, encyclopedic approach to geography prevented him from starting with the places he – or even his European sources – knew best. Although there would be numerous attempts to supplement and resequence world atlases in the half-century or so after his death, Katib Celebi's unfinished draft would be enshrined at the core of the most famous Turcophone contribution to the genre, a printed world atlas inspired by the second version of the *Cihannüma*.

This work was the brainchild of Ibrahim Muteferrika, a Hungarian convert to Islam and member of an elite military and diplomatic corps (hence the moniker 'Muteferrika', the title assumed by members of that corps) who, after receiving a charter from Sultan Ahmet III in 1727 to establish a publishing house in Istanbul, set out to complete the *Cihannüma* for a printed edition. To do this, he relied on geographical works by Abu Bakr al-Dimashqi, a Damascus-born scholar who moved to Istanbul and received a royal commission to produce a Turkish translation of the 1662 edition of Blaeu's *Atlas Maior*, which had been a gift to Sultan Mehmet IV from the Dutch ambassador in 1668. Although al-Dimashqi followed the *Atlas Maior*'s sequence of continents in his translation, he supplied subcontinental maps only for Europe, East Asia and the Americas, and he eschewed the images of cities and people in local dress that adorn many of the Blaeu maps.⁶⁵ He also oriented the world and continental maps toward the south and made a number of other changes to toponyms

and subcontinental divisions that drew from geographical literature produced in the Islamic world, including manuscripts of both versions of the *Cihannüma* to which he gained access after Katib Celebi's death. A number of abridgements and reworkings of this translation are also attributed to al-Dimashqi. These hybrid works, which exist in a dozen or so later copies (not all of which are complete), reorder the continents to begin with Africa and Asia and insert detailed subcontinental maps for Africa and West Asia, which had been left out of the Blaeu translation. They therefore reflect the growing interest in early eighteenth-century Istanbul in world atlases structured along the lines of their printed European counterparts, but adapted and transformed to reflect the scholarly and artistic milieu in which they were produced and to anticipate the priorities of their Ottoman audience.⁶⁶ Muteferrika's own efforts were part of this trend. He assembled a team of cartographers who did not merely copy maps from Katib Celebi's or al-Dimashqi's work, or from any single European model, but selectively combined and reworked maps from a variety of sources to transform the *Cihannüma* into the first printed world atlas in Turkish.⁶⁷

However, the printed *Cihannüma*, which was published in 1732, is perhaps more properly described as an atlas of Asia. Although it includes the requisite double-hemisphere world maps and maps of the four continents, its 'completion' of Katib Celebi's cartographic project involved adding maps of the Arabian Peninsula, Anatolia and the Bosphorus, not moving into subcontinental mapping sequences for Africa, Europe or the Americas, as do contemporary manuscripts ascribed to al-Dimashqi. The major exception is a series of three maps of the Mediterranean, one at a smaller scale depicting the whole area, including both northern and southern shores and the Black Sea, and the other two zooming in on the Adriatic and the Aegean respectively. These maps had already been prepared by the Muteferrika team to accompany the 1729 printed edition of a historical work by Katib Celebi on Ottoman naval campaigns and drew from the maritime mapping tradition to which the charts prepared by Piri Reis or added to later manuscript copies of the *Book of the Sea* belong.⁶⁸ They also use the regional toponyms most often employed in this tradition, with an emphasis on Anatolia and Rumelia, rather than Asia and Europe, to distinguish the lands separated by the Dardanelles, Sea of Marmara



33 Map of Iran from the Muteferrika edition of Katib Celebi's *Cihannüma*, printed in Istanbul in 1732.

and Bosphorus. They thus represent a break from the continental taxonomy and sequencing employed in the printed world atlas tradition and may have been added to the 1732 *Cihannüma* as a way of highlighting Ottoman presence in the Mediterranean, which the focus on Asia did not allow. In fact, the only legend in the entire work that indicates Ottoman sovereignty appears on the map of the Aegean: 'This page shows the Mediterranean Sea and the islands belonging to the Supreme Dynasty.'

The only other map in the entire work that highlights sovereignty in its legend is that of Safavid Iran. This map is also notable for its departure from Katib Celebi's approach to mapping the same area. In general, compared to manuscripts of the second version of the *Cihannüma*, maps of Asian regions in the Muteferrika edition are more uniformly small-scale and detached from the written text. They tend to combine two or more of Katib Celebi's maps into one, a pattern that becomes most dramatic for India and Iran, which had been divided over six or seven maps in the autograph manuscript. As can be seen here, subdivisions within Iran are demarcated by a web of dotted lines that have been lightly traced in red ink (illus. 33).⁶⁹ Some of these subdivisions correspond to a single map in Katib Celebi's design. As with all maps in the 1732 *Cihannüma*, colour was added by hand after printing, which means that the relative emphasis given any of the black-and-white lines on a map varies from copy to copy. The example shown is fairly representative of the coloured copies of the printed work, with coasts and rivers emphasized in darker red and internal boundaries traced in lighter red, each inscribed by a toponym preceded by the elongated script of the term *memleket* (realm), here connoting a traditional region akin to the *iqlim* of the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition. Notably, colour is not used on this map to trace a boundary between Safavid and Ottoman territory, nor does any inscription mark this geopolitical division.⁷⁰

Like the map of Iran, the maps of Anatolia and Arabia are also subdivided by a web of boundary lines and show no markers of political jurisdiction, though the written text makes clear they were under Ottoman control. Since these areas had not been included in Katib Celebi's original, the subdivisions cannot be a way of attempting to preserve some vestige of his larger-scale approach within a smaller-scale map, which may have been the case for Iran,

nor do they neatly correspond with Ottoman administrative units. In the case of the Arabia map titled 'Region of the Arabian Peninsula and part of the regions of Iraq', these subdivisions indicate the ongoing relevance of regionalisms preserved in earlier mapping traditions. The example here comes from a copy of the *Cihannüma* that shows an unusually heavy hand with colour (illus. 34).⁷¹ This has the effect of accentuating the subdivisions, which are labelled with the term 'realm', as in the Iran map, but also with other traditional terms for regional entities, such as *iqīm*, which is used on this map for the regions of Arabia, Iraq and Egypt and for the continent of Africa. The map of Anatolia, by contrast, seems oddly unfinished. Despite the fact that the title announces it will divide the area by *eyālet*, an official term for an Ottoman administrative district, the subdivisions are left unlabelled and topographic detail on the map is comparatively sparse (illus. 35).⁷² Nonetheless, its penultimate position and southward orientation make it distinctive in the context of the work as a whole, which may have been a way of highlighting an Ottoman core. Similarly, the final Bosphorus map is the largest-scale map in the book, with toponyms at perpendicular angles to the shorelines in the style of portolan charts and labels for neighbourhoods in the city of Istanbul. Since the last thirty pages or so of the written text contain a history of the Ottoman dynasty, it would seem that Ibrahim Muteferrika wanted to give the empire the final word – and image.

Despite this, generally speaking the cartographic contents of the 1732 *Cihannüma* do not produce territory in political terms, a tendency on the rise in contemporary European atlases. The Mercator–Hondius and Blaeu atlases each include maps titled 'Turkish Empire', as do a number of other atlases published in Europe in this period. Why did Muteferrika not feature one of these in the *Cihannüma*? A stand-alone map highlighting Ottoman territorial sovereignty was produced in 1727, possibly by Muteferrika or a member of his team. However, by casting its contents in terms of the continent of Asia, it cuts off Ottoman-controlled portions of Europe and Africa, which at the time encompassed the Balkan Peninsula, Romania and the Crimea, as well as North Africa from Alexandria to Algiers, more dramatically than the seventeenth-century European atlases do.⁷³ It may be that Muteferrika, who



34 Map of Arabia from the Muteferrika edition of Katib Celebi's *Cihannüma*, printed in Istanbul in 1732.

was publishing for an elite Ottoman audience in a period of relative confidence, did not feel the need to self-represent. The *Cihannüma*'s run of approximately five hundred copies was small by comparison with the print runs of Dutch, Flemish, German and French atlases even a century earlier, and high production costs, including initial capital outlays for the press, kept prices out of reach for ordinary Ottoman subjects.⁷⁴ Costs may also have prevented Muteferrika from fulfilling his promise, in the conclusion to the work, to publish a second volume covering Europe, Africa and the Americas that would begin with the city of Istanbul. Even if this had materialized, the use of the continents as an ordering mechanism meant that the Dardanelles and Bosphorus straits represented a boundary or ending, not a meeting place or aperture as in earlier mapping traditions.

The idea that clear boundaries separated continents was relatively new when the *Cihannüma* was printed in 1732. Of these boundaries, the location of the one between Europe and Asia was the most vigorously debated among European geographers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. However, such debates were soon forgotten, and continents were naturalized as self-evident and empirically provable divisions of the world. At the same time, they were assigned distinct cultural and racial characteristics, a notion that

was prefigured by Ortelius's sixteenth-century frontispiece.⁷⁵ This process gave European cartographers licence to map the Ottoman Empire increasingly in two parts – 'Turkey in Europe' and 'Turkey in Asia' – a practice that downplayed the interconnectedness of the Ottoman realms and especially the belonging of North African provinces and non-Turkic subjects. Although nineteenth-century Ottoman cartographers generally substituted dynastic for ethnic terms when framing space politically, the trend of appropriating the format of European world atlases and/or translating them into Turkish continued, as did a tendency to map the empire in parts determined by continental boundaries.⁷⁶ In this process, the idea that continents were fundamentally and naturally separate geographical entities gained traction, with the possible corollary that Ottoman holdings in Europe, Asia and Africa might have essentially separate cultural and racial profiles and, perhaps, even political destinies. While other mapping traditions that stressed movement between the ports of the Mediterranean or centres of power or sanctity, or that evoked the regions of an interconnected and flexible 'Realm of Islam', did not immediately die out, they were eclipsed over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by territorial



35 Map of Anatolia from the Muteferrika edition of Katib Celebi's *Cihannüma*, printed in Istanbul in 1732.

taxonomies that were increasingly implicated in discourses of racial and civilizational hierarchy.

MAPPING TRADITIONS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE starting in the sixteenth century stressed belonging in meaningful regions in which boundaries between political jurisdictions, cultures and even land and sea were often blurred. In addition, they frequently evoked movement, emphasizing connectivity between imperial and sacred centres. The generally large scale of the maps analysed in this chapter suggests proximity between the one drawing or viewing the map and the area mapped and promotes a relationship of intimacy between the two. However, with the popularization of a continental scheme and its naturalization as a scientific division of the world in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a new tradition of world atlases tended toward smaller-scale maps that increased the distance between the audience and the area mapped, as well as between the Ottoman centre, situated on the boundary between Asia and Europe, and its peripheries. In the next chapter, the tradition of colonial mapping takes the naturalization of a division of the world based on supposedly scientific principles one step further, producing a series of enclosures in the former Ottoman provinces that categorized space and people in order to separate and dominate them.

TAB. LEU D'ASSEMBLAGE
POUR LA CARTE TOPOGRAPHIQUE DE L'ÉGYPTÉ,
en 47 Feuilles
ET POUR LA CARTE GÉOGRAPHIQUE
en 5 Feuilles.
GRAVÉ AU DÉPÔT GÉNÉRAL DE LA GUERRE.
à l'échelle de 1 Million pour 250 Mètres.
PARIS.



THREE

EUROPEAN COLONIAL MAPPING IN THE LONG NINETEENTH CENTURY

This chapter shifts the perspective away from internal mappings and toward maps that proposed, facilitated or documented European conquest and colonization of much of the Middle East in the nineteenth century. This followed the rise in the eighteenth century of a ‘new planetary consciousness’ among elite Europeans who increasingly saw the world as an object to be scrutinized, categorized and penetrated.¹ These explorers, scholars, soldiers and capitalists were driven by the desire to fill in the blank interior spaces on their maps of Asia, Africa and the Americas and, in so doing, to project modern European knowledge and management systems onto the rest of the world. While some of them had baldly acquisitive motives, others did not see themselves as engaged in conquest or exploitation, but rather in intellectual or altruistic enterprises. However, the outcome was the same, the imposition of an epistemological regime – often along with a political, military and economic one – that rendered the people of those cartographic ‘blank spaces’ inferior, invisible or even inhuman. It also had a pernicious spatial effect: the enclosure of territory and the interruption of earlier traditions of mapping and mobility that made possible overlapping and connective geographical categories of belonging.

For Ottoman lands, the era of intensive European conquest and colonization was heralded by the landing of a fleet of warships under the command of General Napoleon Bonaparte at Alexandria, Egypt, on 2 July 1798. The French occupation of Algeria in 1830 and the British occupation of Egypt in 1882 were subsequent watershed moments in this history, but more subtle recalibrations of the balance of power were taking place in other parts of the Ottoman Empire,

36 Index map from the ‘Carte topographique’ volume of the second edition of the *Description de l’Égypte* (Paris, 1826).

the Arabian Peninsula and Iran in the nineteenth century. Further afield, similar projects were under way, significantly in India, first under the British East India Company and then after 1858 under the 'Raj', a comprehensive colonial administration that was considered the jewel in the crown of the British Empire and a possible blueprint for British interventions elsewhere, such as Egypt and South Africa, by the end of the century. At the onset of the First World War the British and French, among other European powers, were in a position to maintain or intensify control of many of the parts of Africa and Asia in which they had established interests. With the defeat of the Ottomans, who had entered the war at the last moment on the side of the Central Powers, the British and French would carve up the region they now referred to as the 'Near East' or 'Middle East' and rule it either directly under the League of Nations-endorsed mandate system or indirectly by co-opting or coercing local rulers.

This chapter analyses maps of this region made by Europeans between Napoleon's invasion of Egypt and the First World War, a period often referred to as the 'long nineteenth century', in terms of a tradition of colonial mapping. Cartographic projects undertaken as part of the conquest and occupation of a particular area, such as topographic and cadastral surveys, can be fairly straightforwardly described as colonial, given the circumstances of their production and their utility in establishing structures of military and administrative control. However, the tradition of colonial mapping encompassed a wider range of maps that, together with other kinds of texts, helped establish an asymmetrical relationship between a European state and the inhabitants of the places mapped, and should be seen in the broader context of the development of European global hegemony and the propagation of discourses of Eurocentric modernity. These include maps that were not formally implicated in the process of colonization, but that communicated European superiority or that legitimized some form of present or future control over the area depicted. Ultimately these maps reproduced the colony for those whose support, either explicit or implicit, sustained the colonial enterprise, whether by serving in the army, consuming products, making policy, voting for politicians or circulating stereotypes of an exotic 'other'. These maps were not (usually) about belonging in the places mapped, but about belonging in an urban and increasingly

industrialized Europe that relied on unfettered access to markets, raw materials, and strategic or symbolic locations in other parts of the world.²

This was also the period in which a new set of superregional toponyms were popularized in Europe and North America. These toponyms had one thing in common: the use of the word 'East', as in 'Near East', 'Middle East' and 'Far East', or even the more circumscribed 'Levant', taken from the French for the 'rising' of the sun in the east.³ The development in European discourses of a West–East dichotomy with powerful cultural connotations has been the subject of many studies, the most famous of which is Edward Said's book *Orientalism* (1978). Said argued that this dichotomy was constructed in Europe in many areas of human endeavour, including literature, art, scholarship and politics, to assert the superiority of the West (or self) over the East (or other), and thus white, male Europeans (and later North Americans) over the peoples and lands they sought to dominate. According to this construction, the West was the abode of Enlightenment secularism and rationality, while the East was the abode of religion, superstition and fancy; and the West embraced principles of political and economic change premised on the integrity and potential of the individual, while the East was frozen in time by despotic governments, religious fanaticism and socio-economic traditions that stifled individual creativity. One of the consequences of this imagining of a West–East/self–other binary was the collapse of any significant distinctions within the supposed East and the reduction of Easterners to caricatures easily understood by grasping a few essential cultural traits.

No matter how powerful the idea of homogeneous Eastern otherness was, and despite the concomitant use of vaguely delineated toponyms like Near or Middle East to identify the area made available for European penetration by virtue of that otherness, the dominant trend in colonial mapping was division and subdivision. In other words, despite generalizations about a world region named for being some degree east of England or France, it was not – or not primarily – the Near or Middle East that was mapped. It was Egypt or Algeria, Lebanon or Palestine, Turkey or Persia – and even these were often the starting point for the identification and mapping of ever smaller units determined by European desires and the needs of colonial

administration. Of course, this partitioning principle had already started with the tradition of printed world atlases ordered by continent and the naturalization of a division between Europe and Asia. Subcontinental divisions, in the case of Europe, were also already being reified and naturalized as nation-states. Indeed, the tradition of colonial mapping went hand in hand with the rise of the nation-state, which was under way in Western Europe in the eighteenth century, and is sometimes indistinguishable from traditions of national mapping, which will be discussed further in the next chapter. The increasing interest within Europe in delineating domestic, 'national' territory and regularizing its administration, coupled with the requirements of occupying or dominating far-flung lands, helped generate new cartographic methods and forms, which were then coded 'European', 'Western' and 'modern', and became both a means of and a justification for colonialism.

The maps in this chapter represent a variety of genres and served, among others, military, aesthetic, educational and policy-making purposes, but they all belong to the tradition of colonial mapping. This mapping tradition had four main characteristics: an obsession with measurement and subdivision as a way of transforming indigenous geographical knowledge into European knowledge, which was synonymous with scientific achievement and modernity; an emphasis on sites associated with antiquity or military conflict, which could be integrated into a narrative of European civilizational progress; an interest in identifying wasteland or potentially productive but currently underutilized land, as evidence of the shortcomings of native stewardship; and the erasure or dismissal of pre-existing political and social formations. While not all of the maps in this chapter exhibit all four of these characteristics, they often combine two or more of them in ways that facilitated or legitimized the interventions of European states in other parts of the world in the nineteenth century and the early twentieth.

In what follows I focus on four significant moments in which British and French scholars, soldiers and politicians created maps to promote their activities and interests in the North African and West Asian provinces of the Ottoman Empire. I have chosen these areas because they illustrate one of the consequences of the rise of the continental framework. We have already seen the way maps

titled ‘Turkey in Asia’ and ‘Turkey in Europe’ downplayed the interconnectedness of the Ottoman realms, but they also suggested a certain racial or ethnolinguistic character to what was still, well into the nineteenth century, a polity that did not identify itself, or its subjects, in those terms. Nonetheless, this kind of thinking made it possible to see some parts of the Ottoman Empire as peripheral, by virtue of either location or population traits, and thus more available for European rule. I have also chosen maps that mark the beginnings of different kinds of colonial projects in these areas, rather than maps that trace the historical trajectory of any particular colony or type of colony. Early maps highlight efforts to propose or justify colonialism, rather than implement it over the long term, and illuminate the different ways that lands and peoples were defined graphically to advance the pursuit of European interests in the region.

The chapter begins with Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 1798, which, though abortive and ironically framed as a defence of Ottoman sovereignty, marked the beginning of the end of Ottoman North Africa. Next, the chapter moves to the French conquest of Algeria in 1830, which resulted in one of the longest-term experiments with settler colonialism in the modern world and led to the colonization of neighbouring Tunisia and Morocco. It will then consider British activities in Palestine in the late nineteenth century, which did not involve a direct assault on Ottoman sovereignty, but nonetheless showed the ways in which mapping might promote European interests independent (or in advance) of the structures of direct colonial control. The chapter concludes with a discussion of maps made by British politicians in the run-up to the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. These maps visualized a new kind of colonialism for the former West Asian provinces of the Ottoman Empire, one based on the principle of partition and the racially, ethnolinguistically or religiously majoritarian nation-state.

MAPPING EGYPT

The French armada that landed in Alexandria in 1798 carried not only military personnel, but more than five hundred civilians, among them engineers, mathematicians, chemists, biologists, geologists, medical

doctors, archaeologists, artists, linguists and historians. Though Napoleon's immediate goal was to block British access to the eastern Mediterranean, the civilians in his entourage were meant to erect the structures of long-term administrative control and to transform Egypt into a productive, compliant and prestigious addition to the French empire. Less than two months after disembarking, Napoleon ordered the establishment of an Institute of Egypt, to be housed in a villa in Cairo confiscated from one of the local governors. The members of the institute constituted the most senior scholars who had travelled to Egypt, and they immediately embarked on a number of projects, including coming up with methods to ensure supplies of water, bread and gunpowder for the army and to facilitate the control and surveillance of the population of Cairo. In addition, a topographic survey of Egypt and coastal Syria, which Napoleon invaded in early 1799, was commenced almost immediately under the leadership of Pierre Jacotin and a corps of 'Engineer-Geographers'.⁴

Although the actual occupation of Egypt lasted only three years, with Napoleon leaving suddenly to realize his domestic ambitions in the summer of 1799 and the final withdrawal of French troops in September 1801, its legacy for the future of European colonialism was immense. In particular, the intellectual projects launched in that time remained alive and coalesced into the monumental, eighteen-part *Description de l'Égypte* (Description of Egypt), published in Paris in instalments between 1809 and 1828 and often bound in as many as 23 volumes of different sizes.⁵ The bulk of the work is divided into three sections – 'Antiquities', 'Modern State' and 'Natural History' – each of which is made up of compendia of scholarly essays accompanied by illustrations and copper engraved plates, most in black and white, but some in colour. The 'Antiquities' section dwarfs the other two, with four volumes of essays and five volumes of plates, including all the colour plates and the largest number of oversized plates, which had to be bound separately. The final instalment in 1828 was the 'Carte topographique', a volume of maps made from data collected during Jacotin's survey.⁶ The publication of this volume had been purposefully delayed by Napoleon for reasons of military security, and its production, including the engraving of the copper plates necessary for printing, took place at the Dépôt de la guerre (War Depository) independently from the rest of the work. Nonetheless, the various

volumes of plates that comprise the earlier instalments of the *Description de l'Égypte* include a plethora of maps and plans, so the cartographic content of the entire work is not confined to the 'Carte topographique', nor was the *Description de l'Égypte* the only work to contain maps drawn based on the French occupation of Egypt. However, it was certainly the most famous, and its sheer size and weight – the three largest volumes from the first edition measuring over a metre in length – rendered it a sought-after presentation piece for libraries and private patrons.⁷

The maps in the 'Carte topographique' volume, as well as those scattered throughout the rest of the work, exemplify the four major characteristics of the tradition of colonial mapping: the obsession with measurement and subdivision; the emphasis on antiquity and military conflict; the marking of wasteland or underproductive land; and the erasure of local political and social formations. The obsession with measurement came out of the Enlightenment ideal of empiricism, which requires the grounding of all knowledge in direct observation and mathematical or logical proof.⁸ Indeed, the repetition of the word 'imitation' in Jean-Baptiste Joseph Fourier's 'Historical Preface' to the *Description de l'Égypte* underscores his conception of the work as a precise replica of empirical reality.⁹ Taken to its logical conclusion in cartographic terms, this conception would require maps at a 1:1 scale that could stand in for the territory mapped.¹⁰ Although this was logistically neither possible nor desirable, the tendency toward larger-scale mapping and the emphasis on scientific methods of measuring the earth's surface and determining the location of sites reflected the importance of a mimetic standard in the *Description de l'Égypte*.

Jacotin's essay on the topographic survey he led while in Egypt, which was published in 1822 in the second volume of the 'Modern State' section, highlights his team's scientific approach to measurement.¹¹ A survey is a field project in which data is gathered pertaining to the relative location of places, topographic features and boundary lines. Methods may include compass reconnaissance, the determination of astronomical positions and triangulation, as well as the consultation of previous maps and travel accounts and interviews with local inhabitants. Triangulation was considered a 'cartographic ideal' in this period, though limitations in available technology kept it

from being applied consistently.¹² Accordingly, Jacotin emphasizes his team's use of astronomical points and geometrical calculations whenever possible, and explicitly critiques maps made primarily from earlier maps and written sources, such as French geographer Jean-Baptiste Bourguignon d'Anville's 1765 maps of modern and ancient Egypt (which were nonetheless reproduced with the first instalments of the *Description de l'Égypte*).¹³ Moreover, he minimizes the importance of interviews or other contributions by locals to the survey; instead of collaborators, the inhabitants of Egypt and Syria are categorized, along with topographic features, as items to be inscribed on the map (that is, this tribe goes there) or as challenges to be met, usually militarily.¹⁴ In fact, Jacotin quotes Fourier's 'Historical Preface' to emphasize the dangers his team faced in gathering data: 'One was often obligated to substitute armaments for geometric instruments and, on occasion, to fight for or conquer the terrain that one needed to measure'.¹⁵ This intratextual quotation underscores both the inseparability of colonial mapping and military conquest and the characterization of local people as at best incidental to the scientific enterprise of the survey and at worst obstacles to be overcome.

These attitudes are consistent with the Enlightenment view of history as 'progress', a steady march forward toward the highest level of civilization, often assessed in terms of scientific achievement. Indeed, those holding this view considered themselves – elite, urban, male, European – to be closest to this apex; by contrast, it was not yet even on the horizon for other peoples and places. The authors of the *Description de l'Égypte* believed that places like Egypt were marching more slowly, or perhaps even stalled completely, on the path of progress. If, as they believed, Egyptians could not be relied upon to provide the most scientifically advanced, empirically based data, then any information gathered from local sources either was inherently suspect or, if useful, must be systematized and thus transformed into European knowledge. This transformation could be as simple as the acts of transliteration and translation that took place all the time to render Arabic terms and toponyms meaningful to a non-Arabic-speaking audience. The lengthy discussion in Jacotin's essay of the most precise and scientific system to adopt for transliterating Arabic place names, including a transcript from a

government inquiry featuring prominent scholars Constantin François de Chassebœuf, Comte de Volney, and Silvestre de Sacy, was a way of masking, with the repeated invocation of French expertise, the Egyptian origin of much of the geographical knowledge displayed on the maps.¹⁶

The second characteristic of colonial mapping, an emphasis on antiquities and military conflict, is ubiquitous in the *Description de l'Égypte*. The 'Antiquities' section occupies disproportionate space within the work as a whole, and the inseparability of the military and scientific enterprise in Egypt is mentioned repeatedly in Fourier's 'Historical Preface' and Jacotin's essay. Similarly, ancient ruins and contemporary battlesites are depicted on the maps, and French soldiers are juxtaposed with Pharaonic monuments on plates throughout the work.¹⁷ In many ways, ancient Egypt is identified with contemporary France, both models of civilizational progress, emblemized by the two meridians used to measure relative longitude on the maps: Paris and the Great Pyramid at Giza. In his essay, Jacotin even describes the survey as a way in which the French might pay homage to Egypt, 'where geometry was invented', by reuniting it with its mathematical heritage.¹⁸ This rhetorical gesture relies on an acknowledgement of the different temporalities at work in an understanding of history as progress; ancient Egypt (dominated by Hellenistic culture, appropriated since the Renaissance as 'European') had been closer to the highest level of civilization than eighteenth-century Egypt was. Ancient Egypt was deemed culturally, if not geographically, European, and therefore advanced for its era; whereas modern Egypt was deemed culturally Eastern and therefore had not built upon – was ignorant or perhaps suspicious of – the scientific advances that had taken place upon its own soil.

Similarly, according to this view, modern Egypt had not built upon the advantages of that soil. One of the aims of the French occupation was to regularize and centralize tax collection through a cadastral survey of cultivated and revenue-producing land. A natural corollary, the identification of uncultivated land, would in turn facilitate the French goal of tutoring Egyptians on how to make the most efficient and profitable use of their natural resources and to transform wasteland into fertile agricultural zones worked by newly settled tribes.¹⁹ This presumption that Egyptian land was

CARACTÈRES TOPOGRAPHIQUES employés DANS LA CARTE D'ÉGYPTE. N°. Les objets en pointillé dans les colonnes du figuré, expriment des ruines.					
Dénominations		Figuré des Objets.	Dénominations		Figuré des Objets.
en Français	en Arabe		en Français	en Arabe	
Aqueduc	<i>Qana</i> قنا		Lac	<i>Baherch</i> بحيرة	
Bataille	<i>Gagnée</i> <i>Herabeh Kabet</i> هرأبه كابت		Laisses	<i>de la Mer</i> أرض من علو البحر	
	<i>Perdue</i> <i>Herabeh Karet</i> هرأبه كارت			<i>de la Mer</i> أرض من وطي البحر	
Bois de	<i>Palmiers</i> <i>Nahl</i> نخل		Limite	<i>de Pays</i> <i>Herabeh</i> حدود البلاد	
	<i>Gycomores</i> <i>Gemmet</i> جميت			<i>de Province</i> <i>Herabeh</i> حدود الولايات	
Bourg	<i>Kaf</i> كفر		Maison	<i>Beit Dar</i> بيت دار	
Camp.	<i>Français</i> <i>Ordi Français</i> مرتبة الفرنسي		Marais	<i>Sabalath</i> سبخة	
Campem.	<i>Turcs</i> <i>Ordi Ottoman</i> مرتبة العثماني		Mer	<i>El Bahar</i> <i>El Mithch</i> البحر الملح	
	<i>Arabes</i> <i>Ordi Arab</i> مرتبة العربي		Montagne	<i>Cebel</i> جبل	

37 (full image and detail)
Legend from the 'Carte topographique' volume of the second edition of the *Description de l'Égypte* (Paris, 1826).

underperforming anticipates what would become a pattern in nineteenth-century travel writing, stressing the 'availability' of certain areas that were not being exploited to the full potential by their inhabitants and thus justifying their control by more advanced Europeans.²⁰ In actuality, the French surveyors did not have the time to conduct the kind of fieldwork necessary for cadastral mapping or the systematic location of under- or unutilized land. Nonetheless, the maps of the 'Carte topographique' give the illusion that such fieldwork was done by demarcating what appear to be fields in a patchwork pattern in many of the agricultural areas of the country.²¹

These characteristics of colonial mapping are reflected in the legend and index map that open the 'Carte topographique' (illus. 36 and 37). The right-hand column of the legend presents the system adopted for transliterating place names from the Arabic to the Latin alphabet, thus transforming indigenous into European knowledge. The left-hand column lists the symbols and Arabic terms for the most important topographic, agricultural, infrastructural and architectural features inscribed on the maps. Among the numerically

preponderant topographic and agricultural symbols are two types of land, 'cultivated' and 'uncultivated', as well as two kinds of orchards (date palms and fig trees) and various water sources. Among the rest are symbols for the architectural vestiges of ancient Egypt, such as obelisks, pyramids and temples, and symbols for contemporary battles lost and won (by the French) and for French, Ottoman and Arab army camps. The intertwined processes of military conquest, appropriating the legacy of ancient Egypt for modern France, and surveying the land were thus joined together on the resulting maps, as were the potential 'fruits' of the process: fertile, profitable soil worked by Egyptian peasants schooled by the French in the latest agricultural methods. Moreover, the index map shows the relative lack of interest in areas that did not possess immediate economic or strategic potential. The numbered rectangles correspond to the numbered sheets of the 'Carte topographique', which move from south to north, following the central artery of the Nile before fanning out to cover the delta and the potential course of a canal across the isthmus of Suez, and then hugging the Syrian coastline east and north as far as Sidon in present-day Lebanon. In not venturing far from the Nile and other economically or politically strategic areas, the surveyors reduced Egypt, at least the Egypt that was worthy of large-scale mapping, to its potential for tax revenue and communications.

Sheet 19 of the 'Carte topographique', which depicts an agricultural area surrounding the town of Fayyum, about 62 miles (100 km) southwest of Cairo, provides a good example of the way in which the maps themselves exhibit the characteristics of colonial mapping and, in fact, re-enact the twin processes of survey and conquest that produced them (illus. 38). Just like the other 46 sheets, this one is set in a rectangular frame oriented north upon which is superimposed a grid of 1-centimetre-square boxes. Noted along the top of the frame are degrees of distance from the prime meridian of Paris, and on this particular map the meridian of the Great Pyramid of Giza acts as the eastern boundary of the rectangle and is marked just inside the frame on the lower right. Although this is one of the few sheets in which the river Nile does not play a central role, it can be seen flowing through the bottom right corner of the map. The dominant topographic features are two agricultural areas separated

by a mountain range and fed by water courses running southeast to the Nile and northwest to a lake in the upper-left corner. The largest inscriptions on the map announce the 'Libyan Desert' in the west and the 'Province of Fayyum' at the centre, with secondary inscriptions naming the lake, the mountain chain separating the two oases, and the neighbouring 'Province of Beni Suif' to the southeast. Although most of these inscriptions are mirrored by their Arabic translation, the Arabic script is of a smaller size and more difficult to read because of its spacing and/or background. The overall impression is, therefore, a technically executed French topographic map of an Egyptian province.

However, looking closer, several significant additional emphases become clear. Dotted lines, punctuated by arrows, wind through the map, three of which are easy to discern in the centre left. Each of these dotted lines is labelled as a route followed by a member of the French survey team on a particular date, in this map's case Edme François Jomard and Pierre Dominique Martin, in January 1799 and 1801 respectively, who are also given authorial credit, along with two others, at the bottom left corner of the map. Thus the fieldwork that produced the data from which this map was compiled is represented on the map itself, a dynamic element on an otherwise static cartographic background. Other sheets show similar dotted lines indicating either the itineraries followed by the surveyors or the path of the conquering French army, a choice that highlights French military and scholarly penetration of the country. On this map, the site of a French military victory is portrayed with the appropriate symbol in the lower right corner, labelled with the name of the battle and the date in both French Republican and standard Gregorian calendars (7 Vendémiaire, Year 7; 28 September 1798), though the Islamic calendar of the defeated troops is lacking. The marking of three Arab military camps in the northwest suggests either ongoing or potential hostility from the local people, as well as the challenges the surveyors faced in their scientific enterprise.

The area depicted in Sheet 19 was clearly one upon which the French would have wanted to capitalize, both in terms of tax collection and in terms of their plans for improving the efficiency and profitability of land use and tenure. Regular patchwork patterns of cultivated fields appear in the central Fayyum and southeastern Beni Suif provinces. Here and there interrupting the patchwork are areas



38 Sheet 19 from the 'Carte topographique' volume of the second edition of the *Description de l'Égypte* (Paris, 1826).

shaded with the motif for 'uncultivated land'. In the Beni Suif province (lower right), the uncultivated plots appear almost as regularly shaped as the cultivated plots, suggesting their immediate availability for improvement, as well as the alleged failure of the native population to have done so already. In the upper centre of the map is an area shaded with a different motif, but explicitly labelled as 'abandoned cultivable land dotted with tamarisks', also implying neglect on the part of the Egyptians. Similarly, on maps covering the upper Nile, swaths of terrain flanking the river are simply marked 'uncultivated', flanked in turn by blank desert space inscribed with the name of the tribe 'frequenting' it, suggesting the underutilization of both land and labour. This attention to the quality and potential of the land and the iconographic gesture toward the kind of cadastral mapping that could not be achieved in reality reveal both the aspirational and the acquisitive nature of the French occupation. They wanted to transform Egypt in their own image and for their own benefit, patchwork fields worked by a docile peasantry, with profits regularly taxed and raw materials subsequently made

available for export to the manufacturing centres of France, even if they were only able to do so on the pages of the *Description de l'Égypte*.

The fourth characteristic of colonial mapping, the dismissal or erasure of pre-existing political formations, was in fact the ultimate goal of Napoleon's invasion. The official pretext for their intervention, as expressed in a series of communiqués to the local population, was to liberate the country from the oppressive yoke of its provincial elite, known collectively as the Mamluks, who had grown increasingly autonomous within the relatively decentralized Ottoman system of governance. Although the French came ostensibly in the name of the Sultan in Istanbul, the subtext of the mission – to use French military strength to rehabilitate Egypt – was a dismissal of Ottoman rule as at best weak and at worst indifferent to the suffering of its subjects. Either way, continued Ottoman sovereignty would clearly come at the price of being junior partners with the French. Thus deemed illegitimate or ineffectual from the outset, Mamluk and Ottoman rule leaves no trace on the maps of Egypt in the 'Carte topographique', nor are cities or towns identified as administrative centres or capitals. Districts and provinces are named and boundaries between them drawn, but only in Syria do the maps show some concession to the prior claims of a sovereign power. Its administrative divisions are labelled 'Pachalics', a term derived from the Ottoman Turkish honorific given to a provincial governor of the highest rank.

The 'Modern State' section also includes a number of city plans and images that situate French intervention in a political and administrative vacuum. The Cairo metropolitan area is mapped over four different plates: an overview map titled 'Environs of Cairo'; a plan of the island of Rhoda, 'Old Cairo' and the Pyramids of Giza; a plan of Bulaq; and a plan of Cairo proper at the jumbo size of the sheets of the 'Carte topographique'. The plan of Cairo proper represents the city as a conglomeration of darkly shaded blocks, penetrated by the skeleton fingers of roadways, mostly crooked, but with a few straight transverses. The most prominent feature of the map is the division of the city into eight districts, clearly labelled with large Roman numerals, and, on this map from a deluxe copy of the first edition, the boundaries between the districts have been retouched

by hand in red ink (illus. 39). In the accompanying essay, Jomard explains that the French had decided to divide the city into districts in order to facilitate the ‘regularization’ of roads, sanitary policing and general surveillance, a project that gained urgency in the aftermath of the rebellion of October 1798 in which the urban population rose up against the French occupation.²² The essay concludes with a lengthy set of tables, which identify, by district, hundreds of sites of public interest, including mosques, churches, synagogues, baths, fountains, markets, gates and streets, as well as the residences or neighbourhoods of particular individuals, families or groups. Each site is given a number, which is inscribed in the proper place on the map, and a set of coordinates that correspond to the map’s alphanumeric grid. The level of detail that can be discerned by cross-referencing the tables and the map is astonishing, though doing so is labour-intensive, given the very large size and weight of the volume in which the map is bound, the very small size of the numbers on the map, and the location of the tables in the middle of a separate and not inconsiderably sized volume of essays. Although something of the daily life of Cairo’s diverse population can be understood from these tables, the map, with its dark blocks and hundreds of little numbers, suggests that order has been imposed on, but has not (yet) replaced, chaos.

Similarly, the illustrations of the city that are interspersed between the maps in the ‘Modern State’ section give no indication that Cairenes were occupied with political, economic or military management. Take, for example, the image of al-Rumayla Plaza, an open area near the Citadel on the southeastern side of the city (illus. 40). The scene is one of movement and activity, with people engaged in a wide range of leisure activities as well as manual labour. A woman in the foreground nurses a baby while her companion takes a nap; a child is flown on an elaborate swing on the right; people are busy carrying various loads or leading beasts of burden; others share a meal, recline on the ground or mill around next to a cluster of tents. The French in the scene are easy to distinguish in their bicorn hats and military uniforms; two horsemen appear to be rushing in from the lower right corner, toppling a couple of pedestrians in their hurry. In general, they seem to be the ones in charge, or at least the only ones occupying themselves with any sense of urgency. The city rises in the background with majestic architecture on the left and

39 (full image and detail)
Map of Cairo from the
‘Modern State’ section
(vol. 1, plate 26) of the first
edition of the *Description
de l’Égypte* (Paris, 1809).



more ramshackle structures on the right. In this part of the work, Cairo's built environment is the star of the illustrations; its sheer size, especially in comparison to the locals who are often pictured idling in its shadows, suggests a serious city at odds with a frivolous population and ready for proper (French) management.

The examples shown here are representative of the maps and illustrations in the work as a whole, which constituted an early and influential exemplar of the tradition of colonial mapping. The *Description de l'Égypte* claimed to represent Egypt, but, despite pretences to 'imitation', it was an Egypt of France's own making in which the activities and potentialities of French agents of empire obscured logistical limitations and the complexities of local social and political formations.²³ As an artefact, the heroic proportions and not inconsiderable cost of the *Description de l'Égypte* made publishing and acquiring it something of a production, a re-enactment of the ambition of Napoleon's conquest and a metaphor for the way metropolitan populations underwrote – indeed mimicked – colonialism by consuming its products. Given the short duration and ultimate failure of the French occupation, the *Description de l'Égypte* acquired even more significance; it became a textual proxy for the territorial colony. On the work's second frontispiece, added to the later instalments of the first edition published after the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy in 1814, King Louis XVIII issued a decree-benediction: 'May the *Description de l'Égypte* be continued and its editions

40 Cairo Citadel and al-Rumayla Plaza from the 'Modern State' section (vol. II, plate 67) of the first edition of the *Description de l'Égypte* (Paris, 1817).



multiplied'. Thus, despite an official disavowal of the Napoleonic era, the Bourbon monarchy appropriated its colonial legacy. The reproduction of the *Description de l'Égypte* – indeed its very reproducibility, a quality that a territorial colony does not have – would confer prestige to France indefinitely.

MAPPING ALGERIA

Nonetheless, territorial colonies still mattered. In the contentious political climate of nineteenth-century France, an empire was a way of asserting a state's legitimacy and military strength both at home and abroad. After Egypt, the French turned to Algeria, given its close proximity to southern France and its strategic location in the central Mediterranean. Using as a pretext an alleged insult to the French consul by the governor ('dey') of Algiers, an agent of the Ottoman Empire who ruled the area semi-autonomously, King Charles x approved a military invasion in June 1830, weeks before he was overthrown in the 'July Revolution' in favour of his cousin Louis-Philippe. Despite pressure to dissociate himself from the previous regime, King Louis-Philippe did not withdraw support from the colonial project, and over the next decade the French military, through a series of treaties with and violent reprisals against the inhabitants of the mountains surrounding Algiers, established uneven control over coastal areas and their hinterlands stretching from Oran in the west to Bône in the east. The Algerian conquest meant many things to many people. For some it was an opportunity to reclaim the martial glory of the Napoleonic era and to prevent the British from dominating the Mediterranean; for others it was an opportunity to do colonialism the 'right' way, without the slavery and economic exploitation of the Atlantic colonies; for still others it promised a safety valve for impoverished, problematic or displaced populations and a market for French goods. It did not have a single visionary the way Napoleon's invasion of Egypt did, and its 132-year duration, from 1830 to 1962, meant that a vast and varied array of cultural products, including maps, were made to represent French Algeria. An examination of three maps from the mid-nineteenth century gives a sense for the different ways in which the tradition of colonial mapping was inflected

to propose a particular vision of Algeria and to 'sell' its initial conquest and settlement.

The first decade of the French occupation of Algeria was portrayed in a variety of media at home to communicate the righteousness of the cause and the military prowess of the Orleanist monarchy, the compromise between republican and royalist camps that lasted from 1830 to 1848. Triumphalist paintings were commissioned and displayed at the newly inaugurated Museum of French History at Versailles, and mass-market posters depicting battle scenes circulated widely to celebrate the victories of the French army.²⁴ A map entitled 'Map of the Government of Algiers' (illus. 41) was made by popular French cartographer A. R. Frémin and published in Paris sometime between the Battle of Mazagran in February 1840 and the replacement of Governor General Sylvain-Charles Valée with Thomas-Robert Bugeaud in December of the same year. It is explicitly dedicated to the French army and therefore exemplifies the tendency of colonial maps to highlight military conflict, especially the successes of the conquering forces. The ornately decorated frame is studded with portraits of war heroes, including the first three commanding generals to hold the office of Governor General of Algeria, a powerful position that combined military and administrative authority. Pictured clockwise from the top left are Governor General Valée (1837–40), the Duc d'Orléans (King Louis-Philippe's eldest son, who served as an officer in Algeria, 1835–40), Governor General Bertrand Clauzel (1835–7), Governor General Charles-Marie Denys Damrémont (1837) and Abd al-Qadir (one of the most effective leaders of the Algerian resistance in the 1830s and '40s). The prominent placement of the Duc d'Orléans indicates the importance placed on members of the royal family fighting alongside other 'citizen-soldiers' in Algeria and the legitimacy the Orleanist state hoped to derive from the war.

The two illustrations flanking the Duc d'Orléans at the top of the map, an 'Arab Camp' and a 'French Camp', are quasi-mirror images, each camp consisting of rows of tents, huddled men, a rider on horseback and an armed sentry in strikingly similar configurations. This suggestion of symmetry between the two sides, as well as the inclusion of Abd al-Qadir among the portraits in the frame, may have been intended to heighten the victories of the French army by portraying a similarly equipped enemy and/or to reassure viewers



41 A. R. Frémin, 'Map of the Government of Algiers' (Paris, 1840).

with qualms about the manner in which the country was being conquered.²⁵ The illustration at the bottom centre, with the caption 'Heroic defence of Mazagran', sustains this interpretation, casting the Algerians as the aggressors. This episode, in which Abd al-Qadir's forces attacked a French garrison at Mostaganem, just east of Oran, was hyped in the French media during the spring and summer of 1840 as a 'David versus Goliath' encounter in which 123 French soldiers were hopelessly outnumbered but managed to repulse an unprovoked attack by a foe who had unilaterally broken the peace treaty of 1837. This narrative resonated with ideas about the essential justice of defensive warfare and a general nostalgia for Napoleonic militarism.²⁶

Within the frame, the map itself de-emphasizes direct French control of territory, but proposes a subdivision that would later be ratified by the colonial administration. From west to east, the map shows the 'Empire of Morocco', the 'Government of Algiers', 'the Regency of Tunis' and a small part of the 'Regency of Tripoli'. A very subtle, single-line legend at the bottom centre of the map assigns light pink shading to 'French Possessions', which can be seen surrounding the cities of Oran, Algiers and Constantine-Bône along the coast.²⁷ Nevertheless, the title of the map, 'Government of Algiers', is also inscribed across the central territory, which is in turn bounded by light yellow, differentiating it from the light blue of the Regency of Tunis and the light green of the Empire of Morocco. The southern border is formed by a mountain chain beyond which lies the 'Great Desert'. Within Algeria, in addition to the small French 'possessions', two vertical lines (one purple, one orange) dangle from the coast, suggesting the division of the country into three longitudinal provinces. Superimposed across the western two-thirds of the map is another designation, 'Region of the Maghrib', this one harking back to the broader regional entity from the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition. This is a complex picture, one with a nod to neighbouring sovereignties and to older geographical discourses. At the same time, clear-cut borders both between Algeria and its neighbours and within Algeria outlining French possessions and gesturing to provincial divisions, as well as the title 'Government of Algiers', suggest proto-colonial administration. The use of Paris as a prime meridian, with degrees of difference marked at the top and the bottom of the map, also

conveys a relationship with France, as in the maps of the *Description de l'Égypte*.

Just months before this map was published, a group of 21 French scholars, known as the Scientific Commission of Algeria, was sent to the country in a self-conscious attempt to recreate Napoleon's Institute of Egypt and to produce an Algerian counterpart to the *Description de l'Égypte*.²⁸ However, due in part to the particular history of the Algerian occupation and in part to changes in the field of geography by the 1830s, the commission scholars did not engage in survey fieldwork, nor did maps dominate the 39 volumes published between 1844 and 1867 under the series title *Exploration scientifique de l'Algérie* (Scientific Exploration of Algeria) the way they did the *Description de l'Égypte*. From the outset of the invasion, the Dépôt de la guerre dispatched its own survey teams and published regional maps and city plans at a variety of scales. Although roughly half of the members of the Scientific Commission were military officers, their geographical research in Algeria was largely separate from projects conducted by and for the army (though the conditions of war were inescapable, and commission scholars were accompanied by armed escorts wherever they went).²⁹ In part, this is because the conquest had been ongoing for nine years before the commission arrived, so a system for producing maps to plan and document campaigns had already been put in place. Moreover, the French scholarly field of geography had moved away from an eighteenth-century preoccupation with location and measurement, taking for granted that such endeavours were necessary, but would be conducted by technicians. Instead, the scholars on the commission focused on gathering oral testimony from locals regarding land use, trade routes and patterns of migration; writing descriptions of terrain; and coming up with geographical taxonomies based on historical sources and ethnographic observations. Consequently, the maps that were eventually issued by commission scholars were presented as addenda or supplements to the studies, often in the form of fold-out inserts at the end of individual volumes, and were usually based on previously published maps.³⁰

Among these were a number of thematic maps, a cartographic form that displays a relationship between a geographical area and some other factor, such as population density, geologic formation

or ethnic group.³¹ The growing popularity of this genre of map also suggests a division of cartographic labour in this period between those producing maps based on topographic surveys and those using such maps as the background for the analysis of other spatial relationships. Both groups upheld the mimetic standard for mapping. But the second group took the naturalization of the results of topographic surveys one step further, by making them the taken-for-granted prerequisite for, rather than the object of, study. Thus, although the General Secretary of the commission, Ernest Carette, discusses the importance of a mathematical approach to survey fieldwork, what he calls 'positive geography', in the first volume of the *Exploration scientifique*, he, unlike Jacotin in Egypt, did not see himself as a participant in such efforts. Rather, he considered himself engaged in 'critical geography', which entailed fieldwork based on interaction with the indigenous population that was intended to contribute new layers of data to already accomplished locational maps. He explains that 'the testimony of men . . . is to critical geography what the theodolite is to positive geography, an instrument of repetition that is impossible to use without previous experience', drawing an equivalence between both pursuits in terms of systematic, reproducible methods and the need for (French) expertise.³² He clarifies the source of such expertise later in the same discussion; although 'the practical genius of the native' is the essential raw material of critical geography, it is useless without the management and guidance of French 'civilization' – 'they are the flint, and we are the steel'.³³

This attitude reflects not only the changing field of geography, but the deep influence of the philosophy of Claude-Henri de Rouvroy, Comte de Saint-Simon (1760–1825) on Carette and other members of the commission, including, most prominently, the erstwhile leader of the Saint-Simonian movement Barthelémy-Prosper 'Père' Enfantin.³⁴ Saint-Simonians saw colonizing Algeria as a way of building a utopian society by blending the best of Europe with the best of Africa. By the best of Europe, they usually meant technological and scientific expertise and aptitudes for rational thought and political leadership. By the best of Africa, they usually meant fertility and natural resources, often untapped, and rich, though undocumented, oral and visceral knowledge bases. Although attitudes implying the superiority of Europeans and the unrealized potential of the rest of the world

drove most advocates for colonialism, the Saint-Simonians went one step further, calling for interbreeding between colonizer and colonized to produce a perfect race harmoniously combining the best of both for maximum commercial and spiritual benefits. Thus, Saint-Simonians generally painted a positive picture of foreign lands to encourage European civilian settlement. They also tended to oppose the brutal subjugation of indigenous people, which at times brought the Saint-Simonians in the commission into conflict with the military in Algeria, especially after Governor General Bugeaud implemented a policy of 'total war' intended to destroy the Algerian will to resist through spectacular violence and scorched-earth tactics. Because of this conflict, as well as worsening conditions in the country, the first phase of the commission's work was called to a halt in 1842, though the publication of its findings, and in certain cases subsequent research trips to Algeria, extended over the next two and a half decades.

One of the maps that best illustrates the way the historical trajectory of the conquest, the changing field of geography, and the Saint-Simonian movement influenced the tradition of colonial mapping in Algeria is the 'Map of Algeria Divided by Tribes' designed by Carette and adjunct commission member, and fellow Saint-Simonian, Auguste Warnier in 1844–5 (illus. 42). This map was published in 1846 as a supplement to an essay in the *Tableau de la situation des établissements français dans l'Algérie* (Catalogue of the Situation of French Establishments in Algeria), a government series that provided yearly statistics on civilian and military activities in Algeria. It was also, along with the essay, extracted and issued for sale independently by the Librairie Hachette, with locations in Paris and Algiers.³⁵ Though it was not, therefore, officially part of the *Exploration scientifique*, it had a clear relationship with Carette's five volumes on the history and geography of Algeria published for the series between 1844 and 1853. It also exemplifies both authors' aspiration to a Saint-Simonian union between European abstract thinking and African raw material. In this case, such a union is symbolized by the thematic map, which joins European form with African content and makes Algerian social formations legible to the French. In so doing, it displays two of the characteristics of colonial mapping: the obsession with subdivision as a way of transforming indigenous knowledge into European

overleaf

42 Ernest Carette and Auguste Warnier, 'Map of Algeria Divided by Tribes', (Paris, 1846).

MÉDITERRANÉE



knowledge and the identification of areas of untapped agricultural or commercial potential.

The use of the word ‘divided’ in the title of the map points to the obsession with subdivision that simultaneously produced Algeria as a coherent, bounded territory and deconstructed it. In many ways, colonial mapping can be seen as a process of enclosures, effecting spatial divisions among groups of people for the purposes of domination and administration. In this case, the primary enclosure is Algeria, bound in the north and south by topographic features (the coast and the desert) and in the east and west by the limits of neighbouring political entities. An inset map of the Mediterranean in the lower right corner purporting to show the relative position and size of polities in the region puts Algeria on par with the other bounded, seemingly sovereign, entities displayed. No mention of the Ottoman Empire is made, however, and Turkey is represented as separate from its North African possessions, including Tunis, Tripoli and Egypt, perhaps in order to produce them as potential colonial enclosures as well. Depending on how, or whether, the map is coloured (since these were black-and-white printed maps to which colour was later added by hand), subdivisions of Algeria emerge with varying levels of intensity. In the version pictured here, coloured lines separate a northern from a southern region, the ‘Algerian Tell’ from the ‘Algerian Sahara’, and toponyms label three provinces within the Tell named after their principal cities: Oran, Algiers and Constantine, from west to east respectively. Other coloured lines can be seen bounding different areas of the Tell and the Sahara, joining together groups of family names in various sizes of font, usually preceded by the transliterated Arabic terms ‘*oulad*’ or ‘*beni*’ (also abbreviated as ‘o.’ and ‘b.’; literally, ‘sons of’), as well as toponyms for oases, mountains, valleys, plateaus, lakes and rivers, some in transliterated Arabic and some in French, with a glossary provided in the bottom left corner. The writing on the map is far denser in the Tell than it is in the Sahara, which emphasizes the distinction between these two areas even on versions of the map that lack coloured lines.

Carette discusses these boundaries and subdivisions at length in his *Recherches sur la géographie et le commerce de l’Algérie méridionale* (Research on the Geography and Commerce of Southern Algeria), published as the second volume of the *Exploration scientifique* in 1844.

Although he takes pains to point out the complexities involved in determining the southwestern and southeastern borders of the country, given transhumant practices in those areas, the three fold-out maps inserted at the end of the volume, like the 'Map of Algeria Divided by Tribes', betray no such ambiguity, naturalizing the borders and, thus, the existence of the colonial enclosure called Algeria.³⁶ The subdivision of Algeria that Carette describes at the most length in this work is the latitudinal divide between the Tell and the Sahara, which he defines in agricultural terms: the Tell is the country of grains and the Sahara the country of dates. In this formulation, Carette is using 'Sahara' to refer to an area often named 'Country of Dates' (*bilād al-jarīd*) on other maps (see illus. 41). For him, this 'Algerian Sahara', which he describes as an 'archipelago of oases', should be differentiated from the 'Great Desert' to its south, beyond what his maps call the 'natural limit' of Algeria.³⁷ He also determines three longitudinal divisions of the country, each of which joins a part of the Tell with a part of the Sahara, reflecting their economic interdependence and the north–south migrations of Saharan residents. While Carette contends that each of these divisions reflects existing topographic, social and commercial patterns, he also states that the inhabitants know only the most local of them, 'the division by oasis and Tribes'. Thus, he claims credit for having determined 'for the first time' the regional and provincial entities he describes.³⁸ In other words, according to Carette, these entities are neither arbitrary nor ill-fitting for Algeria – indeed they are based on the topography of the country and the testimony of the native people – but it took the French aptitude for order and abstract thinking to establish and map them.

This discussion is epitomized in the main legend for the 'Map of Algeria Divided by Tribes', located in the bottom left section of the map. In two columns, the legend announces 'Division of Territory' and 'Classification of Tribes'. Algeria is divided 'parallel to the coast' between Tell and Sahara and 'perpendicular to the coast' between 'three political districts named provinces'. The Sahara is further divided between 'lands', or 'areas of migration', and 'oases', or 'areas of cultivation'. Moreover, each province is divided into 'groups of tribes', which can be classified as 'nomadic', 'sedentary' or 'mixed', which are in turn associated with areas of migration, cultivation or a combination of both. Also in the legend, Carette and Warnier assure

their audience that the tribal groups on the map were identified in terms of 'local reputation' and were in existence 'before the French occupation'. This, in addition to the notice just to the left of the legend that the delimitation of these groups does not take into consideration the 'accidental displacements occasioned by the recent wars', serves to dissociate the map from the violence of the French occupation. The content of the map is thus advertised as authentic indigenous knowledge, though it has been organized and interpreted by French experts for a French audience.

Despite the apparent clarity of the taxonomies invoked in the legend, the map itself is covered with such a surfeit of writing that it is difficult to differentiate group from tribe and to discern the boundaries between different groups, especially in the Tell.³⁹ Coloured lines on this version of the map help draw attention to some bounded areas, but the use of colour differs so much from copy to copy that it is impossible to determine Carette and Warnier's original vision for colouring the map, if there was one. Reading the accompanying essay or Carette's works from the *Exploration scientifique*, which include detailed descriptions and charts of these groups and their locations, side-by-side with the map would certainly help a viewer sort out and interpret the social units inscribed therein. Given the importance in later French policy of delimiting 'tribal lands' and appointing 'tribal councils' to oversee them, as well as generally distinguishing cooperative and productive from rebellious and destructive natives, one can imagine colonial administrators doing just that, perhaps even drawing their own coloured lines on copies of the map.⁴⁰ Nonetheless, without a concordance between written and graphic texts (or considerable experience in the country), the 'Map of Algeria Divided by Tribes', like the Cairo map from the *Description de l'Égypte*, might appear on its own simply chaotic or impenetrable.

The exception, however, is the land of the Algerian Sahara, which seems more open and ordered on the map than the Tell.⁴¹ Although this can be understood simply as a function of an area of lower population density, picturing it this way may have been intended to push the Saint-Simonian agenda of settler colonialism by stressing the availability of open space and opportunity in Algeria, particularly in the Sahara. In fact, in many of his works Carette self-consciously sets about rehabilitating the Algerian Sahara, challenging

its undeserved reputation among Europeans as an inhospitable and barren wasteland. Instead, he describes it as an underutilized economic powerhouse, a region of entrepôts on major north–south trade routes and cultivable land, lacking only European science and technology to bring it to life.⁴² The indigenous inhabitants, according to Carette, should be seen as the untutored instruments of any potential success, with their trans-Saharan contacts and intimacy with the terrain. The region and its people need only be ‘developed and fertilized’ by the French to realize this potential.⁴³ By drawing attention to this area, the ‘Map of Algeria Divided by Tribes’ may be seen as an advertisement for a Saint-Simonian approach to the French colonial enterprise in Algeria.

Civilian settlers were indeed pouring into the country from economically depressed southern Europe. Between 1830 and 1848 some 100,000 Europeans, including more than 50,000 French, immigrated to Algeria. By the early 1840s French settlers were calling for the formal annexation of Algerian land as an integral part of France. Although the military resisted such a move, the division of Algeria into three *départements* (official French administrative districts, in this case named for their principal cities of Oran, Algiers and Constantine) with representation in the French National Assembly was approved after the revolution of 1848 and finalized in 1870 after the overthrow of Napoleon III and the declaration of the Third Republic. This arrangement, and the privileges it conferred upon French settlers, would last until 1962 when Algerians won their independence after a bloody eight-year war. Immigration to Algeria was encouraged by both push and pull factors. From the start, French politicians had considered the benefits of using Algeria as a penal colony or an escape valve for metropolitan population pressure. Saint-Simonians and other advocates of settler colonialism also saw in Algeria economic and commercial possibilities – fertile land waiting for French expertise or French labour, established Mediterranean and Saharan trade networks to be controlled for the benefit of French goods and merchants. However, with the exception of those whose immigration was forced by law or other circumstances, settling Algeria had to be sold to the French.⁴⁴

The map entitled ‘Algeria, French Colony’ (illus. 43), published in 1856 as part of the *Atlas national illustré* (Illustrated National Atlas)



43 'Algeria, French Colony',
in Victor Levasseur, *Atlas
national illustré* (Paris, 1856).

by Paris-based geographer Victor Levasseur, was part of this effort. Designed using cadastral records held by military and civilian government agencies, the maps in the atlas celebrate the contributions, both human and material, to the French nation of 86 *départements* and six ‘possessions’. The fact that Algeria numbers among the ‘possessions’ rather than the *départements*, a fact reinforced by its designation as a ‘colony’ in the title of the map, reflects Napoleon III’s reversal of the 1848 decision to annex the provinces of Oran, Algiers and Constantine as constituent parts of France. Nevertheless, its inclusion in the atlas highlights its close relationship with France, and the index faithfully lists distances from Paris to the chief cities of both *départements* and ‘possessions’.⁴⁵ Moreover, although all the maps include lavishly illustrated frames, among the six ‘possessions’ Algeria’s map features the most explicit symbols of French nationalism and the most detailed statistical text and legend.

At the top right and left corners of the frame are two female figures who represent modified versions of Marianne, one of the most potent symbols to come out of the French Revolution, here adapted to embody the military (left) and civilian (right) roles of the French in Algeria.⁴⁶ While republican symbols were considered subversive under Napoleon III, iconographic references to Marianne, especially without the overtly revolutionary Phrygian cap, were tolerated as a way of inspiring loyalty to the French nation. On the left side of the map, a seated female figure with sunrays emanating from her head, another gesture to the figure of Marianne, points to a plaque engraved with the words ‘fraternity, union and strength’, as if to teach the Algerian man seated at her feet. This tripartite motto was one of many that circulated in post-revolutionary France; its use of the terms ‘union’ and ‘strength’ may be attributed to reluctance in this period to embrace the republican connotations of ‘liberty’ and ‘equality’, which would later join ‘fraternity’ in the official motto of France, as well as their particular unsuitability in a colonial context. By contrast, the motto ‘fraternity, union and strength’ evokes loyalty to France without encouraging ideas of independence or resistance. The two infants, one lighter- and one darker-skinned, are suggestive of both the general notion of ‘fraternity’ and the more particular Saint-Simonian ideal of racial union, an ideal that seems reinforced by the European woman and Algerian man enframing the children.

Other imagery portrays Algeria as a place of fertility and docility. The broken shackles and abandoned anchor, cannon and other weapons at the bottom of the map suggest that French rule has liberated Algeria from the scourges of piracy, slavery and despotism that characterized the Ottoman era. The submissive figures seated in the lower corners also serve to reassure potential colonists of the peaceful and compliant disposition of the indigenous population; the only armed Algerians in the frame are pictured, along with two Frenchmen, hunting a lion, a scene of cooperation that also shows the countryside being made safe for settlers. Images of salt, rice, dates and gold at the bottom and a profusion of fruits at the top and cereals on the sides of the map conjure lucrative commercial and agricultural opportunities to be had in the country. These portrayals are reinforced by the written text on either side of the map, which highlights Algeria's abundant flora and fauna, its good climate, its attractive cities and its links to ancient Rome, this last serving, as it did in the *Description de l'Égypte*, to appropriate Algeria's past for Europe.

The presentation of the map itself credits the French with the realization of Algeria as a coherent, if divisible, territory. The legend on the bottom left explains the three sets of borders shown on the map, each of which is associated with French administration of the country: the current provincial borders, subdivisions within the Province of Constantine, and former areas of French sovereignty under the terms of the Treaty of Tafna, contracted with Abd al-Qadir between 1837 and 1839. Showing these latter borders helps cast the French conquest of the country in a positive light, reminding the audience of the willingness of the French to negotiate with Algerian leaders in the process. The map shows no southern border for the country, and the written text confirms this, declaring it to have 'no fixed limit' in that direction. The map and commentary also describe the southern part of Algeria as 'the country of dates', rather than the Sahara, reinforcing a promise of agricultural opportunity, as well as legitimizing the indefinite southward expansion of French rule and settlement. Indeed, the image of a French soldier next to a French scholar, who appears to be holding up the map on the left side of the frame, suggests that it was French rule and settlement that have given, and will continue to give, shape to Algeria. Algerian knowledge of the country had been local and inchoate until it was transformed by

the French, the map itself being both vessel and evidence of this transformation. According to this view, the French, through a just and mutually beneficial occupation, were able to perceive the country on the macro level and to represent it back to Algerians, and to the world, in a form now linked to scientific progress and civilization: the map.

These three maps – the commemorative military map of 1840, the ‘Map of Algeria Divided by Tribes’ of 1846 and the *Atlas national illustré* map of 1856 – reflect the various ways in which the tradition of colonial mapping might be inflected to communicate messages in particular historical contexts. They exhibit the characteristics of colonial maps, but in different combinations and to different effects. While all of them emphasize the subdivision of territory and the self-evidence of the colonial enclosure of Algeria itself, these are not maps that came directly out of a topographic survey and their smaller scale does not allow the same kind of insistence on measurement and the parcelling out of ever smaller plots of land that was suggested by the maps of the *Description de l’Égypte*. Such maps were certainly being made for instrumental use by the military, government agents and property owners, but these more popular maps were meant to sell the conquest and promote the settlement of the country. Thus, they stress the availability of economic opportunity and open land, the docility of the native population, and the viability and righteousness of French rule. They represent military conflict, but only in order to reassure their audience that the country had been pacified, and that it had been done so in a just manner. Meant for wide circulation, in Paris as well as Algiers, these maps do not suggest a fundamental distance between their audience and the places mapped, a distance that might be bridged only by references to antiquity. Instead, that distance was meant to be bridged physically and contemporaneously by the settlement of the land. The promise of these maps is that Algeria itself might be or become a geographical category of belonging for the French.

MAPPING PALESTINE

For the British, the tradition of colonial mapping was shaped primarily by strategic and geopolitical concerns, but it was also at least partly

motivated by a desire for belonging – in this case, religious attachment to Palestine. The foreign policy of Great Britain in the nineteenth century was driven by the need to maintain communications with its Indian empire and, consequently, to compete with other European powers for information about, if not overt control over, lands ruled by the Ottomans and the Qajars, a Tehran-based dynasty that had taken over much of what had been Safavid Iran by the end of the eighteenth century. These priorities oriented the British toward the eastern Mediterranean and Red Sea in order to monitor the Suez Canal, constructed under French engineer Ferdinand de Lesseps between 1854 and 1869, as well as the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, which were identified as possible alternative routes for steamship and telegraph service to India via the Persian Gulf. With the exception of Aden, which the British had occupied in 1839, these areas had not been formally colonized. Thus, surveying and mapping proceeded partially clandestinely and partially opportunistically, sometimes with the permission and participation of the sovereign powers. In Mesopotamia, for instance, the Treaty of Erzurum brokered in 1843 between the Ottomans and Qajars mandated a multilateral boundary commission involving the British and Russians to determine a border stretching from Mount Ararat to the Persian Gulf. By 1869 the first official map of the border had been prepared, but further negotiations involving both British and Russian intermediaries, neither of whom wanted to see the other grab land from a weakened Ottoman or Qajar domain, continued through to the First World War.⁴⁷

Similarly, in 1840 the British and French intervened diplomatically in Ottoman affairs to de-escalate hostilities prompted by the expansionist and would-be independent Egyptian governor Muhammad Ali, who had sent forces under the command of his son to occupy Syria in 1830. The Treaty of London of 1841 stipulated that the Egyptian army would retreat from Syria in return for a guarantee from the Ottoman Sultan that the governorship of Egypt would remain in Muhammad Ali's family. When in 1860 conflict again erupted in Syria, especially in the mountains paralleling the coast between Tripoli and Sidon, the French intervened militarily to protect local Christian groups. At the end of 1861 France was joined by Great Britain, Russia, Prussia and Austria in negotiating an agreement with

the Ottoman Sultan whereby seven administrative districts in this area were grouped together and granted a special political arrangement that mandated the governor would always be Christian. This intervention also occasioned a scholarly mission, which conducted archaeological and ethnographic fieldwork and produced the reconnaissance-based 'Map of Lebanon' in 1862 (illus. 44).⁴⁸ This map served to define a territorial entity called 'Lebanon', a toponym that had heretofore been used mostly in the more limited sense of 'Mount Lebanon', as a special arena of French interest. It also made explicit the reason for such interest by featuring a statistical chart breaking down the population of each of Lebanon's districts by sect.⁴⁹ In almost all of the districts, the combination of the three major Christian sects overwhelmed the other categories combined, and Maronite Christians, the group with the strongest ties to French Catholicism, held a clear majority in the entirety of the territory mapped.

With these interventions in Ottoman affairs, the British recognized the importance of pursuing their own ideological interests in the region as a way of simultaneously ensuring continued communications with India and preventing the French from expanding their sphere of influence any further. Missionary activity, scholarly research and tourism in the 'Holy Land' were on the rise in the mid-nineteenth century among both European and North American Protestants.⁵⁰ One of the most prominent of these travellers was the American scholar Edward Robinson (1794–1863), whose works portray Palestine as a living repository of biblical knowledge, a land and people with direct topographic, linguistic and cultural links to the Bible. Because of the importance he placed on a 'close reading' of the terrain to gain a deeper understanding of Scripture, Robinson contracted the acclaimed German cartographer Heinrich Kiepert to make maps based on measurements and other data he gathered during his travels. It was in a similar spirit that the Palestine Exploration Fund (PEF) was founded in London in 1865 with the express purpose of generating new knowledge, primarily in the fields of archaeology and geography, about the Holy Land. Membership was by private subscription and included many well-known scholars, diplomats and clergymen. However, it quickly became clear that the scope of digging and surveying that the fund wished to sponsor would only be feasible with significant additional support and expertise. This came in a variety of forms from

08/05/91

D'APRÈS LES RECONNAISSANCES DE LA BRIGADE TOPOGRAPHIQUE

131

CORPS EXPÉDITIONNAIRE DE SYRIE

EN 1860-1861

DRESSÉE AU DÉPÔT DE LA GUERRE.

ÉTANT DIRIGÉ PAR LE GÉNÉRAL HEDYOT.

SOUS LE MINISTÈRE DE S. E. LE MARÉCHAL COMTE RONDON

1862



TABLEAU STATISTIQUE
indiquant la population des Districts du Liban.

[illegible]

Estadística Métrica (continuación)

Luzes, Homenage de 20 ao Dece

the British War Office, which found in the PEF a useful ‘cover’ for gathering intelligence in Ottoman territory.⁵¹ The fact that many of the Royal Engineers and other military officers who were seconded to the PEF were sympathetic to its scholarly mission made it more than a marriage of convenience. The compatibility of British strategic and ideological goals culminated in the PEF’s *Survey of Western Palestine*, conducted between 1871 and 1877 under the leadership of Lieutenants Claude Reignier Conder and Horatio Herbert Kitchener, both of the Royal Engineers. Kitchener would, in fact, go on to a successful career as an unapologetic proponent of British colonialism; among his future titles were Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Army, Governor General of the Sudan, Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, Consul General of Egypt, and finally Secretary of State for War during the First World War.

While the PEF viewed an ideal survey of Palestine as consisting of lands lying both east and west of the river Jordan, the difficulties of obtaining permission from the Ottoman authorities and funding the work meant that the PEF decided to limit itself to what it called ‘Western Palestine’, at least at first.⁵² This area, bounded in the west by the Mediterranean and the east by the Jordan and extending north as far as the river Litani in present-day Lebanon and south to a line running from Gaza in the west to the middle of the Dead Sea in the east, was mapped over 26 sheets at a scale of 1 inch to 1 mile (1:63,360), which was the standard scale used by the British military’s cartographic branch, the Ordnance Survey. To defray the cost of publication, the PEF agreed that the War Office would undertake the production process and keep the original zinc printing plates for military use. The first edition was published in late 1880 and was made available by subscription to PEF members and prominent educational and theological institutions. Subsequent printings, including smaller-scale versions and ‘special editions’ illustrating the Old and New Testaments, were issued for general sale beginning in 1881. In addition, the PEF embarked on the publication of the memoirs, which included three volumes of explanatory notes on each of the sheets of the map, as well as special volumes dedicated to place names, the city of Jerusalem, geology, and flora and fauna. These were also made available first to subscribers who had already purchased the map and then to the general public.⁵³

44 ‘Map of Lebanon’ (Paris, 1862), according to the French Expeditionary Corps in Syria, 1860–61.

The production and packaging of *The Survey of Western Palestine*, particularly its memoirs and ‘special editions’, exhibit the characteristics of colonial mapping: in particular, an interest in antiquity – here biblical times – and an emphasis on mathematical accuracy as a means by which local knowledge would be reproduced and made available to an English audience. In his separately published account of the survey, *Tent Work in Palestine*, Conder explains: ‘Palestine is thus brought home to England, and the student may travel, in his study, over its weary roads and rugged hills without an ache, and may ford its dangerous streams, and pass through its malarious plains without discomfort’.⁵⁴ This claiming of Palestine for England – a Palestine imagined via its maps – effects a transfer of knowledge earned through the hardship of the survey to the English viewer, who may now possess Palestine in the comfort of his or her home. This resonates with the comments made by the Archbishop of York at the inaugural meeting of the PEF:

This country of Palestine belongs to you and to me. It is essentially ours. It was given to the Father of Israel in the words ‘Walk the land in the length of it and in the breadth of it, for I will give it unto thee’ . . . We mean to walk through Palestine in the length and in the breadth of it because that land has been given unto us.⁵⁵

Indeed, the maps of the *Survey of Western Palestine* were intended as evidence of the ability and worthiness of the English who could not only ‘walk the land’ but reproduce the experience for their compatriots. In this view, although the indigenous people of Palestine certainly walked the land every day, they had been unable to reproduce that experience and therefore assimilate it to a civilizational standard of progress measured in terms of scientific achievement.⁵⁶ The maps were considered, in fact, closer to that ideal than the land itself. They were Palestine at home in England.

Thus, the scientific and technical achievements represented by the maps were every bit as important as the geographical knowledge they conveyed. The preparation of the sheets at the scale that had become the gold standard for the Ordnance Survey, as well as advertisements touting the virtues of ‘The Great Map’, an epithet

commonly used to refer to such large-scale maps, emphasized these achievements. According to the *Quarterly Statement* of the PEF in July 1879, it was

the only map of the country drawn, after a scientific survey, by trained officers. Its accuracy has been attested by official experts. It covers the greater part of the country which is the scene of Biblical history; and though the general features of the land are known, having been described by numerous travellers, the details are now for the first time laid down.⁵⁷

151


highlighting the mathematical basis for the project. The index map included with the 26 sheets reinforces this message (illus. 45). Like the triangulation diagram, it is presented as a grid in which 26 of the 36 squares correspond to the numbered sheets. The fact that the grid is perfectly rectangular, and many of the sheets are only partially filled, suggests an aspiration to standardization and homogenization. To achieve this goal, Sheets 7 and 26 are mostly blank, while Sheets 2, 5 and 16 break the frame of the map to include areas that were deemed too small to merit their own numbered sheet. Colour-coded areas refer to chronological stages in the surveying process, and, in addition to major towns and bodies of water, the only sites marked on the index map are the camps used by the surveyors. Thus, it provides graphic testimony to the methods of the survey itself, as well as to the standardization of the sheets in the series.

As advertised, in addition to exemplifying the latest in cartographic techniques, the maps of *The Survey of Western Palestine* were distinguished by the great detail with which they portray the lands of the Bible. In fact, the topographic details are so abundant that the location of ancient sites on the maps themselves is overshadowed. Take Sheet 17, for example, which features Jerusalem and was one of the first sheets printed independently for sale, signalling its importance for the target audience (illus. 46). This sheet receives by far the longest treatment in the memoirs, a hundred pages given over to the archaeology alone, not to mention the separate volume devoted solely to the city of Jerusalem, but it is representative of the rest of the maps in that the dominant visual elements are topographic, toponymic and infrastructural. Elevations, indicated by shading as well as by small numbers, are perhaps the most immediately apparent feature, followed by place names, orchards and the linear flows of waterways, roads and telegraph lines. District names are inscribed in larger typeface across swaths of terrain without demarcated borderlines, though in the accompanying memoir the names of towns belonging to each district are enumerated. Pink circles next to toponyms indicate inhabited towns, while dotted circles indicate ruins. This is the only sign on the map of the juxtaposition of the ancient and the contemporary that was the PEF's rationale for pursuing the mapping in the first place. Thus, despite the strong emphasis on biblical concordances in the accompanying memoirs,

PALESTINE EXPLORATION FUND MAP

(Sheet 237)

SHEET XVII



Scale of 1 inch = 1 mile
Scale of 1 inch = 1 mile

Prepared and Published under the direction of J. D. D. Under R.E. J. May 1880

Scale of 1 inch = 1 mile
Scale of 1 inch = 1 mile

Height (feet) above sea level where indicated is written.
The altitude (feet) above the height in feet above the level of the Mediterranean Sea.
The distance (feet) above the height in feet above the level of the Mediterranean Sea.

46 Sheet 17 in C. R. Conder and H. R. Kitchener, *Survey of Western Palestine* (London, 1880).

which go through all the major sites on each sheet and discuss their toponymic, topographic or archaeological relationship to sites in the Bible, the maps themselves are not overwhelmingly endowed with religious meaning. Only a close study of the map, alongside the accompanying memoir, would allow a viewer to visualize the land through the lens of the Bible.

The premium put on detail in *The Survey of Western Palestine* results in densely coded maps, and consequently the land itself does not appear overwhelmingly available or underutilized. On most sheets the shading for elevation runs into the patterns for vineyards, orchards and various kinds of trees, making the terrain appear both rugged and wooded. Although some sheets depict gardens in patchwork patterns (for instance, in and around Jaffa, Ramla and Lydda on Sheet 13), these were obviously not intended to be, or even to gesture to, cadastral maps.⁵⁸ This may be because the PEF was not, in fact, advocating formal colonization. After all, the expressed goal for the maps was to bring Palestine home to England, not to bring the English out to Palestine. However, the accompanying commentaries frequently stress the negligence of the local people and the Ottoman government with respect to land ownership, cultivation and general stewardship. In an essay published in the PEF's *Quarterly Statement* in 1876, Conder affirms that the Bible describes Palestine as 'what it still is, or is at least capable of becoming, a *good* land'. He goes on to blame Ottoman administration for any shortcomings: 'Justice and security of person once established, Palestine would become once more a land of corn, vines, and olives, rivalling in fertility and in wealth its ancient condition'.⁵⁹ Charles Tyrwhitt Drake, a PEF member, survey participant and no fan of the 'Fellah', an Arabic term used by the British for the indigenous peasantry, cites a combination of indolence and short-sighted government for holding the land back. In a report published in the *Quarterly Statement* in 1872 and reproduced as part of the memoir on Sheet 13, he opines:

I can only say that it would be a most excellent thing if the Government would set aside its dislike to selling land to foreigners. With proper guarantees a large proportion of this country would find a ready market, and then the present Fellah would be either eliminated or converted into a useful

member of society, while the increase of revenue to the Turkish Government would be very considerable.⁶⁰

Coming in the context of a description of the Agricultural School set up by the French Alliance Israélite on the outskirts of Jaffa in 1870 and portrayed on Sheet 13, this statement actively advocates both European land acquisition and the tutelage or displacement of indigenous people. In this way, *The Survey of Western Palestine* also exhibits the third and fourth characteristics of colonial mapping: the portrayal of the land as underutilized and the dismissal of existing social and political institutions.

While the Survey of Western Palestine was not conducted in the context of formal British colonial rule and was, in fact, subject to the dictates of Ottoman administrators in the area, it nonetheless promoted a proprietary, even acquisitive, relationship between the map audience and the places mapped. This cartographic project took a long-standing regional entity, *Filasṭīn* (Palestine), which often appeared on Ottoman maps even though it did not designate an official administrative district, and defined it as an area of special British interest, both strategic and ideological.⁶¹ Although lands to the east of the river Jordan were considered part of this regional entity, and thus a target for the PEF survey, the fact that they were only incompletely mapped meant that they were also incompletely visualized as belonging to that particular area of British interest. Not coincidentally, when the League of Nations assigned the administration of Palestine to the British in the aftermath of the First World War, it also approved a separate political fate for what the PEF had called 'Eastern Palestine', now dubbed the Emirate of Transjordan. In the same period, the PEF maps and the 1862 'Map of Lebanon', with their overlap between Ra's al-Naqura in the south and Tyre in the north, would act as authoritative, though conflicting, sources for boundary negotiations between the British in Palestine and the French in Lebanon.⁶² More immediately, the publication of the PEF maps occurred on the cusp of intensified British intervention in nearby areas, with the occupation of Egypt in 1882 on the pretext of sorting out its finances after defaulting on payments to European creditors, and the establishment of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium to rule Sudan in 1899. This colonial foothold in the eastern Mediterranean

would serve as one of the main bases for British campaigns against the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, campaigns in which neighbouring Palestine played a central part.

MAPPING ARABS

By the First World War colonial mapping had zoomed both in and out, with very large-scale cadastral maps produced by the British to manage their Egyptian occupation; ongoing border surveys that helped Russia and Britain monitor the margins of Iran; and an extension of the well-established British India Survey westward, which started producing multi-sheet topographic maps of Iran in the 1890s.⁶³ During the war, innovative mobile mapping units were assigned to the Allied campaigns in Egypt and Iraq, and aerial photography was used successfully for surveying areas behind enemy lines.⁶⁴ At the same time, geographical societies in Britain and France advocated for smaller-scale maps that might help visualize the vast sweep of the conflict, and a project was launched to produce a 1:1,000,000 map of the theatres of war in Europe, Africa and Asia.⁶⁵ Similarly, this period saw an explosion in newspaper maps to keep the public informed and morale high on the home front. Such maps were one of the vehicles for the popularization of terms like 'Near and Middle East'. In the case of British newspapers, this designation allowed cartographers to highlight the area stretching from British Egypt in the west to British India in the east without drawing attention to Ottoman sovereignty in the title of the map.⁶⁶ Negotiations among the Allies both during and after the war also required a supply of maps on which borders could be drawn and redrawn with ease, though not, of course, with the precision of boundary surveys. The negotiators at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 were occupied with grand plans for rethinking the world order; implementing such plans on the ground and the attention to cartographic detail, not to mention human agency, that would require could come later.⁶⁷

In formulating these plans, the symbolic importance of 'self-determination', the principle that American President Woodrow Wilson had announced should guide the post-war world in a speech in February 1918, jostled with the self-interest of the Allies, especially

Britain and France. Indeed, they had already engaged in a series of private negotiations to make sure they would be able to continue to pursue the agendas that had driven policy toward the Ottoman Empire's Asian provinces over the last half-century.⁶⁸ Moreover, the discovery of oil in commercial quantities in southwestern Iran in 1908, coupled with the conversion of the Royal Navy to oil power during the war, made guaranteeing access to neighbouring areas with potential fuel reserves a priority. Thus, many of the maps prepared during the war and in the run-up to the Paris Peace Conference carefully frame concessions to various groups so as to facilitate and balance new forms of European control over the region. While there was considerable disagreement over the details – and, indeed, the process has been described as ‘disordered’⁶⁹ – the ‘peace maps’ exhibit familiar patterns of colonial mapping, in particular the emphasis on subdivision and the dismissal of local social and political formations, to advance European interests in ways that could be seen as compatible with self-determination.

Territorially, the Ottoman Empire was but a shadow of its former self on the eve of the First World War. Between 1878 and 1914 the British occupied Cyprus, Egypt and Sudan; in 1881 the French colonized Tunisia and then in 1913 Morocco, just as Italy jumped into the fray and occupied Libya. The Russo-Ottoman war of 1877–8 resulted in significant Ottoman losses in the Balkans and the Caucasus. By 1913, at the conclusion of the Balkan Wars, the Ottoman Empire's European possessions had been reduced to a stretch of about 150 miles (240 km) between Edirne and Istanbul in Thrace. It still controlled most of Anatolia, Syria and Iraq, but no longer had any real power in North Africa. The empire of three continents was finally merely ‘Turkey in Asia’, as if the continental mapping tradition of the late seventeenth century were a self-fulfilling prophecy. Up to this point, the policy of Great Britain and to a lesser extent France had been to protect Ottoman sovereignty in West Asia as a way of containing Russia's plans to expand its empire in the Black Sea region and the Balkans. However, the Ottoman entry into the war on the side of the Central Powers (Germany and Austria-Hungary) meant that the Allied nations at the start of the war (Britain, France and Russia) were no longer willing to protect it. Although the Ottoman military won some key victories early on, by 1915 the Allies were already mapping the spoils.

The Sykes-Picot Agreement started out as a secret negotiation between British and French representatives in autumn 1915 to divvy up the Asian provinces of the Ottoman Empire between themselves. Named for the two principals involved, Sir Mark Sykes and François Georges Picot, the initial agreement was depicted on a map, which was then signed by both men and enclosed with correspondence detailing the plan in May 1916 (illus. 47).⁷⁰ Rather than produce an original map, Sykes and Picot used coloured ink to outline and shade the proposed subdivisions on top of a pre-existing map entitled 'Map of Eastern Turkey in Asia, Syria and Western Persia', published by the Royal Geographic Society in 1910 and updated with railroads through November 1915. As is explained in the accompanying correspondence, but nowhere on the map, blue shading indicated areas of direct British control and red shading areas of direct French control. The letters 'A' and 'B', on the other hand, referred to areas in which France and Great Britain, respectively, were 'prepared to recognize and protect an independent Arab State or a Confederation of Arab States', as long as exclusive economic and diplomatic relationships were established and maintained. Yellowish brown shading signified a proposed area of international administration, to be worked out initially in consultation with Russia, and then with other allies, including the Sharif of Mecca, a Muslim leader who was, at that very moment, concluding a separate agreement with Great Britain.

Although this map was by no means the final word – negotiations would continue and would be complicated by other parties, promises and goals – it helped established the cartographic precedent of subdividing Ottoman Asia into enclosures shaded or inscribed to represent their relationship with particular identities or interests. This precedent emerged seamlessly from earlier ethnographic maps that partitioned Ottoman Europe along racial, ethnolinguistic and religious lines, a practice that shaped nationalist-separatist movements in the Balkan Peninsula during the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth.⁷¹ Unlike these maps, which cloaked themselves in scientific objectivity, the Sykes-Picot map is easily vilified as an example of predatory colonial mapping, since it was drawn up in secret and claimed such substantial territories for direct British and French control. However, in the cases of areas 'A' and 'B', it also proposed an 'Arab State'. This is noteworthy not because it makes the map more just or palatable, but



47 Map accompanying the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 8 May 1916.

because it signals a departure from the earlier forms of colonial mapping examined in this chapter. In the Sykes-Picot map, the modern nation-state replaced triangulation as the cartographic ideal that transformed indigenous knowledge into European knowledge and justified colonial intervention. Ultimately, it helped establish partition and enclosure as the only viable mechanisms by which to pursue political interests and the bounded territory, preferably coterminous with a racially, ethnolinguistically or religiously majoritarian population, as the only recognizable form in which to represent them graphically.⁷²

Just as the Sykes-Picot map was being finalized, another secret wartime negotiation made the question of an Arab state central to the future of the region. Over the course of 1915–16 a series of ten letters was exchanged between Sir Henry McMahon, British High Commissioner for Egypt, and Sharif Husayn, Commander (‘amir’) of Mecca, an appointment made by the Ottoman Sultan for guardianship of the holy cities of western Arabia. The honorific ‘Sharif’ signalled his descent from the Prophet Muhammad, and this, combined with the prestige of his position, made him a potentially influential spokesperson for Arabic-speaking Muslims, some of whom felt that the time was ripe for rebelling against the Ottomans. To explore the possibilities, Husayn initiated contact with McMahon, asking for British support for

the independence of the Arab countries, bounded on the north by Mersina–Adana up to the 37° of latitude . . . ; on the east, by the borders of Persia up to the Gulf of Basra; on the south, by the Indian Ocean, with the exception of the position of Aden to remain as it is; on the west, by the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea up to Mersina.⁷³

McMahon’s response was vague but encouraging. In a subsequent letter, he accepted Husayn’s terms with the exception of ‘the districts of Mersina and Alexandretta, and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo’. The justification for this exception, according to McMahon, was that this area ‘cannot be said to be purely Arab’. Though Husayn had, from the start, made the distinction between ‘Arab’ and ‘Turk’ the basis for his willingness

to rebel against the Ottomans, McMahon insisted on a finer calibration of the Arab identity in determining the geographical extent of the state.

Indeed, attempts to define a modern Arab identity date back to the mid-nineteenth century among intellectuals in Cairo and Beirut – the latter, ironically, in the exact area that McMahon dismissed as insufficiently Arab. These discussions, which tended to link Arabness first and foremost with the Arabic language, emerged in the context of the Ottoman *Tanzimat*, a reform movement aimed at transforming subjects into citizens by removing distinctions of religion from major arenas of administration and law. In this spirit, although he renounced claim to Adana and Mersina, Husayn insisted that ‘the provinces’ of Beirut and Aleppo were ‘purely Arab’, arguing ‘there is no difference between a Muslim and a Christian Arab’. In response, McMahon pulled back from further discussion of identity and cited instead ‘the interests of our ally, France’, as the reason for postponing a decision. Husayn was not to receive a clear assurance on this point before the start of the ‘Arab Revolt’ in June 1916, but he seemed satisfied that the British would support an independent state in, at the very least, the rest of the area he had specified.

The question of whether or not the British had made a promise to Husayn that directly contradicted the Sykes-Picot Agreement – or, indeed, the Balfour Declaration of November 1917, in which the British Foreign Secretary, Arthur Balfour, pledged the government’s support for the establishment of a ‘national home for the Jewish people’ in Palestine – remains a source of controversy to this day. Although no maps accompanied the Husayn-McMahon correspondence, British maps prepared for the Paris Peace Conference attempted to reconcile concessions to ‘Arabs’ with other commitments in the region. One of these maps was presented to the British War Cabinet by the legendary T. E. Lawrence in autumn 1918 (illus. 48).⁷⁴ An Oxford-educated archaeologist and gifted Arabic linguist, Lawrence had been stationed in Cairo at the outbreak of the war as part of an intelligence unit helping to formulate British strategy in the eastern Mediterranean and was assigned to the British contingent that fought alongside Husayn’s son, Faysal, in the Arab Revolt. His advocacy for and participation in the revolt made him a strong critic of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which, he felt, left no room for the Arab state that had been promised Sharif Husayn. To present his alternative vision,

he chose the same base map as that used by Sykes and Picot, the 'Map of Eastern Turkey in Asia, Syria and Western Persia', and likewise overwrote it by drawing borders and shading areas. However, unlike the Sykes-Picot map, Lawrence's map features toponyms and other writing, not simply the letters 'A' and 'B'. And of his additions, the most prominent is the word 'Arabs'.

At the centre of the map is a large unshaded area inscribed with the word 'Arabs' in large letters, underneath which is the name 'Feisal', referring to Husayn's son, Lawrence's comrade-in-arms and proposed ruler of the Arab state portrayed here. Just to its north is a yellowish brown-shaded area also inscribed with the term 'Arabs' in large letters and a name below it, 'Zeid', referring to Husayn's youngest son. However, here the parenthetical 'under British influence' serves to distinguish this domain of 'Arabs' from that below it. As for the other shaded areas on the map, three are designated by toponyms ('Irak', 'Sinai' and 'Palestine') and three by peoples (blue for the French and purple for the Armenians). The area labelled 'Irak' is shaded red, and underneath the toponym are both the name 'Abdullah', referring to another of Husayn's sons, and the parenthetical 'under Direct British Administration'. Based on the colour pattern, it can be assumed that the other red-shaded territories, Sinai and a small area around Haifa, are reserved for direct British administration, and the other yellowish brown-shaded territory, Palestine, for British influence. The two sets of question marks on the map have been interpreted as suggesting the possibility of a Kurdish state, but there is no evidence that this was Lawrence's intention, either on the map or in the relevant minutes from War Cabinet meetings.⁷⁵ Some borderlines are highlighted in bright red, one of them labelled 'Col. Wilson's Line', referring to the then Civil Commissioner in Baghdad and strong advocate for direct British control of as much of Ottoman Asia as possible – and especially for an Iraq that included the area around Mosul, where it was suspected oil reserves might be found. This was an area given over to French influence on the Sykes-Picot map but included here, by virtue of 'Col. Wilson's Line', in British Iraq. The dotted arc at the bottom, copied from Sykes-Picot, is clarified with a label: 'No foreign power other than Great Britain to be allowed any voice in the Government of the Country south of this line'. This enabled Lawrence to present the map as an unambiguous

MAP OF EASTERN TURKEY IN ASIA, SYRIA AND WESTERN PERSIA



48 Map presented by T. E. Lawrence to the British War Cabinet in the autumn of 1918.

prioritization of British interests, as well as a fulfilment of the promises made to Sharif Husayn during the war.

By prominently identifying two indigenous groups, Arabs and Armenians, and toponyms that corresponded loosely to pre-existing regional designations, this map does exhibit more sensitivity to conditions on the ground than the Sykes-Picot map. For instance, its reallocation of French territory to the Armenians can be interpreted as a recognition of the systematic policy of massacres and deportations carried out against them by the Ottoman military during the First World War, amounting to a genocide in which upwards of one million were killed and countless others displaced. Indeed, in a War Cabinet meeting on 29 October 1918, Lawrence explained that an Armenian state should be located in northwestern Syria, rather than in eastern Anatolia, because the Arab population there had shown itself willing to protect Armenians during the war and would thus 'welcome such a State'.⁷⁶ The fact that a large number of Armenian refugees had gathered in that area further bolstered his case.

Whether or not this was true, and despite his professed expertise, Lawrence's map, with its unilaterally assigned rulers and borders, was fully consistent with the tradition of colonial mapping. In fact, the main difference between this map and the Sykes-Picot map is not any greater commitment to self-determination, but rather a serious curtailment of French claims. To the extent that Faysal's Arab state and the Armenian state were viable, it would be at the expense of French colonial interests as expressed in the Sykes-Picot Agreement. However, the basic principle behind the two maps is exactly the same: to divide Ottoman Asia into bounded territories enclosing racially, ethnolinguistically or religiously defined populations as a means of creating a modern nation-state system guided by superior European knowledge. Lawrence's decision to use the same base map and colour scheme may have been for rhetorical effect – to highlight his map as an improvement *on* (literally) the Sykes-Picot map – but in doing so he did not subvert or challenge the tradition of colonial mapping.

Three maps appended to a British Foreign Office memorandum of November 1918 further exemplify the tradition of colonial mapping by illustrating the way debates over how to approach the 1919 Peace Conference took for granted the principle of partition.⁷⁷ The first shows the full extent of the Sykes-Picot negotiations as they had

expanded to include Russia and Italy over the autumn and winter of 1916–17 (illus. 49). Russia's anticipated sphere of influence was no surprise, given its conflicts with the Ottoman Empire since the late eighteenth century and its championing of Eastern Christian separatist movements in the Balkans, the Crimea and the Caucasus. However, the Russian Revolution in autumn 1917 threw the interests portrayed on this map into question, though the Soviet Union would ultimately stake its own claims in the yellow-shaded areas. Italy was a comparative latecomer to the colonial scramble. After invading Tripoli in 1913, Italian leaders became convinced that rounding out a Mediterranean empire was a desirable outcome of the decision to join the Allied cause, and they fought strenuously to realize these goals at the Paris Peace Conference.

The second map appended to the memorandum seems initially to contradict the first map. Utilizing the same base map, the title on the legend is 'Possible Redistribution of Ottoman and Arabian Territory on the Principle of Self-determination' (illus. 50). The definition of 'self' in self-determination that is conveyed by this map seems to be a racial, ethnolinguistic or religious group. This is clearest in the cases of Turkey, Armenia, Kurdistan and the 'Arab Countries', given the implication that these enclosures would be coterminous with Turkish, Armenian, Kurdish and Arab populations, all of which were being increasingly defined and differentiated in this period.⁷⁸ It follows that the 'debatable areas' and 'autonomous' entities designated by single capital letters and explained on the legend constitute a recognition that some ambiguities in the drawing of borders between such populations would arise.


By reserving area 'J' for an 'autonomous Arab state under Persia', for instance, the map explicitly uses a population defined racially or ethnolinguistically to justify the partition of Qajar Iran, which had not been a belligerent in the war. This is the exact area in which the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, of which the British government held the majority share, was drilling for oil from its base in Abadan. Although by the terms of the D'Arcy concession of 1901 the Qajars had already ceded substantial claim to the profits from the company, the separate agreement the British made in 1909 with a local leader in Mohammerah, on the eastern banks of the Shatt al-Arab and fully within area 'J', showed that the British were prepared to fragment not

SECRET.

MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE AGREEMENTS OF 1916 IN REGARD TO ASIA MINOR, MESOPOTAMIA, &c.

MAP 1

183



49 Map 1 from War Cabinet,
Eastern Committee
Memorandum 2525,
21 November 1918.



50 Map 2 from War Cabinet,
Eastern Committee
Memorandum 2525,
21 November 1918.

just Ottoman Asia but also Iran in the name of self-determination in order to maintain preferential access to natural resources.

By contrast, the use of the toponyms Palestine and Lebanon (for area 'G') on this map does not make as explicit who the 'self' in self-determination would be, but since neither entity is included in the 'Arab Countries' it might be assumed their populations were not considered, by the makers of the map, fully Arab. Although residents of both areas assumed identities derived from these toponyms (*filasṭīnī*, Palestinian; and *lubnānī*, Lebanese) in certain contexts, they also assumed identities tied to other regions, as well as to more local, ethnolinguistic, sociological, religious or political factors, in others (such as Syrian, Egyptian, Jerusalemite, Arab, Muslim, Christian, Jew and Ottoman – to name but a few). It would be a stretch in the context in which this map was produced to see it as singling these areas out for independence on the basis of a particularly strong local or regional identity. Instead, the use of toponyms in these cases may be interpreted as a way of rendering traditional geographical designations useful and modern by enclosing them with borders and hinting that they might, like the other enclosures on the map, be associated, either now or in the future, with particular populations or interests. By leaving the exact nature of the populations or interests vague, the toponyms serve as place holders for the emerging strategic and political plans of Britain and France, including the transformation of Palestine into a Jewish national home as promised in the Balfour Declaration.

An overlay made from tracing paper is provided, for superimposing on this map, with a legend that states: 'Areas in which it is hoped that the Peoples of Turkey, Arabia, and the Caucasus, if they group themselves within the lines indicated in map 2, will subsequently opt for the assistance of the Allied Powers'. Red, blue, and green outlines on the tracing paper indicate areas where that assistance would come from Britain, France and Italy respectively. Notably, Russia has been removed, signalling doubts over whether the Bolsheviks would be able to (or should be allowed to) lay claim to former parts of the Russian Empire in the Caucasus. The use of the conditional phrase 'if they group themselves' is the only indication that the vision of self-determination projected by the map underneath the tracing paper would actually require some reshuffling of the

‘selves’ involved. In other words, lines not only needed to be drawn, but people also needed to be ‘grouped’ within those lines. This suggests that it would take some social engineering, if not also mass population transfers, to produce racially, ethnolinguistically or religiously majoritarian nation-states, a task that would in concept rely on European knowledge and in practice require European ‘assistance’, whether or not it was voluntarily sought.

The third and final map made for this memorandum portrays an additional round of subdivisions in the region (illus. 51). The primary subdivisions on this map comprise ‘Syria’, ‘Jezirah’ and ‘Irak’, all of which, along with ‘Kurdistan’, constitute areas of settled or semi-settled population, while areas of nomadic population are designated not by toponyms but by names of kinship groups. The colours refer to the three sons of Sharif Husayn from T. E. Lawrence’s map, who, along with their father, would be assigned the four major groupings of settled and nomadic peoples portrayed here. This map also depicts a bounded ‘Kuwait’, which is not highlighted on the previous two but which reflects agreements with the British going back to 1899 to uphold the autonomy of a local ruling family so as to maintain influence on this strategically situated area. In these ways, the third map exhibits ever more finely tuned distinctions whereby different populations were enclosed, assigned pre-approved rulers, and thus made dependent on or available for European patronage.

It is illuminating to note the use of toponyms, which are inscribed in both the background and the foreground (in separate, though overlapping, areas) of the maps, because it suggests the authors wished to be seen as attempting not only to apply the principle of self-determination, but to sustain geographical continuities, though in a new and improved European form. For instance, in the background of ‘Arab Countries’ (see illus. 50), three major toponyms can be distinguished by their upper-case lettering: ‘Syria’, ‘El Jezireh’ and ‘Irak Arabi’. These referred to regional entities that had been mapped in various ways stretching back to the ‘Atlas of Islam’ tradition. These toponyms are also inscribed in the foreground as bounded subdivisions of the ‘Arab Countries’ (see illus. 51) with slightly revised locations that reflected, presumably, a more appropriate target population for enclosure. The message is that a circumscribed territory coterminous with a single racial, ethnolinguistic or religious

overleaf

51 Map 3 from War Cabinet,
Eastern Committee
Memorandum 2525,
21 November 1918.



MAP 3.

Possible Settlement of Arab Countries.

BLACK OUTLINE...	Permanent areas which must form the basis of any settlement.
COLOURED WASH	Settled areas.
COLOURED OUTLINE	Tribal areas.
COLOURED BARS	Semi-settled areas.
RED LETTERING...	Tribes.
GREEN E	Assyrian Christian Principality (autonomous).
" F	Debatable Territory between Armenia and Jezireh.
" G	Lebanon (autonomous).
" J	Mohammerah (autonomous Arab State under Persia).
BLUE COLOUR AND OUTLINE	Possible "Feisal" group.
RED	"Abdullah" group.
YELLOW	"Husein" group.
BROWN	"Zaid" group Jezireh).
"	Kurdistan.
"	Koweit.
K	Jebeliyah (settled) Arabs and Hauran Druses.
L	Cultivated counry owned by Ruweilah-Anazeh Bedouin and farmed by Arab peasantry.
M	Yezidi Country in Jebel Sinjar.





group is the appropriate configuration for self-determination. Indigenous geographical knowledge might inform this new configuration, but had to be ordered (and mapped) in modern, European terms. Thus, toponyms became facades behind which selves and states were being determined in this new phase of colonial mapping.

The final peace settlement for the lands of the Ottoman Empire did not look like any of these maps. It did not, in fact, even look like itself, or at least the shape it was supposed to take under the terms of the Paris Peace Conference, laid down in the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres, for very long. These terms were altered by events on the ground and then abrogated by the Treaty of Lausanne, signed by representatives of the newly independent state of Turkey, in 1923.⁷⁹ In this time frame, the Mandates for Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine were created under Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant, which provided for 'colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world'. The 'tutelage' of these peoples 'should be entrusted to advanced nations'.⁸⁰ Great Britain was the 'advanced nation' to which Mesopotamia and Palestine would be entrusted, with France playing that role for Syria.

The terms of each of these mandatory relationships were different and were in fact quickly replaced by new arrangements and boundaries. Britain created the Emirate of Transjordan, under the rule of Sharif Husayn's son Abdullah, in the eastern part of the Palestine Mandate. France subdivided the Syria Mandate into five entities, to be eventually reduced to two, Lebanon and Syria. Finally, Britain transformed the Mesopotamia Mandate into the Hashemite Kingdom of Iraq, under the rule of Faysal. These changes notwithstanding, the spirit of the mandate system lived on. The persistence in seeing the inhabitants of the region as ill-prepared for self-rule, and the insistence on partition and the nation-state as the most modern and rational means of fostering whatever rule (self- or otherwise) was desirable, enabled the maintenance of British and French strategic interests and spheres of influence in the former Ottoman Empire through the Second World War.

THE CENTURY-LONG TRADITION of colonial mapping examined in this chapter helped produce a context within which Europeans were able to visualize and justify ongoing control of the North African and West Asian provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Maps created as part of the French occupations of Egypt and Algeria in the early nineteenth century measured, subdivided and attempted to impose order on land and people deemed incapable of doing it themselves. Maps created as part of the late nineteenth-century British survey of Palestine reproduced the lands of the Bible for consumption in Britain, just as they delineated a proto-colonial enclosure as a way of pursuing strategic interests in the area without formal colonization. Finally, maps drawn up during and in the immediate aftermath of the First World War promoted a new form of colonial enclosure that, like the ones before it, would be dependent on modern European expertise for its realization. This form of enclosure was premised on the identification and privileging of particular population groups, usually defined in racial, ethnolinguistic or religious terms, within bounded territories under European supervision. The consequence, perhaps unintended, of this new form of colonialism was that it was readily appropriated by nationalists who claimed those bounded territories and population groups in the name of self-determination. The next chapter explores the dialectic between colonial and emerging national mapping traditions in the twentieth-century Middle East.

ممالك و مستعمرات عبدالمجيد

مجلد اول
ممالك و مستعمرات
عبدالمجيد
تأليف
مفتي اعلى دارالعلوم
الاندلس
الطبعة الاولى
الطبعة الثانية
الطبعة الثالثة



FOUR

ENCLOSURE AND EXCLUSION IN NATIONAL MAPPING

National mapping in the twentieth-century Middle East built directly on the tradition of European colonial mapping. By this, I do not mean that Europeans ‘invented’ the nation-states of the region. Not only did Europeans, as we have seen, rely on indigenous people and geographical knowledge to conceptualize and map their colonial enclosures, but Middle Eastern nationalisms have also drawn heavily, if selectively, from discourses that predate colonialism. Instead, I mean that emerging traditions of national mapping reproduced the cartographic ideals of colonial mapping, primarily the ideal of a bounded territory enclosing a racially, ethno-linguistically or religiously majoritarian population, and thus fostered exclusions of varying kinds and intensities for which there are no precedents in precolonial mapping. While this was at times a successful strategy for resisting or removing conditions of European colonialism, its success depended on the appropriation – indeed on the acceptance – of the very judgements that enabled those conditions in the first place, judgements about what makes a population modern, politically mature and cartographically visible.

This chapter does not, therefore, approach national mapping as a postcolonial, or necessarily emancipatory, practice. Though historians usually date decolonization in much of Africa and Asia to the period after the Second World War, this process remains incomplete in the Middle East and has even reversed itself in recent decades, a contention I examine further in the next chapter. In the context of this chapter, three of its case studies – Turkey, Iran and Israel – represent nation-states that secured their independence by shaking off European colonialism in the first half of the twentieth

52 ‘General Map of the Imperial, Well-protected Realms’ prepared at the Ottoman Imperial War College in Istanbul in 1899–1900.

century, but at the cost of adopting the same strategies, which erase, marginalize or criminalize those who do not conform or acquiesce to the terms of their enclosure. The fourth case study – Palestine – demonstrates the indistinguishability between national and colonial mapping in the modern history of Zionism as well as the unfulfilled promises of decolonization in the era of the nation-state. Indeed, such promises may be unfulfillable without a more decisive break from the spatial logic of this era. By insisting on a zero-sum equation between territory and identity, most traditions of national mapping neither oppose nor subvert the exclusionary dynamics of colonial mapping. They ratify them.

The historical relationship between mapping and the nation-state has attracted substantial scholarly interest over the last quarter of a century. Two of the most foundational of these studies are Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities* and Thongchai Winichakul's *Siam Mapped*. They each theorize the rise, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, of nationalist discourses alongside unprecedentedly centralized state structures, which in many parts of the world occurred under conditions of direct or indirect European intervention. These discourses created and sustained, in Anderson's words, 'imagined communities' among people who might never have face-to-face contact by means of a set of symbols and practices, including the narration of a common history and the delineation of a bounded territory that appears to be the product of that history. This bounded territory is sometimes described as a homeland and is always associated with a seemingly objectively identifiable group of people, usually defined in terms of race, ethnicity, language, religion or residence. The identification of this group and its differentiation from other groups are facilitated by the pervasive reach of the centralized state and its concern with regulating, ordering and homogenizing people and space. The title of a chapter added to the 1991 edition of *Imagined Communities* – 'Census, Map, Museum' – names three technologies by which states produce self-aware national populations within bounded territories.

Thongchai Winichakul's notion of the 'geo-body' informs Anderson's work and emphasizes the importance of the map as a technology of the nation-state. In Thongchai's words:

Geographically speaking, the geo-body of a nation occupies a certain portion of the earth's surface which is objectively identifiable. It appears to be concrete to the eyes as if its existence does not depend on any act of imagining. That, of course, is not the case. The geo-body of a nation is merely an effect of modern geographical discourse whose prime technology is a map.¹

The naturalization of the geo-body – the process by which people are persuaded of its 'concrete' and 'objectively identifiable' existence – is accomplished through repeated exposure to maps and accompanying nationalist and geographical discourses, especially those that stress the 'natural' borders of and historical precedents for the geo-body. As Thongchai demonstrates in the case of late nineteenth- and twentieth-century Siam/Thailand, this process emerged in response to European colonial interventions in neighbouring areas and helped justify increasingly centralized state regulation within a bounded territory that was concurrently being naturalized as the geo-body of the nation.

The reproducibility of maps in the age of print media has facilitated the naturalization of geo-bodies of nations all over the world. In an oft-cited passage, Anderson coins the term 'logo-map' for this phenomenon and traces its origins to colonialism:

In London's imperial maps, British colonies were usually pink-red, French purple-blue, Dutch yellow-brown, and so on. Dyed this way, each colony appeared like a detachable piece of a jigsaw puzzle. As this 'jigsaw' effect became normal, each 'piece' could be wholly detached from its geographic context. In its final form all explanatory glosses could be summarily removed: lines of longitude and latitude, place names, signs for rivers, seas, and mountains, *neighbors*. Pure sign, no longer compass to the world. In this shape, the map entered an infinitely reproducible series, available for transfers to posters, official seals, letterheads, magazines and textbook covers, tablecloths, and hotel walls. Instantly recognizable, everywhere visible, the logo-map penetrated deep into the popular imagination, forming a powerful emblem for the anticolonial nationalisms being born.²

Here Anderson highlights the association between logo-maps and ‘anticolonial nationalisms’, which is relevant to the cases examined in this chapter, but it should be stressed that geo-bodies and logo-maps are important to all nation-states and nationalisms. Even when a geo-body has been naturalized so fully that it no longer attracts notice, as on many weather maps, it can form part of what has been called ‘banal nationalism’.³ By contrast, sometimes logo-maps are arresting visual symbols, explicitly intended to drum up support for a nation-state or to advance competing nationalisms or territorial claims. In both cases, however, maps are implicated in the production of national, and at times fervently nationalist, populations.

In this chapter I use the term ‘national mapping tradition’ to illuminate the ways maps build on each other to naturalize bounded geo-bodies associated with identifiable national populations. Like Anderson and Thongchai, I emphasize the dialectical relationship between colonialism and nationalism, but I also suggest that national mapping traditions may reproduce so thoroughly the spatial logic of colonial mapping traditions as to make them practically indistinguishable. In selecting case studies for this chapter, I have had to be more selective than in any other, both because of the explosion of maps in the twentieth century and because of the many different traditions of national mapping that emerged in this period. Choosing the four well-studied cases of Turkey, Iran, Israel and Palestine has allowed me to build on excellent, recent scholarly work, while drawing attention to the neglect of this subject for the region more broadly.⁴ These cases also yield fertile ground for comparison; each national mapping tradition emerges from a different relationship with colonialism, and some depend on erasure and exclusion more explicitly than others. In all cases, I provide examples that elucidate the historical and discursive context of the production of a geo-body and then discuss its subsequent reproduction and logoization. These include maps from newspapers, textbooks and postage stamps, as well as maps for fundraising and tourism. Though a few examples were issued by governmental agencies, this chapter does not consider state-sponsored, large-scale mapping projects, such as cadastral surveys, nor does it delve into the processes by which national borders have been delineated and securitized.⁵ Instead, it focuses on small-scale maps that were suitable for wide circulation and

adaptable to changing historical circumstances. Notably, many of these maps were published in multiple languages, indicating intended audiences both within and beyond the borders of the nation-state. This suggests the inseparability of national mapping traditions from international contexts and the importance in many cases of direct political and material support from outside groups.

Overall, this chapter argues that conditions of real or imminent European colonialism in the first half of the twentieth century meant that the production of a national geo-body was inseparable from the production of a 'proper' national population – a national population that would be recognized as regulated, stable and appropriate to its cartographic enclosure. As we have seen, Allied negotiations during and after the First World War, and particularly the way in which the Wilsonian concept of self-determination was applied in these negotiations, took for granted that the only way to do this was to delineate bounded territories enclosing (more or less) homogeneous populations. That this process had to take place under European supervision was enshrined in the post-war settlement and contributed to the particularly close relationship between traditions of colonial and national mapping in the region. Even when Europeans were not directly involved, it was widely believed that the only way to ensure independence was to assert a historically attested or geographically 'natural' enclosure for an identifiable, settled and acquiescent population. In this context, those who were most successful at assuming political power were those who demonstrated the will to order represented by colonial maps and/or made territorial claims in the name of the racial, ethnolinguistic or religious identities that had already been inscribed on those maps. This process privileged certain identities at the expense of others – and privileged identity in general over residence, local knowledge or any other criteria for belonging – which resulted in marginalization, displacement or worse for those who did not or would not conform. Despite these exclusionary effects, resistance has often been expressed in similar terms: the production of alternative geo-bodies coterminous with alternative national populations. Only toward the end of the twentieth century do challenges to the very premises of national mapping disrupt the field of competing traditions.

MAPPING TURKEY AND IRAN

Neither Turkey nor Iran was ever formally colonized. Although the predecessor to the modern state of Turkey, a much diminished Ottoman Empire, had lost all of its North African provinces to colonialism and most of its European provinces to separatist movements by the start of the First World War, it was still able to enter the war on the side of the Central Powers as an independent player. Even after it lost, its sovereignty remained intact, at least until the Allied occupation of Istanbul in early 1920. However, by this time a grass-roots resistance movement coalescing under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, a decorated Ottoman army officer, was fighting to secure an independent state in what many viewed as the Turkish heartland of the empire – Anatolia. When a new representative assembly opened in Ankara in April 1920, one of its top priorities was to renegotiate the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres as they affected Anatolia, in particular its proposed partition among Greece, Armenia and a possible Kurdistan. The resulting Treaty of Lausanne, signed in 1923, abrogated these terms completely, recognizing an independent Turkish Republic with Mustafa Kemal as its first president in place of the Ottoman Empire. The last Ottoman dynast left the country a year later after the Turkish National Assembly voted to abolish his only remaining title – that of Caliph, titular head of the worldwide community of Muslims.

The aftermath of the First World War also saw a dramatic shift in Iranian political history, spurred on by the spectres of partition and colonization. Although at the start of the war the ruling Qajar Shah declared neutrality, Iran was nevertheless overrun by British and Russian troops who used it as a base of operations for the eastern front. At the end of the war, news of a semi-covert British attempt to establish a protectorate, combined with uncertainty following the Russian Revolution, sent the country into turmoil. In 1921 Reza Khan, an officer in the Cossack Brigade, an elite Iranian military force, took control in Tehran and embarked on campaigns to quash separatist and resistance movements on the northern and southwestern frontiers. His military successes enabled him, in a series of political moves, to assume the title of Shah in 1925, replacing the Qajar dynasty with his own Pahlavi dynasty and foiling, at least in the short term, British and

Soviet designs on Iranian territory. Reza Shah did not come to power with as much of a popular mandate as had Mustafa Kemal in Turkey, and rather than breaking with the imperial past, as did the new Turkish Republic, he celebrated an Iranian monarchic tradition going back to antiquity, though in an unprecedentedly centralized form. Nonetheless, with strong-arm tactics he kept the country independent and thus gained the support of many Iranians whose anxieties about territorial loss and the threat of colonialism made them tolerant of authoritarian rule.

Anxieties about territorial loss also inspired what could be thought of as proto-national mapping efforts in the Ottoman and Qajar Empires before the First World War. Both governments sponsored cartographic projects and mandated geographical education in schools in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In the more developed Ottoman system of education, wall maps had become an established feature of primary and secondary classrooms by the late nineteenth century. Significantly, these maps moved away from the continental divisions favoured by eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century cartographers and pictured the Ottoman Empire as a contiguous, bounded territory. A good example is the 'General Map of the Imperial, Well-protected Realms' (illus. 52), which was adapted and translated from the work of German cartographer Heinrich Kiepert in 1899–1900 at the Ottoman Imperial War College.⁶ By using the centuries-old designation 'Well-protected Realms' (*memālik-i mahrūse*), rather than any mention of 'Turkey in Europe' or 'Turkey in Asia', this map presents the Empire as indivisible by continent or population category. The pink boundaries indicate Ottoman territory, centred in the map's frame, with pink-rimmed areas lying outside the frame pictured in inset boxes on the lower left. The way the map is designed ends up stressing the place of African and Arabian regions in the Empire, since those great expanses take up the lower two-thirds of the map and the insets picture (clockwise from the upper left) Algeria, the Horn of Africa and Oman. Ironically this was a time when the French colonization of Algeria and Tunisia and British occupation of Egypt, Sudan and southern Arabia had effectively removed those areas from Ottoman control. Such wilful blindness did not fool the generation that came of age in this period, and maps like this served

more to emphasize what had been lost than to secure the loyalty of citizens-in-the-making.⁷

Indeed, a shift in approach can be seen in the aftermath of the Constitutional Revolution of 1908, which brought in a new cadre of administrators, known collectively as the ‘Young Turks’, who advocated, among other things, a more aggressive geography curriculum. Instead of ignoring territorial loss, maps in this period highlighted and personalized it.⁸ A version of what has been dubbed the ‘Revenge Map’ was published in 1914 by the Society of Muslim Refugees from Rumelia (illus. 53).⁹ The title of this map is ‘Revenge’ (*intikām*), and the black mass in the centre is labelled ‘Rumelia’, continuing the centuries-old use of the term for lands west of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. Here it also serves to designate the territory lost to Greece, Serbia, Montenegro and Bulgaria in the Balkan Wars of 1912–13. These wars were the complicated culmination of separatist sentiments among different groups in the area, the expansionist ambitions of the four aforementioned states, and European ‘Great Power’ politics. They should also be seen as a consequence of the cartographic logic of the 1878 Congress of Berlin, in which European diplomats divided Ottoman territory lost in conflicts with Russia along perceived racial, ethnolinguistic or religious lines.¹⁰ This went hand in hand with discourses that sought to consolidate ‘Europe’ against an Islamic and Turkish ‘other’. Thus, during 1912–13 a steady stream of refugees, mainly Muslims, flowed eastward from the Balkan states, where they no longer felt welcome or had become targets for violence. At the bottom right corner of the map is a figure representing these refugees underneath an Ottoman monoplane that seems to be dropping books, one of which lies open with the word ‘revenge’ written on both facing pages. The message of the map is complex. There is aggression, with the repeated use of the word ‘revenge’ implying imminent military action or punitive measures against certain people or polities, but there is also resignation. The almost undifferentiated blackness of Rumelia suggests that it has been lost completely, and the figure of the refugee firmly planted underneath a label that reads ‘Ottoman Asia’ suggests that perhaps this is actually where he belongs. Some of the rhetoric that accompanied the description of these wars in geography textbooks reinforces this idea, invoking the need to ‘remember’ Rumelia, not necessarily to recover it.¹¹



53 Map entitled 'Revenge'
published in Istanbul in 1914
by the Society of Muslim
Refugees from Rumelia.

This sense of resignation may have also reflected a growing interest in the Muslim and Turkish identity of the Empire. In the late nineteenth century the Sultan Abdülhamit II had begun to emphasize the Muslim identity of the Empire in new ways, while lashing out violently against suspected separatist activities among non-Muslims, especially Armenians. With the advent of the Young Turks in 1908, a discourse that stressed the Turkish origins of the Empire started to gain traction. This discourse was partly an internalization of the ways in which the Empire had been understood by Europeans for at least two centuries, as expressed in maps titled ‘Turkey in Asia’ and ‘Turkey in Europe’, which the Ottoman intelligentsia had, until now, largely resisted. It should also be seen in dialogue with ethnolinguistic and religious nationalisms that had emerged within and on the edges of Ottoman-administered areas over the course of the nineteenth century. Not all of these were separatist, but some of those that were had contributed to substantial territorial loss and traumatic population displacement that exacerbated group identification and religious conflict. Thus, the deposition of Abdülhamit II by the Young Turks did not necessarily improve life for non-Muslims in the Empire, most of whom did not see themselves as Turkish and were often assumed to be in cahoots with separatists among their co-religionists. Moreover, Arabic- and Kurdish-speaking Muslims, who had until then enjoyed certain privileges and a degree of autonomy, now experienced increasing pressure to assimilate, particularly linguistically, and in certain contexts faced new forms of discrimination and suspicion.¹² This was accentuated during the First World War, when the British used their bases in Egypt and the Persian Gulf to launch attacks on Ottoman forces and collaborated with Sharif Husayn in Mecca to lead a revolt in the name of Arab independence. Although the vast majority of Arabic-speakers in the Ottoman provinces of Syria and Iraq remained loyal to the Empire during the war, the discourse of Turkism combined with British and French colonial designs on these areas meant that the defeated Ottomans acquiesced fairly readily to their loss in the post-war settlement. Anatolia, however, was another matter, as it was rapidly being cast as a Turkish *vaṭan* (homeland).

Although the terms Anatolia and *vaṭan* had been in use for centuries, they had meant different things to different people. The use of the term *waṭan* in Arabic (from which the Turkish and Persian

vaṭan evolved) stretches back to the early Islamic period, though in the plural form it can be found in pre-Islamic poetry, and usually referred to a place, sometimes a more circumscribed locality or city and sometimes a broader region, to which the speaker felt a particular attachment. In the medieval period, it was sometimes associated with loyalty to a political regime.¹³ The toponym Anatolia had been ubiquitous in Ottoman geography and cartography for four hundred years. It was frequently used with the toponym Rumelia on sixteenth-century maps from Piri Reis's *Book of the Sea* to distinguish the land lying east and west, respectively, of the Bosphorus/Dardanelles (see illus. 19). The penultimate map in the 1732 *Cihannüma* refers to Anatolia in the title and is distinctive in the context of the work as a whole because of its southern orientation, perhaps signalling its importance as an Ottoman core region (see illus. 35). The map titled 'Realms of the Supreme Dynasty in Asia' in the 1803 *Cedid atlas tercümesi* (New Atlas Translation) inscribes 'Region of Anatolia' across the same general area pictured in the *Cihannüma*, but it is dramatically subdivided and has no clear boundaries in the east and southeast.¹⁴ Neither the term *waṭan/vaṭan* nor the toponym Anatolia had, until the nineteenth century, been invoked as a territorial enclosure for a racially or ethnolinguistically defined population.¹⁵

At the close of the First World War, however, the defeated Ottoman government negotiated explicitly in the name of a 'Turkish *vaṭan*', with clearly defined borders that stressed the indivisibility of an expansively understood Anatolia, including the cities of Aleppo, Mosul and Kirkuk.¹⁶ At the same time, nationalist resistance forces were mobilizing to realize this territorial vision, largely achieved on the ground by 1921 when Mustafa Kemal declared 'Turkey belongs to Turks'.¹⁷ Two years later the Treaty of Lausanne granted international recognition to an independent Republic of Turkey within a slightly modified version of these borders. On the one hand, this new Turkey was a resounding victory because it abrogated the humiliating terms of the Treaty of Sèvres as they applied to Anatolia. On the other hand, it represented a compromise, especially in the southeast, where the strategic and, it was suspected, oil-rich area around Kirkuk and Mosul was eventually ceded to British-controlled Iraq. To divert attention away from the losses and to celebrate the achievements of the nationalist resistance movement, early republican geography

textbooks tended to juxtapose cartographic interpretations of the Treaty of Lausanne and the Treaty of Sèvres.¹⁸

Two maps seen here are juxtaposed in Faik Sabri's 1928 *Yeni Türkiye coğrafyası* (New Geography of Turkey), which was the first geography textbook to be translated into the Latin alphabet adopted in the sweeping language reforms passed later the same year (illus. 54).¹⁹ The first portrays the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres, as well as those of the 'Tripartite Agreement between the British Empire, France, and Italy' (signed on 10 August 1920, the same day as the Treaty of Sèvres), which assigned France and Italy zones of 'special interest' in Anatolia. The other portrays the boundaries of Turkey as set by the Treaty of Lausanne. The difference is dramatically apparent and casts the Lausanne borders as a diplomatic victory that restored to the Turkish people their national territory, described in the text below the map as 'all the regions in Anatolia that are inhabited by Turks'.²⁰ Strikingly, although the legend of the Sèvres map explicitly identifies areas that under its terms or those of the Tripartite Agreement would be transferred to Greece or reserved for French and Italian special interests, there is no mention of Armenia or Kurdistan, despite their prominence in the text of the treaty. The map does shade the area reserved for an autonomous Kurdish zone with double diagonal lines, but it is left unlabelled and the legend merely states 'to be determined by public appeal'. These choices emphasize the ways in which the post-war settlement partitioned the Ottoman Empire to promote Allied interests, while de-emphasizing the ways in which that partition was justified in the language of racial, ethnolinguistic and religious self-determination.²¹ To acknowledge this aspect of the post-war settlement, even in order to reject it, would be to call attention to the presence of people who might not identify as Turkish within an area that had been sought and won as a Turkish homeland.

The deliberateness of these choices is made even clearer by comparison with a 1924 interpretation of the Treaty of Sèvres by the American cartographer Lawrence Martin (illus. 55).²² Given the similarities in form and the popularity of Martin's maps, it is possible that it served as a model for Faik Sabri's, but its message is completely different. The American map does not mention Greece in identifying the 'Smyrna District' as a 'plebiscite zone' and does not depict French or Italian spheres of influence as set in the Tripartite Agreement at all.

54 Maps of the Treaty of Sèvres (above and on right below) and the Treaty of Lausanne (on left below) in Faik Sabri, *Yeni Türkiye coğrafyası* (New Geography of Turkey) (Istanbul, 1928).



55 Map of the Treaty of Sèvres by Col. Lawrence Martin in *The Treaties of Peace, 1919-1923*, vol. II (New York, 1924).

On the other hand, it clearly labels a second ‘plebiscite zone’ as ‘Kurdistan’ and inscribes the toponym ‘Armenia’ across the ‘annulled boundaries’ of the Ottoman Empire in the northeast. Unlike Sabri’s map, therefore, Martin’s draws attention to the treaty’s proposed partition of Anatolia on the basis of racial, ethnolinguistic or religious difference, but minimizes the ways in which the post-war settlement was designed to prioritize European interests in the area.²³

Despite the de-emphasis on European interests in Martin’s map, the Treaty of Sèvres did indeed provide the framework for a new era of colonialism in the region. It explicitly endorsed French, British and Italian direct or indirect control over Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Cyprus, Egypt, Sudan, Syria, Palestine and Iraq. In this light, the Treaty of Lausanne *was* a triumph against colonialism, and the integrity of the territory it recognized was justified in those terms, as well as in the language of racial or ethnolinguistic nationalism.²⁴ The new map of Turkey was thus simultaneously a rejection of the colonial regime proposed by the Treaty of Sèvres and an exemplar of the

cartographic ideal of the tradition of colonial mapping as it had evolved by the First World War: a bounded territory enclosing a homogeneous population. This contributed to Turkey's success in asserting its readiness for modern statehood internationally. Nationalist discourse that promoted Anatolia as a Turkish *vaṭan* was easily understood – indeed had been prefigured in European maps for some time – and this made renegotiating the Treaty of Sèvres a matter of diplomatic rather than existential debate.

This success, however, was predicated on displacing, silencing or marginalizing people within the Turkish *vaṭan* who identified or were marked as non-Turkish.²⁵ Ironically, one of the most prominent discourses of resistance to this regime of erasure – Kurdish nationalism – has for the most part adopted the same cartographic terms.²⁶ In a reverse of the triumphal narrative of Turkish national mapping, Kurdish national mapping rehabilitates the Treaty of Sèvres as the better, though insufficient, blueprint for enclosing identities in the post-Ottoman world. The association between a regional entity and a Kurdish identity is an old one.²⁷ However, it was not until the aftermath of the First World War that the right to self-determination came to be widely understood as the right to a sovereign state in a bounded territory enclosing an ethnolinguistically majoritarian population. This interpretation of self-determination has profoundly shaped the trajectory of Kurdish nationalism in post-war Turkey, especially since the 1980s.²⁸ Although alternative solutions to the problems of Kurdish exclusion, not only in Turkey but in Iran, Iraq and Syria, have been proposed and pursued, the spectre of Kurdish separatism has been one of the main threats against which the tradition of Turkish national mapping has most vigorously deployed its geo-body as the self-evident enclosure for the Turkish people.²⁹

As in Turkey, a national geo-body was initially promoted in Iran as a bulwark against colonialism, though the ensuing tradition of national mapping has been less overtly exclusive. In the nineteenth century, boundary commissions dominated by British and Russian interests whittled away at the frontiers of the Qajar domain, while intellectuals, property owners and journalists raised alarms about land loss and unrest, sometimes with the assistance of maps.³⁰ The longest-ruling Qajar dynast, Nasir al-Din Shah (*reg.* 1848–96), took frequent trips to these areas and wrote descriptions of the land and people,

stressing their belonging in the empire.³¹ He also encouraged cartographic training in the country's premier institution of higher education, the Dar al-Funun. At the same time, however, he and his successors granted a series of economic concessions to British and Russian companies, often playing one off the other to generate quick cash. The preferential treatment given to foreign interests caused suffering for farmers, shopkeepers and entrepreneurs, who were faced with increasingly difficult terms of trade and very little autonomy. These grievances helped motivate the Constitutional Revolution of 1906, in which a shifting coalition of local leaders, scholars and merchants forced the Qajar Shah to accept a constitution limiting his powers and a representative legislative assembly called the *majlis* with power over all treaties and concessions.

Barely a year later, news of the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention reached Tehran. This agreement divided Iran into spheres of interest, the Russian sphere in the north and the British in the southeast, in which one power promised not to contest or interfere with 'any Concessions of a political or commercial nature' granted to the other. Signed on 31 August 1907 in St Petersburg without consulting or even informing the Iranian government, this agreement represented a rapprochement between the erstwhile rivals for influence in the region. When news of the Convention trickled into Iran in early September, it was greeted with confusion and fear. Potentially worse than the cavalier attitude toward Iranian sovereignty suggested by the willingness of Britain and Russia to conduct such business without the knowledge of the Shah or *majlis* was the fear that an end to their rivalry would mean an end to their interest in maintaining Iran as an independent buffer zone between their Central and South Asian empires. Despite the Convention's assertion that the signatories 'respect the integrity and independence of Persia', it was seen by many as a slippery slope toward partition.³²

The Iranian periodical press, which was especially lively in this period, responded forcefully to the Convention in both word and image. Editorials denouncing the high-handedness of the agreement, its disregard for the new Iranian constitution and developing democratic processes, and the weakness of the Qajar dynasty in the face of European imperialism were published in a variety of Persian-language newspapers in autumn 1907. One of the strengths of the press in this

period was its use of cartoons for political commentary.³³ A powerful cartoon published in the periodical *Kashkūl* on 21 October 1907 depicts Iran as an old man lying on his back between a Russian man standing in a body of water labelled 'Caspian Sea' and a British man standing in a body of water labelled 'Persian Gulf'. They appear to be in the process of disrobing the old man, who is attempting to retain some dignity by shielding his genitals. On the ground between them lie a wooden box and a saw. Titled simply 'Agreement of Russia and England', this cartoon uses the geography of Iran, the contrast between the abject figure of the colonized and the predatory figures of the colonizers, and the implied violence of the saw to warn of impending partition and colonization.³⁴

This was also the context in which some of the earliest newspaper maps of Iran appeared in the Persian-language press. These maps were used both as a visualization of the terms of the Convention, which were, after all, explicitly geographical, and as a rhetorical device to shock the audience with what looked, when mapped, a lot like partition. The newspaper *Ḥabl al-matīn*, published as a weekly in Calcutta from 1893 to 1930 and as a daily in Tehran and Rasht off and on between 1907 and 1909, printed a series of editorials denouncing the Anglo-Russian Convention.³⁵ The first page of the 4 November 1907 issue of the Calcutta weekly is titled 'Map of Iran divided between two states (Russia and England)' (illus. 56).³⁶ It shows the boundaries of Iran as bold dotted lines within which areas are shaded dark grey in the north and south separated by a strip of white in the middle. The two shaded areas are not labelled, but they are clearly meant to indicate the spheres assigned by the terms of the Convention to Russia in the north (including, notably, the capital city of Tehran) and to Britain in the south. Stretching across the white area separating the two is the label 'Empire of Iran'. The written text surrounding the map makes clear that the map was intended to prompt viewers to 'imagine their future' in a partitioned Iran. Moreover, it explains that things were actually worse than they appeared. The province of Khuzistan in southwestern Iran was also in British sights. Thus, according to the editors, territory remaining under the full sovereignty of the 'Empire of Iran' would be even less than that pictured on the map, amounting to a mere portion of the province of Fars.³⁷

This map functioned like the Treaty of Sèvres maps in Turkey. Whether or not the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 was really a



56 (full image and detail)
Map of the Anglo-Russian
Convention on Iran from
the front page of the
Calcutta weekly edition
of *Habl al-matīn*, published
on 4 November 1907.

precursor to partition was less important than the fact that it seemed plausible to the audience. Maps like these visualized people's fears in order to inspire them to defend the national territory, or *vaṭan*. In general, the periodical press in this period characterized the Iranian *vaṭan* as a homeland for all men living on its soil to encourage the emergence of a politically active citizenry willing to resist colonial incursions.³⁸ This nationalist discourse followed earlier geographical discourses in eschewing the toponym 'Persia', despite its frequent use on European maps, which could be seen as privileging the southwestern province of Fars or a particular ethnolinguistic group. The Qajar dynasty cast belonging in the empire in terms of the loyalty of 'subjects', not Persianness (and, indeed, the Qajars themselves, like many of their subjects, were of Turkic origin), and the constitutionalists for the most part maintained this distinction, substituting citizen for subject and stressing residence in the *vaṭan* as the basis for belonging. To the extent that a historical *vaṭan* was invoked, it was in the name of *Īrānshahr*, generally understood as the vast dominions of the pre-Islamic Sasanian Empire, reconsolidated in large part by the Safavid Empire at the turn of the seventeenth century, and comprising

neighbouring areas in Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkestan and beyond.³⁹ But the national *vaṭan*, or 'Iran' as it was consistently called, was generally accepted by this time as lying between much more modest borders, and this acceptance was at least partly justified as a challenge to perceived efforts by Britain and Russia to whittle it down any further, with the result that the narrowest possible interpretation of 'Persia', the province of Fars, would be all that remained.

The aftermath of the First World War was another moment of acute anxiety about territorial loss in Iran, both because of the opportunist use of the post-war settlement by Britain and the Soviet Union and because of rebellions on the frontiers. The assumption of power by Reza Khan in this context was seen as an anticolonial triumph, since news of the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919, which was signed by the Qajar Shah without the knowledge of the deputies representing Iran at the Paris Peace Conference, raised once again the possibility of colonization. The British had occupied the country during the war, and it looked like they might never leave. After the coup that brought Reza Khan to power in 1921, the Anglo-Persian Agreement was abrogated and Reza turned his attention to squashing rebellions and recovering frontier lands still in dispute. Many Iranians, particularly in the capital and other central cities, tolerated his repression of these movements in the name of national unity and his policy of settling nomadic groups, whose practices blurred the contours of the geo-body, even as some of them became increasingly apprehensive about his authoritarianism.

These initiatives were accompanied by other policies designed to produce a regulated, homogenized national population, such as educational reforms that mandated the teaching of Farsi (modern Persian) and restricted the use of minority languages like Turkish or Kurdish.⁴⁰ Reza Shah and his son and successor Mohammed Reza Shah also privileged a historical narrative that stressed a connection between their Pahlavi dynasty and the pre-Islamic Achaemenid and Sasanian monarchs, who hailed from the province of Fars and were said to have spread 'Persian' culture throughout the vast lands they administered. This narrative contained both anti-Arab and secular elements, marking the coming of Islam as the cause of Iran's backwardness in the modern era. Promoters of this narrative drew on works by nineteenth-century intellectuals who had been profoundly influenced by encounters with

Europeans and resurrected efforts from that period to purge Arabic words from Farsi. Seemingly ironically, these ‘Persianizing’ policies coincided with the international circulation in 1934–5 of a memo insisting that ‘Iran’, rather than ‘Persia’, be used as the country’s official name. This directive was aimed at Europeans, who were the only ones consistently using the toponym ‘Persia’, and had the added benefit of tapping into a well-established strain of European thought stressing the racial superiority of ‘Aryans’, which comes from the same linguistic root as ‘Iran’. This reinforced the racist dimensions of nationalist discourse, which distinguished the Iranian population from its Arab (Semitic) and Turkish neighbours, and had the effect of further marginalizing members of these groups within the national territory.⁴¹

Nonetheless, official disavowal of the toponym ‘Persia’ and historical narratives of an imperial past may have contributed to a certain flexibility, at least on a symbolic level, in Iranian national mapping when it comes to what might be called ethnic difference.⁴² This is especially apparent when compared to Republican Turkey and can be demonstrated in the increasing number of maps produced in both countries in the post-Second World War period. After about 1940 ethnic difference was almost never portrayed on national maps published in Turkey, and geography textbooks routinely celebrated the Turkish population as unusually homogeneous. If minorities were recognized on maps, they tended to be shown in small numbers concentrated in a few cities, particularly Istanbul, and to be identified explicitly as non-Muslims (Greeks, Armenians, Jews).⁴³ This had the effect of casting the ‘default’ citizen, supposedly representative of the vast majority of the population, as a Muslim Turk. In particular, the terms ‘Kurdistan’ and ‘Kurds’ were dropped completely from official use, though some textbooks made the argument that Kurds should more properly be understood as ‘Mountain Turks’, thus dispensing with the problem.⁴⁴ A stamp issued on the occasion of the 1955 census is strikingly clear in its identification of the Turkish geo-body with a homogeneous (and heteronormative) population (illus. 57). The cookie-cutter couples symbolize the ideal of a regulated citizenry, increasing biologically within a bounded territory to affirm an equation between geo-body, state and nation.


By contrast, Iranian national mapping has accommodated, and to a certain extent celebrated, displays of ethnic diversity within state

57 Turkish postage stamp issued on the occasion of the 1955 census.



borders. The oldest private map publisher in Iran, Sahab Geographic and Drafting Institute, founded in 1936 and specializing in educational and historical cartography, has incorporated such displays into its products steadily from the 1950s to today.⁴⁵ An example issued by Sahab in 1955 belongs to a popular mid-century English-language format for mapping Iran and includes, among other thematic maps, a depiction of ‘Tribal Costumes’ contained within the national geobody on the centre left (illus. 58). The legend is titled ‘A Classification of Tribes’ and lists Turks, Turkmen, Kurds, Lurs, Bakhtiyaris, Arabs, Baluchis and others. On the one hand, the emphasis on ‘costumes’ and use of the term ‘tribe’ suggests that these groups are less than modern, thus undermining any claims they might have to their own nationalisms. This was also a tactic of the tradition of colonial mapping, as seen in the ‘Map of Algeria Divided by Tribes’ (see illus. 42).⁴⁶ On the other hand, the design of the map suggests that the population of Iran is made up entirely of such diverse identities, as there is no empty space within the geo-body, nor is the ‘default’ citizen portrayed in any way. In this map, the Iranian nation is not just tolerant of heterogeneity, but defined by it.

Twenty-five years later the message remained the same. A Sahab map in Farsi from the early 1980s, like the earlier series,



right and overleaf
58 (*full image and detail*)
Map of Iran published
by Sahab Geographic
and Drafting Institute
(Tehran) in 1955.

ADMINISTRATIVE



FIVE DIVISIONS OSTANS PROVINCES SHAHRESTANS TOWNSHIPS

GENERAL MAP OF
IRAN
WITH COMPLETE DETAILS



ALPHABETICAL INDEX OF TOWNS
AND CITIES WITH DISTANCES
FROM TEHRAN

NAME	DISTANCE	NAME	DISTANCE	NAME	DISTANCE
Abadan	100	Abbasabad	10	Abbasabad	10
Abbasabad	10	Abbasabad	10	Abbasabad	10
Abbasabad	10	Abbasabad	10	Abbasabad	10
Abbasabad	10	Abbasabad	10	Abbasabad	10
Abbasabad	10	Abbasabad	10	Abbasabad	10
Abbasabad	10	Abbasabad	10	Abbasabad	10
Abbasabad	10	Abbasabad	10	Abbasabad	10
Abbasabad	10	Abbasabad	10	Abbasabad	10
Abbasabad	10	Abbasabad	10	Abbasabad	10

RAILWAYS

NAME	LENGTH	NAME	LENGTH
Abadan	100	Abbasabad	10
Abbasabad	10	Abbasabad	10
Abbasabad	10	Abbasabad	10
Abbasabad	10	Abbasabad	10
Abbasabad	10	Abbasabad	10
Abbasabad	10	Abbasabad	10
Abbasabad	10	Abbasabad	10
Abbasabad	10	Abbasabad	10
Abbasabad	10	Abbasabad	10
Abbasabad	10	Abbasabad	10



59 'Tribal Costumes' inset from a map of Iran published by Sahab Geographic and Drafting Institute (Tehran) in 1973.



combines several different thematic maps in one (illus. 60). The title refers to the 'Islamic Republic of Iran', reflecting the country's name change after the revolution of 1979; just beneath this lies the national geo-body filled with a visually diverse array of images, acting as the cover when the map is folded. The subtitle indicates that the topic of this cover image is 'anthropology' (*mardum shināsi*), which is translated as 'ethno composition' on English versions. Though this one lacks an explanatory legend, other editions published during the 1980s and '90s, in both Farsi and English, provide a key to the map mentioning most of the groups named in the 1955 example, with the notable exception of 'Arabs'. In fact, in an earlier edition of the English-language series, Arabs had already been omitted, leaving a noticeable blank space in the lower left corner of the legend, with the corresponding figures replaced by more neutral iconography on the map (illus. 59). This omission likely reflected border disputes with neighbouring Iraq, which was strongly identified as an Arab state, as well as persistent strains of anti-Arabism in nationalist discourses. The key to the Farsi map also includes more sociological categories – 'city girl (Tehran)', for example, and 'shepherd' – but the overall effect is still to highlight



60 Map of the Islamic Republic of Iran published by Sahab Geographic and Drafting Institute (Tehran) in 1981.



61 Iranian postage stamp issued on the occasion of the first anniversary of the 1979 revolution.

ethnic diversity. In the same manner, a stamp commemorating the first anniversary of the 1979 revolution features the national geo-body as a stylized mosaic of peoples in different costumes with the Iranian flag furled in the shape of the Caspian Sea (illus. 61).⁴⁷ Such maps convey a vision of belonging in Iran that coincides with residence within its national borders.

These images emphasize the quaint and the picturesque and do not by any means constitute evidence of political enfranchisement. They may even be interpreted as the flipside of erasure: hypervisibility as a means of invalidating claims of exclusion.⁴⁸ Moreover, they are completely silent on the topic of religious diversity. Not only have Iranians been repeatedly persecuted or marginalized on the basis of their membership in one of the groups pictured on these maps over the last century, but certain non-Muslim groups, such as the Baha'is, have long been targets of state violence. What these maps do indicate is that the tradition of national mapping in Iran has made space for displays of ethnic difference in a way that the tradition of national mapping in Turkey has not. Iranian nationalism, while similar to Turkish nationalism in terms of the appropriation of various aspects of Eurocentric modernity, retained closer ties to its pre-national imperial past, a past in which a monarch sat at the head of a relatively decentralized confederation of peoples stretching over a vast area.⁴⁹ However, these ties also, at least in part, enabled the persistence of an authoritarian political tradition, a tradition that increasingly came to be seen as a new and exceedingly repressive form of colonialism. The revolution that preceded the declaration of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) in 1979 was explicitly directed against the corruption and tyranny of the Pahlavis. While the revolution was a true mass movement that brought together many different constituencies with different political ideologies and goals, the Islamist opposition led by the exiled cleric Ayatollah Khomeini won the day. The outcome was a complete overhaul of the political system, an unprecedentedly powerful role for the Shi'ite religious establishment in government, and a more intensive emphasis on Islam in public life, though there have been continuities with the Pahlavi period, particularly the use of Persian imperial antiquity and linguistic distinctiveness in a narrative of national exceptionalism.⁵⁰

There has also been territorial continuity. The new government quickly changed a number of place names, but it did not attempt to

alter the country's borders. In fact, posters and murals created by the Islamic resistance as part of the revolutionary struggle in 1979 routinely appropriated the Iranian geo-body as a symbol of anti-colonial protest against the Shah and his allies, most notably the United States.⁵¹ Although the eight-year Iran–Iraq war (1980–88) was motivated in part by a border dispute; it pitted Iraqi desires to change the border against Iranian desires to maintain it (thus the official name for the war effort in Iran, ‘The Sacred Defence’). The outcome was a stalemate. Historical atlases published in Iran on both sides of the 1979 divide convey a mood of nostalgia for the greater reach of past polities (Islamic and pre-Islamic), but post-1979 atlases tend not to call attention to the geo-body of Pahlavi Iran, presumably because it remained the geo-body of the IRI, belying the rupture of the revolution. For instance, despite the fact that one recent historical atlas only officially covers the period up to 1970, its final map titled ‘The Disintegration of Iran, 1813–1970’ is anachronistically accompanied by the flag of the IRI. In this map the Iranian geo-body is emphasized at the centre, surrounded by shadowy territories that seem to have been detached like puzzle pieces. This has the effect of simultaneously blaming the Qajar and Pahlavi dynasties in power between 1813 and 1970 for the loss of those detached territories and cementing an association between the geo-body depicted centrally on the map and the IRI.⁵² Since the early twentieth century this geo-body had been so closely linked to national unity and defence, both of which remain crucial to the IRI, that the tradition of national mapping was not as profoundly transformed as other aspects of political and social life after 1979.

MAPPING PALESTINE AND ISRAEL

While Iran and Turkey avoided direct colonial rule after the First World War, neighbouring areas were not so fortunate. In particular, the League of Nations mandate system, formally announced in the Treaty of Versailles of June 1919, produced a new regime of colonialism in West Asia. This system, which supposedly provided ‘tutelage’ for ‘peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world’, was actually conceived as a means

by which European imperialist goals might be pursued in an age of self-determination. In fact, the two were not incompatible. Though open to various interpretations, the Wilsonian rhetoric of self-determination was applied in this region in a way that divided the population and privileged the association of certain identity groups with bounded territories, a privileging that facilitated British and French control over land and resources. From its inception, therefore, the mandate system was – and was widely understood as – a new form of colonialism and thus had to be imposed, often violently, on the people of the region. Nonetheless, the fact that this new form of colonialism was implemented and overseen by a high-profile international institution, the League of Nations, gave unprecedented opportunities for petition and publicity to groups whose representatives could speak European languages and articulate their goals in a way that appealed to international norms.⁵³ Those who were most successful at this tended to be those whose identities were privileged, already or in turn, by mandatory arrangements.

While the borders of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq and Transjordan were surveyed and delineated, for the most part, in the process of implementing the mandates, it is important to reiterate that they were not therefore European inventions. For one thing, indigenous people advocated their own visions for an independent nation-state system in the aftermath of the First World War, sometimes at considerable cost to themselves and to their colonial occupiers. While these struggles did not forestall the imposition of the mandates, they forced mandatory authorities into compromises or collaborations, both in drawing the lines between states and in determining who belonged where.⁵⁴ For another thing, the idea that there were meaningful regional entities known as Syria and Iraq was nothing new. These regions have been evoked consistently as categories of belonging in Arabic geographical, historical, poetic and religious works from the eighth and ninth centuries until today.⁵⁵ Similarly, Palestine (*Filastīn*), Jordan (*al-Urdunn*) and Lebanon (*Lubnān*) are toponyms with deep historical significance, which have been celebrated as distinctive subdivisions of Syria in Arabic literature for centuries.⁵⁶ Debating whether or not they acted as political units or administrative districts in a particular historical period is an effect of the way nation-state thinking has constrained geographical

imaginations – to the point that places are perceived as meaningful only through the exercise of state power. Rather, places of affective resonance, as well as social, economic and even political cohesiveness, have long been conceived at overlapping scales and in terms that transcended bureaucratic practice by drawing on historical associations and lived experience.⁵⁷

Nonetheless, part of the justification for the mandate system was the premise that local social and political formations, along with indigenous geographical knowledge, were either non-existent or so immaturely and unsystematically manifested that it would take European expertise to render them useful and modern, if they did not replace them completely. Because this has produced a persistent myth that the mandates were ‘lines drawn on empty maps’ – that is, created, for good or ill, entirely and unilaterally by Europeans – it is worth pausing here to review the very ‘full’ maps that laid the groundwork for the mandate period.⁵⁸ First, even the most high-handed of the British and French post-war plans (see Chapter Three) were expressed in the form of cartographic palimpsests, new maps drawn on top of older maps that suggested complex relationships between the toponyms on the base map and the polygons and shading added on top. Second, all surveys and boundary commissions launched by Europeans, from Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt on, relied on local geographical knowledge, as well as prior maps, no matter how effectively this contribution was suppressed in the final product. Finally, from the eleventh century on the ‘Atlas of Islam’ tradition conveyed regionalism within the ‘Realm of Islam’ in both word and image (see Chapter One). Many of the maps from this tradition suggest continuities at the level of toponyms and general regional awareness with aspects of the nation-state system that developed after the First World War.


A striking example is a map of Syria from one of the earliest iterations of the ‘Atlas of Islam’ tradition, an eleventh-century manuscript attributed to Ibn Hawqal (illus. 62).⁵⁹ Oriented southward, the map is framed on the right side by the green Mediterranean Sea and bisected by a blue-green mountain range running north to south. The title, ‘This is an image of Syria (*al-Shām*)’, is inscribed vertically in bold yellow on the left, just beyond a curving elongated inscription in red ink that reads ‘border of Syria’. This eastern border extends from

the river Euphrates, which curves in a semicircle along the lower left side of the map, through the Arabian Desert, labelled just above the Euphrates, to the Red Sea peeking out of the upper-left corner of the map. The western border of the region is formed by the Mediterranean Sea, with a label in the upper-right corner of the map pointing to the neighbouring region of Egypt in the southwest and a label at the bottom pointing to the 'country of the Byzantines' (*balad al-Rūm*) in the north. The rest of the writing on the map indicates cities and subregions, notably the elongated, bifurcated Arabic script of 'country of Palestine' (*balad Filastīn*) encircling the highlands around Jerusalem and Hebron in black ink near the top of the map. Just below it, along the mountain range, is 'Mount Lebanon' (*jabal Lubnān*) in bold yellow ink, and just to the left is the blue bulb of Lake Tiberias spilling into the 'river Jordan' (*nahr al-Urdunn*). This map represents Syria as a region encompassing what would become the states of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan, and specifically highlights the subregion of Palestine within it.

Despite such continuities, the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition, like the other precolonial mapping traditions discussed in this book, was not a national, or even proto-national, mapping tradition, first and foremost because its maps did not produce enclosed and exclusive national populations. I reproduce this eleventh-century map not because I want to claim primordial authenticity for any form of nationalism, but because I am concerned by the persistence today of discourses, which originated as justifications for European colonialism and have been sustained in particular as justifications for the dispossession of Palestinians, that dismiss the people of the region as having understood themselves in only the most localized, tribal or sectarian of terms before their encounters with Eurocentric modernity. On the contrary, intellectuals in nineteenth-century Palestine and Syria more broadly had a rich reservoir of ideas upon which to draw in fashioning new political ideologies and models that would be recognizable as modern and legitimate on the world stage, namely nationalism and, increasingly after the onset of the First World War, the independent nation-state.⁶⁰ By sidestepping, for the most part, these efforts, Britain, France and the League of Nations simply reappropriated the model that local nationalists were already appropriating and, in so doing, continued to refuse to recognize them as modern or capable of self-rule.

62 Map of Greater Syria from the oldest extant manuscript of the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition attributed to Ibn Hawqal and dated 1086.





63 Ethnographic map of Syria in *Filastin risālesi* (Palestine Treatise) (Jerusalem, 1915).

This dynamic of appropriation and reappropriation can be illustrated cartographically by looking at the maps included in a handbook on Palestine, entitled *Filastin risālesi* (Palestine Treatise), published by the Ottoman army in Jerusalem in 1915.⁶¹ This handbook was intended to provide information on the people and terrain of Palestine that might assist in the war effort and includes a fold-out map that represents it as loosely bound by the river Jordan in the east, the Mediterranean in the west, Gaza in the south and the river Litani in the north – the same boundaries employed by the British Palestine Exploration Fund (PEF) Survey of Western Palestine. As such, the map communicates an understanding of Palestine as a discrete region that had strategic significance to the Ottomans, in part because it had already been identified as an area of special interest by the British. Two smaller-scale maps are included in the handbook, one of which could be described as ethnographic and covers a region roughly equivalent to that depicted in the ‘Atlas of Islam’ maps of Syria

(illus. 63). The main visual distinction on this map is between ‘Syrians’ in the west, symbolized by red horizontal hatching, and ‘Arabs’ in the east, symbolized by blue vertical hatching, the two separated by a line running roughly north to south through the cities of Damascus and Aleppo. In the context of the work, these categories likely connoted different ways of life (nomadic Arabs versus settled Syrians) that might inform military or administrative decision-making. Within the Syrian area, islands of other kinds of shading indicate religious groups, such as Druze, Jews, Maronite Christians, Greek Orthodox Christians and various sects of Shi’ites. Since neither the Syrian nor Arab category is explicitly associated with a religion on the map, there is a sense that, at least in spatial terms, the Syrian category may be more religiously inclusive than the Arab; it can also be read as implying that the Syrian and Arab categories share a ‘default’ religion, Sunni Islam, which is not given its own symbol on the legend.

Although the Ottoman officials who put together this handbook did not intend to produce national populations, in appropriating

popular models of ethnographic cartography they were perhaps inadvertently contributing to this process.⁶² At the very least, the map shows that racially, ethnolinguistically or religiously defined populations were being made cartographically available for enclosure within the Ottoman Empire, even as European and American planners were shading their own 'peace maps'. Indeed, defining 'Syrian' and/or 'Arab' identities was already well under way and became a crucial task for many of the nationalist groups that proliferated after 1915. Up to that point, most people saw themselves as loyal Ottoman subjects who belonged in a greater Syrian region and/or its distinctive subregions like Lebanon or Palestine; a few already hoped for independence, though what shape it would take was open to discussion. This number, and such discussions, would expand considerably over the course of the war and its chaotic two-year aftermath.⁶³ During this time, many who understood themselves as Syrian saw no contradiction in the category of Arab, while others were wary of its association with Islam and/or nomadism; still others identified themselves primarily in terms of religious communities. Intellectuals and journalists in Jerusalem, Haifa and Jaffa generally promoted Palestinian nationalism, but debated the merits of independent statehood versus joining with Syria or Egypt; similar debates took place vis-à-vis Lebanon. The Syrian General Congress, an elected body convened in Damascus in 1919, advocated for an independent state within what were being referred to by this time as Syria's 'natural' borders, these being understood geographically in terms almost identical to those of the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition.⁶⁴ At the same time, by stressing the 'natural' aspect of these borders and by increasingly using the term *Sūriyya*, derived from Greek, over the Arabic *al-Shām*, they were appealing to recent European discourses that valued empiricism and ideas from classical antiquity. But was this Syria the homeland of a multi-ethnic, multi-religious population bound together by history and the Arabic language, and/or an Arab population with ties beyond its borders, and/or a Muslim population that was primarily rural and devout? How would the inhabitants of distinctive subregions, such as Lebanon or Palestine, relate to the rest? Though there were no easy answers to these questions, all agreed on their necessity and urgency.

The main reason for this urgency was that establishing borders and population categories was understood as a bulwark against

colonialism, rumours of which had been flying fast and furious since the publication of the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour Declaration in November 1917. Indeed these rumours came true, initially by way of a division between the French Mandate for Syria in the north and the British Mandate for Palestine in the south, publicly proclaimed in the Treaty of Sèvres in August 1920. This put an abrupt end to the Syrian Arab Kingdom, ratified by the Syrian General Congress earlier that spring, as a French army marched east from Beirut to crush nationalist resistance, dissolve the congress and send its king, Faysal, former leader of the Arab Revolt, into exile.⁶⁵ In working out the terms of their mandates over the next two years, France and Britain pursued further partition strategies, designed to compartmentalize the population, primarily in terms of religious identities, to make it easier to control.

First, France detached a greater Lebanese region, within much the same borders depicted on the 1862 map (see *illus. 44*), from the rest of the Syria Mandate. Though preserving some kind of special status for this area had been the goal of many Lebanese nationalists since before the war, some of whom had in fact circulated this map as evidence of their own ‘natural’ borders, the role the French should play in managing it was a matter of contention.⁶⁶ It was well known that French interests in the region were linked to the protection of the Maronite Christian community, and the 1862 map included a statistical table that associated Lebanon with a Christian majority population. Indeed, those living within the boundaries of the new Lebanon, and particularly its Maronite Christian elites, were given more opportunities to participate in governance and closer access to French officials, whose main headquarters were located in Beirut, than others in the Mandate. Next, the French instituted divisions along religious lines within the rest of Syria, creating ‘statelets’ for Druze and Alawite Muslims in the south and northwest respectively. Though these never attained the independent status of Lebanon, the arrangement marked their populations as different from their neighbours. Much of this was justified publicly in the language of protecting ‘minorities’, which was a relatively new concept in international law intended as a panacea for the problems created by dividing the post-war world into racially, ethnolinguistically or religiously majoritarian nation-states.⁶⁷ Nonetheless it functioned

like an updated, internationally sanctioned form of divide and rule, providing selected partners for the French in advancing their interests. Though this did not always work out as the French hoped – it did not, for instance, prevent the 1925–7 revolt against French rule that began within the Druze area and spread throughout Syria – it has had long-term, divisive repercussions in Syrian society.⁶⁸

Similarly, the British pursued partition strategies in managing their Mandate for Palestine, but joined them with support for settler colonialism as a way to privilege their preferred partners, a group represented by leaders born and raised in Europe who articulated their aspirations in terms of what appeared to be a particularly straightforward alignment between territory and identity. Zionism had emerged as a nationalist movement in the late nineteenth century in response to persistent and increasing violence against Jewish communities in Eastern Europe. Its intellectual architects, Leon Pinsker and Theodor Herzl, of Russian and Austro-Hungarian origin respectively, argued that anti-Semitism was too firmly rooted in Europe for Jews to continue to pursue coexistence with Christians; rather, they should seek a nation-state of their own. Neither Herzl nor Pinsker believed that this state had to be located in any particular place. The important thing for them was the survival, in ethnic and cultural terms, of the Jewish people and their achievement of political sovereignty. However, the word ‘Zion’ referred to the biblical notion of a Promised Land centred on Jerusalem, known in Hebrew as *Eretz Yisrael* (Land of Israel), and this religious idea helped animate support for the movement.⁶⁹

Consequently, at the First Zionist Congress, convened in Basel, Switzerland, in 1897, it was decided that the geographical aim of Zionism would be Palestine. To realize this goal materially, the Jewish National Fund (JNF; in Hebrew, Keren Kayemet Leyisrael or KKL) was established in 1901 to coordinate and accelerate land purchases for the settlement of Jewish immigrants. At the same time, Zionist leaders began working to secure political backing from Britain. This culminated in the Balfour Declaration of 1917, in which the British Foreign Secretary Sir Arthur Balfour pledged his government’s support for ‘the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people’. Almost immediately thereafter a special commission travelled to Palestine and worked with the British military to pave the

way for the implementation of the Balfour Declaration. After the war, this commission submitted a petition to the Paris Peace Conference on behalf of the Zionist movement requesting that the area reserved for the Jewish national home span both banks of the river Jordan.⁷⁰ Indeed, the British Mandate for Palestine as described in the Treaty of Sèvres stretched significantly east of the Jordan, reflecting the precedent set some fifty years earlier by the PEF to treat Palestine as consisting of eastern and western halves divided by the river.

However, the official terms of the Palestine Mandate, approved by the League of Nations in 1922, set the wheels in motion for partition. The Balfour Declaration was enshrined within these terms, which also called for a Jewish Agency to advise the Mandate administration and for the facilitation of Jewish immigration, ‘close settlement of the land’ and ‘acquisition of Palestinian citizenship’. But Article 25 reserved the ‘territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern boundary of Palestine’ for an exception. In a memorandum issued later the same year, the British dubbed these territories Transjordan and subjected them to the general terms of the Palestine Mandate but not to those specific to the implementation of the Balfour Declaration. In 1923 Transjordan was granted limited independence under the rule of Abdullah, Faysal’s brother and fellow leader of the Arab Revolt. In this way, the British associated Palestine with Jewishness (through the Balfour Declaration) and Transjordan with Arabness (through the figure of Abdullah). Though this plan thwarted Zionist aspirations for sovereignty over both banks of the Jordan, it implicitly reinforced the principle that a ‘proper’ national population should be defined in racial, ethnolinguistic and/or religious terms and enclosed within a bounded territory.⁷¹

It also implied that there should be only one national population per territorial enclosure. Although Article 2 assigned the mandatory power responsibility for ‘safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion’, the only group associated with the word ‘national’ is Jewish, with the rest described merely as ‘non-Jewish’ or ‘inhabitants of Palestine’, to whom are owed only civil and religious, not political, rights.⁷² By explicitly supporting Jewish immigration and ‘close settlement of the land’, while rendering upwards of 700,000 people living on that land politically invisible, the British Mandate for Palestine was designed

from the start as a settler colonial project. Moreover, by describing only one racial, ethnolinguistic and religious identity as ‘national’, the terms of the Mandate paved the way for future Jewish sovereignty in Palestine, whether or not that was the intention of its architects. In this context, the development of a Zionist tradition of national mapping not only was aided by the preconditions and structures of British colonialism, but depended on discourses of Eurocentric modernity and the dismissal or erasure of indigenous social and political formations to such an extent that it constituted a tradition of colonial mapping in its own right.

However, while working closely with the British to achieve their goals, many early Zionists were concerned not to appear to be colonialists themselves. Although they hailed overwhelmingly from Europe and addressed themselves primarily to a European and North American audience, they stressed Jewish historical precedence in Palestine and framed immigration and settlement as a return to a homeland. They also believed in proving their right to the land by working it themselves.⁷³ Paradoxically, this went hand in hand with assertions that they were better stewards of the land than those who had been living and working on it for generations, a rhetorical move with a long colonial pedigree.⁷⁴ Moreover, despite the symbolic association between Palestine and a Jewish national population already enshrined in the terms of the Mandate, Zionists knew that their best hope for sovereignty lay in being able to claim a majority in as much of Palestine as possible. For this, strategic land acquisition was key, and they were both supporters and beneficiaries of British topographical and cadastral surveys of Palestine between the 1920s and ’40s.⁷⁵ These maps bore many of the characteristics of the tradition of colonial mapping, among them an emphasis on the availability of the land by depicting it as under- or misused by its current inhabitants.⁷⁶ In other words, land was not necessarily perceived as available because it was literally empty but because its inhabitants were not deemed modern enough to manage it properly.

The JNF provided one of the main institutional means by which Zionists made this perception of ‘available’ land a material reality. The funds it collected from Jews worldwide were put toward purchasing land to lease to Jewish immigrants or to set up collective agricultural ventures. This process was a way of nationalizing or, in JNF terms,

‘redeeming’ the land. Starting in the 1930s the JNF increasingly used maps to attract international support for this process, similar to the way in which the colonial maps in the previous chapter sustained the colonial enterprise by attracting attention, resources or settlers from the metropole. The iconic JNF ‘Blue Box’, a collection box with a coin slot at the top, was first decorated with a map in 1934, a practice that has continued to this day.⁷⁷ These maps represented *Eretz Yisrael* as white territory bisected by the river Jordan against a blue background, and the earliest iterations included no international borders and very few toponyms. The major visual feature, other than the river Jordan, was light shading indicating JNF-owned land. The design of these early maps, in which the Jordan is centrally located on the box and the territory east of the river wraps around the side, reflected the JNF vision during this period that *Eretz Yisrael* properly spanned both banks of the Jordan. The stark white expanse of the land and its lack of topographical or toponymic detail projected a strong sense of emptiness, and the comparatively small area shaded as JNF-owned conveyed the great need for contributions to further the process of land redemption – the transformation of this ‘empty’ expanse into cartographically visible national territory.

Other JNF maps created in the mandate period for educational or fundraising purposes adopt the strategies of the tradition of colonial mapping. A map published in Jerusalem in the late 1930s is one of a series at the scale of 1:500,000 distributed by the JNF in this period (illus. 64).⁷⁸ As on the Blue Box map, the river Jordan is centrally located and the only international borders depicted are in the north, with Lebanon and Syria, and in the southwest with Egypt; no border with Transjordan is recognized. The eye is drawn immediately to the areas shaded dark and light green, which, as explained by the legend, refer to JNF land and ‘other Jewish-owned land’ respectively. Although there are many more toponyms than on the Blue Box maps, they are fairly sparsely dispersed, often alongside hollow circles, which the legend defines as ‘Arab settlements’. Toponyms next to solid circles indicating ‘Hebrew settlements’ are comparatively highlighted by different levels of underlining and are located in areas that, because of their green shading, appear both more populated and more fertile, the latter correlated with Jewish stewardship. The legend also includes a statement stressing the great need for more land and exhorting

64 Map entitled ‘Land of Israel’ published by the Jewish National Fund, c. 1937.

those who can to volunteer and support JNF efforts to 'redeem' the land. The term 'redemption' connotes both return and salvation. By using this term, the JNF was claiming territorial rights simultaneously through ancient (biblical) history and Eurocentric modernity, the same strategies by which the PEF asserted Great Britain's right to Palestine a half-century earlier. Zionist national maps like this one not only suggest that Jews were returning to a land promised them in the Bible; their claim was doubly justified by their superiority as representatives of modern European culture who would rehabilitate the land after centuries of neglect. In particular, their scientific expertise and superior work ethic would allow them to transform Palestine into a perfectly calibrated system of productive agricultural areas, protected heritage sites and prosperous urban centres.

In many ways it was the legibility of Zionism as a modern, European political movement that justified British endorsement and facilitation of a settler colonial project in Palestine. Moreover, the willingness of mainstream Zionist leaders to consider the partition plans of the mandate period aimed at engineering a perfect 'fit' between national populations and bounded territories sustained perceptions of them as modern and rational and therefore deserving of a nation-state.⁷⁹ Many Palestinians, on the other hand, saw nothing to gain from working within the terms of a Mandate that did not recognize them as a national group and were perceived as reactionary and irrational for refusing schemes that tied such recognition to partition and the displacement that it would necessarily entail. With the horrors of the Holocaust coming to light, and Jewish refugees pouring out of Europe, Zionism gained increasing support among the Allied nations in the Second World War as not only a rational and modern movement but a morally urgent one. In November 1947 when a United Nations Special Assembly issued Resolution 181, which called for the division of Palestine into two independent states, one for Jews and one for Arabs, the principle that had been held up as a cartographic ideal for the region since the First World War was reinforced as a prerequisite for statehood. While Zionist leaders were dissatisfied with some of the provisions of this plan, including the amount of land granted to the Jewish state, they supported the ideal of a bounded territory enclosing a racially, ethnolinguistically and religiously majoritarian population and considered this a useful starting point

for making their dreams of sovereignty a reality. However, the ongoing reality of British colonial rule and the opposition of the majority of the Palestinian people to partition – not to mention the very presence of those people – stood in their way.

Thus, as soon as Resolution 181 was issued, the Jewish Agency's proto-state apparatus, including a fully formed military that had been established with the tacit consent of British mandatory authorities, allowed it to begin to wrest control over the land designated for a Jewish state by the UN, just as Palestinians mobilized resistance.⁸⁰ Although there were differing opinions as to tactics and timetable, Zionist leaders agreed on the need to secure not only the territory but a clear Jewish majority on that territory. Starting in late 1947 Zionist armed forces targeted certain villages for expulsions and began to establish mechanisms for preventing those who left from returning to their homes. This process accelerated after the final departure of the British and the declaration of the independent state of Israel in May 1948, which was immediately followed by an invasion of Arab armies from Egypt, Syria, Transjordan, Lebanon and Iraq. By the end of the war of 1948 some 750,000 Palestinians had fled or been forced from their land, most of whom ended up in refugee camps throughout the region.⁸¹ Among these refugees was approximately 80 per cent of the Palestinian population living on the territory that became Israel, leaving behind some four hundred villages.⁸² In the same period Jews went from being just over 50 per cent of the population in the same area to more than 80 per cent.⁸³

Between autumn 1948 and spring 1949 armistice lines were drawn between Israel and its neighbours. A large chunk of the land that had been designated for an Arab state in Resolution 181, including the eastern half of the city of Jerusalem, was now under the control of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the new name for the former Transjordan. Though this was not the outcome the UN Special Assembly intended, by basing its partition plan on a distinction between Jewishness and Arabness it made explicit what had been implied by the League of Nations-endorsed plan to establish separate states of Palestine and Transjordan 25 years earlier. At least on the theoretical level, therefore, it could be seen as justifying Jordan's absorption of that land, an outcome that was actively sought by some British and Zionist leaders in secret negotiations with Jordan's King

Abdullah before the war.⁸⁴ The armistice line between Jordan and Israel was dubbed the 'Green Line', for the colour of the pencil used to delineate it on maps, and the territory on the Israeli side was settled as quickly as possible with the Jewish immigrants who were still streaming in from Europe, as well as from nearby states, such as Egypt, Iraq and Yemen, where Jews were being subject to new discrimination.⁸⁵ It was also the target of comprehensive Judaization policies at the symbolic and material levels, which included substituting Hebrew toponyms, if possible derived from the Bible, for Arabic ones and razing villages, shrines and other structures to make way for Jewish settlement and to erase the traces of Palestinian society and culture from the landscape.⁸⁶

Despite these efforts aimed at consolidating Jewish sovereignty and visibility on the territory secured in the war, the tradition of Zionist national mapping over the next two decades was notable for its ambiguity on the location and meaning of borders.⁸⁷ One of the first post-independence JNF maps was produced using a Survey of Israel base map dated December 1950 at the scale of 1:400,000 (illus. 65).⁸⁸ Published in commemoration of the organization's fiftieth anniversary, it delineates international boundaries, unlike earlier JNF maps, but effectively de-emphasizes them by using green ink that blends with the topographical shading of the background. It uses even lighter green hatching for the Green Line. Though accounts vary, the original armistice maps seem to have shown the Green Line with a width of between 1 and 4 mm, corresponding to 60–200 m on the ground depending on the scale of the map.⁸⁹ It was never subject to a survey or boundary commission, since it was not intended to be a permanent border, so its relatively small-scale cartographic manifestation determined its reality, producing liminal zones and 'no man's land' in densely populated areas like Jerusalem.⁹⁰ Elsewhere, particularly in the hills and valleys to the north and south of Jerusalem, it tended to separate villages from the pastures and orchards owned and worked by their residents. This was a major problem because the Green Line was treated in practice as a sealed border between Jordan and Israel.⁹¹ Belying this reality, the hatching for the Green Line here is so wide that many villages appear as islands in the middle of it, and the solid green 'border between states' is depicted running along the river Jordan. Moreover, the entire right side of this map is dedicated

65 Map of Israel published by the Jewish National Fund in 1951.

to an enumeration of 'Hebrew settlements'; only through a close cross-reference does it become clear that the list only includes sites to the west of the Green Line. The immediate effect, therefore, is twofold: first, to eliminate the references to Arabs or Palestine that had appeared, however anaemically, on earlier JNF maps; and second, to associate Jewish settlement with the entirety of the land depicted on the map, not with a clearly bounded national territory.

The delay between the foundation of a nation-state and the naturalization of a clearly bounded national territory through maps is unusual. In the cases of Turkey and Iran, securing a bounded territory, even if it was not as expansive as some hoped it would be, was seen as a priority to forestall colonial incursions. In the case of Turkey, it was also an enclosure within which a homogeneous national population could be both produced and made cartographically visible. In the case of Israel, by contrast, establishing the exclusive identity of the national population was the initial priority. This identity was then harnessed to, rather than set against, a colonial project, and finally enshrined in Israel's 1950 Law of Return, while territorial boundaries remained, at least on maps, seemingly elastic.⁹² In this way, Zionist national mapping has been similar to maps in other situations of settler colonialism, such as French Algeria, which suggest boundlessness to attract immigrants. It also reflects a long-standing debate over how much land a Jewish national population needs or is entitled to. Although Israel's ruling political party in the 1950s and '60s, the Workers' Party of the Land of Israel (MAPAI), did not advocate expansionism, it had to contend, and sometimes form coalitions, with parties representing 'revisionist Zionism', which called for Jewish settlement up to and beyond the river Jordan – in some visions as far east as the Euphrates or even westward into the Sinai Peninsula.⁹³ In this context, vagueness in the tradition of national mapping was a strategy to satisfy multiple constituencies.

Thus, while maps between 1949 and 1967 routinely showed the Green Line, sometimes as Israel's eastern border and sometimes as an armistice boundary distinguishable from an international boundary, a national geo-body was not systematically extracted from its geographical context and made a symbol of Zionism in this period. On the occasions that it was, iconography or writing was often used to

distract attention from, or to fill in, the space between the Green Line and the river Jordan.⁹⁴ Moreover, geography textbooks tended to avoid the issue of borders altogether by focusing on topographical and thematic mapping at a regional scale.⁹⁵ When they did include contemporary political maps, these were often combined with cartographic interpretations of various historical territories that could be associated with Jewish sovereignty and that notably exceeded current boundaries, such as that which was originally requested by the Zionist delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, that which was first dubbed the Mandate for Palestine before its partition to create Transjordan, or that which was said to have been ruled by the biblical 'First Kings' Saul, David and Solomon.⁹⁶ The linearity of the river Jordan, and the cartographic convention of distinguishing bodies of water by colour, even on the most minimalist of maps, also helped in finessing the border issue; by using a bold blue, a map could give the appearance of observing the river as an eastern frontier for the state, without denoting any actual political borders.

The June War of 1967 made this appearance a reality. Over the course of six days Israel defeated the armed forces of Egypt, Syria and Jordan and established a military occupation of the Palestinian territories that had been administered by Jordan and Egypt since 1949 – known as the West Bank and the Gaza Strip respectively – as well as Egypt's Sinai Peninsula and Syria's Golan Heights. The river Jordan, rather than the Green Line, became Israel's new eastern border with Jordan, though it was not officially recognized until the peace treaty in 1994. Although Israel was now in a position to annex land that had once been part of the Palestine Mandate and that many Zionists had long sought for the Jewish state, it was home to approximately a million Palestinians whose very existence threatened the state's Jewish majority. Ironically, therefore, the Green Line became more important than ever as a juridical barrier to citizenship for the non-Jews now living under Israeli military rule – just as it disappeared from most national maps.⁹⁷ The tradition of national mapping after 1967, for the most part, portrayed the West Bank as a seamless part of Israel, along with the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights and, until 1982 with the completion of the Israeli withdrawal following the peace treaty with Egypt, some part of the Sinai Peninsula. The war left Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip isolated and stateless

under Israeli military occupation, while maps tended to ignore their existence completely.

During this period, the Israeli geo-body was (re-)created in the image of the Palestine Mandate, with a slight bulge at the top indicating the addition of the Golan Heights.⁹⁸ The resulting shape, like a dagger with the sharp point of the Negev Desert in the south, has become emblematic of Zionism, appearing on JNF Blue Boxes, stamps, pendants and other reproducible nationalist paraphernalia.⁹⁹ This process was accompanied by a discourse that represented the river Jordan as a ‘natural’ border, a discourse that allowed most expansionist Zionists to recalibrate their territorial aspirations and relinquish claims to ‘both banks’ of the river.¹⁰⁰ It was also accompanied by a settler movement, through which, particularly after 1977, Jewish bodies on the ground would substantiate the claims made on national maps. By 1988 almost 200,000 Jews had settled in the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), a number that has risen steadily ever since.¹⁰¹ These settlers had full rights as citizens of Israel, whereas West Bank Palestinians had no such rights and their mobility was increasingly monitored and restricted after the first intifada, an uprising against the military occupation that began in 1987. Thus, an Israeli national geo-body, adapted from an earlier settler colonial context to reflect a new settler colonial context, finally crystallized.

By this time, an almost identical geo-body, with the exception of the Golan bulge, had been circulating among Palestinians for decades. As we have seen, Palestinian nationalism had roots in the late nineteenth century and grew in tandem with other nationalisms in the region, such as Arab and Syrian nationalism. It associated a territory – cartographically enclosed, but not invented, via the tradition of colonial mapping – with a population defined by residence, local knowledge and shared history. Palestinians saw themselves as distinctive on the basis of their intimate attachment to the land – with the *fallāḥ*, or peasant farmer, an important symbol – and the sacred history of the cities and shrines dotting that land, most prominently Jerusalem.¹⁰² Nonetheless, despite a nationalist press and political associations that advocated for their cause during the mandate period, Palestinians were not able to convince an international audience that they were a distinct people worthy of self-determination, or at least that their claim to self-determination



66 Palestine pendant.

should not be curtailed to accommodate Zionism. The fact that most Palestinian nationalists considered Arabness an important component of their identity may have further weakened their claim. By focusing on this component, some British and Zionist leaders argued that Palestinians were racially, ethnolinguistically and religiously indistinguishable from the inhabitants of neighbouring nation-states and, therefore, transferable to them.

Ironically, it was not until they lost Palestine that they became, in the world's eyes, Palestinians, an identity associated with the figure of the refugee.¹⁰³ This was also the point at which the geo-body of the Palestine Mandate, the territory they had lost, became a potent symbol of the hope for return.¹⁰⁴

Although mandate-era Palestinians circulated maps that visualized their territorial goals, and even issued stamps with cartographic details to support their activities, they did not have the same access to British survey data as the Zionists.¹⁰⁵ Consequently, logo-maps, which were easily produced and highlighted the indivisibility of the geo-body, became one of the major cartographic expressions of Palestinian identity. After 1948 they adorned the classrooms of refugee camps and could be seen, whether painted in elaborate colours or scrawled in chalk, on walls wherever Palestinians lived.¹⁰⁶ Such logo-maps remain to this day one of the most visible symbols of the aspirations of generations in exile. One nearly ubiquitous example is the pendant in the shape of the geo-body of pre-1948 Palestine (illus. 66). In their simplest form, pendants like these can be difficult to distinguish from similar ones worn to express attachment to Israel.¹⁰⁷ This demonstrates the particular salience of logo-maps in the context of competing nationalisms. Their potential multivalence makes them inseparable from the context of their circulation or embodied performance.

More formally, political organizations in the diaspora adopted the geo-body of the Palestine Mandate as a logo, just as other countries appropriated it as a symbol of their struggles for legitimacy and



67 Palestine Liberation Organization poster designed by Palestinian artist Ismail Shammout in 1965.

independence in the post-war world. This may be seen in a poster designed by Palestinian artist Ismail Shammout in 1965, just one year after the foundation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), an umbrella for activist groups based in Cairo (illus. 67).¹⁰⁸ At its centre is a red logo-map underneath a Palestinian flag, a flame and the Arabic name of the PLO. Unfurled across the bottom is a ribbon of flags of the member states of the Arab League, which had been founded in 1945 to promote pan-Arab cooperation and decolonization. The visual continuity among the colours and symbols on the flags communicates Arab solidarity with the Palestinian cause, as does the slogan across the logo-map, which reads 'Patriotic Unity, Liberation, National Mobilization'. Palestinian political parties within the PLO, such as al-Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

(PFLP), also creatively incorporated the logo-map into artwork for posters, publications and other promotional materials from the late 1960s on.¹⁰⁹ At the same time, the member states of the Arab League issued postage stamps featuring this geo-body to commemorate *al-Nakba* (the Catastrophe), as the events of 1948 had become known. Images of Jerusalem were also popular on stamps both in the Arab world and in Iran after 1979.¹¹⁰ These symbols conveyed not only recognition of Palestinian dispossession, but resistance to new forms of European and increasingly American dominance in the region, including support for Israel, in the second half of the twentieth century. This is an example of a geo-body of a colonial state, the Palestine Mandate, being appropriated as a multivalent symbol in a variety of anti-colonial and national contexts.

Palestinians also engaged in other forms of mapping that were intended as specific rebuttals of the claims made in Zionist national maps. The practice of creating and circulating 'village

books' within the refugee community began in the 1980s. These books include detailed descriptions of daily life in pre-1948 Palestine, often along with elaborate hand-drawn maps made entirely from memory locating homes, neighbourhoods, shrines and schools, as well as the orchards and pastures that had been so carefully cultivated. Eloquent testimony to attachment to place, these books, like the house keys that remain prized possessions of many refugees, are a way of keeping the memories of home, and therefore the hope of return, alive.¹¹¹ They are also a way of rendering visible the social and political formations, as well as the economic and agricultural productivity, that Zionist national mapping has systematically erased. In this capacity, many village books are exercises in documentation, including photographs, reproductions of property deeds, contemporary maps and other data intended both to piece together the fragments of memory and to make the case for return in legal and empirical terms. Larger documentary projects are performing a similar kind of work aimed explicitly at an international audience. For example, by reproducing, if not one-upping, the massive scale and scientific methods of the Survey of Israel's 1970 English-language *Atlas of Israel*, the *Atlas of Palestine, 1948* by Salman Abu-Sitta, published in English in 2004, has accomplished an impressive feat of what has been called 'counter-counter-mapping'.¹¹² Such undertakings are examples of the tendency in national mapping to reproduce the form, even while challenging the content, of colonial maps and, in so doing, to seek legitimacy or redress on the world's stage.

These competing cartographic projects and the nearly identical logo-maps circulating among Israelis and Palestinians since 1967 can be interpreted as making rival, maximalist or exclusive claims to the same land. They can also be seen as performances that have less to do with asserting control over a particular bounded territory than with seeking recognition of the memories, losses and hopes that have animated both Zionism and Palestinian nationalism over the decades.¹¹³ Nonetheless, the territorial element remains strong in both nationalisms and has only got more complicated with the implementation of a new partition regime as the result of the series of negotiations starting in 1993 between Israel and the PLO known as the Oslo Peace Process. At the conclusion of the Oslo II Accord in 1995, Israel agreed to transfer most of the trappings of civilian rule



(including responsibility for internal, but notably not external, security) to a proto-state entity, the Palestinian Authority (PA), in non-contiguous parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip called 'Area A', constituting about 3 per cent of the total land between the Green Line and the river Jordan. A second category, 'Area B', accommodated the continuing (and, it has turned out, increasing) presence of Israeli settlers by splitting jurisdiction between the PA and Israel. The final category, 'Area C', remained under full Israeli military occupation. This patchwork of jurisdictions was intended to lay the groundwork for an eventual independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip – the so-called 'two-state solution' – pending final status negotiations that have not yet occurred. In the meantime, most official Israeli maps de-emphasize the separateness of even Area A from the national territory and thus continue to dismiss or erase Palestinian social and political formations, undermining efforts toward a two-state solution.

For instance, an English-language Survey of Israel map from the year 2000 depicts Areas A and B with light pink and yellow shading that is not immediately distinguishable from the various kinds of topographical shading on the map (illus. 68). Neither the Green Line nor Area C appears on the map, and no boundaries separate Areas A and B from their surroundings. One reason for this might be the caution that was raised by a member of the Israeli Oslo delegation that to inscribe clear boundaries around the plots of land that make up Areas A and B is to emphasize their isolation. The original Israeli negotiation map had done just this, using bold red ink, which almost derailed

the entire process.¹¹⁴ Rather, picturing Areas A and B as unbounded, or as only lightly bounded, might suggest their potential expansion or the eventual transfer of their surroundings (Area C) to Palestinian administration, which was slated for a later date in the text of the Oslo II Accord. However, this is clearly not the message of the map shown here. Instead, by using such light shading, by not picturing the Green Line, and by inscribing biblical toponyms like 'Samaria' across even the largest swaths of Area A, the map implies that the West Bank is an integral part of Israeli national territory. In addition, the inset map on the left side uses bright yellow to emphasize what had become, by this time, the most widely disseminated geo-body of Israel, occupying the full space of the Palestine Mandate and giving no indication of the separate status of the West Bank and Gaza. Finally, consistent with the tradition of Zionist national mapping as it has evolved since the mandate period, the five categories of international border defined in the legend and pictured on the map convey ambiguity about the exact limits of the state.

While most official Israeli maps did not show the Green Line until 2007, many other maps made by Israelis and international NGOs in this period emphasize the increasingly convoluted spatial regime of the Oslo Accords, to different ends. Maps made by the centre right Israeli political party Likud, heir to the revisionist Zionism that had previously sought a state on both banks of the river Jordan and a strong supporter of Israeli settlement in the West Bank and, until 2005, the Gaza Strip, tend to visualize Palestinian rule in these areas as a persistent 'Arab threat'.¹¹⁵ This is portrayed cartographically as a military threat, stressing the short distances between the West Bank and Israeli population centres, but the demographics of the 'threat' are often raised in accompanying discourse. In this view, the Palestinian birth rate is cited as endangering the Jewish right to sovereignty on the basis of majority status between the Mediterranean and the river Jordan. Textbooks and road maps also use images and iconography to represent the 'Arabs' of the West Bank and Gaza as menacing and backward and/or as indistinguishable from the 'Arabs' of Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Egypt. Road maps divide West Bank space into zones of safety and risk and highlight ways to manoeuvre through the space with as little contact with Areas A and B as possible. These kinds of maps also tend to de-emphasize the separation of the

68 Map of Israel published by the Survey of Israel in 2000.

West Bank from Israel, even when they do portray the Green Line, through the use of colour and toponymy.¹¹⁶ By contrast, human rights organizations and NGOs have increasingly produced maps that emphasize the ongoing military occupation of the West Bank, the checkpoint system that chokes the Palestinian economy, the illegality of Israeli settlement activity in the area, and the hardships caused by Israel's unilateral construction of a wall along, but in some cases significantly east of, the Green Line since 2002. These maps tend to draw heavily from the maps produced by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, to invoke the authority of international law, and to make use of sophisticated methods of data mapping, particularly in a digital format.¹¹⁷

For their part, Palestinians committed to a two-state solution in the post-Oslo era have struggled to establish an alternative to the tradition of national mapping based on the Palestine Mandate. The Oslo Accords have not come close to giving Palestinians the prerequisites of statehood, including control over borders and security, as well as unfettered mobility throughout the territory allocated for an eventual state, which is itself non-contiguous, complicating the production of a new geo-body. The relationship of the PA to Israel is an indirect colonial relationship, in which Israeli authority prevails on any issue relevant to external communications, mobility and security. Among other things, Israel has made it difficult for the PA to collect the kind of survey data that makes possible a wide range of governance-related maps, even for Area A. Divisions within the PA and persistent shortages of funds have also exacerbated the problems of establishing a consistent, state-led tradition of national mapping. Thus, to the limited extent that maps have been made for Palestinian state-building in the post-Oslo era, they have usually been funded and/or produced by international donors and NGOs.¹¹⁸

These challenges have contributed to ambiguities in the presentation of the national geo-body on Palestinian maps for education and tourism.¹¹⁹ Recent English-language tourist maps made by the PA's Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities (MOTA) and the private Good Shepherd Engineering (GSE)/Palestine Mapping Center (PalMap) illustrate the different approaches. The MOTA folding tourist map is entitled 'Palestine: The Holy Land' and nowhere mentions Israel (illus. 69). However, it shows both international

69 Map of Palestine published by the Palestinian Authority's Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities.

© 4 (Copyrighted, Published and Designed by: IAS, Liquid Management Engineering & Consulting Pvt. Ltd., Education Management, 1001, 1002, 1003, 1004, 1005, 1006, 1007, 1008, 1009, 1010, 1011, 1012, 1013, 1014, 1015, 1016, 1017, 1018, 1019, 1020, 1021, 1022, 1023, 1024, 1025, 1026, 1027, 1028, 1029, 1030, 1031, 1032, 1033, 1034, 1035, 1036, 1037, 1038, 1039, 1040, 1041, 1042, 1043, 1044, 1045, 1046, 1047, 1048, 1049, 1050, 1051, 1052, 1053, 1054, 1055, 1056, 1057, 1058, 1059, 1060, 1061, 1062, 1063, 1064, 1065, 1066, 1067, 1068, 1069, 1070, 1071, 1072, 1073, 1074, 1075, 1076, 1077, 1078, 1079, 1080, 1081, 1082, 1083, 1084, 1085, 1086, 1087, 1088, 1089, 1090, 1091, 1092, 1093, 1094, 1095, 1096, 1097, 1098, 1099, 1100, 1101, 1102, 1103, 1104, 1105, 1106, 1107, 1108, 1109, 1110, 1111, 1112, 1113, 1114, 1115, 1116, 1117, 1118, 1119, 1120, 1121, 1122, 1123, 1124, 1125, 1126, 1127, 1128, 1129, 1130, 1131, 1132, 1133, 1134, 1135, 1136, 1137, 1138, 1139, 1140, 1141, 1142, 1143, 1144, 1145, 1146, 1147, 1148, 1149, 1150, 1151, 1152, 1153, 1154, 1155, 1156, 1157, 1158, 1159, 1160, 1161, 1162, 1163, 1164, 1165, 1166, 1167, 1168, 1169, 1170, 1171, 1172, 1173, 1174, 1175, 1176, 1177, 1178, 1179, 1180, 1181, 1182, 1183, 1184, 1185, 1186, 1187, 1188, 1189, 1190, 1191, 1192, 1193, 1194, 1195, 1196, 1197, 1198, 1199, 1200, 1201, 1202, 1203, 1204, 1205, 1206, 1207, 1208, 1209, 1210, 1211, 1212, 1213, 1214, 1215, 1216, 1217, 1218, 1219, 1220, 1221, 1222, 1223, 1224, 1225, 1226, 1227, 1228, 1229, 1230, 1231, 1232, 1233, 1234, 1235, 1236, 1237, 1238, 1239, 1240, 1241, 1242, 1243, 1244, 1245, 1246, 1247, 1248, 1249, 1250, 1251, 1252, 1253, 1254, 1255, 1256, 1257, 1258, 1259, 1260, 1261, 1262, 1263, 1264, 1265, 1266, 1267, 1268, 1269, 1270, 1271, 1272, 1273, 1274, 1275, 1276, 1277, 1278, 1279, 1280, 1281, 1282, 1283, 1284, 1285, 1286, 1287, 1288, 1289, 1290, 1291, 1292, 1293, 1294, 1295, 1296, 1297, 1298, 1299, 1300, 1301, 1302, 1303, 1304, 1305, 1306, 1307, 1308, 1309, 1310, 1311, 1312, 1313, 1314, 1315, 1316, 1317, 1318, 1319, 1320, 1321, 1322, 1323, 1324, 1325, 1326, 1327, 1328, 1329, 1330, 1331, 1332, 1333, 1334, 1335, 1336, 1337, 1338, 1339, 1340, 1341, 1342, 1343, 1344, 1345, 1346, 1347, 1348, 1349, 1350, 1351, 1352, 1353, 1354, 1355, 1356, 1357, 1358, 1359, 1360, 1361, 1362, 1363, 1364, 1365, 1366, 1367, 1368, 1369, 1370, 1371, 1372, 1373, 1374, 1375, 1376, 1377, 1378, 1379, 1380, 1381, 1382, 1383, 1384, 1385, 1386, 1387, 1388, 1389, 1390, 1391, 1392, 1393, 1394, 1395, 1396, 1397, 1398, 1399, 1400, 1401, 1402, 1403, 1404, 1405, 1406, 1407, 1408, 1409, 1410, 1411, 1412, 1413, 1414, 1415, 1416, 1417, 1418, 1419, 1420, 1421, 1422, 1423, 1424, 1425, 1426, 1427, 1428, 1429, 1430, 1431, 1432, 1433, 1434, 1435, 1436, 1437, 1438, 1439, 1440, 1441, 1442, 1443, 1444, 1445, 1446, 1447, 1448, 1449, 1450, 1451, 1452, 1453, 1454, 1455, 1456, 1457, 1458, 1459, 1460, 1461, 1462, 1463, 1464, 1465, 1466, 1467, 1468, 1469, 1470, 1471, 1472, 1473, 1474, 1475, 1476, 1477, 1478, 1479, 1480, 1481, 1482, 1483, 1484, 1485, 1486, 1487, 1488, 1489, 1490, 1491, 1492, 1493, 1494, 1495, 1496, 1497, 1498, 1499, 1500, 1501, 1502, 1503, 1504, 1505, 1506, 1507, 1508, 1509, 1510, 1511, 1512, 1513, 1514, 1515, 1516, 1517, 1518, 1519, 1520, 1521, 1522, 1523, 1524, 1525, 1526, 1527, 1528, 1529, 1530, 1531, 1532, 1533, 1534, 1535, 1536, 1537, 1538, 1539, 1540, 1541, 1542, 1543, 1544, 1545, 1546, 1547, 1548, 1549, 1550, 1551, 1552, 1553, 1554, 1555, 1556, 1557, 1558, 1559, 1560, 1561, 1562, 1563, 1564, 1565, 1566, 1567, 1568, 1569, 1570, 1571, 1572, 1573, 1574, 1575, 1576, 1577, 1578, 1579, 1580, 1581, 1582, 1583, 1584, 1585, 1586, 1587, 1588, 1589, 1590, 1591, 1592, 1593, 1594, 1595, 1596, 1597, 1598, 1599, 1600, 1601, 1602, 1603, 1604, 1605, 1606, 1607, 1608, 1609, 1610, 1611, 1612, 1613, 1614, 1615, 1616, 1617, 1618, 1619, 1620, 1621, 1622, 1623, 1624, 1625, 1626, 1627, 1628, 1629, 1630, 1631, 1632, 1633, 1634, 1635, 1636, 1637, 1638, 1639, 1640, 1641, 1642, 1643, 1644, 1645, 1646, 1647, 1648, 1649, 1650, 1651, 1652, 1653, 1654, 1655, 1656, 1657, 1658, 1659, 1660, 1661, 1662, 1663, 1664, 1665, 1666, 1667, 1668, 1669, 1670, 1671, 1672, 1673, 1674, 1675, 1676, 1677, 16



Regional Map



- [illegible]



borders and the Green Line (identified as 'armistice line 1949' on the legend) and includes toponymic and iconographic detail only within the West Bank and Gaza Strip, though these are not labelled as such. It omits any indication of the Oslo Accords or the obstacles to mobility it has produced within the areas being promoted for tourism and instead suggests the territorial integrity of Palestine. At the bottom are photos of holy sites in and around Jerusalem, and on the back are more photos, as well as another map entitled 'Historical Map of Palestine' that features textual descriptions next to toponyms for villages and towns in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which are again bound but unlabelled. By contrast, on the PalMap tourist map titled 'The Holy Land: Palestine & Israel', the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Golan Heights are each labelled and shaded a different colour than Israel or the neighbouring states of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon (illus. 70). The map is detailed in its depiction of what the legend calls 'Oslo ABC Zoning' and the different manifestations of the 'Separation Wall', as distinct from the Green Line. This suggests a commitment to precision in representing the different jurisdictions imposed since Oslo. At the same time the logo of PalMap itself, pictured five times on the map (twice at the top, once in each of the inset maps, and once at the bottom), is a logo-map of pre-1948 Palestine, which seems to contradict the two-state message in the title.¹²⁰ In registering support for the Palestinian nationalist cause as it has developed since the mandate period, the PalMap logo provides a counterpoint to, and perhaps a critique of, the convoluted spatial regime of the maps it accompanies.

Although the vast majority of Palestinian logo-maps, like that of PalMap, continue to be based on the borders of the Palestine Mandate, since Oslo it has been possible to find geo-bodies of the West Bank and/or Gaza Strip extracted from their geographical context and made symbols of a future Palestinian state. However, Oslo has also intensified a critique of the tradition of national mapping, and of nationalism itself, in the past and future of Israel and Palestine. Proponents of a 'one-state solution' question the political and cartographic logic that has propelled the succession of partition plans in the region since the First World War. They reject the nation-state model in which a bounded territory is associated with a privileged racial, ethnolinguistic or religious identity.¹²¹ Similarly, since the 1970s scholars and artists have

70 Map of Palestine and Israel published by GSE/PalMap in 2010.





71 (installation view and close-up)
Mona Hatoum, *Present Tense*, 1996,
installation at Gallery Anadiel,
Jerusalem.

been calling attention to the role maps play in producing enclosure and exclusions in the name of nationalism or modernity.¹²² Palestinian artist Mona Hatoum's famous sculpture *Present Tense*, first installed in 1996 in the Gallery Anadiel in Jerusalem, can be seen as both a specific critique of Oslo and a broader interrogation of traditions of national mapping.¹²³ In *Present Tense*, Hatoum uses cubes of Nablus olive oil soap to construct a floor mosaic in the form of a map of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (illus. 71). Red glass beads trace the contours of Areas A and B. The soap is a coveted product of the land, as well as of centuries of Palestinian manufacturing, but also an ephemeral one. The soap's purpose is to dissolve, suggesting the transience of all mapping traditions and the ambiguity of their relationship with the land. As Edward Said wrote in the catalogue for her 2000 exhibition at the Tate Gallery in London, 'Hatoum's art is hard to bear . . . yet very necessary to see as an art that travesties the idea of a single homeland. Better disparity and dislocation than reconciliation under duress of subject and object; better a lucid exile than sloppy, sentimental homecomings.'¹²⁴ It is difficult not to see *Present Tense* as a profound critique of the 'sloppy, sentimental homecomings' promised by traditions of national mapping. In this view, true homes are neither enclosed nor exclusive; when they are, exile may indeed be preferable. By questioning the power of maps to arbitrate belonging, Hatoum's *Present Tense* raises the possibility that we might be better off abandoning the map altogether because it will, sooner or later, abandon us.

THE TRADITIONS OF NATIONAL MAPPING examined in this chapter are all implicated in the nationalist logic of differentiating between homogenized populations, which has, in turn, been territorialized through the colonialist logic of enclosure and partition. In the context of anticolonial struggle, accepting these logics has helped legitimize some bids for independence and self-determination in the international arena. For others, however, such 'homecomings' remain elusive. This is the dark side of traditions of national mapping – indeed of nationalism in general, which is always bound up with processes of exclusion. In all the cases examined in this chapter, these processes have generated ongoing contention, displacement

and violence, though only in the case of Israel/Palestine is the territorial issue still so central and unresolved. In other parts of the region, however, the territorial issue, though seemingly resolved since the Second World War in a neat set of geo-bodies, has been reopened in recent decades, and the logics of enclosure and partition reinvoked, in the context of a new colonial moment dominated by the United States. The next chapter will examine this development, as well as alternative approaches to mapping that build on, and to a certain extent transcend, the national-colonial dialectic.



72 Map of the Arab
Homeland prepared
by Abd al-Al
Muhammad Rashdan
and published in Cairo
in 1964.

MAPPING ALTERNATIVE GEOGRAPHIES

By privileging the association between certain groups and bounded territories, the logic of the traditions of national mapping examined in the previous chapter ensured that there would be ongoing struggles for belonging in those territories. It also, ironically, meant that the cause of those struggles, partition, would often be invoked as the solution, as it has been again and again in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. By contrast, some voices have called, from the aftermath of the Second World War onward, for breaking the cycle of enclosure and exclusion, and broadening the frame in which space and identity are imagined and mapped. This strain of thought has stressed a regional or superregional connectivity that does not take the nation-state as the only (or most) effective scale for mass political engagement. This new regionalism arose out of the anti-colonial rhetoric of the period of decolonization, which was fed by the recognition that new forms of imperialism, spearheaded especially by the United States, continued to undermine efforts to achieve self-determination, solidarity and dignity. While the forms of superregional mapping that emerged in this period may be seen as a corrective to the partition principle, they have nevertheless stopped short of challenging the model of the nation-state, or the identity-based exclusions that accompany it, as a political and cartographic ideal. Nevertheless, they present a stark contrast to Anglo-American media maps over the last two decades that have reinvoked partition with a vengeance.

This chapter begins with the heyday of Arab nationalism in the 1950s, which presented possibilities for a radical rethinking of borders and state territoriality, and then explores a new superregional mapping

tradition inspired by the discourse of Arabism. Arabic-language maps and atlases devoted to the 'Arab Homeland' have been published consistently in many different countries over the past fifty years. This mapping tradition shows no sign of abating; if anything, it was reinvigorated, with transformative potential, by the events of the so-called 'Arab Spring' in 2011. Nonetheless, it is debatable to what extent it represents or has the potential to be a true alternative to traditions of national mapping. The chapter then considers a new cartographic obsession with partition, especially along religious lines, which threatens to make its fragmented, identitarian vision a reality in 'the colonial present'. This idea comes from Derek Gregory's 2004 book of the same name, which argues that, despite conventional historical narratives that trace decolonization to the post-Second World War period and the concomitant use of the term 'postcolonial' to understand the legacy of political and economic asymmetry in the parts of the world that experienced European colonialism, we are, in fact, living in a colonial present. The conditions of this colonial present, characterized by the succession of wars launched or supported by the U.S. with backing from other North Atlantic states, are produced and sustained by 'imaginative geographies'. The return to partition is one of these imaginative geographies, inextricably linked to colonialism – both its history, explored in the previous two chapters, and its unrelenting present.

MAPPING ARABISM

By the time of the First World War, discourses stressing the cultural distinctions of Arabic-speaking peoples within the Ottoman Empire were being selectively engaged in the service of a nationalist movement aimed at creating an independent Arab state. Amir Faysal's leadership of the Arab Revolt of 1916–17 positioned him to become one of the most visible advocates for this movement in the immediate aftermath of the war. Between 1918 and 1920, from his base in Damascus, Faysal tried to consolidate support for various visions of this state, beginning with the expansive vision articulated by his father in the Husayn–McMahon correspondence. This vision was shared by those who increasingly identified as Arab nationalists and

who tended to feel more comfortable with Islam playing a role in fostering unity among Arabic-speaking peoples. However, strong opposition within Syria to being absorbed into a larger state, which, it was feared, would be dominated by Faysal's home region of the Hijaz (western Arabian Peninsula) and/or would marginalize Christians, caused Faysal to shift gears and advocate for an Arab confederation rather than a single state. In this vision, Syria, Iraq and the Hijaz would all have independent governments that would collaborate on foreign and economic policy.¹ Territorial nationalism – the idea that a 'natural' or historical region produces bonds among its co-residents – would determine the contours of states and allow for ethnic and religious inclusivity within those contours. Arab nationalism, meanwhile, would be the glue that would keep the confederation together, assuring its economic viability and security. This plan was thwarted by the imposition of the mandate regime, but it was never forgotten. European dominance of the former provinces of the Ottoman Empire during the interwar period, a dominance that was sustained by partition and other divide-and-rule tactics, increased dissatisfaction with the state system as it had been shaped in the post-war settlement and made some form of Arab nationalism an attractive alternative.

One of the first institutional manifestations of this alternative was the League of Arab States, founded in 1945 and based in Cairo in recognition of the leading role played by Egyptian politicians in the negotiations that led to its establishment.² The original member states were Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan and Iraq, though membership steadily expanded over the years. The founding document proclaims its purpose as fostering 'cooperation' between 'independent Arab states', but also includes provisions for the participation of a delegate from Palestine and for supporting the 'aspirations' of those Arab countries still under colonial rule.³ This anti-colonial rhetoric aimed at other countries sometimes sat uneasily with the fact that most of the Arab League member states were not, in 1945, themselves entirely free of colonial relationships and/or were dominated by elites with close ties to Europe. While the pact was relatively ambiguous on the form this support and cooperation would take, it erected a framework within which Arab unity might be pursued in an incipient postcolonial era without encroaching upon

the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the individual nation-state. This last assurance was a compromise that allowed for the participation of states like Lebanon, which feared the organization might otherwise be a vehicle for dissolving borders and absorbing small countries into large ones. Others, however, hoped that this compromise would soon give way to a more radical rethinking of the state system imposed on the region in an era of colonialism and thus effect a more definitive break with that era and those who benefited from it. This split reflects what might be termed a difference between Arabism and Arab nationalism.

Although these two terms are often used interchangeably and refer to a complex array of political positions, they are being differentiated here in terms of their relationship to the territoriality of the nation-state. 'Arabism' (*al-'urūba*) suggests an awareness of or aspiration to solidarity between Arabs the world over that might form the basis for some kind of coordinated or collaborative politics. It posits the existence of an 'Arab Nation' (*al-umma al-'arabiyya*) or an 'Arab Homeland' (*al-waṭan al-'arabī*) that transcends, but does not necessarily threaten, territorial nationalism and the nation-state system that had evolved by the mid-twentieth century. Arab nationalism (*al-qawmiyya al-'arabiyya*), on the other hand, suggests an aspiration to organic political unity that would supersede territorial nationalism and result in a rethinking of borders and the colonial legacies that they represent.⁴ Both Arabism and Arab nationalism are premised on a shared racial or ethnolinguistic identity that includes Islam as an important component, sometimes with a more historical/cultural inflection and sometimes with an explicitly religious one. The relationship between that identity and state territoriality, however, has remained unresolved. This is in part because attempts to challenge the nation-state system in the immediate postcolonial era were unsuccessful, with the consequence that even the most outspoken Arab nationalist political parties, such as the Ba'ath Parties of Syria and Iraq, shifted their focus to territorial nationalism by the 1970s, bringing their ideologies more in line with the Arabism of the Arab League than with the Arab nationalism of their founders.

The first test for the League was the 1948 war against Israel, a test that revealed the limits of Arabist 'cooperation'. Although the Arab League dispatched a four-thousand-strong 'Arab Liberation

Army' to Palestine in early 1948, it was ineffectual, and the later manoeuvres of the member states in the war revealed deeply conflicting goals and an unwillingness to prioritize pan-Arab interests over national ones. Nonetheless, the ideals represented by the Arab League remained strong, and Egypt continued to be, at least for the time being, a leader in attempts to make these ideals a reality. The Free Officers coup of July 1952 brought regime change to Egypt for the first time since 1805 and repudiated once and for all its colonial relationship with Britain, a relationship that had been maintained by treaty since the country's nominal independence in 1936. The consolidation of power by Gamal Abdel Nasser in the wake of that coup was accompanied by extraordinarily popular anti-colonial policy-making, culminating in the Suez Crisis of 1956 in which Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal and managed to foil an attempt by Britain and France, in collusion with Israel, to re-establish European control over the strategic waterway. This success catapulted Nasser onto the world's stage and went hand in hand with his increasing adoption of Arab nationalist rhetoric. At the same time, political leaders and parties in neighbouring states were shaping their own Arab nationalist agendas, and the late 1950s saw several attempts to rethink state structures and territoriality to reflect Arabist and/or anti-colonial solidarities. The most famous of these and the one that came the closest to establishing an alternative Arab nationalist state in the region was the United Arab Republic (UAR), a merger between Egypt and Syria that lasted from 1958 to 1961.

This merger was originally requested by representatives of Syria's Arab nationalist Ba'ath Party, which was competing with the Communist Party and the military for ascendancy in newly independent Syria. Although Nasser was at first reluctant, the logic of his own Arab nationalist rhetoric as it had escalated by 1958 made it nearly impossible for him to decline this radical rethinking of the postcolonial state. Unfortunately, his reluctance appears to have been warranted, as the entire project was hastily formulated in a context of extreme political division in Syria and was more dependent on Nasser's charisma than on the development of institutional structures or partnerships across political constituencies. Nevertheless, it was initially greeted with breathless excitement, as well as a considerable amount of fear on the part of those invested in the status quo, such as the monarchies of Jordan, Saudi Arabia and, until its own revolution




73 Postage stamp issued in Egypt on the occasion of the declaration of the United Arab Republic on 1 February 1958.

in July 1958, Iraq.⁵ Celebratory postage stamps issued in Egypt soon after the official declaration of the UAR on 1 February 1958 depict Egypt and Syria as three-dimensional geo-bodies, raised above their geographical surroundings and connected by a rainbow-shaped bridge inscribed with the Arabic toponym for the UAR, *al-Jumhūriyya al-ʿArabiyya al-Mutaḥidda* (illus. 73). Both geo-bodies are labelled with toponyms, Egypt (*Miṣr*) and Syria (*Sūriyya*), and their borders as well as major topographical features (the Nile and the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt's case, the Euphrates in Syria's case) are immediately recognizable. This communicates the individuality of each 'region', as they were called (using the Arabic *iqlīm*, the same term used for the regions of the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition), within the united whole, as does the fact that they are clearly pictured as non-contiguous. However, the intervening land is left unmarked and one-dimensional, suggesting its insignificance as an obstacle to the union. In fact, Egypt and Syria seem to be on the verge of sliding toward each other, a kinetic quality that is facilitated by the flatness of their surroundings and the puzzle-piece-like appearance of the geo-bodies.

Other maps made over the nearly four years of the UAR's existence are not so triumphalist and suggest instead the complexity of this Arab nationalist project and tensions with other forms of nationalism. Although Syria and Egypt were often called the 'northern' and 'southern' region, respectively, of the UAR in public rhetoric, they appear on maps rather as the 'Syrian region' and the 'Egyptian region', a reminder of their distinct identities.⁶ A map published in Aleppo and designed by the cartographer Ibrahim Hilmi al-Ghuri has a title at the top that reads 'The Syrian Region of the UAR, with Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan' (illus. 74). Another title toward the bottom reads, 'Topographical image of the UAR', though in fact the main map depicts only the topography of Syria and its contiguous neighbours. The entire UAR is pictured without topographical detail in an inset map at the lower right in which both Syria and Egypt are shaded light green and each is inscribed with the Arabic toponym for the UAR as well as 'Syrian region' or 'Egyptian region'. Interestingly, the inset map also shades both Jordan and Iraq orange, which may have been a gesture to the short-lived 'Arab Federation' between the two Hashemite monarchies, announced in February 1958 as a rival to the UAR and brought to an abrupt end by the July revolution in

74 Map of 'The Syrian Region of the UAR, with Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan', designed by Ibrahim Hilmi al-Ghuri and published in Aleppo between 1958 and 1961.



Iraq. It also lacks borders around Lebanon, which may reflect the desires of many Syrian nationalists since the First World War for more proximate regional unity. In fact, the overall message of the map seems closer to a vision of 'Greater Syrian' nationalism than to the Arab nationalism of Nasser and the UAR.

Indeed, the area portrayed with topographical shading corresponds to the regional entity that has come to be known as 'Greater Syria', loosely equivalent to *al-Shām* of the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition (see illus. 62). The depiction of international borders, both to divide the area internally and to delineate its outer extent, and the choice of toponyms, especially Transjordan (literally, 'Eastern Jordan') rather than Jordan, are direct, if sometimes anachronistic, inheritances from the mandate system. Among the anachronisms is the fact that the province of Alexandretta, which is pictured here as part of Syria, had been ceded to Turkey in 1939.⁷ Moreover, the map does not recognize Israel at all, nor does it recognize Jordan's administration of the West Bank at the time of the map's production. Thus, al-Ghuri's map evokes a mid-century vision of the geographic extent and internal divisions of a 'greater' regional entity, incorporating both older aspirations and mandate-era transformations, just as it makes clear that one part of it is committed to another 'greater' entity, the UAR. The writing on the base of the map emphasizes this latter commitment by noting the population and area in square kilometres of both the Egyptian and Syrian regions of the UAR. It even boasts that Egypt's area constitutes one-thirtieth of the entire African continent, a nod to Egyptian pride in an otherwise Syria-focused map. The word 'Arab', however, appears nowhere except in the toponyms for the UAR, and it would be a stretch to say the map was communicating a clear Arab nationalist message. It is not surprising that the designer was able to issue a new edition titled 'The Syrian Arab Republic with Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan', with only minor changes, just after the demise of the UAR.⁸ These nearly identical maps show how little Arab nationalism had disrupted traditions of national mapping as they had evolved since the First World War. At the same time they show the persistence of regional thinking parallel to, and sometimes in tension with, traditions of national mapping.

The most popular mapping tradition to embrace regionalism in the post-Second World War period, however, can be described

as a cartographic expression of Arabism, or what has been called ‘supranationalism’, among the member states of the Arab League.⁹ A steady stream of stand-alone maps and atlases published from the late 1950s on has been devoted to an expansive entity called the ‘Arab Homeland’ (*al-waṭan al-‘arabī*), or, less often, the ‘Arab World’ (*al-‘ālam al-‘arabī*). The term ‘homeland’ (*waṭan*), in the singular, on these maps connotes a unitary national territory, as its derivative, *waṭaniyya*, was in wide use by this time to refer to territorial nationalism. However, by consistently depicting the contours of the Arab Homeland as determined by the borders of existing nation-states and frequently highlighting internal divisions, these maps belie the connotations of the singular *waṭan*. Instead, the main message is one of an overarching superregion that connects, but does not challenge the sovereignty of, its constituent nation-states. In most cases, these are the member states of the Arab League at the time of the map’s publication. However, it is notable that most Arab Homeland maps do not refer to the league at all. Rather, they purport to portray something different, an ideal of solidarity, cultural pride or, perhaps, Arab ethnolinguistic supremacy that may – but does not need to – be in accord with the political goals of an international organization. Nonetheless, it is an Arabism not dissimilar from that of the league, rather than a more transformative Arab nationalism, that is most clearly conveyed by this mapping tradition.

For instance, an early stand-alone map titled ‘The Arab Homeland’, published in Cairo in 1964, uses different colours for each of its constituent nation-states, equivalent to the membership of the Arab League at the time, though the organization is nowhere mentioned (illus. 72). These states are separated from those outside the Arab Homeland by a bold red line, which traces, as the legend indicates, the ‘borders of the Arab world’, as opposed to the dotted black lines that trace ‘political borders’. Of course, the bold red line is itself a political border, as it follows the contours of the nation-states at the frontiers. The publisher’s logo in the bottom left corner shows the Arab Homeland as its own geo-body, without internal divisions. Although such geo-bodies occur frequently on the covers of atlases or as logos for publishers in this tradition, the fundamental building block of the Arab Homeland remains the individual, sovereign nation-state, which is clearly communicated by the use of colour on this map.



75 Map of the Arab
Homeland designed and
published in Damascus in
the 1990s.

Arab Homeland maps tend to reinforce not only the integrity of the nation-state, but, selectively, the cause of the would-be nation-state. The most prominent would-be nation-state in 'The Arab Homeland' map of 1964 is Palestine. Pictured in an inset map in the top right corner, the bounded geo-body of the Palestine Mandate is divided between pink and green shading (the same geo-body is shaded purple in its entirety on the main map). Although Israel is not named anywhere on either map, the legend of the inset map describes the pink shaded area as the 'occupied region', whereas the green shaded areas are described as 'Arab regions'. Thus, the map claims the entire bounded territory as part of the Arab Homeland, but acknowledges that some part of it is currently 'occupied', while the rest of it is properly 'Arab'. The legend also refers to the two green-shaded areas as 'the Gaza region' and 'Western Jordan', but does not make clear that, at the time of the map's production, they were administered by Egypt and Jordan respectively. By downplaying others' claims, including that of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the land lying between the Green Line and the river Jordan, the map reflects the Arab League's official position at the time that Palestine should be its own sovereign state within the Mandate boundaries. This is strikingly consistent across Arab Homeland maps, which almost never recognize Israel and rarely even portray a divided Palestine, as this one does. Cartographically speaking, given its relatively central location, Palestine's seamless inclusion in the Arab Homeland was essential to the vision of a contiguous super-region. Moreover, as more and more states, especially in northern Africa, gained their independence and became official members of the Arab League, Palestine was left as the only remaining symbol of the anti-colonial struggle that had animated Arabist and Arab nationalist political energies since the Second World War. While Palestinians rarely benefited from these energies, the aspiration to a Palestinian nation-state was inseparable from the cause of Arab unity in the second half of the twentieth century.


This is clearly demonstrated by a bilingual map published in Damascus in the mid-1990s in which the title, 'The Arab Homeland', is flanked by two flags, one for Syria, the country in which the map was produced, and the other for Palestine, along with the motto: 'One Arab Nation with an Immortal Mission' (illus. 75). Membership in the Arab League clearly does not determine belonging in the Arab

Homeland on this map. Instead, it includes states and would-be states that did not have member or even observer status at the time, such as Eritrea, Western Sahara and an area called 'Arabistan' in western Iran.¹⁰ This assertive, expansionist vision of the Arab Homeland may reflect a general crisis of confidence in the Arab League, precipitated by Egypt and Jordan concluding peace treaties with Israel in 1981 and 1994 respectively, the Iran–Iraq war of 1980–88, and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. It certainly reflects the rhetoric of Syria's ruling Ba'ath Party, which had always been more radically Arab nationalist than the League.¹¹ This vision is reinforced by the writing at the top right, which announces in the first bullet point that 'the Arab Homeland occupies second place in the world in terms of area'. This ranks the Arab Homeland among other geographical entities in the world, though whether these are nation-states or supranational bodies like the European Union is left unsaid. If indeed the comparison is with nation-states, as it seems to be in the second bullet point on population figures, then it implicitly treats the Arab Homeland like a single state, an Arab nationalist position. At the same time, on the map and in the table on the bottom right the individual nation-state is depicted as the building block of the Arab Homeland, an affirmation of a basic Arabism in which collaboration and cooperation do not trump state sovereignty.

Oil furnished a material basis for Arabist cooperation as well as an ongoing incentive for well-endowed states to insist on the integrity of existing national boundaries. Since Arab Homeland maps, even in their more radical manifestations, never seriously challenged these boundaries, they were frequent vehicles for the celebration of oil as a sign of modernization and prosperity. A map titled 'The Arab Homeland' was published in 1974 as a supplement to the Kuwaiti monthly magazine *al-'Arabī* to celebrate its fifteenth anniversary (illus. 76). It portrays the Arab Homeland with yellow shading and dotted lines separating nation-states. Oilfields are designated by red shading, gas fields by hollow red circles and pipelines by double black lines. An inset map enlarges the 'Arab Gulf', which by that time was the conventional Arabic toponym for the Persian Gulf, to show its ample oil supply. Two tables at the bottom document the world's dependency on oil exports from Arab countries, with a particular focus on the United States. The map was issued after the Organization

of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) initiated an oil embargo against the U.S. to protest its support for Israel in the war of October 1973. The crisis that this blockade caused in the U.S., and the ensuing global spike in oil prices, demonstrated the political and economic power of Arabist cooperation. This map testifies to pride in that power, but also, perhaps unintentionally, illustrates its unequal distribution, with the states of the Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, producing almost two-thirds of total OAPEC exports. This disparity has led to episodes of intra-Arab conflict over the past half-century, not the least of which was Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 sparked in part by a dispute over an oilfield lying beneath the border of the two states. That the Arab Homeland mapping tradition – and indeed international Arabist organizations like the Arab League and OAPEC – survived such periods of conflict is testimony to their ability to convey a message of solidarity that does not threaten the entitlement of each state to the natural resources located within its boundaries.

The atlas format was able to convey this message even more clearly than stand-alone maps. Atlases published in Arabic from the late 1950s on tend to juxtapose an Arab Homeland map or maps with a sequence of pages devoted to each of its constituent nation-states before shifting to, in many cases, a continental organization. This format proposes the Arab Homeland as the most important superregional affiliation for those states, but also allows them to stand, cartographically, on their own, as well as in the context of other superregions. Palestinian geographer and educator Sa'id al-Sabbagh (1899–1967) was one of the pioneers in publishing such atlases. Successive editions in both his General Atlas and General Arab Atlas series open with world and Arab Homeland maps, move through topographical and thematic maps for each of its nation-states, and conclude with continental and sub-continental maps. Al-Sabbagh saw himself as providing an indigenous alternative to the European atlases that had dominated geographical education in Arab countries in the first half of the twentieth century. He explains his decision to focus on the Arab Homeland, 'which comprises all parts of the world that speak Arabic', as a way of 'acquainting Arab students and citizens with the borders of their greater homeland so that they feel strength and dignity'.¹²



77 Map of the Arab Homeland
with inset of 'The Islamic
World' in Sa'id al-Sabbagh,
al-Atlas al-'arabī al-'āmm
(General Arab Atlas)
(Beirut and Milan, 1968).

The two-page map titled 'The Arab Homeland' (illus. 77) comes from the first edition of al-Sabbagh's *al-Atlas al-'arabī al-'āmm* (General Arab Atlas), published in 1968, and includes an inset map of 'The Islamic World' on the bottom left. The subtitle of the main map explains that 'Arab countries' are coloured, while 'non-Arab countries' are left colourless, just as the legend of the inset map explains that green indicates 'Arab zones', while orange and yellow indicate 'non-Arab zones', of the Islamic world. The use of different colours for the different nation-states of the Arab Homeland reinforces their individual identities, just as the inset Islamic world map suggests an even broader superregion within which the Arab Homeland is itself a distinctive region. Consistent with other maps in the tradition, Israel is not recognized as interrupting the contiguity of either the Arab Homeland or the Islamic world, though in this case Palestine is portrayed as part of a larger geo-body that includes the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The atlas concludes with a set of continental and subcontinental maps starting with Africa and Asia, including one map entitled 'Western Asia or the Middle East'. This reflects both the strong Afro-Asian orientation of the Arab Homeland and an acknowledgement of other internationally conventional ways of dividing the world.

Other atlases published in Arabic in this period, both those explicitly styled world atlases and those devoted to a single nation-state, also reveal an emphasis on the Arab Homeland. A world atlas titled *al-Atlas al-jadīd li-l-'ālam* (New Atlas of the World) published in Beirut in 1983 begins with a series of eleven thematic Arab Homeland maps, all of which include the political borders of nation-states as internal divisions.¹³ It then moves to individual maps of each of those nation-states before reverting to a continental organization for the rest of the world, starting with Asia. A Libyan national atlas titled *Atlas al-Jamāhiriyya al-'Arabiyya al-Lībiyya al-Sha'biyya al-Ishtirākiyya* (Atlas of the Libyan Arab People's Socialist Jamahiriya), published in Beirut in 1987, begins with five maps situating Libya in broader geographical contexts: two of them are the Arab Homeland, one is North Africa, one is the Islamic world, and one is the world in its entirety.¹⁴ This is followed by a map of the Mediterranean region, a chart of the flags of 'Arab states', and another Arab Homeland map showing economic activities and resources. Finally, the atlas arrives

at Libya itself, pictured in a series of nine thematic maps, before moving to single maps for each of the other Arab states, starting with those located in Africa, followed by those in Asia, and then concluding with two maps of the continent of Africa. The contents and sequencing suggest that while the Arab Homeland is Libya's primary superregional affiliation, it does not rule out other affiliations – in this case, most prominently with Africa – nor does it interfere with Libya's individual identity as a bounded national territory.

Some atlases reveal other geographical orientations, or make tensions with neighbours explicit. Atlases published in Saudi Arabia often place the Saudi nation-state within the context of the Islamic world and emphasize its status as a destination for international Muslim pilgrimage.¹⁵ Kuwaiti national atlases published since the Iraqi invasion of 1990 stress Kuwait's long-standing existence as an independent political and territorial entity, sometimes at the expense of any mention of the Arab Homeland.¹⁶ Atlases of Palestine focus on the territory within the boundaries of the Palestine Mandate to highlight Israel's dispossession and displacement of Palestinians since 1948.¹⁷ There have even been Arabic atlases devoted to the Middle East, such as *Atlas al-Sharq al-Awsaṭ* (Atlas of the Middle East), published in Cairo in 1958.¹⁸ In the preface to this atlas, the authors describe the Middle East as a place of ancient eminence that has attracted the world's attention because of its oil reserves and strategic location.¹⁹ The authors acknowledge some difficulty in defining it geographically, but they decide that it stretches from Libya in the west to Iran in the east, and from Turkey in the north to the Arabian Peninsula in the south. This discussion suggests that while the land itself might have long-standing importance, the Middle East as a world regional concept was new and, to a certain extent, inchoate, taking shape under the gaze of foreigners. Alongside its thematic maps of the Middle East, the atlas also includes maps of the 'Arab World' and the Arab League and concludes with a set of national maps of Egypt. Despite the authors' presentiments, the idea of the Middle East did not go on to inspire an Arabic mapping tradition, though individual maps of the Middle East/West Asia appear occasionally in the continental section of world atlases. By contrast, it is rare for world and national atlases published in Arabic since the 1960s not to include at least one Arab Homeland map, and many of

78 Graphic celebrating the protest movements of the Arab Spring, published online by al-Jazeera in 2011.



them unambiguously present it as the most important superregional affiliation for their audience.²⁰

In fact, the Arab Homeland has become such a popular subject in Arabic cartography that its relationship with the Arab League or with the Arab nationalist and anti-colonial discourses of the 1950s and '60s is no longer explicit or, perhaps, even meaningful. While some maps include areas that are outside the Arab League, most simply do not mention the organization or depict any symbols associated with Arab nationalism at all. The most that can be said is that, in reinforcing the nation-state status quo, maps of the Arab Homeland are compatible with, but not reducible to, the Arabist rhetoric of the Arab League. As such, they are part of the process of cartographic naturalization that leads, in the tradition of national mapping, to logo-maps, which may be reproduced and received in unpredictable and changing ways. Nonetheless, in resting on a mostly undefined notion of Arabness as the basis for belonging in the 'homeland', they uphold the norm of equating territory with identity. Thus, they are susceptible to becoming shorthand for assumptions about what makes the Arab Homeland 'Arab', assumptions that, at best, obscure the ethnolinguistic diversity of the superregion and, at worst, actively exclude certain groups, such as Berbers and Kurds, among others, from belonging.

Despite this potentially exclusionary dynamic, the Arab Homeland was given new cartographic life in maps of the ‘Arab Spring’, a series of popular uprisings against autocratic rule that began in the winter of 2010–11 and moved hopefully into the spring of 2011. In the excitement of early victories, against the Ben Ali regime in Tunisia and the Mubarak regime in Egypt in January and February 2011 respectively, it was attractive to invoke some kind of seamless pan-Arab arena within which such positive change would spread. It also seemed appropriate, since protesters in multiple countries adopted similar slogans and strategies of mobilization made possible by the wide circulation of various forms of ‘new media’ in the Arabic language.²¹ Maps made in response to the early events of the Arab Spring tended not to be labelled ‘The Arab Homeland’, but were otherwise, in their contours, indistinguishable from decades of such maps. Examples were published online by the Qatar-based news agency al-Jazeera in summer 2011 (illus. 78) and crafted by Beirut’s Bokja Design, first exhibited in Kuwait’s Sultan Gallery in autumn 2011 (illus. 79). The al-Jazeera piece is a logo-map without internal borders superimposed on a background of protesters, emphasizing the mass mobilization of the period and the energy of the people demanding change. The Bokja Design piece constructs the same geobody through patchwork fabrics, so that the individual nation-states



79 Bokja Design, *Arab Spring*, 2011, installation at Sultan Gallery, Kuwait City.

are distinguished from each other, and sets them all against the background of an antique rug. The designers explain that the rug represents ‘the core values of the Arab culture that should be the bases of any new beginning’.²² Even without this commentary, and independent of any associations with the textiles involved, this piece, like the al-Jazeera logo-map, depends for its intelligibility on the naturalization of the geo-body of the Arab Homeland.

Significantly, maps like these circulated broadly on the Internet in 2011 and were intended for multilingual audiences. This may represent the first time another superregional idea has vied with the Middle East in European-language media in many decades. Some have hailed this as a much-needed recognition of indigenous or anti-colonial geographies.²³ However, it is difficult to ignore the way these maps can be seen as reproducing colonial and nationalist discourses about the proper relationship between populations, states and territory and, in specific terms, as excluding those movements in neighbouring countries, such as Turkey, Greece or Iran – as well as those protesters who do not identify as Arab – from consideration as part of the revolutionary moment.²⁴ As Hamid Dabashi warns, ‘The imaginative geography we call “the Arab World” will either reconfigure its worldliness as an emancipatory proposition or else collapse upon its own post-colonial paradoxes’.²⁵ Perhaps to the extent that logo-maps become symbols untethered from the ideological and territorial claims they might otherwise convey, Arab Spring maps may serve as a reminder that other ways of seeing the world, expressing belonging in spatial terms and seeking justice and dignity, are possible. Especially at a time when trends in the Anglo-American media call for further rounds of partition, these maps bring not only a different spirit but a different scale to the imaginative geographies that shape our world.

MAPPING THE COLONIAL PRESENT

One of the ways in which the colonial present most resembles the colonial past is in its obsession with partition. This is why superregional thinking has the potential to challenge or at least interrupt the ever-devolving cartographic logics of the last two centuries. Even such a problematic example as the ‘Middle East’,

which emerged from asymmetrical colonial power relations and presupposes a Western European or North American perspective, could be seen as emphasizing possibilities for connectivity within a space of significant breadth and diversity. Unfortunately, accompanying discourses continue to associate it with negative stereotypes and generalizations about Islam, Arabs, terrorism, deserts or oil; they stress the essential difference of a monolithic Middle East, cast as the polar opposite of the 'West', which in turn becomes shorthand for universal civilization and modernity. Nonetheless, geographically speaking – and despite the fact that there is no consensus on its parameters – the idea of the Middle East, along with related ideas increasingly expressed in terms of continental composites, such as Southwest Asia and North Africa (SWANA), enjoys substantial overlap with the other superregional ideas examined in this book.

In fact, the very fuzziness of its parameters endows it with a certain flexibility that resonates with earlier mapping traditions. For instance, the 'Realm of Islam' was conceived as stretching from the Atlantic Ocean in the west well into Central and South Asia in the east, though in maps its internal borders were porous and external frontiers open-ended. The Ottoman Empire united Anatolia with lands from Algeria through to Iraq, as well as much of Eastern Europe, though mapping traditions from the period stressed mobility and relationality, as well as the meaningfulness of regions that were not defined by political sovereignty. Finally, the Arab Homeland, in some ways the most rigid cartographic manifestation of superregional thinking in this book, spans what might be described as Southwest Asia and North Africa minus Turkey and Iran. If these mapping traditions were superimposed on a modern world map, they would cover all the variations on the Middle East that have been proposed over the last fifty years.²⁶ This is not to cast the concept of the Middle East as somehow more authentic than has previously been thought or to rehabilitate it. It is rather to suggest the creative, connective potential of thinking that is both deeply historical and broadly superregional.


Thus, while keeping in mind the dominance of discourses that generalize and essentialize the Middle East, my concern in this concluding section is with the persistence of subdivision, partition and enclosure in the colonial present. The last decade has seen a new proliferation of plans for 'redrawing the map' of the Middle East

or of an individual country, such as Iraq, Libya or Syria, to produce religiously or ethnically homogeneous states, statelets or zones.²⁷ The presumption behind such plans is that diverse populations are inherently destabilizing – or rather they are inherently destabilizing *in the Middle East* (as opposed to, for instance, Europe or North America). For the most part, the implication is that Middle Easterners are so consumed by ‘ancient hatreds’ revolving around tribe, sect and ethnicity that the only way to achieve peace is to separate them along those lines.²⁸ Sometimes the blame is directed at the ‘artificial’ colonial borders drawn during the mandate period, which exacerbated problems between identity groups and deprived some of them of states of their own. While it is true that the mandate system was problematic, it is not because it failed to produce racially, ethnolinguistically or religiously majoritarian states, but because it tried to do so in the first place while also privileging certain identities at the expense of others as a way of ensuring continued European control of land and resources. Similarly, new plans for partition facilitate the pursuit of particular interests without acknowledging the ways in which the pursuit of those interests has been inseparable from the conflicts that, in turn, seem to justify partition.


A prime example comes from the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, ostensibly to topple the dictatorial regime of Saddam Hussein, promote democracy in the country and rid it of an alleged cache of weapons of mass destruction, which were never found. One of the first things the occupying forces did after establishing themselves in the capital city of Baghdad was to impose a mass ‘de-Ba’athification’ policy, which was a ham-fisted way of removing Saddam Hussein’s supporters from government and military positions. This policy was widely understood as collective punishment aimed at those whose ethnosectarian identity, Sunni Arab, had been privileged by the state, and it had the effect of ensuring that a large swath of the Iraqi population was, or felt, excluded from future political participation. Next, U.S. representatives handpicked an interim Iraqi Governing Council to reflect their perception of the sectarian and ethnolinguistic composition of the country. The resulting Council membership comprised thirteen Shi’ites, five Sunni Arabs, five Kurds, one Turkmen and one Christian. This further alienated those counted as Sunni Arabs, who were concerned that they would be permanently

marginalized in Iraq's political future, just as it empowered some of the more sectarian Shi'ite political parties who enjoyed greater access to the occupying forces. Finally, in a seeming volte-face in 2005, the U.S. started funding Sunni Arab militias – the so-called 'Sunni Awakening' – to act as proxies in stabilizing a country roiled by violence, which took the form of both armed resistance to the occupation and, increasingly, civil war. Whether through design or blunder, these policies hardened religious identities and compounded the damage done by Saddam Hussein, who, despite nationalist rhetoric stressing Iraqi unity, had repressed segments of the population on the basis of sectarian or ethnolinguistic identity.²⁹ It is no surprise that partition plans for Iraq and for the region more broadly, which have been circulating among American pundits, policy-makers and scholars since 2006, have featured separate states for Sunnis and Shi'ites.³⁰ By viewing the Middle East through a sectarian lens, whether out of opportunism or ignorance, the U.S. applies policies that presuppose sectarianism in its interventions in the region. Those policies then either create sectarianism where it does not exist, or they exacerbate it.

By ignoring the way in which American and European optics and policies have contributed to religious conflict and focusing instead on the dysfunction of 'others', we deploy what Derek Gregory, following Edward Said, calls an imaginative geography, a 'construction that folds distance into difference through a series of spatializations'.³¹ Media maps that highlight sectarianism are one such spatialization. Even when they purport simply to locate identities in space, maps produce those identities as permanent features of the landscape and reproduce imaginative geographies that mark some places as *other* and in need of a different kind of management. For instance, maps circulating in the first year after the 2011 Syrian uprising against the regime of Bashar al-Assad, a dictator who governs, as had Saddam Hussein in neighbouring Iraq, in the name of the Arab nationalist Ba'ath Party, frequently superimposed symbols for resistance and violence on base maps showing the distribution of religious groups in the country.³² The map published online by *The Guardian* on 2 March 2012 uses hollow red circles to mark 'reported protests' on a base map shaded to indicate Sunni, Alawite, Christian, Druze and Yezidi populations (illus. 80). The resulting spatial pattern suggests that protests mainly occurred along the seams between religious



80 Map from 'Syria Crisis: The Violence Mapped by the UN', published online by *The Guardian* on 2 March 2012.



81 Map from 'The Long Road to Damascus', from the 11 February 2012 issue of *The Economist*.

groups. The map does not state that religious identity had anything to do with why people were protesting, but the choice of base map makes it look as though it did. In other words, correlation on this map appears to be causation. For anyone who knows Syrian geography, it might seem obvious that the protests were occurring in areas of high population-density. However, it is significant that a population density base map was not chosen. Instead, the people of Syria are represented here primarily as representatives of religious groups.

Similarly, maps of the Syrian city of Homs, one of the major sites of clashes between government forces and opposition groups in the same period,

tended to highlight the location of 'Alawite' neighbourhoods. A map from the 11 February 2012 issue of *The Economist* uses green shading for 'predominantly Alawite districts', which appear insulated from protests and attacks (illus. 81). No other neighbourhoods of the city are identified in terms of their population. The implication here is not only that Alawites live in enclaves apart from other Syrians (also suggested by illus. 80), but that they were not protesting against the government, presumably because the Assad family shares their Alawite affiliation, and were thus being spared any violence. It is true that the Assad regime, like that of Saddam Hussein, played religious and ethno-linguistic identities against each other and privileged those from the same background as the ruler. At best, however, maps like these draw attention to one motivation for protest, or cause for persecution, to the occlusion of others. Alawites have participated in protests against the government, and they have been targeted for violence by various groups for reasons that may or may not have anything to do with their sectarian affiliation.³³ At worst, such maps produce or perpetuate the very dynamic they purport to describe by promoting an oversimplified narrative with seemingly straightforward spatial dimensions that can be used to justify partition.

This is a narrative that drives the so-called Islamic State (I.S.). A rigidly sectarian and violent Sunni organization, I.S. emerged from the rubble of the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq, tapping into the despair and disenfranchisement it caused, especially in the

predominantly rural areas in the centre of the country.³⁴ One of I.S.'s rhetorical strategies to attract volunteers for its military campaigns has been to adopt historically resonant geographical language with anti-colonial and millenarian overtones.³⁵ In April 2013, after it had initiated a branch of operations in Syria, the leadership of I.S. announced a formal name change from the 'Islamic State in Iraq' to the 'Islamic State in Iraq and Syria' (*al-Dawla al-Islāmiyya fī l-'Irāq wa-l-Shām*). By joining toponyms for two of the regions from the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition, which involved replacing the Greek-derived *Sūriyya* with the Arabic *al-Shām*, it asserted an indigenous pedigree for the territorial units as well as their historical connectivity, reunited at long last under the banner of the Islamic State. The selectivity of this use of language is clear in the fact that its Iraqi base in and around Mosul and the main east–west corridors it controlled at the time actually comprise a different historical region, also mapped in the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition: al-Jazira, or 'the island' of land lying between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers in what is today northern Iraq, south-eastern Turkey and northeastern Syria. Since this region is less well known internationally and has already been associated with rival Kurdish national mapping traditions, it would not have possessed the same immediate rhetorical appeal to I.S. as the idea of a merger between Iraq and Syria.

In another gesture to cartographic history, I.S. staged a performance in June 2014 entitled 'Smashing the Sykes-Picot Borders', which featured a bulldozer filmed demolishing a barrier on the Iraq–Syria border. This invocation of Sykes-Picot allowed I.S. to cast itself as an anti-colonial hero putting an end once and for all to its legacy of partition. However, it is clear that I.S. simply wants to replace one partition regime with another. According to 'The Principles for the Administration of the Islamic State', issued in the second half of 2014, 'the basis of the western Sykes-Picot Agreement was the deprivation of Sunnis from the wealth [of the land]'. It goes on to state that the mountains were given to the Kurds, the sea to the Shi'ites and Alawites, and the river and surrounding agricultural areas to the Jews, a statement that does not make sense as a literal reference to Sykes-Picot.³⁶ However, if Sykes-Picot is taken as a symbol for colonialism in general, this statement functions as a general indictment of the post-First World War enclosures that privileged certain identity groups at the

expense of others. Despite this rhetoric, I.S. has not rejected the premise of partition at all; it is simply repackaged to justify a vision of a homogeneous Sunni Muslim state with inviolable boundaries that enclose as much resource-rich territory as possible.³⁷

The thinking behind some of the partition plans circulating in the American media has been in fact to pre-empt I.S. by making this vision a reality on U.S. terms. In a November 2015 op-ed for the *New York Times*, diplomat and former U.S. Ambassador to the UN John Bolton argues: 'The best alternative to the Islamic State in northeastern Syria and western Iraq is a new, independent Sunni state'. This 'Sunni-stan', he goes on to say, would have access to oil, but would initially be funded by Saudi Arabia and the 'Arab monarchies'. The way forward is to do what the U.S. did in 2005 in Iraq, 'empower viable Sunni leaders, including tribal authorities who prize their existing social structures'.³⁸ Here, Bolton is endorsing the exact same vision as I.S. He simply wants his version of 'Sunni-stan' to be beholden to the U.S. and its allies, the Arab monarchies. This is a direct throwback to British policy during the First World War, which promised an 'independent Arab state' to the family of Sharif Husayn in return for their support for the Allied war effort. Substitute 'Arab' for 'Sunni', and it is 1916 all over again.

What is all the more disturbing about this is the fact that very few opponents of Assad in Syria have been seeking partition.³⁹ A version of federalism was endorsed in March 2016 by Syria's Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD). This announcement followed Turkey's refusal to allow the PYD a seat at peace talks because of its close ties to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a Kurdish-Turkish political party that has been in armed conflict with the Turkish government for decades. While the Syrian conflict has opened up new territorial possibilities for Kurdish nationalists, they are far from united, and the priorities of Kurdish parties in Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria are still very much shaped by their nation-state context.⁴⁰ Indeed, just months before the PYD's federalism announcement, it had spearheaded the formation of a coalition called the Syrian Democratic Forces, which included non-Kurdish groups and has been able, with the help of Russian and American air strikes, to make inroads into I.S.-controlled areas.⁴¹ During these efforts, the coalition flew a flag that features the national geo-body of Syria above 'Syrian Democratic Forces' written in Arabic, Turkish and Kurdish (illus. 82).



82 Syrian Democratic Forces flag.

Apart from its clear anti-partition message, one feature of the geo-body is worth mentioning – its inclusion of the district of Alexandretta, known in Turkey as Hatay, in the northwest corner of the country. This district was ceded to Turkey by the French Syria Mandate authorities in 1939 in order to gain Turkish support on the eve of the Second World War, but the transfer was cloaked in the language of ethnolinguistic nationalism, restoring a ‘Turkish’ province to its motherland.⁴² The application of this model of nationalism has been inseparable from processes of forced assimilation, exclusion or displacement, which have certainly not been limited to Turkey. The appearance of this Syrian geo-body on a trilingual flag could be interpreted as a bid for territorial nationalism based on bonds of co-residence rather than ethnicity or religion. Whatever the future of the Syrian Democratic Forces, it is worth remembering that other ways of imagining land and belonging, even those that preserve existing nation-state borders, are possible.

ONE OF THE MAIN PURPOSES of this book has been to offer a deep history of mapping in one part of the world as a corrective to assumptions that the national model of bounded territories enclosing racially, ethnolinguistically or religiously majoritarian populations is either primordial or ideal. The analysis of maps in the preceding chapters does not bear out any such assumptions. At the same time, it shows that people did imagine land in relation to belonging before nationalism – and they imagined it at regional and superregional scales and in ways that evoked connectivity across vast distances. This is not to say that old maps are necessarily better maps, but they are different, sometimes radically different, and thus may suggest possibilities that have been foreclosed in more recent thought. Also, the fact that old maps often fall short of modern standards of scientific accuracy – that they had, rather, other priorities, including aesthetics – may be an asset in the attempt to enlarge our geographical imaginations. Indeed, artists like Mona Hatoum are among today's most powerful alternative voices, and their subversion of the scientific authority of maps and related cartographic ideals is a welcome provocation.⁴³ Finally, scale matters. Conceiving of broader, rather than narrower, geographies opens up possibilities that partition and subdivision do not. Whether this is about supranationalism as an alternative to nationalism or rethinking world regions, it is an exercise in expanding the imagination and questioning the divisions that have been so effectively naturalized over the last two centuries. In cartographic terms, this might include visualizing non-contiguous spaces or centring what have been thought of as 'natural' peripheries: seas, deserts, mountains.⁴⁴

If nothing else, however, this book pays homage to the long history of mapping in the Middle East. The mapping traditions analysed in the first two chapters were meaningful to diverse people in far-flung lands from the eleventh century on. Their meanings often depended on the activation of some aspect of a viewer's identity, but without reifying or enclosing it. This allowed for continued investment in, and creative adaptation of, mapping traditions well beyond the circumstances of their original design. Some such traditions persist to this day: notably, hajj paintings on the walls of homes of people recently returned from Mecca and other visual media that enable 'virtual' pilgrimage.⁴⁵ Others, however, have given way to new

mapping traditions that produce territory as a container for identity, a shift that occurred alongside – and that served – the rise of European and North American global dominance. This has resulted in a zero-sum game in which belonging for one group depends on the displacement, repression or minoritization of another. It has reached the point that even the utterance of a toponym conjures the exclusions and erasures that have been made in its name. My use of the term ‘Middle East’, for instance, may have a certain recognition value but it has trafficked in ideas that undercut the very arguments I am trying to make. It is important, therefore, to experiment with new language and methods, and many have praised the unprecedented possibilities presented by digital mapping technologies. But terms and technology alone cannot change entrenched habits of cartographic thought. I hope that in exploring the varied ways people mapped their worlds over the past millennium this book contributes to broader efforts to break habits, stimulate imaginations and map a better future.

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INTRODUCTION: ON THE 'MIDDLE EAST' AND MAPPING

- 1 The critical literature on the idea of the Middle East is extensive. See in particular Karen Culcasi, 'Constructing and Naturalizing the Middle East', *Geographical Review*, c/4 (2010), pp. 583–97; Rashid Khalidi, 'The "Middle East" as a Framework of Analysis: Re-mapping a Region in the Era of Globalization', *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, xviii/1 (1998), pp. 74–81; and the essays in Michael E. Bonine, Abbas Amanat and Michael Ezekiel Gasper, eds, *Is There a Middle East? The Evolution of a Geopolitical Concept* (Stanford, CA, 2012). On the history of discourses related to the Middle East, particularly in the U.S., and the emergence of Middle East Studies, see Zachary Lockman, *Contending Visions of the Middle East: The History and Politics of Orientalism*, 2nd edn (Cambridge, 2009); and Lockman, *Field Notes: The Making of Middle East Studies in the United States* (Stanford, CA, 2016). On media images of the Middle East, with an emphasis on the U.S., see Melani McAlister, *Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East since 1945*, 2nd edn (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, 2005); and Jack G. Shaheen, *Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies a People*, 2nd edn (Northampton, MA, 2009).
- 2 These ideas owe much to Martin W. Lewis and Kären E. Wigen, *The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, 1997). In this book, however, I use 'superregion' interchangeably with 'world region' to suggest spatial thought at a scale that transcends or subsumes, but does not dissolve, distinct regional entities. Lewis and Wigen distinguish the two based on the former's association with historical geography and the latter's greater applicability to all parts of the modern world (see especially chap. 5, pp. 146–50, and chap. 6).
- 3 J. B. Harley and David Woodward are often considered pioneers in this field. They launched and co-edited the first three instalments of the massive (and still unfinished) *History of Cartography* project, in which they proposed a more capacious definition of maps as 'graphic representations that facilitate a spatial understanding of things, concepts, conditions, processes, or events in the human world'; see J. B. Harley and David Woodward, eds, *The History of Cartography: Cartography in Prehistoric, Ancient, and Medieval Europe*

and the Mediterranean (Chicago, IL, 1987), vol. 1, p. xvi. J. B. Harley's many publications are good starting points for further reading in critical cartography; see J. B. Harley, *The New Nature of Maps: Essays in the History of Cartography* (Baltimore, MD, 2001). For other foundational statements of the field, see Denis Wood, *The Power of Maps* (New York, 1992); Matthew H. Edney, 'Cartography without "Progress": Reinterpreting the Nature and Historical Development of Mapmaking', *Cartographica*, xxx/2–3 (1993), pp. 54–68; Matthew H. Edney, 'The Origins and Development of J. B. Harley's Cartographic Theories', *Cartographica*, xl/1–2 (2005), monograph 54; Christian Jacob, *The Sovereign Map: Theoretical Approaches in Cartography Throughout History*, trans. T. Conley (Chicago, IL, 2006); and Jeremy W. Crampton and John Krygier, 'An Introduction to Critical Cartography', *ACME: An International E-journal for Critical Geographies*, iv/1 (2006), pp. 11–33.

- 4 Mark Monmonier has published extensively on the consequences of selectivity in map design and content; see in particular Mark Monmonier, *How to Lie with Maps*, 2nd edn (Chicago, IL, 1996). The u.s. election map example was popularized by Mark Newman at the University of Michigan; see M.E.J. Newman, 'Maps of the 2016 u.s. Presidential Election Results', www-personal.umich.edu, accessed 1 January 2017.
- 5 See in particular the introductions to and essays in the following: Denis Cosgrove, ed., *Mappings* (London, 1999); and Martin Dodge, Rob Kitchin and Chris Perkins, eds, *Rethinking Maps: New Frontiers in Cartographic Theory* (New York, 2009). See also John Pickles, *A History of Spaces: Cartographic Reason, Mapping and the Geo-coded World* (New York, 2004).
- 6 This has been a preoccupation of historians of science, most notably Fuat Sezgin; among his numerous publications, see in particular Fuat Sezgin, *Mathematical Geography and Cartography in Islam and Their Continuation in the Occident*, 3 vols, trans. G. Moore and G. Sammon (Frankfurt, 2000–2007).

1 MAPPING THE 'REALM OF ISLAM'

- 1 On these and other challenges in the field, see Ahmet T. Karamustafa, 'Introduction to Islamic Maps', in *The History of Cartography*, vol. 11, book 1: *Cartography in the Traditional Islamic and South Asian Societies*, ed. J. B. Harley and D. Woodward (Chicago, IL, 1992), pp. 3–11.
- 2 This is the approach adopted by Karen C. Pinto in *Medieval Islamic Maps: An Exploration* (Chicago, IL, 2016).
- 3 For relevant examples of different methods, see the introduction to Yossef Rapoport and Emilie Savage-Smith, *An Eleventh-century Egyptian Guide to the Universe: The 'Book of Curiosities'* (Leiden, 2014); and Andreas Kaplony, 'Comparing al-Kāshgharī's Map to His Text: On the Visual Language, Purpose, and Transmission of Arabic-Islamic Maps', in *The Journey of Maps and Images on the Silk Road*, ed. P. Forêt and A. Kaplony (Leiden, 2008), pp. 137–53.
- 4 This is a necessarily rough periodization, and the 1500 cut-off is not meant to be taken rigidly. It is merely a convenient demarcation between the mapping traditions examined in this chapter and the sixteenth-century innovations examined in the next. For an overview of the variety of maps

- produced throughout the premodern Islamic world, see Sonja Brentjes, 'Cartography', in *Encyclopaedia of Islam Three*, vol. 2016–4, ed. Kate Fleet et al. (Leiden, 2016), pp. 15–29.
- 5 I take 'Atlas of Islam' from Konrad Miller, ed., *Mappae Arabicae*, 6 vols (Stuttgart, 1926–31), which is the largest collection of published images of maps from manuscripts to date. For a list of manuscripts from the tradition, see Gerald R. Tibbetts, 'The Balkhī School of Geographers', in *The History of Cartography*, vol. II, book 1, ed. Harley and Woodward, pp. 130–36. This list contains some errors and overlooks a number of manuscripts. For updated information and recent manuscript discoveries, see Jean-Charles Ducène, 'Un nouveau manuscrit du *Ṣuwar al-aqālīm* d'al-Iṣṭaḥrī: Le ms 'Aref Ḥakamt Ġuḡrāfiya 910/7 (Médecine, Maktabat 'Abd al-'Azīz)', *Folia Orientalia*, XL (2004), pp. 279–311; Jean-Charles Ducène, 'Une nouvelle description de Ṣuḥār ('Umān) extraite d'un manuscrit inexploité du *Kitāb ṣuwar al-aqālīm* d'al-Iṣṭaḥrī', *Arabica*, L/1 (2003), pp. 109–13; and Pinto, *Medieval Islamic Maps*.
 - 6 Manuscripts of al-Muqaddasī's text do not include world or maritime maps. They also order the terrestrial regions differently, add a map of the Arabian desert and drop the map of Sijistan.
 - 7 The importance of the maps is reflected in the frequent use of terms like 'images' or 'shapes' in the titles of the manuscripts over the centuries. Examples include *Kitāb ṣuwar al-aqālīm* (Book of Images of the Regions) and *Kitāb ashkāl al-bilād* (Book of the Shapes of the Countries). On the question of titles, see Jean-Charles Ducène, 'Quel est le titre véritable de l'ouvrage géographique d'al-Iṣṭaḥrī?', *Acta Orientalia Belgica*, XIX (2006), pp. 99–108.
 - 8 For example, see al-Muqaddasī, *The Best Divisions for Knowledge of the Regions*, trans. B. Collins (Reading, 2001), p. 8. For more on the interplay between maps and written text in these works, see Zayde Antrim, *Routes and Realms: The Power of Place in the Early Islamic World* (New York, 2012), pp. 108–42.
 - 9 See Istanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III 3346, fols 3b–4a (illus. 4); Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Ms. Ouseley 373, fols 3b–4a (illus. 5); and Istanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III 2830, fol. 4a (illus. 6).
 - 10 On the 'Encircling Ocean', see Pinto, *Medieval Islamic Maps*, pp. 79–186.
 - 11 One notable exception is the West-oriented world map in a fifteenth-century Persian translation of al-Istakhri's work: Istanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Bağdat 334. For a reproduction and analysis, see Karen Pinto, "'Searchin' His Eyes, Lookin' for Traces": Piri Reis' World Map of 1513 and Its Islamic Iconographic Connections (A Reading through Bağdat 334 and Proust)', *Journal of Ottoman Studies*, xxxix (2012), p. 86. On the question of a centre, see Arnoud Vrolijk, 'Appearances Belie: A Mecca-centered World Map and a Snouck Hurgronje Photograph from the Leiden University Collections', in *Hajj: Global Interactions through Pilgrimage*, ed. L. Mols and M. Buitelaar (Leiden, 2015), pp. 213–27.
 - 12 For analyses of such toponyms, see Karen Pinto, 'Capturing Imagination: The Buja and Medieval Islamic Mappa Mundi', in *Views from the Edge: Essays in Honor of Richard W. Bulliet*, ed. N. Yavari, L. G. Potter and J.-M.R. Oppenheim (New York, 2004), pp. 154–83; and Koray Durak, 'Who Are the Romans? The Definition of *Bilād al-Rūm* (Land of the Romans) in Medieval

- Islamic Geographies', *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, xxxvii/3 (2010), pp. 285–98.
- 13 For an analysis of a set of fifteenth-century manuscripts from this tradition that shows the way the world maps could be subtly adapted to emphasize the claims of the Ottoman Sultan Mehmet II, see Karen Pinto, 'The Maps Are the Message: Mehmet II's Patronage of an "Ottoman Cluster"', *Imago Mundi*, lXIII/2 (2011), pp. 155–79.
 - 14 It is common to see world maps that resemble the 'Atlas of Islam' model in manuscript copies of popular medieval works of cosmography, such as the Arabic '*Ajā'ib al-makhlūqāt* (Wonders of Creation) by al-Qazwini (d. 1283), a Persian work of the same title by al-Tusi (fl. 1160), and, especially, the Arabic *Kharīdat al-'ajā'ib* (Pearl of the Wonders) by Ibn al-Wardī (fl. 1419). It is much rarer to see 'Atlas of Islam'-style regional maps outside the core works attributable to al-Istakhri, Ibn Hawqal and al-Muqaddasi, though some manuscripts of al-Tusi's cosmography include simplified versions of all the regional maps from the tradition. For fourteenth-century examples, see Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Suppl. Pers. 332; and Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Fatih 4173. On the development of this genre of illustrated cosmography, see Persis Berlekamp, *Wonder, Image, and Cosmos in Medieval Islam* (New Haven, CT, 2011); Rachel Milstein and Bilha Moor, 'Wonders of a Changing World: Late Illustrated '*Ajā'ib* Manuscripts (Part I)', *Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam*, xxxii (2006), pp. 1–48; and Francesca Bellino, 'Sirāj al-Dīn Ibn al-Wardī and the *Ḥarīdat al-'Ajā'ib*: Authority and Plagiarism in a Fifteenth-century Arabic Cosmography', *Eurasian Studies*, xii/1–2 (2014), pp. 257–96.
 - 15 One possible exception is a tradition of regional mapping from thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Yemen, which has been preserved in two works: a register of tax revenues from the reign of the Rasulid Sultan al-Malik al-Mu'ayyad (d. 1321); and a sixteenth-century manuscript of a description of Yemen written by a thirteenth-century traveller named Ibn al-Mujawir. Both of these works feature a series of town plans, which, taken together, represent the region via its urban network, though the former also includes a unique map of the region of Yemen as a whole. For the administrative register, see Muḥammad 'Abd al-Raḥīm Jāzim, ed., *Irtifā' al-dawla al-Mu'ayyadiyya* (Sanaa, 2008). For the travelogue, see G. Rex Smith, ed. and trans., *A Traveller in Thirteenth-century Arabia: Ibn al-Mujāwir's 'Tārīkh al-Mustashir'* (London, 2008).
 - 16 See Istanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III 3348, fol. 9a (illus. 2). Two very unusual manuscripts of a Persian translation of al-Istakhri's work, dating from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries respectively, are adorned with elaborate iconography, including images of people, sea creatures, angels and prophets related to legendary or sacred sites in each region: Istanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Bağdat 334; and Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Cod. Mixt. 344. For published maps from the two manuscripts, see, for the first, Mustafa Kaçar, *Piri Reis ve Kristof Kolomb Öncesi İslam Haritaları* (Istanbul, 2013); and, for the second, Hans Mžik, *al-Iṣṭaḥrī und seine Landkarten im Buch 'Suwar al-aḳālīm'* (Vienna, 1965). Two other Persian manuscripts, both copied in the nineteenth century, include some related iconography: London, British Library, Or. 1587; and London, British Library, Add. 23542.

- 17 In the tenth century the concept of 'Arab' was more fluid than it is today. Al-Muqaddasi seems to have been using it to differentiate between areas in which the primary language was Arabic versus those in which it was Persian. For the relevant passage, see al-Muqaddasī, *The Best Divisions*, p. 217. For more on the early development of this concept, see Peter Webb, *Imagining the Arabs: Arab Identity and the Rise of Islam* (Edinburgh, 2016).
- 18 See Leiden University Libraries, Cod. Or. 3101, p. 20 (illus. 7); and Istanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III 3348, fol. 20b (illus. 8). For a detailed analysis, with a focus on the map in illus. 7, see Karen Pinto, 'Passion and Conflict: Medieval Islamic Views of the West', in *Mapping Medieval Geographies: Geographical Encounters in the Latin West and Beyond*, ed. K. D. Lilley (Cambridge, 2013), pp. 201–24.
- 19 It should be noted that the maps of the Maghrib in the handful of manuscripts attributed to Ibn Hawqal are very different. In general, maps in manuscripts attributable to al-Istakhri and al-Muqaddasi are similar for the western regions, and maps in manuscripts attributable to al-Istakhri and Ibn Hawqal are similar for the eastern regions. Al-Istakhri manuscripts outnumber those attributable to the other two authors combined by more than two to one.
- 20 This is Emilie Savage-Smith's argument in 'Memory and Maps', in *Culture and Memory in Medieval Islam*, ed. F. Daftary (London, 2003), pp. 109–27.
- 21 See Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ayasofya 3156, fols 36a (Iraq, illus. 9), 39b (Khuzistan, illus. 10).
- 22 Al-Idrisi also authored a shorter geographical work accompanied by maps, which survives in only three manuscript copies. For more on his body of work, see S. Maqbul Ahmad, 'Cartography of al-Sharīf al-Idrīsī', in *The History of Cartography*, vol. II, book 1, ed. Harley and Woodward, pp. 156–74; and Jean-Charles Ducène, 'Les oeuvres géographiques d'al-Idrīsī et leur diffusion', *Journal Asiatique*, CCCV/1 (2017), pp. 33–41.
- 23 Contrasting views on al-Ma'mun's cartographic project can be found in Sezgin, *Mathematical Geography and Cartography in Islam*, vol. I, pp. 71–137; Gerald R. Tibbetts, 'The Beginnings of a Cartographic Tradition', in *The History of Cartography*, vol. II, book 1, ed. Harley and Woodward, pp. 90–107; David A. King, *World-maps for Finding the Direction and Distance to Mecca: Innovation and Tradition in Islamic Science* (Leiden, 1999), pp. 23–49; and Pinto, *Medieval Islamic Maps*, pp. 44–7.
- 24 See Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Ms. Pococke 375, fols 3b–4a (illus. 11). A very similar map appears in a late twelfth- or early thirteenth-century manuscript of an anonymous Arabic work known as the *Book of Curiosities*, which will be discussed below. For other examples, see Gerald R. Tibbetts, 'Later Cartographic Developments', in *The History of Cartography*, vol. II, book 1, ed. Harley and Woodward, pp. 137–55.
- 25 Emilie Savage-Smith, 'Cartography', in *A Companion to Mediterranean History*, ed. P. Horden and S. Kinoshita (Oxford, 2014), p. 191. A composite map has been assembled digitally by the Bibliothèque nationale de France; see 'al-Idrīsī: La Méditerranée au XII^e siècle', <http://classes.bnf.fr>, accessed 1 January 2017.
- 26 Some sectional maps in an early manuscript include notations of longitude and latitude; for a discussion of how this relates to al-Idrisi's cartographic method, see Jean-Charles Ducène, 'Les coordonnées géographiques de

- la carte manuscrite d'al-Idrīsī (Paris, Bnf ar. 2221)', *Der Islam*, LXXXVI/2 (2009), pp. 271–85.
- 27 See Bibliothèque nationale de France, Arabe 2221, fols 227b–228a.
- 28 For illus. 13 and the Maghrib map from the same manuscript, see Istanbul Topkapı, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III 3346, fols 20a–20b–21a (Maghrib), 58b (Mediterranean, illus. 13). For a more detailed discussion of these maps in conjunction with the written text, see Jean-Charles Ducène, 'L'Europe dans la cartographie arabe médiévale', *Belgeo*, III–IV (2008), pp. 256–60.
- 29 See Istanbul Kütüphanesi, Ayasofya 2613, fol. 20b. Karen Pinto makes the case for the patronage of an 'Ottoman cluster' of such manuscripts in *Medieval Islamic Maps*, pp. 219–78.
- 30 For a different interpretation of the Mediterranean maps from the tradition, see Karen Pinto, "'Surat Bahr al-Rum' (Picture of the Sea of Byzantium): Possible Meanings Underlying the Forms', in *Eastern Mediterranean Cartographies*, ed. G. Tolias and D. Loupis (Athens, 2004), pp. 223–41; and Pinto, 'Passion and Conflict: Medieval Islamic Views of the West'.
- 31 See Rapoport and Savage-Smith, *An Eleventh-century Egyptian Guide to the Universe: The 'Book of Curiosities'*; and the online edition, 'Medieval Islamic Views of the Cosmos: The Book of Curiosities', <http://cosmos.bodley.ox.ac.uk>, accessed 1 January 2017.
- 32 On this rectangular map, see Yossef Rapoport and Emilie Savage-Smith, 'The *Book of Curiosities* and a Unique Map of the World', in *Cartography in Antiquity and the Middle Ages: Fresh Perspectives, New Methods*, ed. R.J.A. Talbert and R. W. Unger (Leiden, 2008), pp. 121–38.
- 33 See Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Ms. Arab 90, fols 30b–31a. Although the coastal toponyms and islands are evenly arrayed in cartographic space, the actual space detailed by the map is heavily weighted toward the eastern Mediterranean, with almost the entire upper half of the oval dedicated to the Byzantine coastline and the four westernmost columns of islands simply labelled 'island'; for more on this map, see Emilie Savage-Smith, 'The *Book of Curiosities*: An Eleventh-century Egyptian View of the Lands of the Infidels', in *Geography and Ethnography: Perceptions of the World in Pre-modern Societies*, ed. K. Raaflaub and R.J.A. Talbert (Oxford, 2010), pp. 291–310.
- 34 For more on the way the maps in this work reflect geopolitical and commercial realities, see Yossef Rapoport, 'Reflections of Fatimid Power in the Maps of Island Cities in the "Book of Curiosities"', in *Herrschaft verorten: Politische Kartographie im Mittelalter und in der frühen Neuzeit*, ed. I. Baumgärtner and M. Stercken (Zurich, 2012), pp. 183–210; Yossef Rapoport, 'The View from the South: The Maps of the *Book of Curiosities* and the Commercial Revolution of the Eleventh Century', in *Histories of the Middle East: Studies in Middle Eastern Society, Economy and Law in Honor of A. L. Udovitch*, ed. R. E. Margariti, A. Sabra and P. M. Sijpesteijn (Leiden, 2011), pp. 183–212; and Emilie Savage-Smith, 'Maps and Trade', in *Byzantine Trade (4th–12th Centuries): The Archaeology of Local, Regional and International Exchange*, ed. M. Mango (Farnham, 2009), pp. 15–29.
- 35 See Oxford, Bodleian Libraries, Ms. Arab 90, fol. 43b. My discussion of this map draws from Yossef Rapoport, 'The *Book of Curiosities*:

- A Medieval Islamic View of the East', in *The Journey of Maps and Images on the Silk Road*, ed. P. Forêt and A. Kaplony (Leiden, 2008), pp. 155–71.
- 36 For more on these topics, see David A. King and Richard R. Lorch, 'Qibla Charts, Qibla Maps, and Related Instruments', in *The History of Cartography*, vol. II, book 1, ed. Harley and Woodward, pp. 189–205.
- 37 For instance, manuscripts of Ibn al-Wardi's fifteenth-century cosmography, *Kharīdat al-'ajā'ib*, frequently include both a *qibla* chart and an 'Atlas of Islam'-style world map, suggesting the cross-fertilization of traditions. Similarly an eight-sector *qibla* chart was inserted into a fifteenth-century manuscript of al-Muqaddasi's text; although David King says this was 'certainly not original to the work' (see King, *World-maps for Finding the Direction and Distance to Mecca*, p. 52), its addition suggests that a fifteenth-century copyist felt it would be an appropriate supplement to the manuscript.
- 38 For more on these kinds of maps, see Evelyn Edson, *Mapping Time and Space: How Medieval Mapmakers Viewed Their World* (London, 1997).
- 39 See London, British Library, Ms. Or. 3623, fol. 33a.
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- 41 For studies and critical editions of these certificates, see Dominique Sourdel and Janine Sourdel-Thomine, *Certificats de pèlerinage d'époque ayyoubide: Contribution à l'histoire de l'idéologie de l'Islam au temps des Croisades* (Paris, 2006); Sourdel and Sourdel-Thomine, 'Certificats de pèlerinage par procuration à l'époque mamlouke', *Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam*, xxv (2001), pp. 212–33; and Sourdel and Sourdel-Thomine, 'Une collection médiévale de certificats de pèlerinage', in *Études médiévales et patrimoine turc*, ed. Janine Sourdel-Thomine (Paris, 1983), pp. 167–273.
- 42 For more on the illustrated certificates, see Şule Aksoy and Rachel Milstein, 'A Collection of Thirteenth-century Illustrated Hajj Certificates', in *M. Uğur Derman Armağanı*, ed. İ. C. Schick (Istanbul, 2000), pp. 101–34; Janine Sourdel-Thomine, 'Une image musulmane de Jérusalem au début du XIII^e siècle', in *Jerusalem, Rome, Constantinople: L'image et le mythe de la ville au Moyen Age*, ed. D. Poirion (Paris, 1986), pp. 217–33; and David Roxburgh, 'Pilgrimage City', in *The City in the Islamic World*, ed. S. K. Jayyusi et al. (Leiden, 2008), vol. II, pp. 753–74.
- 43 See Aksoy and Milstein, 'A Collection of Thirteenth-century Illustrated Hajj Certificates', pp. 103–4.
- 44 See Istanbul, Türk ve İslam Eserleri Müzesi, 4091. For the text of the certificate, see Sourdel and Sourdel-Thomine, *Certificats de pèlerinage*, pp. 243–5. This certificate is the model for the line drawings in Aksoy and Milstein, 'A Collection of Thirteenth-century Illustrated Hajj Certificates', pp. 105, 107, 111 and 114; it has been reproduced and studied in Gülru Necipoğlu, 'The Dome of the Rock as Palimpsest: 'Abd al-Malik's Grand Narrative and Sultan Süleyman's Glosses', *Muqarnas*, xxv (2008), pp. 73–5.
- 45 No mention of the visitation of Medina or Jerusalem is made in the written texts of the surviving pilgrimage certificates. This does not mean that the

- pilgrim did not also visit Medina and/or Jerusalem, as literary evidence from the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries attests the frequency of this practice.
- 46 See Aksoy and Milstein, 'A Collection of Thirteenth-century Illustrated Hajj Certificates', pp. 123–34.
 - 47 See Sourdel and Sourdel-Thomine, *Certificats de pèlerinage*, pp. 60–61, 71–81. This is the exact same period from which has been preserved a stone slab from Mosul, Iraq, inscribed with an image of the Meccan sanctuary nearly identical to that used for the illustrated pilgrimage certificates; see Sheila Blair, 'Inscribing the Hajj', in *The Hajj: Collected Essays*, ed. V. Porter and L. Saif (London, 2013), pp. 160–68.
 - 48 Two fifteenth-century examples are, first, a scroll dated 1433 depicting the sanctuaries of Mecca and Medina (London, British Library, Ms. Add. 27566); and, second, a scroll also dated 1433 depicting the sanctuaries of Mecca, Medina, Jerusalem, Hebron, Najaf and Karbala (Doha, Museum of Islamic Art, Ms. 267.1998). On this latter scroll, the only one, to my knowledge, to depict the Shi'ite pilgrimage destinations of Najaf and Karbala before the eighteenth century, see *Focus on 50 Unseen Treasures*, exh. cat., Museum of Islamic Art, Doha (2010), pp. 56–61. The most famous sixteenth-century example, which is related to the hajj guides that will be discussed in the next chapter, is a scroll dated 1544–5 depicting the sanctuaries of Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem (Istanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Hazine 1812).

2 MAPPING IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

- 1 The western portion of this map was discovered in the library of the Topkapı Palace in Istanbul in 1929 and has since become something of a symbol of Turkish national pride. A fragment from a second world map made by Piri Reis in 1528–9, which portrays part of the Caribbean and may be even more impressive than that of 1513, is also held in the same library. See Svat Soucek, *Piri Reis and Turkish Mapmaking after Columbus* (London, 1996); and Gregory C. McIntosh, *The Piri Reis Map of 1513* (Athens, GA, 2000).
- 2 For a discussion of related representations of the Mediterranean including Ottoman 'self-mappings', see Palmira Brummett, 'Visions of the Mediterranean: A Classification', *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies*, xxxvii/1 (2007), pp. 9–55; and Palmira Brummett, *Mapping the Ottomans: Sovereignty, Territory, and Identity in the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Cambridge, 2015).
- 3 See Svat Soucek, 'Islamic Charting in the Mediterranean', in *The History of Cartography*, vol. II, book 1: *Cartography in the Traditional Islamic and South Asian Societies*, ed. J. B. Harley and D. Woodward (Chicago, IL, 1992), pp. 263–92. For the culturally hybrid origins of the genre, see Sonja Brentjes, 'Medieval Portolan Charts as Documents of Shared Cultural Spaces', in *Acteurs des transferts culturels en Méditerranée médiévale*, ed. R. Abdellatif et al. (Munich, 2012), pp. 134–45.
- 4 For more on this genre, see George Tolia, 'Isolariu, Fifteenth to Seventeenth Century', in *The History of Cartography*, vol. III, part 1: *Cartography in the European Renaissance*, ed. D. Woodward (Chicago, IL, 2007), pp. 263–84.

- 5 See Thomas D. Goodrich, 'Better Directions at Sea: The Piri Reis Innovation', in *Essays in Honour of Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu*, ed. M. Kaçar and Z. Durukal (Istanbul, 2006), vol. 1, pp. 501–15; and Soucek, *Piri Reis and Turkish Mapmaking after Columbus*.
- 6 No manuscripts in the author's hand survive. Lists of extant manuscripts can be found in Thomas D. Goodrich, 'The 5658 Maps of the *Kitab-ı Bahriye* of Piri Reis', in *Proceedings of the International Piri Reis Symposium, 27–29 September 2004* (Istanbul, n.d.), pp. 6, 93–6, 113; Soucek, 'Islamic Charting in the Mediterranean'; and Mine Esiner Özen, *Piri Reis and His Charts* (Istanbul, 1999).
- 7 Although he begins the counterclockwise circuit by heading west from the Dardanelles, after a few chapters the circuit is interrupted with backtracking to the southwestern Anatolian coast and then to some of the Aegean islands, before returning to the Greek mainland and continuing westward. He finishes with the rest of the Aegean islands toward the end of the work.
- 8 Indeed, twice as many manuscript copies of the first version have survived, and a couple of them show water damage, which may mean they were actually used by sailors: Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Suppl. turc 220; and Kiel Universitätsbibliothek, Cod. Ms. ori 34. On the latter manuscript, see Claus-Peter Haase, 'An Early Version of Piri Reis' Naval Charts', in *Scribes et manuscrits du Moyen Orient*, ed. F. Déroche and F. Richard (Paris, 1997), pp. 266–79.
- 9 See Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ayasofya 2612, fols 44a (Dardanelles, illus. 19), 308b–309a (Straits of Gibraltar, illus. 20). For the other three early manuscripts, see Istanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Hazine 642; Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Hacı Ahmed Paşa 171; and Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Suppl. turc 956. The maps from Ayasofya 2612 and Hazine 642 have been published as, respectively, Ertuğrul Zekâi Ökte, ed., *Kitab-ı Bahriye*, 4 vols (Ankara, 1988–91); and Nurettin Güz, Halil İnalçık and Bülent Arı, eds, *Kitab-ı Bahriye* (Ankara, 2002).
- 10 See Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ahmet Paşa 171, fol. 337a (illus. 21); and Baltimore, Walters Art Museum, Ms. 658, fols 289/282a (illus. 22).
- 11 References to the 'Supreme Dynasty' (*devlet-i 'aliye*) or to the 'Well-protected Realms' (*memâlik-i maḥrûse*) were used instead of 'Ottoman Empire' until the nineteenth century; see Einar Wigen, 'Ottoman Concepts of Empire', *Contributions to the History of Concepts*, VIII/1 (2013), pp. 44–66. Ottoman use of the term 'realm' (*memleket*) in the singular, therefore, has the connotation of 'region' or 'country', in the sense that it is one among many geographical units that make up the 'Well-protected Realms'.
- 12 On flags and fortresses as cartographic markers of possession, see Brummett, *Mapping the Ottomans*, especially pp. 128–86.
- 13 See İstanbul Üniversitesi Kütüphanesi, Türkçe 6605. Maps from this manuscript have been published along with English translations of the commentaries as Bülent Özükan, ed., *The Book of Bahriye* (Istanbul, 2013). It has been suggested that these two manuscripts, along with a third housed in Istanbul, Deniz Müzesi, no. 988, were all produced in the same atelier in the second half of the seventeenth century. See Thomas D. Goodrich, 'Supplemental Maps in the *Kitab-ı Bahriye* of Piri Reis', *Archivum Ottomanicum*, XIII (1993–4), pp. 117–41; and Dimitri Loupis, 'Piri Reis' Book

- on Navigation* (Kitab-ı Bahriyye) as a Geography Handbook', in *Eastern Mediterranean Cartographies*, ed. G. Toliaş and D. Loupis (Athens, 2004), pp. 35–49.
- 14 See Nicola Melis, 'Tripoli vu par les Ottomans', *Hypothèses*, 1 (2012), pp. 365–73.
- 15 See Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ahmet Paşa 171, fol. 341b (illus. 23).
- 16 See Pınar Emiralioğlu, *Geographical Knowledge and Imperial Culture in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire* (Farnham, 2014), pp. 89–116.
- 17 The same cannot be said for the written text, which is particularly detailed in both versions for parts of North Africa, notably present-day Tunisia; see Svat Soucek, 'Tunisia in the *Kitab-i Bahriye* by Piri Reis', *Archivum Ottomanicum*, v (1973), pp. 129–296.
- 18 For more on the evolution of the city views in the *Book of the Sea*, see Soucek, *Piri Reis and Turkish Mapmaking after Columbus*; and J. M. Rogers, 'Itineraries and Town Views in Ottoman Histories', in *The History of Cartography*, vol. II, book 1, ed. Harley and Woodward, pp. 228–55.
- 19 A few later manuscripts of the first version include a small-scale, schematized map showing the entire course of the river Nile to its source, though this is not common across the extant manuscripts; see, for examples, Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ayasofya 3161; and Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Nuruosmaniye 2997.
- 20 For the idea of Egypt as a gateway to the Indian Ocean, see Giancarlo Casale, *The Ottoman Age of Exploration* (New York, 2010), especially pp. 34–52.
- 21 See Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ahmet Paşa 171, fol. 357a (illus. 24). For very similar maps of Cairo, see Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ayasofya 2612; Istanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Hazine 642; Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Suppl. turc 956; and Biblioteca Universitaria di Bologna, Ms. 3609. For more elaborate maps of Cairo in later manuscripts, see İstanbul Üniversitesi Kütüphanesi, Türkçe 6605; Istanbul, Deniz Müzesi, no. 988; and Baltimore, Walters Art Gallery, Ms. 658. An unusual two-page map of Cairo can be found in London, Nasser D. Khalili Collection of Islamic Arts, Ms. 718, which has also been published in facsimile accompanying Soucek, *Piri Reis and Turkish Mapmaking after Columbus*.
- 22 See Goodrich, 'Supplemental Maps in the *Kitab-i Bahriye* of Piri Reis'. On images of Constantinople in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, see Çiğdem Kafescioğlu, *Constantinople/Istanbul: Cultural Encounter, Imperial Vision, and the Construction of the Ottoman Capital* (University Park, PA, 2009); and Çiğdem Kafescioğlu, 'Viewing, Walking, Mapping Istanbul, ca. 1580', *Mitteilungen des Kunsthistorischen Institutes in Florenz*, LVI/1 (2014), pp. 16–35.
- 23 See Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ayasofya 3161, fol. 202b (illus. 1). The copyist of this manuscript was likely the same Mehmet Reis who copied a late sixteenth-century manuscript of the *Tarih-i Hind-i Garbi* (History of the West Indies) that includes a similar world map. See Thomas Goodrich, *The Ottoman Turks and the New World: A Study of Tarih-i Hind-i Garbi and Sixteenth-century Ottoman Americana* (Wiesbaden, 1990), pp. 26, 39, 48. A handful of 'presentation' portolans made for an Ottoman market, consisting of smaller-scale charts of the Mediterranean Sea, Black Sea, Atlantic coasts of Europe and Africa, and Indian Ocean, can also be dated

- to the second half of the sixteenth century. On this phenomenon, see Casale, *The Ottoman Age of Exploration*, pp. 180–204; and Emiralioğlu, *Geographical Knowledge and Imperial Culture in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire*, pp. 89–116. For specific examples, see Thomas D. Goodrich, ‘Atlas-ı hümayun: A Sixteenth-century Ottoman Maritime Atlas Discovered in 1984’, *Archivum Ottomanicum*, x (1985), pp. 83–101; Thomas D. Goodrich, ‘The Earliest Ottoman Maritime Atlas: The Walters *Deniz Atlası*’, *Archivum Ottomanicum*, xi (1986), pp. 25–50; Svat Soucek, ‘The “Ali Macar Reis Atlas” and the Deniz Kitabı: Their Place in the Genre of Portolan Charts and Atlases’, *Imago Mundi*, xxv (1971), pp. 17–27; and Giancarlo Casale, ‘From Hungary to Southeast Asia: The Ali Macar Reis Atlas in a Global Context’, *Journal of Ottoman Studies*, xxxix (2012), pp. 55–62.
- 24 On this image of Istanbul, see Kafescioğlu, *Constantinopolis/Istanbul*, pp. 207–26.
- 25 This point is made about fortresses and ships in Palmira Brummett, ‘Imagining the Early Modern Ottoman Space, from World History to Piri Reis’, in *The Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire*, ed. V. H. Aksan and D. Goffman (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 135–58; and Brummett, *Mapping the Ottomans*, pp. 128–86.
- 26 It should be noted that the modifiers ‘Arab’ and ‘Persian’ in these toponyms did not refer to stable identities, nor should they be taken literally as ethnic or linguistic descriptions of the inhabitants of these areas, though clearly they had emerged by this time as a culturally or historically inflected way of distinguishing the two regions. For the use of these two terms in a slightly earlier period, see Michael Cooperson, ‘“Arabs” and “Iranians”: The Uses of Ethnicity in the Early Abbasid Period’, in *Islamic Cultures, Islamic Contexts: Essays in Honor of Professor Patricia Crone*, ed. B. Sadeghi et al. (Leiden, 2015), pp. 364–87; and Boris James, ‘Arab Ethnonyms (‘Ajam, ‘Arab, Badū and Turk): The Kurdish Case as a Paradigm for Thinking about Differences in the Middle Ages’, *Iranian Studies*, xlvii/5 (2014), pp. 683–712.
- 27 For more on the genre of illustrated imperial histories, and especially their tendency toward portraying battles and urban scenes, see Rogers, ‘Itineraries and Town Views in Ottoman Histories’; Brummett, *Mapping the Ottomans*; and Kathryn Ebel, ‘Visual Sources for Urban History of the Ottoman Empire’, *Türkiye Araştırmaları Literatür Dergisi*, iii/6 (2005), pp. 457–8.
- 28 For more on Matrakci Nasuh’s biography, the context of the composition of the work, and a facsimile and transcription of the manuscript, see Hüseyin Yurdaydın, ed., *Beyân-ı Menâzil-i Sefer-i ‘Irâķeyn-i Sultân Süleymân Hân* (Ankara, 1976).
- 29 For Ottoman river maps, see those of the Nile and the Tigris and Euphrates thought to have been prepared by the famous seventeenth-century traveller Evliya Celebi in Ahmet T. Karamustafa, ‘Military, Administrative, and Scholarly Maps and Plans’, in *The History of Cartography*, vol. ii, book 1, ed. Harley and Woodward, pp. 209–27; and Zekeriya Kurşun, ‘Does the Qatar Map of the Tigris and Euphrates Belong to Evliya Çelebi?’, *Journal of Ottoman Studies*, xxxix (2012), pp. 1–15.
- 30 See İstanbul Üniversitesi Kütüphanesi, T. 5964, fols 30b–31a. Interestingly, this same stretch of the route is illustrated on the return trip in a much darker colour palette, among other stylistic contrasts, reinforcing the sense that different artists worked on different images in the same manuscript.

- 31 Palmira Brummett observes that only one image in the entire work draws attention to a border, but it is a regional border (between the two Iraqs) rather than a political one; see Brummett, *Mapping the Ottomans*, pp. 88–9. Nonetheless, Pınar Emiralioğlu sees the tents as a symbol of the Sultan's sovereign role as 'dispenser of justice' in the lands he controlled; see Emiralioğlu, *Geographical Knowledge and Imperial Culture in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire*, pp. 84–5.
- 32 This is Kathryn Ebel's argument in 'Representations of the Frontier in Ottoman Town Views of the Sixteenth Century', *Imago Mundi*, LX (2008), pp. 1–22.
- 33 This work has also been preserved in a single manuscript, dated c. 1543: Istanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Hazine 1608.
- 34 For more on this idea, see Gottfried Hagen, 'Ptolemaeus Triumphans, or: Maps, Knowledge, and Ottoman Patronage', in *Between Europe and the Ottoman Empire: Ideas, Knowledge, Practice (1453–1718)*, ed. K. Fleet, S. Mandelbrote and S. Mills (Leiden, forthcoming).
- 35 For a discussion of this dynamic in the case of Aleppo, see Heghnar Zeitlian Watenpaugh, *The Image of an Ottoman City: Imperial Architecture and Urban Experience in Aleppo in the 16th and 17th Centuries* (Leiden, 2004), pp. 211–33.
- 36 See İstanbul Üniversitesi Kütüphanesi, T. 5964, fols 31b–32a; this immediately follows illus. 25 on the route traced by the *Compendium of Stages*. On the tomb of Uljaytu, see Sheila Blair, 'The Mongol Capital of Sulṭāniyya, "The Imperial"', *Iran*, 24 (1986), pp. 139–51.
- 37 That said, Sheila Blair suggests that Matrakci Nasuh may have inserted Ottomanized elements into even this image, in particular the five-domed portico flanked by minarets on the right. She also notes similarities between the tomb at Sultaniyya and later Ottoman monumental structures, such as the Selimiye mosque complex at Edirne designed by the famous architect Sinan, who also happened to be on the 1534–5 campaign. See Sheila Blair, *Text and Image in Medieval Persian Art* (Edinburgh, 2014), pp. 156–8.
- 38 This idea was suggested to me by Gottfried Hagen.
- 39 See İstanbul Üniversitesi Kütüphanesi, T. 5964, fols 47b–48a.
- 40 See Yurdaydın, ed., *Beyān-ı Menāzil*, pp. 53a–53b.
- 41 See İstanbul Üniversitesi Kütüphanesi, T. 5964, fols 64b–65a (Najaf, illus. 28).
- 42 J. M. Rogers observes that the illustration of Karbala shows renovations to the structures made by the Safavid Shah Tahmasp in 1530; see Rogers, 'Itineraries and Town Views in Ottoman Histories', pp. 243–5.
- 43 On Süleyman's co-optation of rival claims, see Gülru Necipoğlu, 'Süleyman the Magnificent and the Representation of Power in the Context of Ottoman–Hapsburg–Papal Rivalry', *Art Bulletin*, LXXI/3 (1989), pp. 401–27. See also Wigen, 'Ottoman Concepts of Empire'.
- 44 Rachel Milstein claims a direct influence from Matrakci Nasuh in 'Futuh-i Haramayn: Sixteenth-century Illustrations of the Hajj Route', in *Mamluks and Ottomans: Studies in Honour of Michael Winter*, ed. D. J. Wasserstein and A. Ayalon (London and New York, 2006), p. 170. See also Rogers, 'Itineraries and Town Views in Ottoman Histories', pp. 243–5.
- 45 For a list of over nineteen sixteenth-century manuscripts, including six that conclude with images of the Dome of the Rock, see Milstein, 'Futuh-i Haramayn', pp. 189–90. For a detailed analysis of one of those manuscripts,

- see Rachel Milstein, 'Kitāb Shawq-nāma: An Illustrated Tour of Holy Arabia', *Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam*, xxv (2001), pp. 275–345.
- 46 It also helped keep the illustrations up to date architecturally. For instance, images of Mecca in manuscripts composed after 1565–6 tend to depict the seventh minaret that was added in that year; see Milstein, 'Futuh-i Haramayn', p. 173.
- 47 See London, British Library, Ms. Or. 3633, fol. 12b.
- 48 Similar images of Mecca and Medina occur in Ottoman pilgrimage scrolls and manuscripts of other works copied in this this period. See, for example, the elaborate scroll dated 1544–5 in Istanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Hazine 1812. See also the following sixteenth-century copies of al-Tusi's 'Ajā'ib al-makhlūqāt: Baltimore, Walters Art Gallery, Ms. 593; and Istanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Hazine 404.
- 49 See Milstein, 'Kitāb Shawq-nāma', pp. 285–9.
- 50 See, for examples, Jan Just Witkam, 'The Battle of the Images: Mecca vs. Medina in the Iconography of the Manuscripts of al-Jazūlī's *Dalā'il al-Khayrāt*', in *Theoretical Approaches to the Transmission and Edition of Oriental Manuscripts*, ed. J. Pfeiffer and M. Kropp (Beirut, 2007), pp. 67–82; Venetia Porter, ed., *Hajj: Journey to the Heart of Islam* (Cambridge, MA, 2012); Charlotte Maury, 'Depictions of the Haramayn on Ottoman Tiles: Content and Context', in *The Hajj: Collected Essays*, ed. V. Porter and L. Saif (London, 2013), pp. 143–59; Ulrich Marzolph, 'From Mecca to Mashhad: The Narrative of an Illustrated Shi'i Pilgrimage Scroll from the Qajar Period', *Muqarnas*, xxxi (2014), pp. 207–42; and Luitgaard Mols, 'Souvenir, Testimony, and Device for Instruction: Late Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-century Printed Hajj Certificates', in *Hajj: Global Interactions through Pilgrimage*, ed. L. Mols and M. Buitelaar (Leiden, 2015), pp. 185–212.
- 51 For the connective function of such images up to the present, see Juan Campo, 'Visualizing the Hajj: Representations of a Changing Sacred Landscape Past and Present', in *The Hajj: Pilgrimage in Islam*, ed. E. Tagliacozzo and S. Toorawa (Cambridge, 2016), pp. 269–87.
- 52 See Gülru Necipoğlu, 'The Dome of the Rock as Palimpsest: 'Abd al-Malik's Grand Narrative and Sultan Süleyman's Glosses', *Muqarnas*, xxv (2008), pp. 17–105.
- 53 For a related interpretation of Ottoman maps as structured by 'axes of movement', see Gottfried Hagen, 'Kātip Çelebi's Maps and the Visualization of Space in Ottoman Culture', *Journal of Ottoman Studies*, xl (2012), pp. 283–93.
- 54 For a study of the possibilities for such interactivity in Christian pilgrimage maps, see Daniel K. Connolly, *The Maps of Matthew Paris: Medieval Journeys through Space, Time and Liturgy* (Woodbridge, 2009).
- 55 The Ottoman Turkish translation, which was made in 1598, is housed in the Biblioteca Universitaria di Bologna, Ms. 3611; for a reproduction of its map of Arabia, see Sonja Brentjes, 'The Interplay of Science, Art and Literature in Islamic Societies before 1700', in *History of Science, Philosophy and Culture in Indian Civilization*, vol. xv, part 3, ed. A. Dev (New Delhi, 2009), p. 469. For other Ottoman world maps reflecting the conventions of the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition, see the genealogical scroll housed in Istanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III 3599, and reproduced in Karamustafa, 'Military, Administrative, and Scholarly Maps and Plans',

- p. 220; and manuscripts of the popular sixteenth-century Ottoman Turkish translation of Ibn al-Wardi's fifteenth-century cosmography, *Kharīdat al-'ajā'ib*. On this latter work, see Feray Coşkun, 'An Ottoman Preacher's Perception of an Imperial Cosmography: Maḥmūd al-Ḥaṭīb's Translation of *Kharīdat al-'Ajā'ib wa Farīdat al-Gharā'ib*', *Al-Masāq: Journal of the Medieval Mediterranean*, XXIII/1 (2011), pp. 53–66.
- 56 A nearly identical copy of the map of the Arabian Peninsula from the earliest known manuscript of Ibn Hawqal's geography may have been inserted into a sixteenth-century manuscript of Ibn al-Wardi's cosmography held at the Museum of Islamic Art in Doha; see Mounia Chekhab-Abudaya and Cécile Bresc, *Hajj: The Journey through Art*, exh. cat., Museum of Islamic Art, Doha (Milan, 2013), p. 27.
- 57 Although the ancient Greek division of the world into continents had been known among Muslim geographers since the eighth and ninth centuries, it had not inspired a mapping tradition, nor had it been a popular way of organizing geographical or cartographical information. When continents were mentioned in Arabic works, they were usually termed, generically, 'parts' (*aqsām*) of the world.
- 58 See James Akerman, 'The Structuring of Political Territory in Early Printed Atlases', *Imago Mundi*, XLVII (1995), pp. 138–54.
- 59 On the development of the atlas and the expectations of its audience, see Christian Jacob, *The Sovereign Map: Theoretical Approaches in Cartography throughout History*, trans. T. Conley (Chicago, IL, 2006), pp. 66–76.
- 60 See Denis Cosgrove, *Apollo's Eye: A Cartographic Genealogy of the Earth in the Western Imagination* (Baltimore, MD, 2001), pp. 130–35; and Valerie Traub, 'Mapping the Global Body', in *Early Modern Visual Culture: Representation, Race, and Empire in Renaissance England*, ed. P. Erickson and C. Hulse (Philadelphia, PA, 2000), pp. 44–97.
- 61 For a definitive study of the development of Katib Celebi's cartographic style, his sources and the extant manuscripts of his work, see Gottfried Hagen, *Ein osmanischer Geograph bei der Arbeit: Entstehung und Gedankenwelt von Kâtib Çelebi's Ğihānnümâ* (Berlin, 2003).
- 62 For this discovery, see Gottfried Hagen, 'Kâtib Çelebi and Sipâhizâde', in *Essays in Honour of Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu*, ed. Kaçar and Durukal, vol. 1, pp. 525–42. For the examples here, see Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Library (Special Collections), Isl. Ms. 215, pp. 5 (world map, illus. 30), 43 (Tigris and Euphrates, illus. 31).
- 63 For this manuscript, see Istanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Revan 1624; it was published in facsimile as Fuat Sezgin, ed., *Kâtib Çelebi'nin Esas Kitâb-ı Cihānnümâ'sı ve Coğrafya Tarihindeki Yeri* (Istanbul, 2013).
- 64 See Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Suppl. Turc 215, fol. 167a.
- 65 For the significance of this practice in European mapping, see Traub, 'Mapping the Global Body'.
- 66 See Sonja Brentjes, 'On Two Manuscripts by Abū Bakr b. Bahrām al-Dimashqī (d. 1102/1691) related to W. and J. Blaeu's *Atlas Maior*', *Journal of Ottoman Studies*, XL (2012), pp. 171–92; and Brentjes, 'Mapmaking in Ottoman Istanbul between 1650 and 1750: A Domain of Painters, Calligraphers or Cartographers?', in *Frontiers of Ottoman Studies*, ed. C. Imber, K. Kiyotaki, and R. Murphey (London, 2005), vol. II, pp. 125–56.

- 67 For an overview of the work's cartographic contents, see Emily Zoss, 'An Ottoman View of the World: The *Kitab Cihannüma* and Its Cartographic Contents', in *The Islamic Manuscript Tradition*, ed. C. Gruber (Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN, 2010), pp. 194–219.
- 68 An autograph manuscript of this work is housed in Istanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Revan 1192; it, along with maps accompanying it from several versions of the work, including Muteferrika's print edition, has been published in facsimile as İdris Bostan, ed., *Tuhfetü'l-Kibâr fî Esfâri'l-Bihâr* (Ankara, 2008).
- 69 See Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Halet Efendi 638, between pp. 289 and 290. The 1724 map of Persia by Johann Baptiste Homann includes these same subdivisions and may have been the basis for Muteferrika's stand-alone 1729 map of Iran, which was also likely a source for the map of Iran in the 1732 *Cihannüma*. Both maps have been reproduced in Cyrus Alai, *General Maps of Persia, 1477–1925* (Leiden, 2005), pp. 145–9, 275–6.
- 70 Muteferrika's stand-alone 1729 map of Iran provides two western boundary lines, the more easterly of which is identified as 'borders of the Ottoman realms'. This is likely a reflection of territorial gains made during Sultan Ahmet III's 1724 campaign against the Safavids. This same inscription can be found in the Caucasus map of the 1732 *Cihannüma*, in approximately the same place as on the 1729 map, but nothing like it appears on the 1732 Iran map, leaving the only marker of sovereignty the legend's use of the term 'Safavid'.
- 71 See Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Pertevniyal 754, between pp. 483 and 484.
- 72 See Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Halet Efendi 638, between pp. 629 and 630. One map of Anatolia in a manuscript attributed to Abu Bakr al-Dimashqi shows systematic subdivision, and is also oriented southward, but its subdivisions are not identical to those showed in the 1732 *Cihannüma* and they are labelled with the terms *eyâlet* (district) and *livâ'* (subdistrict) followed by a toponym; for this manuscript, see Istanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Nuruosmaniye 2996.
- 73 For a reproduction and discussion of this map, see Ariel Salzmann, *Tocqueville in the Ottoman Empire: Rival Paths to the Modern State* (Leiden, 2004), pp. 31–74. Compare with John Speed's 1626 map of 'The Turkish Empire' or Johann Baptiste Homann's 1716 map of 'Imperium Turcicum', both reproduced in Sezgin, *Mathematical Geography and Cartography in Islam*, vol. III, pp. 210 (map 135), 218 (map 140c).
- 74 Indeed, of the five-hundred-copy run, only about half of them had been sold at the time of Muteferrika's death. See Orlin Sabev, 'The First Ottoman Turkish Printing Enterprise: Success or Failure?', in *Ottoman Tulips, Ottoman Coffee*, ed. D. Sajdi (London, 2007), pp. 63–89; and Yasemin Gencer, 'İbrahim Müteferrika and the Age of the Printed Manuscript', in *The Islamic Manuscript Tradition*, ed. C. Gruber (Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN, 2010), pp. 154–93.
- 75 For this argument, see Lewis and Wigen, *The Myth of Continents*, pp. 21–46.
- 76 For an example, see the *Cedid atlas tercümesi* (New Atlas Translation), published in Istanbul in 1803–4, which includes maps of the 'Supreme Dynasty in Asia' and the 'Supreme Dynasty in Europe'. This reproduces the continental division from earlier European atlases, but stresses the concept

of dynastic rule rather than ethnic identity. A copy has been digitized at 'Cedid atlas tercümesi', U.S. Library of Congress, www.loc.gov, accessed 1 January 2017.

3 EUROPEAN COLONIAL MAPPING IN THE LONG NINETEENTH CENTURY

- 1 This idea comes from Mary Louise Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation*, 2nd edn (New York, 2008), especially pp. 15–37.
- 2 This definition of colonial mapping relies on Matthew H. Edney, 'The Irony of Imperial Mapping', in *The Imperial Map: Cartography and the Mastery of Empire*, ed. J. R. Akerman (Chicago, IL, 2009), pp. 11–45. However, the distinction Edney draws between state and imperial mapping on the basis of, in the latter case, a more distant relationship between map audience and territory mapped is complicated for Algeria and Palestine, to be discussed below. Also, I have chosen to use the term 'colonial' rather than 'imperial' to differentiate the mapping traditions examined in this chapter from those in the last chapter, most of which emerged from the context of Ottoman imperial service.
- 3 For more on the use of these toponyms, see Huseyin Yilmaz, 'The Eastern Question and the Ottoman Empire: The Genesis of the Near and Middle East', in *Is There a Middle East?: The Evolution of a Geopolitical Concept* (Stanford, CA, 2012), ed. Michael E. Bonine, Abbas Amanat and Michael Ezekiel Gasper, pp. 11–35.
- 4 For a history of the French occupation of Egypt, see Juan Cole, *Napoleon's Egypt: Invading the Middle East* (New York, 2007). For the work of the Institute of Egypt, see Charles Coulston Gillispie, 'Scientific Aspects of the French Egyptian Expedition, 1798–1801', *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, CXXXIII/4 (1989), pp. 447–74.
- 5 For a useful overview of the production and publication of the work, see Charles Coulston Gillispie and Michel Dewachter, eds, *Monuments of Egypt: The Napoleonic Edition* (Princeton, NJ, 1987), vol. 1, pp. 1–45.
- 6 This consists of 47 map sheets at a scale of 1:100,000, as well as a 'Carte géographique', a map of the same area produced in three sheets at a scale of 1:1,000,000.
- 7 A second, more modest and manageable edition was published in 26 consistently sized volumes between 1821 and 1829 by the publisher C.L.F. Panckoucke. In this edition, all the plates were reprinted from the original copper engravings, but reduced in size to fit the new format.
- 8 For a discussion of the 'Enlightenment Project' and the maps of the *Description de l'Égypte*, see Anne Godlewska, 'Map, Text and Image: The Mentality of Enlightened Conquerors: A New Look at the *Description de l'Égypte*', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, XX/1 (1995), pp. 5–28.
- 9 Jean-Baptiste Joseph Fourier's 92-page 'Préface historique' was originally published separately from the other essays and can often be found in the same volume as the general 'explanation of the plates' for the Antiquities section.
- 10 On this 'flawed ideal', which has been satirized by Lewis Carroll, Jorge Luis Borges and Umberto Eco, see Matthew H. Edney, *Mapping an Empire*:

- The Geographical Construction of British India, 1765–1843* (Chicago, IL, 1997), pp. 25–30, 353 n.39.
- 11 Pierre Jacotin, 'Mémoire sur la construction de la carte de l'Égypte', in *Description de l'Égypte: État Moderne*, vol. II, part 2 (Paris, 1822), pp. 1–118.
 - 12 This phrase is from Edney, *Mapping an Empire*, chap. 1.
 - 13 For more on the survey itself and the method of compilation that produced the maps, see Anne Godlewska, 'The Napoleonic Survey of Egypt: A Masterpiece of Cartographic Compilation and Early Nineteenth-century Fieldwork', *Cartographica*, xxv/1–2 (1988), monograph 38–9.
 - 14 Jacotin, 'Mémoire', pp. 13–15.
 - 15 Fourier, 'Préface historique', p. li; also quoted in Jacotin, 'Mémoire', p. 112.
 - 16 Jacotin, 'Mémoire', pp. 105–10.
 - 17 See the discussion in Godlewska, 'Map, Text and Image', especially pp. 17–24.
 - 18 Jacotin, 'Mémoire', p. 2.
 - 19 This was one of the many 'benefits' to be brought to Egyptians by the French occupation, according to the authors of the *Description de l'Égypte*; see, for example, Fourier, 'Historical Preface', p. lxxxvi.
 - 20 See Pratt, *Imperial Eyes*, especially pp. 144–71.
 - 21 See Godlewska, 'Map, Text and Image', pp. 15–16; and Godlewska, 'The Napoleonic Survey', pp. 8–10.
 - 22 Edme François Jomard, 'Description abrégée de la ville et de la citadelle du Kaire', in *Description de l'Égypte: État Moderne*, p. 585.
 - 23 For the way in which the *Description de l'Égypte* inspired other such 'simulacra', see Edward W. Said, *Orientalism*, repr. edn (New York, 1995), pp. 81–8.
 - 24 See Jennifer Sessions, *By Sword and Plow: France and the Conquest of Algeria* (Ithaca, NY, 2011), chaps 1–3.
 - 25 Abd al-Qadir was often represented in a positive light; see Benjamin Claude Brower, *A Desert Named Peace: The Violence of France's Empire in the Algerian Sahara, 1844–1902* (New York, 2009), pp. 223–5.
 - 26 Sessions, *By Sword and Plow*, pp. 154–73.
 - 27 Different copies of this map show different uses of colour (or no colour at all), as it was added by hand after printing.
 - 28 On the composition, work and publications of the Commission, see Monique Dondin-Payre, *La Commission d'exploration scientifique d'Algérie: une héritière méconnue de la Commission d'Égypte* (Paris, 1994); and Daniel Nordman, 'L'exploration scientifique de l'Algérie: Le terrain et le texte', in *L'invention scientifique de la Méditerranée: Égypte, Morée, Algérie*, ed. M.-N. Bourguet et al. (Paris, 1998), pp. 71–95.
 - 29 On the cartographic activities of the Dépôt de la guerre and Scientific Commission of Algeria, see Hélène Blais, *Mirages de la carte: L'invention de l'Algérie coloniale* (Paris, 2014), especially chaps 2–4; Hélène Blais, 'Les enquêtes des cartographes en Algérie, ou les ambiguïtés de l'usage des savoirs vernaculaires en situation coloniale', *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, LIV/4 (2007), pp. 70–85; and Hélène Blais, 'Les représentations cartographiques du territoire algérien au moment de la conquête: Le cas de la carte des officiers d'état-major (1830–1870)', in *L'empire des géographes: Géographie, exploration et colonisation (xixe-xxe)*, ed. P. Singaravélou (Paris, 2008), pp. 124–34.

- 30 See Anne Godlewska, 'Traditions, Crisis, and New Paradigms in the Rise of the Modern French Discipline of Geography, 1760–1850', *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, LXXIX/2 (1989), pp. 201–9.
- 31 On French thematic mapping, see Josef W. Konvitz, *Cartography in France, 1660–1848: Science, Engineering, and Statecraft* (Chicago, IL, 1987), chap. 5.
- 32 Ernest Carette, *Exploration scientifique de l'Algérie: Étude des routes suivies par les arabes dans la partie méridionale de l'Algérie et de la Régence de Tunis*, vol. I (Paris, 1844), p. xlv.
- 33 *Ibid.*, pp. lxxii–lxxiii.
- 34 See Michael J. Heffernan, 'An Imperial Utopia: French Surveys of North Africa in the Early Colonial Period', in *Maps and Africa*, ed. J. C. Stone (Aberdeen, 1994), pp. 81–107.
- 35 See Ernest Carette and Auguste Warnier, 'Notice sur la division territoriale de l'Algérie', in *Tableau de la situation des établissements français dans l'Algérie, 1844–1845* (Paris, 1846), pp. 377–96; and Carette and Warnier, *Description et division de l'Algérie* (Paris and Algiers, 1847).
- 36 For the intellectual and political processes that naturalized Algeria as a colonial enclosure and fixed its borders, see Hélène Blais, 'An Intra-imperial Conflict: The Mapping of the Border between Algeria and Tunisia, 1881–1914', *Journal of Historical Geography*, XXXVII (2011), pp. 178–90; and Blais, *Mirages de la carte*, especially chaps 1 and 5.
- 37 Ernest Carette, *Exploration scientifique de l'Algérie: Recherches sur la géographie et le commerce de l'Algérie méridionale*, vol. II (Paris, 1844), p. 7.
- 38 *Ibid.*, pp. 81–2. In fact, Carette was not even the first French geographer to identify a distinction between Tell and Sahara, though he was instrumental in its reinterpretation in the colonial context. See Florence Deprest, 'Tell et Sahara: Le palimpseste d'un premier découpage de l'Algérie colonial', in *Territoires impériaux: Une histoire spatiale du fait colonial*, ed. H. Blais, F. Deprest and P. Singaravélou (Paris, 2011), pp. 25–57; and Numa Broc, 'Les grandes missions scientifiques françaises au XIXe siècle (Morée, Algérie, Mexique) et leurs travaux géographiques', *Revue d'histoire des sciences*, XXXIV/3–4 (1981), p. 344. It should be noted that cartographic portrayals of a latitudinal division between a coastal zone and an interior zone go back to the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition, in which maps of the Maghrib in manuscripts attributable to al-Istakhri and al-Muqaddasi regularly depict a line bisecting the region parallel to the coast; see, for example, illus. 7 and 8 in this book.
- 39 On this tendency in this and other colonial maps of Algeria, see Blais, *Mirages de la carte*, pp. 147–52.
- 40 The key legislation that forced the settlement of nomadic groups and the conversion of their lands to private property was, in fact, penned by Auguste Warnier himself in 1873; see Diana K. Davis, *Resurrecting the Granary of Rome: Environmental History and French Colonial Expansion in North Africa* (Athens, OH, 2007), pp. 96–102. On the distinction increasingly made between the 'good Berbers' or settled cultivators of the Tell and the 'bad Arabs' or nomads of the Sahara, which Carette's publications on Kabylie (a region of the Tell east of Algiers) for the *Exploration scientifique* played a significant role in promoting, see Patricia M. E. Lorcin, *Imperial Identities: Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Race in Colonial Algeria* (London, 1995), especially pp. 35–52; and Abdelmajid Hannoum, *Violent Modernity: France in Algeria* (Cambridge, MA, 2010), especially pp. 162–6.

- 41 For tendencies in the French cartographic depiction of the Sahara, see Hélène Blais, 'Un empire du sable? L'espace saharien et la junction Algérie–Soudain: Histoire d'une construction impériale (1830–1930)', in *Territoires impériaux: Une histoire spatiale du fait colonial*, ed. H. Blais, F. Deprest and P. Singaravélou (Paris, 2011), pp. 237–70; and Blais, *Mirages de la carte*, chap. 6.
- 42 See Brower, *A Desert Called Peace*, pp. 61–74. This portrayal of the Sahara was more complex than the 'declensionist narrative' that became dominant in the period after 1848 as a way of justifying French colonial settlement. According to the narrative, the native population of Algeria was to blame for ignorant and destructive practices that had transformed what had been the 'granary of Rome' in ancient times into a desiccated wasteland; see Davis, *Resurrecting the Granary of Rome*.
- 43 Carette, *Recherches sur la géographie*, p. 246.
- 44 See Sessions, *By Sword and Plow*, especially chap. 5.
- 45 One of the ways in which the colonization of Algeria was justified and promoted was on the basis of its proximity to France. Although this map does not show the southern coast of France, others in the same period did so to portray the Mediterranean as a link between the two rather than a barrier; see Hélène Blais and Florence Deprest, 'The Mediterranean, a Territory between France and Colonial Algeria: Imperial Constructions', *European Review of History*, XIX/1 (2012), pp. 33–57.
- 46 See Maurice Agulhon, *Marianne into Battle: Republican Imagery and Symbolism in France, 1789–1880* (Cambridge, 1981).
- 47 On this process, see Sabri Ateş, *The Ottoman–Iranian Borderlands: Making a Boundary, 1843–1914* (Cambridge, 2013).
- 48 The association of Lebanon with antiquity, in this case Phoenicia, dominated the chief publication of the mission: Ernest Renan, *Mission de Phénicie* (Paris, 1864). On the significance of this association for modern Lebanese nationalism, see Asher Kaufman, *Reviving Phoenicia: The Search for Identity in Lebanon* (London, 2004).
- 49 The title of this map set a precedent for slippage between the small, Christian-ruled districts of Mount Lebanon and the larger entity pictured on the map, a precedent that was eventually enshrined within the borders of the modern Lebanese state. On this process, see Carol Hakim, *The Origins of the Lebanese National Idea, 1840–1920* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, 2013), especially pp. 65–98.
- 50 See Yehoshua Ben-Arieh, *The Rediscovery of the Holy Land in the Nineteenth Century* (Jerusalem, 1979); Moshe Davis and Yehoshua Ben-Arieh, eds, *With Eyes toward Zion*, vol. III: *Western Societies and the Holy Land* (New York, 1991); Hilton Obenzinger, *American Palestine: Melville, Twain, and Holy Land Mania* (Princeton, NJ, 1999); and Burke O. Long, *Imagining the Holy Land: Maps, Models, and Fantasy Travels* (Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN, 2003).
- 51 This is one of the main arguments in John James Moscrop, *Measuring Jerusalem: The Palestine Exploration Fund and British Interests in the Holy Land* (London, 2000). On the interrelation between the archaeological, cartographical and colonial activities of the PEF, see Nadia Abu El-Haj, *Facts on the Ground: Archeological Practice and Territorial Self-Fashioning in Israeli Society* (Chicago, IL, 2001), pp. 22–44. On the historical context

- of this survey, see also Haim Goren, 'Sacred, but Not Surveyed: Nineteenth-century Surveys of Palestine', *Imago Mundi*, LIV (2002), pp. 87–110; and Dov Gavish, 'French Cartography of the Holy Land in the Nineteenth-century', *Palestine Exploration Quarterly*, CXXVI (1994), pp. 24–31.
- 52 The fate of the Survey of Eastern Palestine was initially entrusted to the American Palestine Exploration Society, who were ill-equipped to produce maps on par with those of the PEF but who were regarded as a convenient 'place holder', preventing rival groups from surveying the area; see Moscrop, *Measuring Jerusalem*, pp. 95–6. After the completion of the Survey of Western Palestine, Conder began to survey the area east of the river Jordan, but the PEF was forced to abandon the project due to a variety of circumstances with only about 500 square miles extending east-northeast of the Dead Sea mapped.
- 53 On the process of publication and distribution, see Yolande Hodson, 'The Survey of Western Palestine: An Introduction to the Publication of the Map and Memoirs', in *The Survey of Western Palestine: Introductory Essays* (London, 1999), pp. 33–75.
- 54 C. R. Conder, *Tent Work in Palestine: A Record of Discovery and Adventure*, vol. I (London, 1879), p. xii.
- 55 Quoted in Moscrop, *Measuring Jerusalem*, pp. 70–71.
- 56 Indeed, their knowledge was considered, at best, an unreliable resource; see Abu El-Haj, *Facts on the Ground*, pp. 32–8.
- 57 Quoted in Hodson, 'The Survey of Western Palestine', p. 46.
- 58 For the cadastral mapping of parts of Palestine in this period, see Ruth Kark, 'The Lands of the Sultan: Newly Discovered Ottoman Cadastral Maps in Palestine', in *Eastern Mediterranean Cartographies*, ed. G. Tolia and D. Loupis (Athens, 2004), pp. 197–220; and Ruth Kark and Dov Gavish, 'The Cadastral Mapping of Palestine, 1858–1928', *Geographical Journal*, CLIX/1 (1993), pp. 70–80.
- 59 C. R. Conder, 'The Fertility of Ancient Palestine', in *The Survey of Western Palestine: Special Papers on Topography, Archaeology, Manners and Customs, etc.* (London, 1881), pp. 195, 207.
- 60 Quoted in C. R. Conder and H. H. Kitchenner, *The Survey of Western Palestine: Memoirs of the Topography, Orography, Hydrography, and Archaeology*, vol. II, *Sheets vii–xvi: Samaria* (London, 1881), p. 256.
- 61 For instance, in the 1732 *Cihannüma* (illus. 34) a northern border is traced beyond which the phrase 'land of Palestine' is inscribed vertically along the eastern side of the river Jordan. Similarly in the *Cedid atlas tercümesi* (New atlas translation) of 1803, the phrase 'land of Palestine' is inscribed in the southern part of Syria horizontally from the Mediterranean coast across the river Jordan; see Zachary J. Foster, 'The First Printed Ottoman Map of Palestine, 1804', www.midafternoonmap.com, 9 June 2015. In 1872 Ottoman officials contemplated creating an independent administrative district centred on Jerusalem in most of the area mapped by the PEF as 'Western Palestine', but scuttled the plan, perhaps to deflect growing British interest; see Zachary J. Foster, 'The Origins of Modern Palestine in Ottoman Documents', www.palestinesquare.com, 9 February 2016.
- 62 On this process, see Asher Kaufman, *Contested Frontiers in the Syria–Lebanon–Israel Region: Cartography, Sovereignty, and Conflict* (Baltimore, MD, and Washington, DC, 2014), chaps 1–2.

- 63 On the survey in Egypt, see Timothy Mitchell, *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-politics, Modernity* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, 2002), chap. 3. On border commissions in Iran, see Ateş, *The Ottoman–Iranian Borderlands*; and Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet, *Frontier Fictions: Shaping the Iranian Nation, 1804–1946* (Princeton, NJ, 1999). On the extension of the Survey of India to Iran, see Cyrus Alai, *General Maps of Persia, 1477–1925* (Leiden, 2005), pp. 229–43.
- 64 See Peter Collier and Rob Inkpen, ‘Mapping Palestine and Mesopotamia in the First World War’, *Cartographic Journal*, xxxviii/2 (2001), pp. 143–54.
- 65 See Michael J. Heffernan, ‘Geography, Cartography and Military Intelligence: The Royal Geographical Society and the First World War’, *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, xxi/3 (1996), pp. 504–33; and Michael J. Heffernan, ‘The Spoils of War: The Société de géographie de Paris and the French Empire, 1914–1919’, in *Geography and Imperialism, 1820–1940*, ed. M. Bell, R. Butlin and M. J. Heffernan (Manchester, 1995), pp. 221–64.
- 66 See Michael J. Heffernan, ‘The Cartography of the Fourth Estate: Mapping the New Imperialism in British and French Newspapers, 1875–1925’, in *The Imperial Map: Cartography and the Mastery of Empire*, ed. J. R. Akerman (Chicago, IL, 2009), pp. 261–99.
- 67 For more on the Paris Peace Conference, see Margaret Macmillan, *Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World* (New York, 2001).
- 68 For more on this context, see David Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East* (New York, 1989); and James Barr, *A Line in the Sand: The Anglo-French Struggle for the Middle East, 1914–1948* (New York, 2012).
- 69 See Karen Culcasi, ‘Disordered Ordering: Mapping the Divisions of the Ottoman Empire’, *Cartographica*, xlix/1 (2014), pp. 2–17.
- 70 See Kew, National Archives, MPK 1/426. For the correspondence, see J. C. Hurewitz, ed., *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record* (Princeton, NJ, 1956), vol. II, p. 19.
- 71 On this process, see İpek Yosmaoğlu, *Blood Ties: Religion, Violence, and the Politics of Nationhood in Ottoman Macedonia, 1878–1908* (Ithaca, NY, 2014), chap. 3. For the way this thinking was elaborated at the Paris Peace Conference, see Jeremy W. Crampton, ‘The Cartographic Calculation of Space: Race Mapping and the Balkans at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919’, *Social and Cultural Geography*, vii/5 (2006), pp. 731–52.
- 72 At this point in European discourse, the term ‘race’ often stood in for what today might be understood as ‘ethnicity’ or ‘ethnolinguistic group’. In this context, the category ‘Arab’ was perceived by the British primarily in racial terms, though it was also certainly linked to religion.
- 73 All of the quotes from the Husayn–McMahon correspondence are taken from the English translation of the letters provided in J.M.N. Jeffries, *Palestine: The Reality* (New York, 1939), pp. 64–87. For a slightly different translation, see George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement* (Philadelphia, PA, 1939), appendix A. For a discussion of the ambiguities of the letters, see Elie Kedourie, *In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth: The Husayn–McMahon Correspondence and Its Interpretations, 1914–1939* (Cambridge, 1976), chap. 3.
- 74 See Kew, National Archives, MPI 1/720/1.

- 75 Indeed, for the very implausibility of such an interpretation, see Sara Pursley, “‘Lines Drawn on an Empty Map’: Iraq’s Borders and the Legend of the Artificial State (Part 1)”, www.jadaliyya.com, 2 June 2015. Overall, there was very little interest among the Allies in proposing a Kurdish state; see Nicholas Danforth, ‘The Kurds, Sykes-Picot and Quest for Redrawing Borders’, www.bipartisanpolicy.org, 10 February 2016.
- 76 See War Cabinet, Eastern Committee 37th Minutes, 29 October 1918, Kew, National Archives, CAB 27/24.
- 77 For illus. 49–51, see War Cabinet, Eastern Committee Memorandum 2525 (‘Memorandum Respecting the Settlement of Turkey and the Arabian Peninsula’ by Sir Eyre Crowe and Arnold Toynbee), 21 November 1918, Kew, National Archives, CAB 27/37 (nos 183, 185, 186).
- 78 Although European discourses cast these identities primarily in racial and religious terms, contemporary internal discourses were more varied, stressing language, religion, race, or other cultural, historical or sociological factors at different moments.
- 79 See *The Treaties of Peace, 1919–1923* (New York, 1924), vol. II, pp. 789–941 (Treaty of Sèvres), 959–1052 (Treaty of Lausanne).
- 80 See *ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 19–20.

4 ENCLOSURE AND EXCLUSION IN NATIONAL MAPPING

- 1 Thongchai Winichakul, *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-body of a Nation* (Honolulu, 1994), p. 17.
- 2 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, rev. edn (London, 1991), p. 175.
- 3 See Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism* (London, 2005).
- 4 Evidence for this can be found in the relative dearth of entries dealing with the Middle East in comparison to Europe, North America, Latin America and Africa in the sixth volume of the *History of Cartography* project. Fortunately, however, the following entry features numerous examples from the Middle East: Karen Culcasi, ‘Nation-state Formation and Cartography’, in *The History of Cartography*: vol. VI, part 2: *Cartography in the Twentieth Century*, ed. M. Monmonier (Chicago, IL, 2015), pp. 1000–1009.
- 5 For the way these kinds of maps help states impose order on otherwise complex phenomena, see James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven, CT, 1998), chaps 1–2. For a study of the role played by maps in border negotiation, see Kaufman, *Contested Frontiers*.
- 6 See London, British Library, Maps.43305.(59). For this map and others from the era, see Benjamin C. Fortna, ‘Change in the School Maps of the Late Ottoman Empire’, *Imago Mundi*, XVII/1 (2005), pp. 23–34; and Benjamin C. Fortna, *Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Oxford, 2002), chap. 5.
- 7 This is Fortna’s argument in ‘Change in the School Maps’; and *Imperial Classroom*, chap. 5.
- 8 See Behlül Özkan, *From the Abode of Islam to the Turkish Vatan: The Making of a National Homeland in Turkey* (New Haven, CT, 2012), pp. 102–45; and Palmira Brummett, ‘Ottoman Cartoon Maps: Imagining Space, Identity, and Nation in the Istanbul Popular Press, 1908–1913’, in *The Ottoman*

- Empire: Myths, Realities and 'Black Holes': Contributions in Honour of Colin Imber*, ed. E. Kermeli and O. Özel (Istanbul, 2006), pp. 325–46.
- 9 See Nicholas Danforth, 'Intikam: Revenge 1914', www.midafternoonmap.com, 21 January 2013.
 - 10 On this cartographic logic and its consequences, see İpek Yosmaoğlu, *Blood Ties: Religion, Violence, and the Politics of Nationhood in Ottoman Macedonia, 1878–1908* (Ithaca, NY, 2014), chap. 3.
 - 11 Özkan, *From the Abode of Islam*, pp. 114–16.
 - 12 It should be noted, however, that negative racial or ethnic stereotypes were rare in the Istanbul-based satirical press as late as 1911; see Palmira Brummett, *Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908–1911* (Albany, NY, 2000), pp. 317–32. For more on 'Turkification' during this period, see Erol Ülker, 'Contextualizing "Turkification": Nation-building in the Late Ottoman Empire, 1908–18', *Nations and Nationalism*, XI/4 (2005), pp. 613–36.
 - 13 On this, see Zayde Antrim, *Routes and Realms: The Power of Place in the Early Islamic World* (New York, 2012), chap. 1; and Zayde Antrim, 'Waṭan before Waṭaniyya: Loyalty to Land in Ayyūbid and Mamlūk Syria', *al-Masāq: Islam and the Medieval Mediterranean*, XXII/2 (2010), pp. 173–90.
 - 14 This was a translation and adaptation of European atlases, primarily William Faden's *General Atlas*, accompanied by a geographical treatise by Ottoman diplomat and scholar Mahmud Raif Efendi. Fifty copies were published by the Ottoman Military Engineering School Press in Istanbul in 1803–4, one of which was given to the Sultan and six others to high government officials. A copy has been digitized at 'Cedid atlas tercümesi', U.S. Library of Congress, www.loc.gov, accessed 1 January 2017.
 - 15 In certain cases, the term *waṭan* was invoked in combination with what might be understood as an ethnonym – for example, discussions of the Arabian peninsula as an 'Arab' homeland; see Antrim, *Routes and Realms*, pp. 98–9. However, identifications like 'Arab' in the premodern Islamic world were complex, situational and fluid; on this, see Peter Webb, *Imagining the Arabs: Arab Identity and the Rise of Islam* (Edinburgh, 2016); Michael Cooperson, '"Arabs" and "Iranians": The Uses of Ethnicity in the Early Abbasid Period', in *Islamic Cultures, Islamic Contexts: Essays in Honor of Professor Patricia Crone*, ed. B. Sadeghi et al. (Leiden, 2015), pp. 364–87; and Boris James, 'Arab Ethnonyms ('Ajam, 'Arab, Badū and Turk): The Kurdish Case as a Paradigm for Thinking about Differences in the Middle Ages', *Iranian Studies*, XLVII/5 (2014), pp. 683–712.
 - 16 For ethnographic maps prepared in French to promote Ottoman claims to these areas in the post-war period, see Nicholas Danforth, 'Ethnographic Maps as Propaganda', www.midafternoonmap.com, 1 October 2013.
 - 17 Quoted in Özkan, *From the Abode of Islam*, p. 95. This has also been the front-page slogan of the major Turkish newspaper *Hürriyet* since 1949.
 - 18 See Özkan, *From the Abode of Islam*, pp. 130–31.
 - 19 See Faik Sabri, *Yeni Türkiye coğrafyası* (Istanbul, 1928), pp. 134–5.
 - 20 Quoted in Özkan, *From the Abode of Islam*, p. 131. For the Ottoman Turkish original, see Sabri, *Yeni Türkiye coğrafyası*, p. 135.
 - 21 The Treaty of Sèvres routinely invokes the category of race, as well as, less often, language and religion. See, for instance, Section XII of the Treaty of Sèvres on 'nationality' in *The Treaties of Peace, 1919–1923* (New York, 1924),

- vol. II, pp. 823–5. For the importance of race among the cartographers of the American delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, see Jeremy W. Crampton, 'The Cartographic Calculation of Space: Race Mapping and the Balkans at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919', *Social and Cultural Geography*, VII/5 (2006), pp. 731–52.
- 22 Lt. Col. Lawrence Martin compiled a series of maps to illustrate a two-volume edition of the English text of all the treaties made between 1919 and 1923, published in 1924 by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Martin discusses his method of compiling the maps for this publication in the introduction to *The Treaties of Peace, 1919–1923* (New York, 1924), vol. I, pp. v–lxxvii. For his Sèvres and Lausanne maps, see *The Treaties of Peace*, vol. II, figs 11, 14 (facing pp. 789, 959).
- 23 This does not necessarily reflect Martin's viewpoint, as he also produced a set of maps for a 1922 publication that was highly critical of the French and British for using the post-war settlement as a way of exploiting the natural resources of the area for their own gain. See 'Turkey's Story Told in Maps: The Struggle of the Nations to Exploit the Economic Wealth of Asia Minor Shown in Maps Prepared by Col. Lawrence Martin of Washington, D.C., with Explanations by A.L.P. Dennis', *Our World*, 1/5 (August 1922), pp. 54–9.
- 24 On the complex interplay of racial, ethnic and linguistic categories in early Turkish nationalism, see Howard Eissenstat, 'Metaphors of Race and Discourse of Nation: Racial Theory and State Nationalism in the First Decades of the Turkish Republic', in *Race and Nation: Ethnic Systems in the Modern World*, ed. P. Spickard (New York, 2005), pp. 239–56.
- 25 For more on the history of the Turkish Republic's Turkification policies, as well as more recent efforts to embrace pluralism, see the essays in Hans Lukas-Kieser, ed., *Turkey Beyond Nationalism: Towards Post-nationalist Identities* (London, 2006).
- 26 For Kurdish national mapping, see Maria T. O'Shea, *Trapped Between the Map and Reality: Geography and Perceptions of Kurdistan* (New York, 2004), especially pp. 143–61; Karen Culcasi, 'Cartographically Constructing Kurdistan within Geopolitical and Orientalist Discourses', *Political Geography*, xxv (2006), pp. 680–706; and Karen Culcasi, 'Locating Kurdistan: Contextualizing the Region's Ambiguous Boundaries', in *Borderlines and Borderlands: Political Oddities at the Edge of the Nation-State*, ed. A. C. Diener and J. Hagen (Lanham, MD, 2010), pp. 107–20.
- 27 For the history of this association, see Boris James, 'Le "territoire tribal des Kurdes" et l'aire iraquienne (xe–xiii siècles): Esquisse des recompositions spatiales', *Revue des mondes Musulmans et de la Méditerranée*, CXVII–CXVIII (2007), pp. 101–26.
- 28 On this, see Konrad Hirschler, 'Defining the Nation: Kurdish Historiography in Turkey in the 1990s', *Middle Eastern Studies*, xxxvii/3 (2001), pp. 145–66.
- 29 On this, see Bülent Batuman, 'The Shape of the Nation: Visual Production of Nationalism through Maps in Turkey', *Political Geography*, xxix (2010), pp. 220–34. Other threats against which Turkish national mapping has consolidated itself in different historical periods include disputes over the province of Alexandretta/Hatay and Cyprus. On the former, see Sarah D. Shields, *Fezzes in the River: Identity Politics and European Diplomacy in the Middle East on the Eve of World War II* (New York, 2011). On the latter,

- see Özkan, *From the Abode of Islam*, pp. 146–210; and Nicholas Danforth, ‘Mapping the Turkishness of Cyprus’, www.midafternoonmap.com, 30 January 2013.
- 30 See Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet, *Frontier Fictions: Shaping the Iranian Nation, 1804–1946* (Princeton, NJ, 1999), pp. 47–76. For a landowner’s map disputing the findings of the British commission on the boundary between Iran and Afghanistan, see Cyrus Alai, *Special Maps of Persia, 1477–1925* (Leiden, 2010), pp. 222–3. For examples of other maps made in this period, see Cyrus Alai, *General Maps of Persia, 1477–1925* (Leiden, 2005), pp. 271–5 (Iran); and Alai, *Special Maps of Persia*, pp. 83–5 (Fars), 345–9 (Tehran).
- 31 At least partly in response to these top-down initiatives, a series of regional geographies were penned in the 1880s and ’90s; see James M. Gustafson, ‘Geographical Literature in Nineteenth-century Iran: Regional Identities and the Construction of Space’, *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, LIX (2016), pp. 793–827.
- 32 See text of the Convention in J. C. Hurewitz, ed., *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record* (Princeton, NJ, 1956), vol. 1, pp. 265–7.
- 33 This was also true of the Ottoman press, which followed events in Iran closely; see Brummett, ‘Ottoman Cartoon Maps’.
- 34 For reproductions of and commentary on this cartoon and others from the period, see Shiva Balaghi, ‘Print Culture in Late Qajar Iran: The Cartoons of *Kashkūl*’, *Iranian Studies*, xxxiii/3–4 (2000), pp. 179–80; Janet Afary, *The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906–1911: Grassroots Democracy, Social Democracy, and the Origins of Feminism* (New York, 1996), pp. 116–42 and fig. 9; and Kashani-Sabet, *Frontier Fictions*, pp. 101–43. Cartoons critical of the Anglo-Russian Convention were also published in the Ottoman, Indian and European presses; for examples, see Mansour Bonakdarian, *Britain and the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1906–1911: Foreign Policy, Imperialism, and Dissent* (Syracuse, NY, 2006), pp. 152–3.
- 35 Those that appeared in the Tehran-based daily were translated, along with a map, in E. G. Browne, *The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909* (Cambridge, 1910), pp. 172–95.
- 36 The map was reprinted in the 15 December 1907 issue of the Tehran daily. A similar map, but without the dramatic shading, was published in the newspaper *Anjuman* (11 October 1907), published in Tabriz. For reproductions of these two maps, see Bonakdarian, *Britain and the Iranian Constitutional Revolution*, pp. 78, 80.
- 37 See the discussion of this map and quotations from the editorial in Kashani-Sabet, *Frontier Fictions*, p. 125.
- 38 See *ibid.*, pp. 101–43. See also Afsaneh Najmabadi, *Women with Mustaches and Men without Beards: Gender and Sexual Anxieties of Iranian Modernity* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, 2005), pp. 92–131; and Mohamed Tavakoli-Targhi, *Refashioning Iran: Orientalism, Occidentalism, and Nationalist Historiography* (New York, 2001), pp. 113–34.
- 39 In the ‘Atlas of Islam’ tradition, this region was mapped only in its constituent parts (see *illus.* 3), but the map of Safavid Iran from the 1732 *Cihannüma* approximates this expansive geographical idea (see *illus.* 33). On earlier formulations of this idea, see Mana Kia, ‘Imagining Iran before Nationalism: Geocultural Meanings of Land in Azar’s *Atashkadeh*’, in

- Rethinking Iranian Nationalism and Modernity*, ed. K. S. Aghaie and A. Marashi (Austin, TX, 2014), pp. 89–112.
- 40 See Kashani-Sabet, *Frontier Fictions*, pp. 114–215; and Afshin Marashi, *Nationalizing Iran: Culture, Power, and the State, 1870–1940* (Seattle, WA, 2008), pp. 86–109.
- 41 On anti-Arabism and discourses of Aryan racial supremacy in Iranian nationalism, see Reza Zia-Ebrahimi, *The Emergence of Iranian Nationalism: Race and the Politics of Dislocation* (New York, 2016), especially pp. 99–124 and 147–68. See also Marashi, *Nationalizing Iran*, pp. 49–85; Kashani-Sabet, *Frontier Fictions*, pp. 216–26; and Ali M. Ansari, *The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran* (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 97–109.
- 42 For the complexities involved in using the term ‘ethnicity’ in this context, see Rasmus Christian Elling, *Minorities in Iran: Nationalism and Ethnicity after Khomeini* (New York, 2013), especially pp. 15–44.
- 43 See, for example, the map of *azınlıklar* (minorities) in Ali Tanoğlu, Sırrı Erinç and Erol Tümertekin, *Türkiye Atlası* (Istanbul, 1961), no. 66.
- 44 Özkan, *From the Abode of Islam*, pp. 128–44.
- 45 For more on the company and its history, see www.sahabmap.com, accessed 1 January 2017.
- 46 In the Turkish case, the word ‘tribe’ could be used as a way to avoid using ethnonyms, such as Kurd. See the discussion and reproduction of a 1946 map in Nicholas Danforth, ‘Rebellious Tribes of Eastern Anatolia’, www.midafternoonmap.com, 10 October 2013.
- 47 This stamp has also been reproduced in Ervand Abrahamian, *A History of Modern Iran* (Cambridge, 2008), p. 173.
- 48 Nationalist discourses that stress inclusivity may in fact be a means of excluding or policing dissent; for more on this in the case of Iran, see Elling, *Minorities in Iran*, especially pp. 119–60.
- 49 In early Republican Turkey, the break with the Ottoman era was consciously cultivated. Nonetheless, Turkish nationalists have selectively celebrated their imperial past, principally in ways that stress the ‘Turkishness’ of the Ottomans; on this, see Nicholas Danforth, ‘Multi-purpose Empire: Ottoman History in Republican Turkey’, *Middle Eastern Studies*, 1/4 (2014), pp. 655–78; and Nicholas Danforth, ‘The Ottoman Empire from 1923 to Today: In Search of a Usable Past’, *Mediterranean Quarterly*, xxvii/2 (2016), pp. 5–27.
- 50 See Elling, *Minorities in Iran*, especially pp. 83–118; Zia-Ebrahimi, *The Emergence of Iranian Nationalism*, pp. 201–14; and Ansari, *The Politics of Nationalism*, pp. 198–284.
- 51 For examples, see Peter Chelkowski and Hamid Dabashi, *Staging a Revolution: The Art of Persuasion in the Islamic Republic of Iran* (New York, 1999), pp. 80, 148–9; and Christiane Gruber, ‘The Message Is on the Wall: Mural Arts in Post-revolutionary Iran’, *Persica*, xxii (2008), p. 22.
- 52 Hushang Tāli, *Jahān’namā-yi tārikh-i Īrān* (Rasht, 2011), p. 73. For another example from the post-1979 period, see *Atlas-i millī-i Īrān, tārikh* (Tehran, 1999). Sahab has been a prolific publisher of historical maps and atlases that highlight an expansive territorial past; see, for example, the Sahab Farsi–English–German-language *Atlas of Ancient and Historical Maps of Iran* (Tehran, 1976).
- 53 On this process of ‘internationalization’, see Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire* (New York, 2015).

- 54 For the case of Iraq, see Sara Pursley, “Lines Drawn on an Empty Map”: Iraq’s Borders and the Legend of the Artificial State (Part 2), www.jadaliyya.com, 3 June 2015.
- 55 See Antrim, *Routes and Realms*, pp. 87–142; and Elias Muhanna, ‘Iraq and Syria’s Poetic Borders’, www.newyorker.com, 13 August 2014.
- 56 See Zayde Antrim, ‘Making Syria Mamluk: Ibn Shaddād’s *al-A’lāq al-Khaṭīrah*’, *Mamlūk Studies Review*, x1/1 (2007), pp. 1–18; Haim Gerber, ‘Palestine and Other Territorial Concepts in the 17th Century’, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, xxx (1998), pp. 563–72; Zachary J. Foster, ‘Was Jerusalem Part of Palestine? The Forgotten City of Ramla, 900–1900’, *British Journal of Middle East Studies* (2016), pp. 1–15; Steve Tamari, ‘Territorial Consciousness in the 17th Century: Bilād al-Shām among Syrian Christians and Muslims’, in *Cohabitation et conflits dans le Bilād al-Shām à l’époque ottoman*, ed. S. Daccache et al. (Beirut and Balamand, 2014), pp. 63–73; and Kamal Salibi, *Maronite Historians of Medieval Lebanon* (Beirut, 1991).
- 57 See, for example, Beshara Doumani, *Rediscovering Palestine: Merchants and Peasants in Jabal Nablus, 1700–1900* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, 1995).
- 58 Quoted in Sara Pursley, “Lines Drawn on an Empty Map”: Iraq’s Borders and the Legend of the Artificial State (Part 1), www.jadaliyya.com, 2 June 2015. For the original, see David Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East* (New York, 1989), p. 9.
- 59 See Istanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III 3346, fol. 50b.
- 60 For Palestine, see Rashid Khalidi, *Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness* (New York, 1997); and Salim Tamari, *Year of the Locust: A Soldier’s Diary and the Erasure of Ottoman Palestine* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, 2011). For Syria, see the essays in Thomas Philipp and Christoph Schumann, eds, *From the Syrian Land to the States of Syria and Lebanon* (Beirut, 2004); Thomas Philipp, ed., *The Syrian Land in the 18th and 19th Century: The Common and the Specific in the Historical Experience* (Stuttgart, 1992); and Adel Beshara, ed., *The Origins of Syrian Nationhood: Histories, Pioneers, Identities* (London, 2011).
- 61 For more on this work, its context and its cartographic contents, see Salim Tamari, ‘Shifting Conceptions of Ottoman Palestine (part 1): *Filistin Risalesi* and the Two Jamals’, *Jerusalem Quarterly*, XLVII (2011), pp. 28–38; and Salim Tamari, ‘Shifting Conceptions of Ottoman Palestine (part 2): Ethnography and Cartography’, *Jerusalem Quarterly*, XLVIII (2011), pp. 6–16. See also Nicholas Danforth, ‘Ottoman Ethnographic Map of the Middle East’, www.midafternoonmap.com, 29 September 2013. For other Ottoman maps of Syria and Palestine, see Zachary J. Foster, ‘Ottoman and Arab Maps of Palestine’, www.midafternoonmap.com, 30 July 2013; Foster, ‘The Most Beautiful 19th-century Arabic Maps of Syria and Palestine’, www.midafternoonmap.com, 29 August 2015; and Zachary J. Foster, ‘The First Printed Ottoman Map of Palestine, 1804’, www.midafternoonmap.com, 9 June 2015.
- 62 On the influence of European ethnographic mapping in the late nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire, see Yosmaoğlu, *Blood Ties*, chap. 3. The map in illus. 63 is very similar to a 1915 map published by the American Geographical Society of New York entitled ‘Part of Asiatic Turkey Showing

- Distribution of Peoples'. This map is available online in the American Geographical Society Library Digital Map Collection, <http://collections.lib.uwm.edu>, accessed 1 January 2017.
- 63 See James L. Gelvin, *Divided Loyalties: Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of Empire* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, 1998).
- 64 Two maps, one published in French in Paris in 1915 and the other published in Arabic in Cairo during the Syrian revolt against the French Mandate between 1925 and 1927, depict this region within the same general boundaries as those of the 'Atlas of Islam' map. These maps are reproduced in Dominique Chevallier, 'Consciences syriennes et représentations cartographiques à la fin du XIXe siècle et au début du XXe siècle', in *The Syrian Land in the 18th and 19th Century*, ed. Philipp, pp. 1–10. Similarly, Muhammad Kurd Ali's monumental two-thousand-page, six-volume *Khiṭaṭ al-Shām* (Delineation of Syria), published in Damascus between 1925 and 1928, uses what have been called 'verbal maps' to evoke the natural frontiers of Syria. See Tetz Rooke, 'Tracing the Boundaries: From Colonial Dream to National Propaganda', in *State Frontiers: Borders and Colonies in the Middle East*, ed. I. Brandell (London, 2006), pp. 123–40; and Tetz Rooke, 'Writing the Boundary: *Khiṭaṭ al-Shām* by Muhammad Kurd 'Ali', in *The Concept of Territory in Islamic Thought*, ed. Y. Hiroyuki (London, 2000), pp. 165–86.
- 65 He would be brought back from exile a year later and installed by the British as king of their Mandate for Mesopotamia, which gained nominal independence under his rule in 1932. During this time, an Arabic pamphlet published in the name of 'King Faysal I of Iraq' includes a map of the independent Syria he had envisioned after the war. See Nicholas Danforth, 'Free Syria', www.midafternoonmap.com, 29 April 2015.
- 66 On Lebanese nationalism in this period, see Kaufman, *Reviving Phoenicia*; Kais M. Firro, *Inventing Lebanon: Nationalism and the State under the Mandate* (London, 2003); and Carol Hakim, *The Origins of the Lebanese National Idea, 1840–1920* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, 2013).
- 67 See Benjamin Thomas White, 'The Nation-state Form and the Emergence of "Minorities" in Syria', *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, VII/1 (2007), pp. 64–85.
- 68 On the production of divisions in Syrian society under the French mandate, see Daniel Neep, *Occupying Syria under the French Mandate: Insurgency, Space, and State Formation* (Cambridge, 2010); and Benjamin Thomas White, *The Emergence of Minorities in the Middle East: The Politics of Community in French Mandate Syria* (Edinburgh, 2012). For the role of maps in this process, see Chris Gratien, 'Mapping Minorities in Syria', www.midafternoonmap.com, 29 August 2013.
- 69 On the tension between the ethnic and territorial dimensions of early Zionism, see Yitzhak Conforti, 'Searching for a Homeland: The Territorial Dimension in the Zionist Movement and the Boundaries of Jewish Nationalism', *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, XIV/1 (2014), pp. 36–54.
- 70 See Gideon Biger, *The Boundaries of Mandate Palestine, 1840–1947* (London, 2004), p. 76.
- 71 Intellectuals in Palestine in the late Ottoman period sometimes used race as a way to stress the 'Semitic' similarities between Arabs and Jews; see Jonathan Marc Gribetz, *Defining Neighbors: Religion, Race, and the Early*

- Zionist–Arab Encounter* (Princeton, NJ, 2014). However, by this time the administration of the former provinces of the Ottoman Empire was seen in terms of promoting racially majoritarian states, and Palestine was associated with a Jewish racial majority defined in explicit opposition to Arabness; see Lauren Banko, 'A Brief History of Banning Arabs from Palestine', www.nakbafiles.org, 23 August 2016.
- 72 Differential criteria for formal citizenship were elaborated in legislation over the following three years; see Lauren Banko, *The Invention of Palestinian Citizenship, 1918–1947* (Edinburgh, 2016), chap. 2.
 - 73 For the complex history of this idea, see Gershon Shafir, *Land, Labor and the Origins of the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, 1882–1914* (Cambridge, 1989).
 - 74 This was linked to a narrative in which Jewish immigration would revive the land's 'natural' abundance, which had been compromised by Arab and Ottoman rule. After the declaration of Israel's independence in 1948, the narrative shifted to cast water scarcity as a 'natural' feature of the land, justifying a range of political–economic–environmental policies; see Samer Alatout, 'Bringing Abundance into Environmental Politics: Constructing a Zionist Network of Water Abundance, Immigration, and Colonization', *Social Studies of Science*, xxxix/3 (2009), pp. 363–94; and Diana K. Davis, 'Scorched Earth: The Problematic Environmental History that Defines the Middle East', in *Is There a Middle East?: The Evolution of a Geopolitical Concept*, ed. Michael E. Bonine, Abbas Amanat and Michael Ezekiel Gasper (Stanford, CA, 2012), pp. 170–87.
 - 75 For a detailed study of the British surveys conducted in the mandate period, see Dov Gavish, *A Survey of Palestine under the British Mandate, 1920–1948* (London, 2005).
 - 76 See Efrat Ben-Ze'ev, 'The Cartographic Imagination: British Mandate Palestine', in *The Partition Motif in Contemporary Conflicts*, ed. E. Ben-Ari and S. T. Jassal (Thousand Oaks, CA, 2007), pp. 98–121.
 - 77 Yoram Bar-Gal, *Propaganda and Zionist Education: The Jewish National Fund, 1924–1947* (Rochester, NY, 2003), pp. 137–51 (especially pp. 146–7). See also Yoram Bar-Gal, 'The Blue Box and JNF Propaganda Maps, 1930–1947', *Israel Studies*, viii/1 (2003), pp. 1–19. For iterations of the Blue Box over the years, see Keren Kayemeth LeIsrael, 'The Blue Box', www.kkl-jnf.org, accessed 1 January 2017.
 - 78 See Central Zionist Archives (Jerusalem), A538\28-1m. For more on this series, see Bar-Gal, *Propaganda and Zionist Education*, pp. 137–51 (especially pp. 149–50).
 - 79 On partition plans during the mandate period, see Penny Sinanoglou, 'British Plans for the Partition of Palestine, 1929–1938', *Historical Journal*, lii/1 (2009), pp. 131–52. On Zionist views of partition, see Itzhak Galnoor, *The Partition of Palestine: Decision Crossroads in the Zionist Movement* (Albany, NY, 1995).
 - 80 The Zionist military effort was aided by the 1:100,000 topographical sheets that had been produced by the British survey. See Gavish, *A Survey of Palestine*, pp. 253–5.
 - 81 An old but persistent Zionist narrative interprets the Palestinian exodus as voluntary or triggered by orders from Arab leaders. Since the 1980s, however, historians have utilized a range of sources, among them newly declassified Israeli archives, to document the measures implemented by

- Zionist political and military leaders to force or keep Palestinians from their homes. For an overview, see Avi Shlaim, 'The Debate about 1948', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, xxvii (1995), pp. 287–304; and the essays in Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim, eds, *The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948* (Cambridge, 2001). For full-length studies, see Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited* (Cambridge, 2004); Ilan Pappé, *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine* (Oxford, 2006); and Nur Masalha, *Expulsion of the Palestinians: The Concept of 'Transfer' in Zionist Political Thought, 1882–1948* (Washington, DC, 1992).
- 82 See Walid Khalidi, ed., *All That Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948* (Washington, DC, 1992), which documents 418 such villages.
- 83 See Shira Robinson, *Citizen Strangers: Palestinians and the Birth of Israel's Liberal Settler State* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, 2013), pp. 27, 30; and Rochelle Davis, *Palestinian Village Histories: Geographies of the Displaced* (Stanford, CA, 2011), pp. 155–6.
- 84 Indeed, some partition plans floated during the mandate years explicitly recommended this outcome; see Avi Shlaim, *The Politics of Partition: King Abdullah, the Zionists, and Palestine, 1921–1951* (Oxford, 1990).
- 85 Many of these immigrants also encountered discrimination in Israel once they arrived. On this, see Ella Shohat, 'The Narrative of the Nation and the Discourse of Modernization: The Case of the Mizrahim', *Middle East Critique*, vi/10 (1997), pp. 3–18.
- 86 See Ghazi Falah, 'The 1948 Israeli–Palestinian War and Its Aftermath: The Transformation and De-signification of Palestine's Cultural Landscape', *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, lxxxvi/2 (1996), pp. 256–85; Moaz Azaryahu and Arnon Golan, '(Re)Naming the Landscape: The Formation of the Hebrew Map of Israel, 1949–1960', *Journal of Historical Geography*, xxvii/2 (2001), pp. 178–95; and Meron Benvenisti, *Sacred Landscape: The Buried History of the Holy Land since 1948*, trans. M. Kaufman-Lacusta (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, 2000). For the way in which the Zionist pursuit of Biblical archaeology, building upon the activities of the PEF, informed the twin processes of Judaization and erasure, see Nadia Abu El-Haj, *Facts on the Ground: Archeological Practice and Territorial Self-fashioning in Israeli Society* (Chicago, IL, 2001), especially pp. 73–98.
- 87 This is observed in Yair Wallach, 'Trapped in Mirror Images: The Rhetoric of Maps in Israel/Palestine', *Political Geography*, xxx (2011), p. 363.
- 88 See Jerusalem, Central Zionist Archives, MM\428\2. The Survey of Israel had taken over the British Mandate Survey of Palestine records and infrastructure and continued its work almost seamlessly after independence. See Haim Srebro, Ron Adler and Dov Gavish, *Sixty Years of Surveying and Mapping Israel, 1948–2008* (Tel Aviv, 2009).
- 89 For a discussion of the different accounts, see Mette Gieskes, 'The Green Line: Potency, Absurdity, and Disruption of Dichotomy in Francis Alÿs's Intervention in Jerusalem', in *The Imagined and Real Jerusalem in Art and Architecture*, ed. J. Goudeau, M. Verhoeven and W. Weijers (Leiden, 2014), pp. 33–58 (especially 38–41). His sources are David Newman, 'Boundaries in Flux: The "Green Line" Boundary between Israel and the West Bank – Past, Present, and Future', in *Boundary and Territory Briefing*, 1/7 (Durham, 1995),

- p. 8; and Meron Benvenisti, *City of Stone: The Hidden History of Jerusalem*, trans. M. K. Nunn (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, 1996), pp. 56–9.
- 90 The best account of this for the 1949–67 period is Benvenisti, *City of Stone*, pp. 50–68.
- 91 See David Newman, ‘The Renaissance of a Border That Never Died: The Green Line between Israel and the West Bank’, in *Borderlines and Borderlands: Political Oddities at the Edge of the Nation-state*, ed. A. C. Diener and J. Hagen (Lanham, MD, 2010), pp. 87–106; and Newman, ‘Boundaries in Flux’. See also Ghazi Falah, ‘The “Green Line” Revisited: October 2000’, in *The Razor’s Edge: International Boundaries and Political Geography*, ed. C. Schofield et al. (London, 2002), pp. 493–511.
- 92 On the way the Law of Return and discourses of citizenship worked in this period, see Robinson, *Citizen Strangers*, especially pp. 68–122.
- 93 See Nadav G. Shelef, ‘From “Both Banks of the Jordan” to the “Whole Land of Israel”’: Ideological Change in Revisionist Zionism’, *Israel Studies*, 19/1 (2004), pp. 125–48.
- 94 See, for example, a May Day poster made in 1954 by Histadrut, the Israeli federation of labour unions, reproduced in Robinson, *Citizen Strangers*, p. 136. Another poster from the 1950s entitled ‘Growth Under Siege’ clearly delineates the geo-body of the nation, but also suggests the importance of ‘growth’ to accommodate the influx of Jewish immigrants and to protect them from the looming spectre of Arab aggression depicted on the map; it is reproduced in Christine Leuenberger and Izhak Schnell, ‘The Politics of Maps: Constructing National Territory in Israel’, *Social Studies of Science*, 41/6 (2010), pp. 813–14. For these and other examples from this period, see the Palestine Poster Project Archives, www.palestineposterproject.org, accessed 1 January 2017; and the website for the Israel Museum’s exhibit ‘On the Map’, www.imj.org.il, accessed 1 January 2017.
- 95 See Yoram Bar-Gal, *The Good and the Bad: A Hundred Years of Zionist Images in Geography Textbooks* (London, 1991), especially chap. 3.
- 96 For an example, see Efraim Orni and Elisha Efrat, *Geography of Israel* (Jerusalem, 1964), pp. 142, 162, 247. This textbook was originally published in Hebrew in 1960 and reissued in Hebrew and English editions over the next two decades. For a discussion of these and other textbooks from the period, see Izhak Schnell, ‘Narratives and Styles in the Regional Geography of Israel’, in *Text and Image: Social Construction of Regional Knowledges*, ed. A. Buttner, S. D. Brunn and U. Wardenga (Leipzig, 1999), pp. 215–25.
- 97 See Newman, ‘The Renaissance of a Border’; Newman, ‘Boundaries in Flux’; and N. Collins-Kreiner, Y. Mansfeld and N. Klot, ‘The Reflection of a Political Conflict in Mapping: The Case of Israel’s Borders and Frontiers’, *Middle Eastern Studies*, 42/3 (2006), pp. 381–408. The Green Line was reinstated on official government maps, atlases and textbooks by Israeli Education Minister Yuli Tamir in 2007.
- 98 A geo-body that also included the entire Sinai Peninsula circulated in the first decade after the war before the peace process with Egypt began.
- 99 See Wallach, ‘Trapped in Mirror Images’; and Denis Wood, *Rethinking the Power of Maps* (New York, 2010), pp. 231–56. For the 2014 edition of the JNF Blue Box, which does not show the Green Line, see ‘JNF’s Iconic Blue Box Redesigned’, Jewish National Fund, www.jnf.org, accessed 1 January 2017.
- 100 See Shelef, ‘From “Both Banks of the Jordan”’.

- 101 Oren Yiftachel, *Ethnocracy: Land and Identity Politics in Israel/Palestine* (Philadelphia, PA, 2006), p. 66.
- 102 See Khalidi, *Palestinian Identity*, especially pp. 9–34 and 89–118; and Zachary J. Foster, ‘Who Was the First Palestinian in Modern History?’, www.palestinesquare.com, 18 February 2016.
- 103 See Beshara Doumani, ‘Palestine versus the Palestinians? The Iron Laws and Ironies of a People Denied’, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, xxxvi/4 (2007), pp. 51–2.
- 104 For some early examples, which show differing approaches to the Green Line, see Zachary J. Foster, ‘Arab Maps of Palestine during the “Lost Years”, 1948–1964’, www.midafternoonmap.com, 26 April 2015.
- 105 See *Palestine Stamps (1865–1981)* (Beirut and Cairo, 1981), appendix A, nos 154–8.
- 106 See A. L. Tibawi, ‘Visions of the Return: The Palestine Arab Refugees in Arabic Poetry and Art’, *Middle East Journal*, xvii/5 (1963), pp. 507–26; and Adam Ramadan, ‘A Refugee Landscape: Writing Palestinian Nationalisms in Lebanon’, *ACME: An International E-journal for Critical Geographies*, viii/1 (2009), pp. 69–99.
- 107 Google image searches for ‘Israel pendants’ and ‘Palestine pendants’ illustrate the similarities.
- 108 For more on Ismail Shammout and Palestinian artists in this period, see Kamal Boullata, *Palestinian Art from 1850 to the Present* (London, 2009), chap. 3.
- 109 See *Palestine Stamps (1865–1981)*, appendix A, nos 344, 359; and examples throughout the Palestine Poster Project Archives, www.palestineposterproject.org, accessed 1 January 2017.
- 110 *Palestine Stamps (1865–1981)*, appendix B (throughout). For the Iranian use of this iconography, see Chelkowski and Dabashi, *Staging a Revolution*, pp. 159, 203–4, 206–7, 223, 226; and Christiane J. Gruber, ‘Jerusalem in the Visual Propaganda of Post-revolutionary Iran’, in *Jerusalem: Idea and Reality*, ed. T. Mayer and S. A. Mourad (New York, 2008), pp. 168–97.
- 111 See Rochelle Davis, ‘Mapping the Past, Re-creating the Homeland: Memories of Village Places in Pre-1948 Palestine’, in *Nakba: Palestine, 1948, and the Claims of Memory*, ed. A. H. Sa’di and L. Abu-Lughod (New York, 2007), pp. 52–75; Davis, *Palestinian Village Histories*; Laleh Khalili, ‘Grass-roots Commemorations: Remembering the Land in the Camps of Lebanon’, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, xxxiv/1 (2004), pp. 6–22; and Susan Slyomovics, *The Object of Memory: Arab and Jew Narrate the Palestinian Village* (Philadelphia, PA, 1998).
- 112 This is Denis Wood’s term in *Rethinking the Power of Maps*, p. 246. See Salman H. Abu-Sitta, *Atlas of Palestine, 1948* (London, 2004). Abu-Sitta has published a series of thematic and historical atlases and maps of Palestine in Arabic, English and Hebrew since the late 1990s.
- 113 For this interpretation, see Wallach, ‘Trapped in Mirror Images’.
- 114 See Shari Motro, ‘Lessons from the Swiss Cheese Map’, www.legalaffairs.org, September/October 2005. This article illustrates the often unintended consequences of careless map-making. Motro provides her own cartographic interpretations of both Oslo II and the subsequent Geneva Convention that she contends would offer the most optimistic and non-partisan visualizations of the territorial element of these negotiations.

- 115 Christine Leuenberger and Izhak Schnell, 'Mapping Genres and Geopolitics: The Case of Israel', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, xxxix (2014), pp. 518–31; and Leuenberger and Schnell, 'The Politics of Maps'.
- 116 For road maps, see Leuenberger and Schnell, 'The Politics of Maps', pp. 818–23; and for textbooks, see Nurit Peled-Elhanan, *Palestine in Israeli School Books: Ideology and Propaganda in Education* (London, 2012), especially pp. 100–136.
- 117 Leuenberger and Schnell, 'The Politics of Maps', pp. 827–32. See also Leuenberger and Schnell, 'Mapping Genres and Geopolitics'; and Christine Leuenberger, 'Maps as Politics: Mapping the West Bank Barrier', *Journal of Borderland Studies* (2016), pp. 1–26. For an example of sophisticated data mapping by an international NGO launched in 2012, see the Visualizing Palestine project, <http://visualizingpalestine.org>, accessed 1 January 2017.
- 118 On these issues, see Christine Leuenberger, 'Map-making for Palestinian State-making', *Arab World Geographer*, xvi/1 (2013), pp. 54–74.
- 119 On PA textbooks, see Nathan J. Brown, *Democracy, History, and the Contest over the Palestinian Curriculum* (Washington, DC, 2001); Nathan J. Brown, 'The Palestinian National Authority: The Politics of Writing and Interpreting Curricula: 7.1 Genesis of a New Curriculum', in *Teaching Islam: Textbooks and Religion in the Middle East*, ed. E. A. Doumato and G. Starrett (Boulder, CO, 2007), pp. 125–38; and Seif Da'Na, 'The Palestinian National Authority: The Politics of Writing and Interpreting Curricula: 7.2 A Conflict of Historical Narratives', in *Teaching Islam*, ed. Doumato and Starrett, pp. 139–52.
- 120 Some other editions of this map do not include the toponym 'Israel' in the title.
- 121 These are roughly divided between those advocating a one-person, one-vote system and those advocating binationalism. See Leila Farsakh, 'The One-state Solution and the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict: Palestinian Challenges and Prospects', *Middle East Journal*, lxxv/1 (2011), pp. 55–71; Ali Abunimah, *The Battle for Justice in Palestine* (Chicago, IL, 2014); Yiftachel, *Ethnocracy*, especially pp. 259–94; and Meron Benvenisti, 'United We Stand', www.haaretz.com, 28 January 2010.
- 122 See Irit Rogoff, *Terra Infirma: Geography's Visual Culture* (London, 2000), especially pp. 73–111; and Wood, *Rethinking the Power of Maps*, pp. 249–54.
- 123 For the importance of the work as a 'site-specific sculpture' made for the Anadiel Gallery, see Anneke Schulenberg, 'Sites and Senses: Mapping Palestinian Territories in Mona Hatoum's Sculpture *Present Tense*', in *The Imagined and Real Jerusalem in Art and Architecture*, ed. J. Goudeau, M. Verhoeven and W. Weijers (Leiden, 2014), pp. 11–32.
- 124 Edward W. Said, 'The Art of Displacement: Mona Hatoum's Logic of Irreconcilables', in *Mona Hatoum: The Entire World as a Foreign Land*, exh. cat., Tate Gallery, London (2000), p. 17.

5 MAPPING ALTERNATIVE GEOGRAPHIES

- 1 James L. Gelvin, *Divided Loyalties: Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of Empire* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, 1998), pp. 150–68.
- 2 Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski, *Redefining the Egyptian Nation, 1930–1945* (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 192–211.

- 3 See 'The Pact of the Arab League' in J. C. Hurewitz, ed., *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record* (Princeton, NJ, 1956), vol. II, pp. 245–9.
- 4 This is the definition of Arab nationalism proposed in Adeed Dawisha, *Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair* (Princeton, NJ, 2003), pp. 1–13.
- 5 For a detailed account of the rise and fall of the UAR, see James Jankowski, *Nasser's Egypt, Arab Nationalism, and the United Arab Republic* (Boulder, CO, 2002).
- 6 In addition to the examples shown here, see Sa'īd al-Ṣabbāgh, *al-Aṭlas al-'āmm*, 4th edn (Beirut and Milan, 1960), pp. 16–20; and Karen Culcasi, 'Cartographies of Nation Building: Creating and Contesting the Egyptian Geo-body', *Arab World Geographer*, xvi/1 (2013), pp. 30–53, figs 4–5.
- 7 This is a convention of most maps published in Syria and other Arab countries up to the present day. On the history and contemporary status of this province, see Shields, *Fezzes in the River*; and Roberta Micallef, 'Hatay Joins the Motherland', in *State Frontiers: Borders and Boundaries in the Middle East*, ed. I. Brandell (London, 2006), pp. 141–58.
- 8 Both maps are undated, but it is clear that the one in illus. 74 was published while the UAR was still intact, while the new edition was published at some point after 1961, but likely before 1965, since it does not show the border adjustment between Saudi Arabia and Jordan of that year.
- 9 For a discussion of the concept of supranationalism as a 'hybrid scale that simultaneously includes *and* transcends states' with reference to a large sample of maps of the 'Arab Homeland', see Karen Culcasi, 'Cartographies of Supranationalism: Creating and Silencing Territories in the "Arab Homeland"', *Political Geography*, xxx (2011), pp. 417–28.
- 10 This Arabistan is roughly equivalent, though with a significant southward extension, to the Khuzistan of the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition (see illus. 10 and 32).
- 11 A school atlas published in Damascus around the same time portrays the Arab Homeland as comprising all the same territory as this map with an added extension into southwestern Turkey. See Maḥmūd 'Iṣām al-Maydānī, *al-Aṭlas al-jughhrāfī al-madrasī* (Damascus, 1993), p. 41.
- 12 See the introductions to Sa'īd al-Ṣabbāgh, *al-Aṭlas al-'arabī al-'āmm* (Beirut and Milan, 1968); and Sa'īd al-Ṣabbāgh, *al-Aṭlas al-'āmm*.
- 13 'Alī Fā'ūr, Ḥassān Ḥāmid and Ibrāhīm Muḥammad al-Shaṭṭī, *al-Aṭlas al-jadīd li-l-'ālam*, 4th edn (Beirut, 1983).
- 14 Muḥammad 'Alī al-Farrā and Sālim 'Alī al-Ḥajjājī, *Aṭlas al-Jamāhīriyya al-'Arabiyya al-Libiyya al-Sha'biyya al-Ishtirākīyya* (Beirut, 1987). Atlases published in North Africa from the 1990s on often devote a map to the 'Greater Arab Maghreb' (*al-Maghrib al-'arabī al-kabīr*), consisting of Morocco, Western Sahara, Mauritania, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya, or, more formally, the 'Arab Maghreb Union' (*Ittihad al-Maghrib al-'Arabi*), the product of a 1989 trade agreement, in addition to one or more maps of the Arab Homeland in its entirety.
- 15 See, for examples, *Aṭlas al-Mamlaka al-'Arabiyya al-Sa'ūdiyya* (Riyadh, 1999); and Dawlat Aḥmad Ṣādiq, *Aṭlas al-'ālam al-Islāmī* (Jidda, 1983). For an exception, which turns to the Arab Homeland in the second half, see *al-Aṭlas al-jughhrāfī li-l-Mamlaka al-'Arabiyya al-Sa'ūdiyya* (Riyadh, 2001).

- Atlases of the Islamic world were also published in other Arab countries, such as Shawqī Abū Khalīl, *Atlas duwal al-‘ālam al-Islāmī* (Damascus, 1999).
- 16 See, for examples, ‘Abd Allāh Yūsuf al-Ghunaym, *al-Kuwayt fī kharā’iṭ al-‘ālam: ḥaqā’iq wa-wathā’iq* (Kuwait City, 1992); and ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad al-Ḥammādī and ‘Abd al-Laṭīf Aḥmad al-‘Abd al-Razzāq, *Aṭlas jarā’im al-ḥarb al-‘Irāqīyya fī dawlat al-Kuwayt* (Kuwait City, 1994). These can be contrasted with the following atlas published before the war, which emphasized Kuwait’s membership in the Arab Homeland: *Aṭlas al-Kuwayt al-qawmī* (Kuwait City, 1988). This contrast should not be overstated, however, as more recent Kuwaiti textbooks de-emphasize the conflict with Iraq; see Taghreed Alqudsi-ghabra, ‘Kuwait: Striving to Align Islam with Western Values’, in *Teaching Islam*, ed. Doumato and Starrett, pp. 89–101.
 - 17 See atlases by Salman H. Abu-Sitta published in Arabic, English and Hebrew since the 1990s, such as *Atlas of Palestine, 1948* (London, 2004).
 - 18 For a discussion of other examples, see Karen Culcasi, ‘Mapping the Middle East from Within: (Counter-) Cartographies of an Imperialist Construction’, *Antipode*, XLIV/4 (2012), pp. 1099–118.
 - 19 Ijlāl al-Sibā’ī and Muḥammad Ṣubḥī ‘Abd al-Hakīm, *Aṭlas al-Sharq al-Awsaṭ* (Cairo, 1958).
 - 20 For more examples, see Culcasi, ‘Cartographies of Supranationalism’.
 - 21 See Marc Lynch, ‘Media, Old and New’, in *The Arab Uprisings Explained: New Contentious Politics in the Middle East*, ed. M. Lynch (New York, 2014), pp. 93–109; and Lawrence Pintak, ‘Border Guards of the “Imagined” Watan: Arab Journalists and the New Arab Consciousness’, *Middle East Journal*, LXIII/2 (2009), pp. 191–212.
 - 22 See the description of the piece titled ‘Arab Spring/Arab Fall’ on the Bokja Design website, www.bokjadesign.com, accessed 1 January 2017.
 - 23 See Culcasi, ‘Mapping the Middle East from Within’; Laura Khoury and Seif Da’Na, ‘Decolonizing the Geographies of Resistance: Imperialist Cartography of the Arab World’, *Arab World Geographer*, xv/3 (2012), pp. 189–225; and Hamid Dabashi, *The Arab Spring: The End of Postcolonialism* (London, 2012), pp. 41–58.
 - 24 Although some headlines celebrated Greece’s ‘Arab Spring’ in 2011–12, the history of nationalism in Turkey and Iran has limited the traction the term ‘Arab’ might have as a positive moniker for resistance movements in those countries.
 - 25 Dabashi, *The Arab Spring*, p. 94.
 - 26 See Karen Culcasi, ‘Constructing and Naturalizing the Middle East’, *Geographical Review*, C/4 (2010), pp. 583–97.
 - 27 For a trenchant critique of this trend, see Daniel Neep, ‘The Middle East, Hallucination, and the Cartographic Imagination’, www.discoversociety.org, 3 January 2015.
 - 28 One high-profile example was U.S. President Obama’s 2016 State of the Union address in which he declared: ‘The Middle East is going through a transformation that will play out for a generation, rooted in conflicts that date back millennia.’
 - 29 For an account of the first two years of the occupation, including the consequences of these policies, see Rajiv Chandrasekaran, *Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq’s Green Zone* (New York, 2006). See also Fanar Haddad, ‘A Sectarian Awakening: Reinventing Sunni Identity in Iraq after

- 2003', www.hudson.org, 4 August 2014; and Stephen Zunes, 'The United States in Iraq: The Consequences of Occupation', *International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies*, 1/1 (2007), pp. 57–75.
- 30 See Ralph Peters, 'Blood Borders: How a Better Middle East Would Look', *Armed Forces Journal* (June 2006), pp. 52–5; Jeffrey Goldberg, 'After Iraq', *The Atlantic* (January/February 2008), pp. 68–79; Jeffrey Goldberg, 'The New Map of the Middle East', www.theatlantic.com, 19 June 2014; and Robin Wright, 'How 5 Countries Could Become 14', www.nytimes.com, 28 September 2013.
- 31 Derek Gregory, *The Colonial Present* (Oxford, 2004), p. 17.
- 32 Similar maps of Iraq and Baghdad proliferated in the Anglo-American media between 2003 and 2010. On the spatial discourses associated with them, see Sahar Bazzaz, 'The Discursive Mapping of Sectarianism in Iraq: The "Sunni Triangle" in the Pages of *The New York Times*', in *Imperial Geographies in Byzantine and Ottoman Space*, ed. S. Bazzaz, Y. Batsaki and D. Angelov (Washington, DC, 2013), pp. 245–61.
- 33 See Samar Yazbek, *A Woman in the Crossfire: Diaries of the Syrian Revolution*, trans. M. Weiss (London, 2012); and Paulo Gabriel Hilu Pinto, 'Syria', in *Dispatches from the Arab Spring: Understanding the New Middle East*, ed. P. Amar and V. Prashad (Minneapolis, MN, 2013), pp. 204–42.
- 34 See Patrick Cockburn, *The Rise of the Islamic State: ISIS and the New Sunni Revolution* (London, 2015); and Vijay Prashad, *The Death of the Nation and the Future of the Arab Revolution* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, 2016), pp. 54–136.
- 35 See Robyn Creswell and Bernard Haykel, 'Battle Lines', www.newyorker.com, 8 and 15 June 2015; Elias Muhanna, 'Iraq and Syria's Poetic Borders', www.newyorker.com, 13 August 2014; and Tam Hussein, 'The Virtues of Sham: The Place of Syria in the Muslim Sacral Imagination', www.joshualandis.com, 8 September 2016.
- 36 For a reproduction of the document itself and an English translation, see 'The Isis Papers: A Masterplan for Consolidating Power', trans. A. J. al-Tamimi, www.theguardian.com, 7 December 2015.
- 37 See Aaron Y. Zelin, 'The Islamic State's Territorial Methodology', www.washingtoninstitute.org, January 2016.
- 38 John R. Bolton, 'To Defeat ISIS, Create a Sunni State', www.nytimes.com, 24 November 2015. Many other such plans have been proposed in the English-language media. For an example that divides Syria into 'quadrants' and calls for an 'American security protectorate' in al-Jazira to replace I.S., see Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan, 'How to Salvage Syria', www.thedailybeast.com, 7 December 2016.
- 39 See Thomas Pierret, 'Syrie: État sans nation ou nation sans État?', in *Vers un nouveau moyen-orient: États arabes en crise entre logiques de division et sociétés civiles*, ed. A. Bozzo and P.-J. Luizard (Rome, 2016), pp. 179–92.
- 40 On the new territorial possibilities for Kurdish nationalism opened up by the Syria conflict, see H. Akin Ünver, 'Schrödinger's Kurds: Transnational Kurdish Geopolitics in the Age of Shifting Borders', *Journal of International Affairs*, LXIX/2 (2016), pp. 65–98.
- 41 See Aron Lund, 'Origins of the Syrian Democratic Forces: A Primer', www.syriadeeply.org, 22 January 2016.
- 42 See Shields, *Fezzes in the River*.

- 43 For more on map art, see Denis Wood, *Rethinking the Power of Maps* (New York, 2010), pp. 189–230; and Denis Cosgrove, ‘Maps, Mapping, Modernity: Art and Cartography in the Twentieth Century’, *Imago Mundi*, LVII/1 (2005), pp. 35–54.
- 44 For related ideas, see the conclusion of Lewis and Wigen, *The Myth of Continents*.
- 45 See Juan Campo, ‘Visualizing the Hajj: Representations of a Changing Sacred Landscape Past and Present’, in *The Hajj: Pilgrimage in Islam*, ed. E. Tagliacozzo and S. Toorawa (Cambridge, 2016), pp. 269–87; and Ann Parker and Avon Neal, *Hajj Paintings: Folk Art of the Great Pilgrimage* (Cairo, 2009).

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INDEX

- Abbasid Caliphate 18, 23, 36–7, 53, 60, 63, 84, 89
 Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza'iri 130–32, 144
 Abdülhamit II, sultan 184
 Abdullah ibn Husayn, amir and later king 162, 172, 210, 217
 Abu-Sitta, Salman 223
 Aegean Sea 69, 77, 103, 105
 Ahwaz 56
 Alawites 208, 257–60
 Aleppo 80–81, 160–61, 185, 206, 240
 Alexandretta 160, 242, 262
 Alexandria 50, 106, 111, 115
 Algeria 111, 115, 129–45, 173, 181, 188, 195, 218, 41, 42, 43
 Algiers 63, 106, 41
 see also Algeria
 Ali ibn Abi Talib 85, 89
 Anatolia 63, 80, 157, 164, 255
 in *Cihannüma* 102–3, 105–6, 35
 and Rumelia 69, 71
 as Turkish *vaṭan* 180, 184–6, 188–9
 al-Andalus 22, 37, 71, 99
 see also Iberian Peninsula
 Anderson, Benedict 176–8
 Anglo-Russian Convention 190–91, 56
 Anville, Jean-Baptiste Bourguignon d' 118
 Arab Gulf 246
 Arab Homeland 236, 238, 243–55, 72, 75, 76, 77
 al-ʿArabī 246, 76
 Arabia *see* Arabian Peninsula
 Arabian Peninsula 17, 53, 57, 63, 112, 160, 168, 181, 237, 251
 in the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition 22, 28, 29, 2
 in *Cihannüma* 103, 105–6, 34
 as pilgrimage destination 64, 92, 95
 Arabism 198, 236, 238, 243, 246
 see also Arab nationalism
 Arabistan 246
 Arab League 222, 237–9, 243–8, 251–2
 Arab nationalism 235, 237–8, 242–3, 252
 see also Arabism
 Arab Revolt 161, 208, 210, 236
 Arab Spring 236, 253–4, 78, 79
 Arafat, mount 58, 60, 93
 Armenia 22, 41, 162–5, 180, 184, 186–8, 194
 Armenians *see* Armenia
 al-Assad, Bashar 257–9, 261
 Atatürk *see* Kemal, Mustafa
 Atlantic Ocean *see* 'Encircling Ocean'
 'Atlas of Islam' tradition 20–24, 53, 55–6, 60–61, 63, 105, 203
 maritime maps 44–7, 50, 13, 14
 in the Ottoman Empire 96–7
 regional maps 29–37, 40–41, 78, 100, 102, 132, 169, 203–7, 240, 242, 260, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10, 62
 world maps 24–8, 39, 99, 4, 5, 6
 Ayyubid dynasty 59–60
 see also Saladin
 Azerbaijan 22, 41

- Ba'ath Party 238–9, 246, 256–7
 Baghdad 18, 23, 39, 59, 60, 80–81, 84–5,
 88–9, 99, 162, 256, 27
 Balfour Declaration 161, 168, 208–10
 Balkan Wars 157, 182
 'Balkhi school' 20–21
 see also 'Atlas of Islam' tradition
 Basra 56, 100, 160
 Beirut 161, 208, 250, 253
 Beni Suif 123–4, 38
 Black Sea 66, 77, 103, 157
 Black Stone 56, 93
 see also Ka'ba
 Blaauw, Willem and Joan 97–8, 102–3,
 106
 Blue Box 212, 220
 see also Jewish National Fund
 Bokja Design 253, 79
 Bolton, John 261
Book of Curiosities 47–53, 58, 80, 15, 16
 Bosphorus, the 28, 47, 77, 103, 105–7,
 182, 185
 Budapest 63, 81
 Bugeaud, Thomas-Robert 130, 135
 Bulaq 77, 125
 Byzantine Empire 17, 28, 44, 47, 50,
 63, 204

 Cairo 63, 116, 243, 251
 and Arab nationalism 161, 222,
 237
 in *Book of the Sea* 67, 74–7, 24
 in *Description de l'Égypte* 125–8,
 140, 39, 40
 Carette, Ernest 134–41, 42
 Caspian Sea 22, 23, 41, 191, 200
Cedid atlas tercümesi 185
 China 28, 52, 56, 99
Cihannüma 98, 100–108, 185, 32, 33,
 34, 35
Civitates Orbis Terrarum 80
 Conder, Claude Reignier 149–50,
 154, 45, 46
 Constantine (Algeria) 132, 138,
 141–4
 Constantinople 47, 61, 63, 77
 see also Istanbul
 Córdoba 32, 39
 Crete 47
 Cyprus 47–50, 157, 188

 Dabashi, Hamid 254
 Damascus 17, 57, 60, 102, 160, 206–7,
 236, 245
 Dardanelles, the 28, 47, 69, 71, 103, 107,
 182, 185, 19
Description de l'Égypte 116–29, 133, 140,
 144–5, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40
 al-Dimashqi, Abu Bakr 64, 98, 102–3
 Dome of the Rock 59, 92
 Druze 206, 208–9, 257

Economist, The 259, 81
 Egypt 47, 59, 63, 75, 106, 113, 138, 146,
 207, 212, 245, 251, 253
 and the Arab League 237–9,
 246
 in the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition
 22, 34, 36, 47, 204
 under British occupation 112,
 149, 155–7, 160, 181, 184, 188
 in *Description de l'Égypte* 115–29,
 133–4
 and Israel 215, 217, 219, 225, 229,
 246
 Napoleon's invasion of 111–12, 115,
 129, 133, 173, 203
 in the United Arab Republic
 239–42, 73
 Elburz, the 22, 41
 'Encircling Ocean' 24, 28, 31, 39, 47
 Euphrates, river 21, 23, 35, 40, 99, 146,
 204, 218, 240, 260, 31
Exploration scientifique de l'Algérie
 133–40
eyâlet 106

fallâh see fellah
 Fars 22, 29, 35, 56, 100, 191–3
 Fatimid Caliphate 36, 47, 50, 77
 Fayyum 122–4, 38
 fellah 154, 220
 Fezzan 74
Filâşîn risâlesî 206–7, 63
 Fourier, Jean-Baptiste Joseph
 117–19
 Frémin, A. R. 130, 41

 Gaza 149, 206
 see also Gaza Strip
 Gaza Strip 219, 224–5, 229, 232, 245

- geo-body 176–9
 of the Arab Homeland 243, 253–4
 of Iran 189, 193, 195, 198, 200–201
 of Israel 218, 220, 225
 of Palestine 220–22, 226, 245, 250
 of Syria 261–2
 of Turkey 189, 194
 al-Ghuri, Ibrahim Hilmi 240–42, 74
 Gibraltar, straits of 69–71, 78, 20
 Giza, pyramids of 75, 119, 122, 125
 Golan Heights 219, 220, 229
 Good Shepherd Engineering (GSE)
 see PalMap
 Green Line 217–19, 224–6, 229, 245
 Gregory, Derek 236, 257
Guardian, The 257, 80
 Gujarat 22, 92, 95
- Ḥabl al-matīn* 191–2, 56
 Haifa 162, 207
 hajj *see* pilgrimage
 Hajji Khalifa *see* Katib Celebi
 Hatay *see* Alexandretta
 Hatoum, Mona, *Present Tense* 232, 263, 71
 Hijaz, the 237
al-ḥijr 56, 93
 see also Ka'ba
 Hilla 81, 85, 89
 Holy Land *see* Palestine
 homeland 176, 186, 192, 207, 211, 232, 243, 248, 252
 see also *vaṭan*
 Homs 160, 259, 81
 Husayn-McMahon Correspondence 160–61, 236
 Husayn, Faysal ibn, amir and later king 161, 164, 172, 208, 210, 236–7
 Husayn, sharif and amir 160–62, 164, 169, 172, 184, 261
 Hussein, Saddam 256–7, 259
- Iberian Peninsula 22, 31–2, 37, 44
 see also al-Andalus
 Ibn Hawqal, Abu l-Qasim Muhammad 21–2, 29, 44, 97, 203, 4, 13, 62
 al-Idrisi, al-Sharif 20, 39–41, 47, 53, 11, 12
- India 61, 92, 105
 and British colonialism 10, 112, 146–7, 156
 and the 'Realm of Islam' 28, 52, 56–7
 Indian Ocean 22, 28, 63, 96, 160
 Indus, river 13, 17, 52, 16
iqḥlīm 29, 39, 97, 105, 106, 240
 Iran 41, 56, 61, 112, 146, 156
 and Arabs 194–8, 246, 254
 in the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition 21, 22
 in *Cihannüma* 100, 105–6, 33
 in *Compendium of Stages* 71, 80, 25
 in historical atlases 201
 as *İrānshahr* 192
 Islamic Republic of 198–200, 60
 and Kurds 189, 193, 195, 261
 and national mapping 175, 178, 180–81, 189–201, 218, 56, 58, 59, 60, 61
 and oil 157, 165
 and Palestine 222
 as Persia 158, 160, 162, 165, 190, 192–4, 200
 Iran–Iraq War 201, 246
 Iraq 41, 55–7, 106, 202, 205
 and Arab nationalism 237–8, 240, 242
 in the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition 22, 31, 34–5, 78, 9
 under British control 162, 172, 185, 188
 in *Compendium of Stages* 78, 85, 92
 in the First World War 156–7, 184
 as *'Irāk-i 'acepm* 78, 100
 see also al-Jibal
 and Iran 193, 198, 201, 246
 and the Islamic State 259–61
 and Israel 215, 217
 and Kurds 189, 261
 and Kuwait 246, 248, 251
 U.S. invasion of 10, 256–7, 259
 Isfahan 56, 61
 Islamic State (I.S.) 259–61
isolarīi 67

- Israel 150, 235, 239, 251
 and Arab nationalism 242,
 245–6, 248, 250
 as *Eretz Yisrael* 209, 212, 64
 and national mapping 175, 178,
 209–26, 229, 233, 64, 65, 68
 and Oslo 223–6
 and the settler movement 220,
 224–6
 Survey of 217, 223–4, 68
 in textbooks 219, 225
 and the 1948 war 215, 238
 and the 1967 war 219
see also Jewish National Fund;
 Palestine; Zionism
- al-Istakhri, Abu Ishaq Ibrahim 21–3,
 29–35, 47, 97, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 14
- Istanbul 57, 61, 64, 98, 102–3, 125, 157,
 180, 194
 in *Book of the Sea* 77–8
 in *Cihannüma* 106–7
 in *Compendium of Stages* 78–81,
 84–5, 93
see also Constantinople
- Jacotin, Pierre 116–19, 134
- Jaffa 154–5, 207
- al-Jazeera 253–4, 78
- al-Jazira (Upper Mesopotamia) 22, 41,
 260
- Jerusalem 31, 55, 204, 206, 212, 215, 217,
 232
 and the Palestine Exploration
 Fund 149, 152, 46
 and Palestinian nationalism 207,
 220, 222, 229
 and pilgrimage 57–60, 92, 95, 18
 and Zionism 209
- Jewish National Fund (JNF) 209,
 211–14, 217–18, 220, 64, 65
- al-Jibal 22, 41, 78, 100
- Jidda 95
- JNF *see* Jewish National Fund
- Jomard, Edme François 123, 126
- Jordan, Hashemite Kingdom of 229,
 239, 240, 250
 and Israel 217, 219, 225, 246
 and the West Bank 215, 219, 242,
 245
see also Transjordan
- Jordan, river 206, 219, 224, 245
 on maps 204, 212, 217, 219
 and the Palestine Exploration
 Fund 149, 155
 and Zionism 210, 218, 220, 225
- Ka'ba 53–6, 59, 93–5, 17, 29
- Karbala 81, 85, 89, 92–3
- Kashkūl* 191
- Katib Celebi, Mustafa ibn Abdullah 64,
 98–105, 30, 31, 32
- Kemal, Mustafa (Atatürk) 180–81, 185
- Keren Kayemet Leyisrael *see* Jewish
 National Fund
- Khurasan 22, 31, 36
- Khuzistan 22, 35, 100, 191, 10, 32
- Kiepert, Heinrich 147, 181
- Kitchener, Horatio Herbert 149, 45, 46
- Kurdish nationalism 189, 260–61
- Kurdistan 162, 165, 169, 180, 186, 188,
 194
- Kuwait 169, 246–8, 251, 253
- Lari, Muhyi al-Din 92, 29
- Latakia 50
- Lawrence, T. E. 161–4, 169, 48
- League of Arab States *see* Arab League
- League of Nations 112, 155, 172, 201–2,
 204, 210, 212, 215
- Lebanon 122, 149, 168, 202, 204, 207,
 229
 and Arab nationalism 237–8,
 240–42
 and the French 147, 155, 172, 208,
 44
 and Israel 215, 225
- Levasseur, Victor 143, 43
- Libya 11, 71–4, 123, 157, 188, 250–51, 256
- Litani, river 149, 206
- logo-map 177–8, 221–3, 229, 243, 252–4
- Louis XVIII, King 128
- Maghrib, the 22, 31–4, 44, 47, 71–2, 99,
 132, 7, 8
- al-Mahdiyya 50
- Mamluks 63, 77, 125
- al-Ma'mun, caliph 18, 39
- mandate system 112, 172, 201–3, 208,
 237, 242, 256
- Marianne (French symbol) 143

- Marmara Sea 67, 77, 103
 Maronite Christians 147, 206, 208
 Martin, Lawrence 186, 188, 55
 Matrakci Nasuh 64, 78–96, 25, 26, 27, 28
 Mazagran, battle of 130–32
 Mecca 17, 158, 160, 184
 in the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition 28–9
 as pilgrimage destination 58–60, 92–5, 263, 18, 29
 as *qibla* 53–5, 57
 Medina 57–60, 92–5, 18
 Mediterranean Sea 37, 63, 79, 108, 165, 206, 225, 250
 and Algeria 129, 138, 141
 in the 'Atlas of Islam' tradition 22, 24, 31, 44–7, 96, 203–4, 13, 14
 in *Book of Curiosities* 50, 15
 in *Book of the Sea* 64–78
 and the British 116, 146, 149, 155, 160–61
 in *Cihannüma* 98, 103, 105
 Mehmet II, sultan 47, 63
memleket 71, 105
 Mercator, Gerard 97–8, 102, 106
 Mesopotamia 146, 172
 see also al-Jazira
mihṛāb *see* prayer niche
 Mina 58, 93
 Miyana 81
 Morocco 115, 132, 157, 188
 Mosul 99, 162, 185, 260
 Muhammad, prophet 17, 29, 53, 85, 89, 160
muḡāwara 93
 Multan 52
 al-Muḡaddasi, Shams al-Din
 Muhammad 21, 29, 31–2, 97
 Muteferrika, Ibrahim 64, 98, 102–7, 33, 34, 35
 Muzdalifa 58, 93

 Najaf 81, 85, 89–93, 28
 Napoleon III, emperor 141, 143
 Napoleon Bonaparte 111–12, 115–16, 125, 128–9, 132–3, 203
 al-Nasir, caliph 59–60
 Nasir al-Din, shah 189
 Nasser, Gamal Abdel 239, 242

 Nile, river 28, 47, 74–7, 122–4, 240, 24
 Normans 32, 37, 50

 oil 10, 157, 162, 165, 185, 246–8, 251, 255, 261
 Oran 129, 132, 138, 141, 143
 Ortelius, Abraham 97–8, 108
 Oslo Peace Process 223–6, 229, 232
 Ottoman Empire 10, 47, 61, 255
 and British colonial mapping 111–15, 146–73, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51
 and French colonial mapping 111–15, 122, 125, 129, 138, 144
 geographical education in 181–2
 mapping traditions in 14, 63–109
 and national mapping 180–89, 206–7, 236–7
 as 'Supreme Dynasty' 72, 105, 185
 as Turkey in Asia/Europe 108, 115, 157, 158, 162, 181, 184
 as 'Well-protected Realms' 181, 52

 Pahlavi dynasty 180, 193, 200–201
 Palermo 37, 39, 50
 Palestine
 and Arab nationalism 221–2, 237, 239, 240, 242, 245, 250
 and the Balfour Declaration 161, 168
 and British colonial mapping 115, 145–56, 162, 168, 173
 British Mandate for 155, 172, 188, 208–11, 214
 as *Filastīn* 155, 202, 204, 206
 as the 'Holy Land' 147, 226, 229, 69, 70
 and national mapping 176, 178, 201–7, 220–23, 226–33, 251, 66, 67, 69, 70
 and Oslo 226, 229, 232
 and refugees 215, 221, 223
 on tourist maps 226–8, 69, 70
 and 'village books' 222–3
 see also Gaza Strip; Israel; Palestine Exploration Fund; West Bank
 Palestine Exploration Fund (PEF)
 147–56, 206, 210, 214, 45, 46
 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 222, 67

- Palestine Mapping Center *see* PalMap
 Palestinian Authority (PA) 224, 226, 69
 PalMap 226, 229, 70
 Pan-Arabism *see* Arabism
 Paris Peace Conference 115, 156–7, 161, 164–5, 172, 193, 210, 219
 PEF *see* Palestine Exploration Fund
 Persia *see* Iran
 Persian Gulf 35, 100, 146, 184, 191
 see also Arab Gulf
 pilgrimage 20, 89, 92, 251, 263
 certificates 57–60, 92, 95–6, 18
 hajj guides 64, 92–6, 29
 Piri Reis 64–78, 95–6, 103, 185, 1, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24
 portolan 64, 66–7, 77, 80, 96, 106
 prayer niche 53, 56
 Ptolemy, Claudius 18, 47

 Qajar dynasty 146, 165, 180–81, 189–90, 192–3, 201
 Qanawj 52
 Qazvin 61, 81
 al-Qazwini, Zakariyya 56, 17
qibla 53, 55, 57
 qibla charts 55–7, 60, 17

 Rashdan, Abd al-Al Muhammad 72
 Red Sea 63, 146, 160, 204
 Resolution 181, UN Special Assembly 214–15
 Reza Pahlavi, khan and later shah 180–81, 193
 Rhoda, island of 77, 125
 Robinson, Edward 147
 Roger II, king 39
 Rumelia 69, 71, 103, 182, 185, 53

 al-Sabbagh, Saʿid 248–50, 77
 Sabri, Faik 186–8, 54
 Safavid Empire 61, 78–89, 105, 146, 192
 Sahab Geographic and Drafting Institute 195, 58, 59, 60
 Sahara, the 31, 44, 74, 78, 138–41, 144
 Said, Edward 113, 232, 257
 Saint-Simonian movement 134–5, 140–41, 143
 Saladin (Salah al-Din ibn Ayyub) 59
 Samaria 225
 Sasanian Empire 17, 21–2, 29, 192–3

 Saudi Arabia 237, 239, 248, 251, 261
 Scientific Commission of Algeria 133
 self-determination 156–7, 164–5, 168–9, 172–3, 179, 186, 189, 202, 220, 232, 235
 Selim I, sultan 63, 75, 79–80
 Shammout, Ismail 222, 67
 Sicily 31–2, 37, 44, 47, 50
 Sidon 122, 146
 Sidra, gulf of 74, 23
 Sijilmasa 31
 Sinai Peninsula 162, 218–19, 240
 al-Sind 22, 52, 56
 Sipahizade, Muhammad ibn Ali 30, 31
 Sudan 155, 157, 181, 188
 Suez 122, 146, 239
 Süleyman I, sultan 78–81, 84, 92
 Sultaniyya 81, 84, 26
 Sykes-Picot Agreement 158–64, 208, 260, 47, 49
 Syria 11, 55, 59, 63, 202, 256
 in the ‘Atlas of Islam’ tradition 22, 31, 47, 203–6, 242, 62
 in British colonial mapping 158, 160, 162, 164, 169
 and the *Description de l’Égypte* 116, 118, 122, 125
 French Mandate for 172, 188, 202, 208–9, 212, 262
 and the Islamic State 260–61
 and Israel 215, 219, 225, 229, 242
 and Kurds 189, 261
 in the Ottoman Empire 146, 157, 184, 206, 63
 and nationalism 204, 207, 220, 237–8, 242, 245–6, 262
 as *Sūriyya* vs. *al-Shām* 207, 260
 as Syrian Arab Kingdom 208
 in the United Arab Republic 239–42, 74
 and the 2011 uprising 257–9, 261–2, 80, 81, 82
 Syrian Democratic Forces 261–2, 82
 Syrian General Congress 207–8

 Tabriz 61, 63, 80–81, 84
 Tell, the 138–40
 thematic maps 133–5, 195–8, 219, 248–51
 Thongchai Winichakul 176–8

- Tibet 28, 52, 56
- Tigris, river 35, 40, 84, 99, 146, 260, 31
- Transjordan, Emirate and later
 - Kingdom of 155, 172, 202, 204,
 - 210, 212, 215, 219, 237, 240, 242
- Transoxiana 22, 31
- Treaty of Lausanne 172, 180, 185–8, 54
- Treaty of Sèvres 172, 180, 185–9, 191,
 - 208, 210, 54, 55
- triangulation 117–18, 151–2, 160
- Tripartite Agreement 186
- Tripoli (Lebanon) 146
- Tripoli (Libya) 71–4, 132, 138, 165, 21, 22
- Tunisia 37, 50, 115, 132, 138, 157, 181, 188,
 - 253
- Turkey 138, 165, 168, 172, 201, 254, 260
 - in Asia/Europe 108, 115, 157–8,
 - 162, 181, 184
 - and Hatay 242, 262
 - and Kurds 189, 194, 261
 - and national mapping 175, 178,
 - 180–89, 194, 200, 218, 57
 - in textbooks 186, 194
- UAR *see* United Arab Republic
- Uljaytu, sultan 84
- Umayyad Caliphate 17, 37, 53
- umma* 56–7, 59–60
- United Arab Republic (UAR) 239–42,
 - 73, 74
- vaṭan* 184–5, 189, 192–3, 238, 243
- Venice 74–5, 77, 81
- Warnier, Auguste 135, 139–40, 42
- waṭan see vaṭan*
- West Bank 219–20, 224–6, 229, 232, 242
- Wilson, Woodrow 156, 179, 202
- wind roses 66, 68, 71
- Yemen 11, 55, 217, 237
- Zagros, the 22, 40
- Zanjan 81
- Zionism 176, 209–26
 - see also* Israel; Jewish National
 - Fund